Fantasy proneness, mental imagery and reality monitoring

Individual differences in fantasy proneness and vividness of mental imagery have been suggested to be related to source memory confusions. To test this hypothesis, two groups scoring either high or low on a measure of fantasy proneness (selected from a group of 231 subjects) were compared on measures of self report vividness of mental imagery, objective imagery ability and reality monitoring performance. The two groups differed significantly on ratings of imagery vividness (p<0.01), but not on the imagery performance tasks, nor on reality monitoring performance. Our results indicate that, although fantasy proneness is associated with experiences of vivid mental imagery, it does not necessarily lead to reality monitoring errors.     

Regulatory mode effects on counterfactual thinking and regret

The present studies examined the influence of two regulatory mode concerns—a locomotion concern with movement from state to state and an assessment concern with making comparisons [see Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293-344). New York: Academic Press]—on engaging in counterfactual thinking and experiencing post-decisional regret. When contemplating a decision with a negative outcome, it was predicted that high (vs. low) locomotion would induce less counterfactual thinking and less regret, whereas the opposite would be true for high (vs. low) assessment. Locomotion and assessment orientations were measured as chronic individual differences in Study 1 and 2, and were induced experimentally in Study 3. In Study 1 and 3 a purchase scenario with a negative outcome was used to elicit counterfactuals and regret, while in Study 2 participants were asked to recall one of their own personal purchases that had a negative outcome. The results supported our predictions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of counterfactual thinking and regret from the perspective of their relation to regulatory mode.     

Relating developments in children's counterfactual thinking and executive functions

The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.     

Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis

This research tests the idea that repeatedly generating counterfactual thoughts in response to recurring events can lead to impairments in memory for actual outcomes (i.e., counterfactual inflation hypothesis). Participants (N = 56) played 40 games of blackjack and listed their thoughts after each win. They were instructed to list evaluative counterfactuals, reflective counterfactuals, or any thoughts that came to mind following each loss. Because reflective counterfactuals focus only on the alternatives to reality, and not in addition to reality (like evaluative counterfactuals), they were expected to lead to the greatest degree of overestimations of performance and confidence for future blackjack playing. The results confirmed this hypothesis, and also demonstrated that the relationship between thought-listing instructions and confidence for the future was mediated by overestimations of performance. Thus, repeatedly generating reflective counterfactual thoughts appears to lead to a special case of imagination inflation with dysfunctional implications for future confidence and risk-taking.     

The effect of autonomy on counterfactual thinking about controllable events

We investigated the role of autonomy in counterfactual thinking in two experiments. Autonomy emphasises intrinsic motivation and reduced preoccupation with external outcomes. Experiment 1 demonstrated that autonomy influences both the number and content of counterfactual thoughts, particularly for individuals performing a task rather than reading about someone else performing a task. Experiment 2 investigated the performance improving effects of counterfactual thinking, while considering the role of autonomy. Individuals higher in autonomy were more likely to focus on undoing controllable aspects of their behaviour compared to individuals lower in autonomy. Controllable (versus uncontrollable) counterfactual thoughts were associated with greater performance improvement on a subsequent task. Self-regulatory traits such as autonomy may be important in the types of counterfactual thoughts that people generate. We discuss the mechanisms by which autonomy may exert an influence on counterfactual thinking and consider the implications of the findings for the functional theory of counterfactual thought.     

Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past,future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and older adults

Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological characteristics associated with these mental simulations change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The current study employs adapted versions of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics associated with both positive and negative episodic past, future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults generate more external details and report higher ratings of vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults. Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely future events as more likely than did older adults. Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors during episodic memories relative to future and counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and future simulations. Implications for the psychology of mental simulation and ageing are discussed.     

Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Episodic counterfactual thoughts—imagined alternative ways in which personal past events might have occurred—are frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here, participants recollected positive and negative autobiographical memories and then generated better and worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories. Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event is significantly higher than but typically positively related to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual events heightened the emotional intensity felt while simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the emotional intensity accompanying the experience of remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are discussed in relation to clinical work and functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

Exploring the experience of episodic past,future, and counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study of a Colombian sample

Although extant evidence suggests that many neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking overlap, recent results have uncovered differences among these three processes. However, the extent to which there may be age-related differences in the phenomenological characteristics associated with episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking remains unclear. This study used adapted versions of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical Interview in younger and older adults to investigate the subjective experience of episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking. The results suggest that, across all conditions, younger adults generated more internal details than older adults. However, older adults generated more external details for episodic future and counterfactual thinking than younger adults. Additionally, younger and older adults generated more internal details, and gave higher sensory and contextual ratings, for memories rather than future and counterfactual thoughts. Methodological and theoretical consequences for extant theories of mental simulation are discussed.     

