Equity judgments in hypothetical,four-person partnerships

Subjects' ratings of the fairness of a set of suggested allocations in hypothetical, four-person partnerships demonstrated that an ordinal relationship between inputs and outcomes is not a sufficient definition of equity. Subjects' suggestions for fair distributions of outcomes failed to conform to G. W. Walster's (Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 65–67) increasing-profits and profit-sign criteria, and were better fit by R. J. Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear formula than by any other formula thus far proposed.     

Need for uniqueness,self-schemas,and thought as moderators of the false-consensus effect

L. Ross and his colleagues (L. Ross, D. Greene, & P. House, 1977, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 880–892) have demonstrated the tendency for people to expect peer similarity in behavior, termed the “false-consensus” bias. The present study was concerned with factors that might affect the generality of this bias. Specifically, we looked at the impact of level of need for uniqueness (C. R. Snyder & H. L. Fromkin, 1977, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 5, 518–527), existence of a self-schema (H. Markus, 1977, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78), and thought on expectations of peer similarity. It was predicted that thought would polarize the estimates of high and low N Uniq individuals in opposite directions, but only when the individual possessed a self-schema along the relevant behavioral dimension. The results for behaviors reflecting independence supported this prediction. Discussion centered around limits of the false-consensus bias, along with consideration of the complexities involved in the link between availability factors and interpersonal judgments.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.     

Further evidence for meaning change in impression formation

Hamilton and Zanna (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 649–654) demonstrated that the meaning of an attribute as rated on connotatively related scales changed as a function of context desirability. This finding was viewed as supporting a meaning change interpretation of context effects in impression formation. Kaplan (Memory and Cognition, 1975, 3, 375–380, Exp. 1) found that similar changes also occurred on scales unrelated in meaning to the test attribute and argued that changes on both kinds of scales were due to halo effects produced by the contexts. Controlling for possible scaling artifacts, the first experiment reported here showed that substantially greater changes occurred on related than on unrelated scales. Kaplan (1975, Exp. 2) also found that the magnitude of context-induced differences in judgments of trait likability was not increased by creating contexts denotatively related to the test attributes. Adding measures of connotative meaning, the second experiment in this paper showed that substantially greater context-induced changes did occur on related meaning scales and, in contrast to Kaplan, on trait likability for the denotatively related contexts. The results of each experiment are consistent with a meaning change position but would not be expected on the basis of the halo effects model.     

Finite and infinite state confusion models

A confusion model is defined as a model that decomposes response probabilities in stimulus identification experiments into perceptual parameters and response parameters. Historically, confusion models fall into two groups. Models in Group I, which includes Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50) overlap model, were developed on the basis of the notion that stimulus identification is mediated by a finite number of internal states. We call the general class of models that have this processing interpretation finite state confusion models. Models in Group II, which includes Luce's (R. O. Luce et al., Eds., Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. I), New York: Wiley, 1963) biased choice model, were not developed on the basis of an explicit processing interpretation. It is shown here that models in Group II are not finite state confusion models. We prove in addition that except for Falmagne's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 206–224) simply biased model models in Group II belong to a certain class of infinite state confusion models, namely, models asserting that stimulus identification is mediated by a continuous space of vectors representing detector activation levels.     

Informational cues and attributions based on role behavior

A recent experiment by Messick and Reeder (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 18, 482–491) attempted to extend Jones, Davis, and Gergen's (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 302–310) classic finding that out-of-role behavior.is more informative for person perception than in-role behavior. It is argued, however, that this study confounded two variables, role performance and occupation. Evidence is presented that the occupation variable alone could have produced Messick and Reeder's results. Both variables seem to affect attributions. The importance of these findings for relating attribution theory and role theory is discussed.     

Comment on Gollin and Rosser

Gollin and Rosser (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1974, 17, 539–544) misunderstand the way in which we use the term mediation. We agree with them in the need to reject inferences about cognitive processes from what children do not do, and we also agree in the need for age × task experimental designs.     

