Monkey business: Children’s use of character identity to infer shared properties

Children’s toys provide a rich arena for investigating conceptual flexibility, because they often can be understood as possessing an individual identity at multiple levels of abstraction. For example, many dolls (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh) and action figures (e.g., Batman) can be construed either as characters from a fictional world or as physical objects in the real world. In two experiments, 72 4- and 5-year-olds took part in a property extension task, the results of which provide evidence of an understanding that (1) two representations of a character share certain properties in virtue of their shared character identity, and this sharing does not stem simply from having the same name, and (2) one representation of a character is more likely to share properties with another representation of the character if the properties were acquired by the character than if they were acquired by the representation. Children’s understanding of a representational object’s abstract character identity thus enabled them to transcend using its unique spatio-temporal history as a sole basis for inferring its idiosyncratic properties.     

The effects of interacting in repeated events on children's eyewitness memory and source monitoring

Accurate eyewitness memory of an event may be affected by exposure to and degree of involvement with other related events. In this study, we investigated whether interacting in a related video event affected children's accounts of a real-life target event, and whether interacting in the target event affected memory for different details within the target event. Four-, 6-, and 9-year-old children interacted with an adult who made a puppet. Half of the children in each age group also interacted with a video of a similar event (interactive condition) and half sat and watched the video without interacting (watch condition). When asked non-misleading questions a week later, children in the interactive condition confused the two events more than those in the watch condition. The 4-year-olds in the interactive condition reported a higher rate of confusions in free recall than the 4-year-olds in the watch condition. There were no effects of interaction on responses to misleading questions. The 6- and 9-year-olds were more accurate at answering questions related to actions they themselves had performed than actions performed by the experimenter, although this pattern was reversed for the 4-year-olds. The results are discussed in terms of children's eyewitness memory. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Familiarity and attraction to stimuli: Developmental change or methodological artifact?

One hundred thirteen 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children viewed a series of stimuli consisting of Chinese characters exposed a different number of times. Following exposure to the stimuli, children ranked the stimuli according to liking. Seven- and 9-year-olds preferred the more familiar characters to those seen less frequently, but the oldest children preferred novel stimuli. In rankings taken 3 weeks after original exposure, a subsample of 11-year-olds preferred the more familiar characters. These results suggest that discrepancies obtained in previous research on the affective consequences of mere exposure are of methodological rather than developmental origin. Possible critical differences in procedure are discussed.     

Supporting children’s counterfactual thinking with alternative modes of responding

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N = 39), children’s performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.     

Development of beliefs about storybook reality

The goal of this research was to assess children's beliefs about the reality status of storybook characters and events. In Experiment 1, 156 preschool age children heard realistic, fantastical, or religious stories, and their understanding of the reality status of the characters and events in the stories was assessed. Results revealed that 3-year-olds were more likely to judge characters as real than were 4- and 5-year-olds, but most children judged all characters as not real for all story types. Children of all ages who heard realistic stories made more claims that the events in the stories could happen in real life than did children who heard fantastical stories. Five-year-olds made significantly more claims that events in religious stories could happen in real life than did younger children. In Experiment 2, 136 4- and 5-year-olds heard similar stories. Results replicated those from Experiment 1, and also indicated a growing awareness of the basic nature of realistic fiction.     

Learning From Fantasy and Real Characters in Preschool and Kindergarten

In three experiments, 3½- to 6-year-old children were presented with analogical problems in which the protagonists were either real people or fantasy characters. Children were more likely to transfer solutions from the stories about real people rather than the stories about fantasy characters. These results suggest that the use of a fantasy character might not be an effective strategy for teaching children information that is meant to be applied to the real world.     

Object processing in visual perception and action in children and adults

We investigated whether 6- and 7-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds, as well as adults, process object dimensions independent of or in interaction with one another in a perception and action task by adapting Ganel and Goodale's method for testing adults (Nature, 2003, Vol. 426, pp. 664-667). In addition, we aimed to confirm Ganel and Goodale's results in adults to reliably compare their processing strategies with those of children. Specifically, we tested the abilities of children and adults to perceptually classify (perception task) or grasp (action task) the width of a rectangular object while ignoring its length. We found that adults process object dimensions in interaction with one another in visual perception but independent of each other in action, thereby replicating Ganel and Goodale's results. Children processed object dimensions interactively in visual perception, and there was also some evidence for interactive processing in action. Possible reasons for these differences in object processing between children and adults are discussed.     