Event detail and confidence in gambling: The role of counterfactual thought reactions

Differences in people’s reactions to the same events described with full vs. sketchy information are examined. It is hypothesized that differences in counterfactual thought reactions to varying levels of event detail shape confidence in, and willingness to gamble on similar, future events. In three experiments, participants were presented with different types and levels of event detail about their performances on a trivia test, on several games of blackjack, or on gambling on a professional horse race. Upward counterfactual thoughts were observed more frequently in response to losing events containing high levels of detail and specificity. Importantly, counterfactual thought frequency also mediated the relationships between event detail and the level of confidence in and willingness to gamble on similar, future events. Evidence also indicates that this relationship is based on the hindsight bias that results from counterfactual thinking. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive processes and decision making research.     

Fantasy proneness as a confounder of verbal lie detection tools

This study investigated whether high fantasy‐prone individuals have superior storytelling abilities. It also explored whether this trait is related to specific linguistic features (i.e. self‐references, cognitive complexity, and emotional words). Participants high (n = 30) and low (n = 30) on a fantasy proneness scale were instructed to write down a true and a fabricated story about an aversive situation in which they had been the victim. Stories were then examined using two verbal lie detection approaches: criteria‐based content analysis (CBCA) and linguistic inquiry and word count (LIWC). Irrespective of the truth status of the stories, independent observers rated stories of high fantasy‐prone individuals as being richer in all nine CBCA elements than those of low fantasy‐prone individuals. Furthermore, overall, high fantasy‐prone people used more self‐references in their stories compared with low fantasy‐prone individuals. High fantasy prones' fabricated stories scored higher on various truth indices than authentic stories of low fantasy prones. Thus, high fantasy‐prone people are good in creating a sense of authenticity, even when they fabricate stories. Forensic experts should bear this in mind when they employ verbal lie detection tools. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“What I did” versus “what I might have done”: Effect of factual versus counterfactual thinking on blame, guilt, and shame in prisoners

The present study tested the prediction that counterfactual thinking would have a stronger amplificatory effect on guilt than on shame and that the effect would be mediated by self-blame. Ninety sentenced prisoners were instructed to think either counterfactually or factually about the role they played in the events leading to their capture, conviction, and sentencing prior to reporting on their level of self-blame, guilt, and shame. Compared to factual-focused prisoners, counterfactual-focused prisoners reported feeling more blameworthy and guiltier but not more shameful. The effect of thought focus on guilt was fully mediated by blame. The findings support an emotion-specific account of the emotional consequences of counterfactual thinking that implicate attributional judgment as an important mediating process.     

Counterfactual thinking facilitates behavioral intentions

People often ponder what might have been, and these counterfactual inferences have been linked to behavior regulation. Counterfactuals may enhance performance by either a content-specific pathway (via shift in behavioral intentions) and/or a content-neutral pathway (via mindsets or motivation). Three experiments provided new specification of the content-specific pathway. A sequential priming paradigm revealed that counterfactual judgments facilitated RTs to complete behavioral intention judgments relative to control judgments and to a no-judgment baseline (Experiment 1). This facilitation effect was found only for intention judgments that matched the information content of the counterfactual (Experiment 2) and only for intention judgments as opposed to a different judgment that nevertheless focused on the same information content (Experiment 3). These findings clarify the content-specific pathway by which counterfactuals influence behavior.     

The importance of contextual variables when judging fairness: An examination of counterfactual thoughts and fairness theory

This research empirically examines the underlying mechanisms of fairness theory (  and ), namely counterfactual thought processes. Study 1 used a policy-capturing design to examine the relative importance of contextual variables in predicting counterfactual thoughts and fairness perceptions. Study 2 utilized a between-subjects design and asked participants to generate their own counterfactuals in response to an unfortunate event. Results of both studies showed that fairness perceptions are influenced by contextual variables (i.e., outcome severity, target knowledge and expertise, sin of commission vs. omission) and counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thoughts partially mediated the effects of contextual variables and fairness perceptions in Study 1. Exploratory analyses from Study 3 revealed that the measurement of counterfactual thoughts (frequency vs. strength) may capture different underlying constructs. Implications are discussed.     

Supporting children’s counterfactual thinking with alternative modes of responding

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N = 39), children’s performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.     