Elkind on egocentrism

The purpose of this paper is to respond to D. Elkind's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 218–226) reply to D. Lapsley and M. Murphy's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 201–217) critique of the adolescent egocentrism theory. After a reprise of the issues in contention, we address the problem of theoretical consistency and self-other differentiation in Dr. Elkind's (1967, Child Development, 38, 1025–1034) theory. The role of formal operations in the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) account of the imaginary audience and personal fable is revised, and the empirical support for Elkind's theory is reviewed. We conclude that there are good conceptual and empirical grounds for doubting the major assumptions of the adolescent egocentrism theory, and that the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) framework has promise in suggesting theoretical integration with other approaches to the self.     

Subjective utility,anticipated utility,and the Allais paradox

One of the most notable counterexamples to expected utility theory is the “Allais paradox” (M. Allais, 1953, Econometrica, 31, 503–546). A number of alternative theories have been proposed in an attempt to resolve this paradox, notably including Karmarkar, 1978, Karmarkar, 1979, 24, 67–72). It is shown that SWU theory necessarily involves violations of dominance, but that the theory can be modified to avoid these violations. The result is a special case of J. Quiggin's anticipated utility theory (1982, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 3, 323–343).     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.     

Sequencing of vocational development stages: Further studies

This paper reports two studies which support the prediction derived from Hershenson's (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1968, 15, 23–30) life-stage vocational development model that average scores on Self-differentiation (worker self-concept and motivation) would exceed those on Competence (work habits, skills, and interpersonal relations), which in turn would exceed those on Independence (appropriateness and crystallization of vocational goals). The first study involved ratings by project staff on an inner city, socially disadvantaged population, and the second study involved self-ratings by individuals who had changed occupations in midcareer. Findings are consistent with those reported by Hershenson and Langbauer (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1973, 20, 519–521) on a population of deaf clients.     

Do birds of a feather flock together? A test of the similarities within and the differences between five occupations

Two sets of samples of 40 women from each of five different occupations were subjected to J. H. Ward's (Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1963, 58, 236–244) hierarchical cluster analysis, using an index of similarity from Kuder, 1977, Kuder, 1980, 40, 1–8). The five-group solution in neither case adequately recaptured the occupational membership of the original groups. This finding was interpreted to mean that there may be important differences in the interests of person in the same occupation, which in turn has implications for occupational scaling on interest inventories and theories of career development and counseling.     

Occupational prestige: Exploration of a theoretical basis

Drawing on the theory and research of psychophysics, a nonlinear model is hypothesized to explain the connection between education and income and occupational prestige. To achieve this, Weber's (R. L. Gregory, 1981, Mind in Science, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 501–503) and Stevens' (S. S. Stevens, 1970, Science170, 1043–1050) laws are brought together in an intrinsically nonlinear model. Guided by the earlier work of R. L. Hamblin (1971, Sociometry, 34, 423–452) and others, the work of O. D. Duncan (1961, in A. J. Reiss, Jr., O. D. Duncan, P. K. Hatt, & C. C. North (Eds.), Occupations and Social Status, New York, Free Press) is reanalyzed testing the possibility that work on the socioeconomic index can be understood as a prestige allocation process which follows psychophysical principles. That is, prestige is assigned to occupations, given specifiable levels of educational and income attainment, in a manner parallel to the way in which individuals respond to changes in the intensity of other stimuli. Using first the data developed by Duncan (1961) to test the model and the 1963 NORC data (R. W. Hodge, P. M. Siegel, & P. H. Rossi, 1964, American Journal of Sociology, 70, 286–302) to replicate it, a measurement model consistent with the theoretical model is evaluated. Comparing the results of the nonlinear model to that of the linear, it is concluded that a model is obtained yielding theoretical confirmation with no loss in predictive accuracy. The resultant nonlinear model yields alternative substantive implications concerning the relative influence of income and education on occupational prestige to those to be inferred from linear models. Perhaps most important, however, is the candidacy given by these results to psychophysics as the explanatory mechanism in the prestige allocation process.     