Age differences in understanding precedent-setting decisions and authorities' responses to violations of deontic rules

Oral narrative skills are assumed to develop through parent-child interactive routines. One such routine is shared reading. A causal link between shared reading and narrative knowledge, however, has not been clearly established. The current research tested whether an 8-week shared reading intervention enhanced the fictional narrative skills of children entering formal education. Dialogic reading, a shared reading activity that involves elaborative questioning techniques, was used to engage children in oral interaction during reading and to emphasize elements of story knowledge. Participants were 40 English-speaking 5- and 6-year-olds who were assigned to either the dialogic reading group or an alternative treatment group. Analysis of covariance results found that the dialogic reading children’s posttest narratives were significantly better on structure and context measures than those for the alternative treatment children, but results differed for produced or retold narratives. The dialogic reading children also showed expressive vocabulary gains. Overall, this study concretely determined that aspects of fictional narrative construction knowledge can be learned from interactive book reading.     

Do children need to learn to collaborate?: The effect of age and age differences on collaborative recall

We used a collaborative recall task to explore the nature and consequences of children's interaction with another child at the same or different age. Ninety-six children memorised word lists for recall. In a first condition children recalled collaboratively: in a pair with another child. In a second condition children recalled words independently (this made possible the creation of “nominal” pairs for comparison). Pairs were either composed of two 7-year-olds, two 9-year-olds, or a 7- and a 9-year-old. Older pairs, like adults, showed a net negative effect of collaborative recall. However, younger children showed no effects of collaboration. Analyses of the different contributions offered by each child in a pair, and of measures of social dominance suggest that older children dominate social aspects of interaction and recall when paired with a younger child. We argue that younger children may lack full awareness of the role of interaction as a forum for the co-construction of knowledge.     

Structural priming of adjective-noun structures in hearing and deaf children

We examined priming of adjective-noun structures in Dutch hearing and deaf children. In three experiments, hearing 7- and 8-year-olds, hearing 11- and 12-year-olds, and deaf 11- and 12-year-olds read a prenominal structure (e.g., the blue ball), a relative clause structure (e.g., the ball that is blue), or a main clause (e.g., the ball is blue). After reading each prime structure, children described a target picture in writing. Half of the target pictures contained the same noun as the prime structure and half contained a different noun. Hearing 7- and 8-year-olds and 11- and 12-year-olds, as well as deaf 11- and 12-year-olds, showed priming effects for all three structures in both the same-noun and different-noun conditions. Structural priming was not boosted by lexical repetition in the hearing and deaf 11- and 12-year-olds; a lexical boost effect was observed only in the 7- and 8-year-olds and only in the relative clause structure. The findings suggest that hearing and deaf children possess abstract representations of adjective-noun structures independent of particular lexical items.     

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.     

"It's magic!" The effects of presentation modality on children's event memory, suggestibility, and confidence judgments

The current study investigated the influence of presentation modality (live, video, and slide show) on children's memory, suggestibility, recognition, and metamemorial monitoring processes. A total of 270 children in three age groups (5- and 6-year-olds, 7- and 8-year-olds, and 9- and 10-year-olds) watched a magic show and were questioned about it 1 week later. The live show yielded more correct answers to nonleading questions, higher resistance to misleading questions, and better recognition memory than did the video condition, which in turn resulted in better performance than did the slide show. Although presentation modality raised the general level of memory performance, the effects were equally strong in all age groups and did not affect memory phenomena such as the size of the misinformation effect and confidence judgments.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

Counterfactual reasoning: From childhood to adulthood

The objective of this study was to describe the developmental progression of counterfactual reasoning from childhood to adulthood. In contrast to the traditional view, it was recently reported by Rafetseder and colleagues that even a majority of 6-year-old children do not engage in counterfactual reasoning when asked counterfactual questions (Child Development, 2010, Vol. 81, pp. 376–389). By continuing to use the same method, the main result of the current Study 1 was that performance of the 9- to 11-year-olds was comparable to that of the 6-year-olds, whereas the 12- to 14-year-olds approximated adult performance. Study 2, using an intuitively simpler task based on Harris and colleagues (Cognition, 1996, Vol. 61, pp. 233–259), resulted in a similar conclusion, specifically that the ability to apply counterfactual reasoning is not fully developed in all children before 12 years of age. We conclude that children who failed our tasks seem to lack an understanding of what needs to be changed (events that are causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption) and what needs to be left unchanged and so needs to be kept as it actually happened. Alternative explanations, particularly executive functioning, are discussed in detail.     

Being nice by choice: The effect of counterfactual reasoning on children's social evaluations

The ability to engage in counterfactual thinking (reason about what else could have happened) is critical to learning, agency, and social evaluation. However, not much is known about how individual differences in counterfactual reasoning may play a role in children's social evaluations. In the current study, we investigate how prompting children to engage in counterfactual thinking about positive moral actions impacts children's social evaluations. Eighty-seven 4-8-year-olds were introduced to a character who engaged in a positive moral action (shared a sticker with a friend) and asked about what else the character could have done with the sticker (counterfactual simulation). Children were asked to generate either a high number of counterfactuals (five alternative actions) or a low number of counterfactuals (one alternative action). Children were then asked a series of social evaluation questions contrasting that character with one who did not have a choice and had no alternatives (was told to give away the sticker to his friend). Results show that children who generated selfish counterfactuals were more likely to positively evaluate the character with choice than children who did not generate selfish counterfactuals, suggesting that generating counterfactuals most distant from the chosen action (prosociality) leads children to view prosocial actions more positively. We also found age-related changes: as children got older, regardless of the type of counterfactuals generated, they were more likely to evaluate the character with choice more positively. These results highlight the importance of counterfactual reasoning in the development of moral evaluations.