Fantasy proneness and psychopathology

Fantasy prone persons ("fantasizers") selected from "normal" populations report experiences associated with psychopathology in clinical populations (e.g., fantasies that reach hallucinatory proportions, difficulty discriminating reality from fantasy). In Study 1, we administered objective (MMPI) and projective (Rorschach) measures to high fantasy prone individuals (upper 4% of college population), medium fantasy prone individuals (middle range), and nonfantasizers (lowest 4%). Subjects who were fantasizers appeared to use fantasy for defensive or adaptive purposes compared with others and produced 8/9 modal code types on the MMPI. On the basis of the MMPI findings, a subset of fantasizers could be described as exhibiting a significant degree of psychopathology. In Study 2, a second sample of fantasy prone individuals could not be distinguished from comparison groups in contacts with professionals for help with psychological problems, use of psychotropic medication, or number of close friendships. Although fantasizers perceived themselves as less well adjusted than comparison subjects and reported greater difficulty in distinguishing fantasy from reality, most fantasizers rated their psychological functioning as adequate and above and did not differ from less fantasy prone subjects in ratings of positivity of self-concept. As demonstrated in Study 1, a subset of fantasizers did appear to be more pathological than other subjects were, with three fantasizers reporting a history of psychiatric hospitalizations. It is estimated that between 10 and 20% of fantasizers exhibit significant signs of maladjustment/psychopathology; however, as a rule, fantasy proneness does not appear to be antecedent to severe manifestations of psychopathology.     

Counterfactual thinking, persistence, and performance: A test of the Reflection and Evaluation Model

The present research extends previous functional accounts of counterfactual thinking by incorporating the notion of reflective and evaluative processing. Participants generated counterfactuals about their anagram performance, after which their persistence and performance on a second set of anagrams was measured. Evaluative processing of upward counterfactuals elicited a larger increase in persistence and better performance than did reflective processing of upward counterfactuals, whereas reflective processing of downward counterfactuals elicited a larger increase in persistence and better performance than did evaluative processing of downward counterfactuals. Moreover, path analyses indicated that whereas the relationship between counterfactual thinking and persistence was accounted for by emotional responses following upward and downward counterfactual generation, the relationship between counterfactual thinking and performance was accounted for by enhanced persistence following reflective processing of downward counterfactuals, but was accounted for by both enhanced persistence and strategic thinking following evaluative processing of upward counterfactuals.     

Development and validation of the Maladaptive Daydreaming Scale (MDS)

This study describes the development of the Maladaptive Daydreaming Scale (MDS), a 14-item self-report instrument designed to gauge abnormal fantasizing. Our sample consisted of 447 English-speaking individuals from 45 different countries. A 3-correlated-factors model best presented the underlying dimensions Yearning, Kinesthesia and Impairment, capturing related rewarding experiences as well as psychological impairment of maladaptive daydreaming. MDS scores were associated with obsessive–compulsive behavior and thoughts, dissociative absorption, attention deficit, and high sense of presence during daydreaming, but less with psychotic symptoms. The MDS and its subscale demonstrated good validity, sound internal consistency and temporal stability and discriminated well between self-identified individuals with and without maladaptive daydreaming. Considering the instrument’s high sensitivity and specificity levels, it seems an excellent measure for future investigation of MD that will, hopefully, shed light on the etiology and psycho-biological mechanisms involved in this mental condition, as well as on the development of effective MD treatment methods.     

Hallucination proneness, schizotypy and meta-cognition

Disordered or maladaptive meta-cognitive processing appears to be a prominent feature for some individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. We sought to establish whether healthy individuals distinguished either in terms hallucination proneness (HP) or level of schizotypy could also be differentiated on the sub-scales of the Meta-cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ), or a modified version of it in which items about worry were replaced with items specifically related to thinking. A total of 106 healthy volunteers completed the Oxford and Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences and Launay-Slade hallucination scale, the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire and two versions of the MCQ: the original which assesses five domains of meta-cognition and an adapted version in which items relating to worry had been replaced by items relating to thinking or reflecting on thinking (MCQ-th). ANOVA indicated highly significant differences between three groups of individuals differentiated in terms of high, medium and low proneness to hallucinations on four of the five MCQ sub-scales, and three of the four MCQ-th factors. Regression analyses indicated that the MCQ factors encompassing (1) a sense of uncontrollability of thinking (and the perceived attendant dangers of this) and (2) negative beliefs about thinking related to suspicion and punishment were the strongest predictors of high schizotypy. Individuals who score higher on a measure of HP are more likely to display patterns of meta-cognitive processing that resemble, in certain respects, those reported in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. High schizotypy predicts a negative appraisal about both the controllability and consequences of thinking.     

Percolating ideas: The effects of caffeine on creative thinking and problem solving

Caffeine is the most widely consumed psychotropic drug in the world, with numerous studies documenting the effects of caffeine on people’s alertness, vigilance, mood, concentration, and attentional focus. The effects of caffeine on creative thinking, however, remain unknown. In a randomized placebo-controlled between-subject double-blind design the present study investigated the effect of moderate caffeine consumption on creative problem solving (i.e., convergent thinking) and creative idea generation (i.e., divergent thinking). We found that participants who consumed 200 mg of caffeine (approximately one 12 oz cup of coffee, n = 44), compared to those in the placebo condition (n = 44), showed significantly enhanced problem-solving abilities. Caffeine had no significant effects on creative generation or on working memory. The effects remained after controlling for participants’ caffeine expectancies, whether they believed they consumed caffeine or a placebo, and changes in mood. Possible mechanisms and future directions are discussed.