Fairness and preference

Two equity models were evaluated by fitting them to subjects' judgments of the fairness of payment distributions to “self” and “other” under hypothetical work situations. Neither the E. Walster, G. W. Walster, and E. Berscheid (Equity: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978) equity formulation nor Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear model adequately accounted for the fairness judgments regardless of whether self worked more or less than other. Subjects also were asked to indicate their most preferred payment distributions and these preferences were significantly different from the fairness judgments. Results suggested that fairness judgments were influenced by a bias in the direction of overpayment to self.     

An experimental and theoretical investigation of the constant-ratio rule and other models of visual letter confusion

The constant-ratio rule (CRR) and four interpretations of R. D. Luce's (In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of mathematical psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1963) similarity choice model (SCM) were tested using an alphabetic confusion paradigm. Four stimulus conditions were employed that varied in set size (three, four or five stimulus elements) and set constituency (block letters: A, E, X; F, H, X; A, E, F, H; A, E, F, H, X), and were presented to each subject in independent blocks. The four interpretations of the SCM were generated by constraining one, both, or neither of its similarity and bias parameter sets to be invariant in across-stimulus set model predictions. The strictest interpretation of the SCM (both the similarity and bias parameters constrained), shown to be a special case of the CRR, and the CRR produced nearly equivalent across-set predictions that provided a reasonable first approximation to the data. However, they proved inferior to the least strict SCM (neither the similarity nor bias parameters were constrained; the common interpretation of the SCM in visual confusion). Additionally, the least strict SCM was compared to J. T. Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50, 449–454) overlap model, the all-or-none model (J. T. Townsend, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978, 18, 25–38), and a modified version of L. H. Nakatani's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 104–127) confusion-choice model. Both the least strict SCM and confusion-choice models produced nearly equivalent within stimulus set predictions that were superior to the overlap and all-or-none within-set predictions. Measurement conditions related to model structure and equivalence relations among the models, many of them new, were examined and compared with the statistical fit results of the investigation.     

Depth relationships in young children's drawings

It has been found in previous studies that attempts to represent the occlusion of a further object by a nearer one are infrequent in the drawings of young children (N. Ingram, The encoding of depth relations in children's drawing. Unpublished paper, Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, 1975; N. Freeman, D. Eiser, & J. Sayers, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 23, 305–314, 1977; M. Cox, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 26, 551–554, 1978). Possible explanations for this are considered. In the first part of the present study 64 children of mean age 6 years 10 months were asked to draw two opaque objects placed one behind the other. Previous findings were confirmed in that over two-thirds of the children drew the two objects separately in a horizontal or, more commonly, a vertical relationship. In the second part of the study the children were asked to draw an opaque object which they saw placed inside and/or behind a transparent glass beaker. All Inside Glass drawings showed the object within the confines of the glass, but half of the Behind Glass drawings showed the object to the side of, or above, the glass. Implications of these findings are discussed in terms of an orientation to the visual world rather than the visual field.     

Why Reading? Because it's there

Three papers (V. A. Mann, Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15; G. Wolford & C. A. Fowler, Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35; F. J. Morrison, Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47) are critiqued from the standpoint of their adequacy in advancing our understanding of a problem as complex as reading disability. Experimenters should be explicit about their guiding theoretical assumptions, and should think through the relations, if any, between their laboratory tasks and the actual processes of reading. The reading protocol of a dyslexic child is provided, and is interpreted within the frameworks of the Mann, Wolford and Fowler, and Morrison viewpoints.     

On mediation

The mediation-nonmediation dichotomy proposed by the Kendlers (Psychological Review, 1962, 69, 1–16) and subscribed to by Cole and Medin (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1973, 15, 352–355) is reviewed and critiqued. It is proposed that the appropriate question for research is how children mediate, not when they mediate.     

Motivation to manage among college business students: A reassessment

The present study reassesses trends in motivation to manage among college business students (N = 216). Motivation to manage scores are compared with J. B. Miner's (Personnel Psychology, 1974, 27, 605–613) results for three periods since the early 1960s, across two types of universities—public and private, and between males and females. Results indicate that the downward trend in motivation to manage scores appears to be reversing; business students at the private university scored higher on motivation to manage than those at the public university, and males scored higher than females. Implications for vocational research are discussed.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.