Research Highlights

• Older children were more likely to endorse agents who choose to share over those who do not have a choice.
• Children who were prompted to generate more counterfactuals were more likely to allocate resources to characters with choice.
• Children who generated selfish counterfactuals more positively evaluated agents with choice.
• Comparable to theories suggesting children punish willful transgressors more than accidental transgressors, we propose children also consider free will when making positive moral evaluations.

     

Abraham Lincoln and Harry Potter: Children’s differentiation between historical and fantasy characters

Based on the testimony of others, children learn about a variety of figures that they never meet. We ask when and how they are able to differentiate between the historical figures that they learn about (e.g., Abraham Lincoln) and fantasy characters (e.g., Harry Potter). Experiment 1 showed that both younger (3- and 4-year-olds) and older children (5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds) understand the status of familiar figures, correctly judging historical figures to be real and fictional figures to be pretend. However, when presented with information about novel figures embedded in either a realistic narrative or a narrative with obvious fantasy elements, only older children used the narrative to make an appropriate assessment of the status of the protagonist. In Experiment 2, 3-, and 4-year-olds were prompted to judge whether the story events were really possible or not. Those who did so accurately were able to deploy that judgment to correctly assess the status of the protagonist.     

Adjective Semantics, World Knowledge and Visual Context: Comprehension of Size Terms by 2- to 7-Year-Old Dutch-Speaking Children

The interpretation of size terms involves constructing contextually-relevant reference points by combining visual cues with knowledge of typical object sizes. This study aims to establish at what age children learn to integrate these two sources of information in the interpretation process and tests comprehension of the Dutch adjectives groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’ by 2- to 7-year-old children. The results demonstrate that there is a gradual increase in the ability to inhibit visual cues and to use world knowledge for interpreting size terms. 2- and 3-year-old children only used the extremes of the perceptual range as reference points. From age four onwards children, like adults, used a cut-off point in the mid-zone of a series. From age five on, children were able to integrate world knowledge and perceptual context. Although 7-year-olds could make subtle distinctions between sizes of various object classes, their performance on incongruent items was not yet adult-like.     

Children's search strategies and accompanying verbal and motor strategic behavior: Developmental trends and relations with task performance among children age 5 to 17

Children's reported use of single and multiple search strategies during a matching numbers task, along with accompanying verbal (private speech, self-talk) and motoric (finger pointing, place-holding) strategic behaviors were examined with a large, nationally representative cross-sectional sample (n = 1979) of children between the ages of 5 and 17. Strategic searching increased with age, especially between the ages of 5 (15% strategic) and 9 (63%), with 9-year-olds’ strategy use being similar in many ways to that of 17-year-olds. Use of multiple search strategies similarly increased with age. Relations between reported strategy use and task performance were positive for 5- to 7-year-olds, nonexistent for 8- to 12-year-olds, and slightly negative for adolescents. Self-talk, although relatively rare during this task, was a performance asset for young children who were strategic and a liability for young children who were non-strategic. Pointing was negatively related with performance for those who were strategic and irrelevant for those non-strategic.     

Age-related trends of stroop-like interference in animal size tests in 5- to 12-year-old children and young adults

Few studies have examined the development of Prepotent Response Inhibition (Nigg's interference control) from childhood to adulthood. This cross-sectional study examined differences in Prepotent Response Inhibition among children of 5 age groups: twenty 5- to 6-year-olds, twenty-one 7- to 8-year-olds, twenty-two 9- to 10-year-olds, eighteen 11- to 12-year-olds, and 24 young adults (18- to 24-year-olds). Participants were administered two Stroop-like tasks: the Real Animal Size Test described in 2009 by Catale and Meulemans, which requires that participants decide the real size of animals (big vs. small) displayed in a mismatching pictorial size; and the Pictorial Animal Size Test (an original test), which requires that participants report the pictorial size of the animals. Results showed clear differences between the tests. The Pictorial Animal Size Test elicited robust interference whereas the Real Animal Size Test elicited no interference. The Pictorial Animal Size Test also revealed the development of Prepotent Response Inhibition in children of 5–12 years and between children and young adults. These results were discussed with respect to differences in strengths of processing. The Pictorial Animal Size Test can be a useful tool for assessment of Prepotent Response Inhibition in children older than 5 years of age.