Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

Imitation by animals: how do they do it?

Imitation is of psychological interest in part because it has cognitive implications for how organisms view the behavior of others, relative to their own behavior. It implies the ability to take the perspective of another. For this reason, researchers have tried to distinguish imitation from other kinds of social learning and influence. In the two-action procedure, one of two response topographies is demonstrated, and the correlation between the topography demonstrated and the topography later used by the observer is a measure of imitation. Both pigeons and Japanese quail show response matching, despite the fact that from their perspective, their own behavior appears quite different from that demonstrated. Although imitation has been demonstrated in birds and several species of primates, researchers are still not certain what mechanisms underlie this ability.     

Judging relationships between events: how do we do it?

A decade ago, Allan (1993) concluded that associative models provided the best account of data generated in tasks that require human observers to judge the relationship between binary events. In the intervening years, new data have been reported that provide evidence for higher-order processes. Some have argued that these new data pose a serious threat to the viability of the associative account. The purpose of the present paper is to review this evidence and to assess the severity of this threat.     

How do you feel?

Does your heart pound because you feel afraid, or do you feel afraid because your heart is racing? This question is the crux of a century-old controversy, stemming from a proposal by William James. A recent neuroimaging study addresses this issue and suggests that the functional connectivity of the insula could provide the key to resolving the debate.     

What do philosophers believe?

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual’s views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey also suggest that many of the results of the survey are surprising: philosophers as a whole have quite inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of philosophical views in the profession.     

What does doodling do?

Doodling is a way of passing the time when bored by a lecture or telephone call. Does it improve or hinder attention to the primary task? To answer this question, 40 participants monitored a monotonous mock telephone message for the names of people coming to a party. Half of the group was randomly assigned to a ‘doodling’ condition where they shaded printed shapes while listening to the telephone call. The doodling group performed better on the monitoring task and recalled 29% more information on a surprise memory test. Unlike many dual task situations, doodling while working can be beneficial. Future research could test whether doodling aids cognitive performance by reducing daydreaming. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Causal attributions of married couples: when do they search for causes? What do they conclude when they do?

In this study, we examined when and whether married people engage in attributional activity or form causal attributions to explain their partners' behavior. We used an indirect probe to better approximate naturally occurring cognitive activity. We also examined the content of spouses' causal attributions, using both direct and indirect probes. Spouses were asked about frequent as well as infrequent relationship events, and about partner behaviors that had positive or negative impacts on the recipient. Husbands in unsatisfying relationships reported more attributional thoughts than did happily married husbands, whereas wives in the two groups did not differ. Behaviors having negative impacts elicited more attributional activity than did positive behaviors. Behavioral frequency and impact interacted in ways contrary to predictions. Finally, distressed couples were particularly likely to report distress-maintaining attributions and were particularly unlikely to report relationship-enhancing attributions, compared with their nondistressed counterparts.     

Working 61 plus hours a week: why do managers do it?

The authors investigated why some managers work extreme hours, defined as 61 or more hours per week. The authors tested explanations drawn from theories including the work-leisure tradeoff, work as an emotional respite, social contagion, and work as its own reward. In a demographically homogeneous sample of male managers, the best explanations for why some worked 61 or more hours per week were the financial and psychological rewards they received from doing so. The hypothesis derived from A. Hochschild's (1997) research that managers who work long hours seek relief at work from pressures at home was not supported. Findings in a small sample of managerial women were consistent with the work-leisure trade-off hypothesis, the social contagion hypothesis, and the work as its own reward hypothesis.     

How do people know?

To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people's understanding of their own knowing. Individual and developmental differences in what it means to know something, and hence in the criteria for justifying knowledge claims, have potentially wide-ranging implications. In providing support for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating explanation of why a claim makes sense and evidence that the claim is true. Epistemic understanding progresses developmentally, but substantial variation remains among adults, with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of evidence and explanation in argument. Epistemic understanding shapes intellectual values and hence the disposition (as opposed to competence) to exercise intellectual skills. Only its most advanced levels support a disposition to engage in the intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails. The sample case of juror reasoning illustrates how epistemic understanding underlies and shapes intellectual performance.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

El oído absoluto

RESUMEN

Algunos autores de la psicología han definido el oído absoluto como la capacidad de identificar la frecuencia o nombre musical de un tono específico o, también como la aptitud para producir alguna frecuencia determinada sin compararla con cualquier otro sonido de referencia. Algunos datos parecen observar que esta capacidad es más una desventaja que ventaja. Los trabajos para intentar medir esta capacidad presentan muchos problemas, éstos serán analizados a lo largo del artículo. También se hará una revisión de las distintas teorías sobre su etiología, así como de las perturbaciones que pueden producirse tanto a nivel neurofisiológico como psicológico en relación con el oído absoluto. También se nombran brevemente las utilidades que proporciona el oído absoluto en el campo artístico.     

Positive affectivity and lifestyle in adulthood: do you do what you feel?

There is much evidence for the adaptive value of positive affect. Empirical work examining different facets of positive affect and their consequences for psychological adaptation remains sparse, however. This study (young, middle-aged, and older adults; N = 293) investigated the links between two dimensions of positive affect (positive involvement and pleasant affect) and two lifestyles (hedonic and growth related), each indicated by general value orientations, self-reported everyday activities, and activity aspirations. Structural equation models showed that pleasant affect and positive involvement constitute distinct dimensions evincing different age trends and relating differentially to hedonic and growth-related lifestyles. Specifically, pleasant affect, but not positive involvement, was related to a hedonic lifestyle, whereas positive involvement, and not pleasant affect, was associated with a growth-related lifestyle. These findings underline the importance of considering two dimensions of positive affect--pleasant feelings and positive involvement--separately when studying the link between affect and lifestyle.     

What do epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other?

Epistemic logic is a multi-faceted theory aimed at targeting notions such as knowledge, belief, information, awareness, memory and other propositional attitudes, by means of logical and semantical tools. These concepts ought to be in the spotlight of cognitive science too, but the two have not yet seriously been explored in cooperation. In this paper, it is shown that a number of possibilities is opened up by attempting to answer the question of what epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other. Among the proposed answers are: (i) new quantified versions of multi-agent epistemic logic capture locutions involving object identification, giving rise to applications in representing knowledge in multi-agent systems and parallel processing. (ii) The framework of game-theoretic semantics for the ensuing logics enjoys increased cognitive plausibility as the true semantics for epistemic notions. (iii) Several recent findings in cognitive neuroscience pertaining to the notions of awareness and explicit versus implicit processing contribute to logical studies. These three connections are explored here from both logical and cognitive perspectives. Reflecting neuroscientific research, new extensions of epistemic logic are defined, increasing formal understanding of unconscious and unaware information processing in the brain, and making the formalism thus amenable to knowledge representation in multi-agent configurations.