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1.
Fabienne Peter 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(4):373-387
Political egalitarianism is at the core of most normative conceptions of democratic legitimacy. It finds its minimal expression
in the “one person one vote” formula. In the literature on deliberative democracy, political equality is typically interpreted
in a more demanding sense, but different interpretations of what political equality requires can be identified. In this paper
I shall argue that the attempt to specify political equality in deliberative democracy is affected by a dilemma. I shall illustrate
the political egalitarian’s dilemma by a hypothetical choice between two informational bases for political equality: Rawlsian
primary goods and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The political egalitarian’s dilemma reveals a clash between the requirement
of ensuring equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of subjecting substantive judgments
to deliberative evaluation. As such, the dilemma is a variant of the procedure vs. substance dilemma that is well-known in
democratic theory. While it has sometimes been argued that deliberative democracy solves the tension between procedure and
substance, the political egalitarian’s dilemma shows that this tension continues within deliberative democracy.
相似文献
Fabienne PeterEmail: |
2.
Claudia W. Ruitenberg 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(3):269-281
Many scholars in the area of citizenship education take deliberative approaches to democracy, especially as put forward by
John Rawls, as their point of departure. From there, they explore how students’ capacity for political and/or moral reasoning
can be fostered. Recent work by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, however, questions some of the central tenets of deliberative
conceptions of democracy. In the paper I first explain the central differences between Mouffe’s and Rawls’s conceptions of
democracy and politics. To this end I take Eamonn Callan’s Creating Citizens as an example of Rawlsian political education and focus on the role of conflict and disagreement in his account. I then address
three areas in which political education would need to change if it were to accept Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative approaches
to democracy and her proposal for an agonistic public sphere. The first area is the education of political emotions; the second
is fostering an understanding of the difference between the moral and the political; the third is developing an awareness
of the historical and contemporary political projects of the “left” and “right.” I propose that a radical democratic citizenship
education would be an education of political adversaries.
相似文献
Claudia W. RuitenbergEmail: |
3.
In this paper we examine Prior’s reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a
purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language.
It is the logic K
t
4 plus a new axiom (P): ‘p Λ G
p ⊃ P G
p’. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. (P) is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is
a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear
time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by (P) in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献
4.
Giorgi Japaridze 《Studia Logica》2009,91(1):1-24
Within the program of finding axiomatizations for various parts of computability logic, it was proven earlier that the logic of interactive Turing reduction is exactly the implicative fragment of Heyting’s intuitionistic
calculus. That sort of reduction permits unlimited reusage of the computational resource represented by the antecedent. An
at least equally basic and natural sort of algorithmic reduction, however, is the one that does not allow such reusage. The
present article shows that turning the logic of the first sort of reduction into the logic of the second sort of reduction
takes nothing more than just deleting the contraction rule from its Gentzen-style axiomatization. The first (Turing) sort
of interactive reduction is also shown to come in three natural versions. While those three versions are very different from
each other, their logical behaviors (in isolation) turn out to be indistinguishable, with that common behavior being precisely
captured by implicative intuitionistic logic. Among the other contributions of the present article is an informal introduction
of a series of new — finite and bounded — versions of recurrence operations and the associated reduction operations.
Presented by Robert Goldblatt 相似文献
5.
In this paper we propose a method for modeling social influence within the STIT approach to action. Our proposal consists in extending the STIT language with special operators that allow us to represent the consequences of an agent’s choices over the rational choices of another agent. 相似文献
6.
Michael Barber 《Human Studies》2010,33(1):1-21
Dorion Cairns correctly interprets the preconstituted stratum of Edmund Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation to be the primordial
ego and not the social world, as was thought by Alfred Schutz, who considered Husserl to be insufficiently attentive to the
social world’s hold upon us. Following Cairns’s interpretation, which involves recovering and reconstructing strata that may
never exist independently, one better understands how the transfer of sense “animate organism” involves automatic association,
or somatic apprehension. This sense-transfer extends to any animate organism, not just humans, and draws on extensive unreflected-upon
similarities despite the distinctive fact that the other’s body is never given to oneself as is one’s own. Following Cairns’s
interpretation, one can also understand the second epoché as an imaginative, reconstructive abstraction rather than as an example of failed ascesis. Consequently, Husserl appears as less intellectualized in his approach to empathy than often thought to be and more confident
in the phenomenologist’s capacity to imagine and attend selectively to experience. 相似文献
7.
Christopher Gregory Weaver 《Synthese》2012,184(3):299-317
I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused,
are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander
Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies
inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the
argument founders on the fact that Pruss’s Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, “Lewisian”
argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis’s analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility
claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections
from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics. 相似文献
8.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2005,126(1):1-27
Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator
has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘
ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly
treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges
not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The aims of this paper are, first, to offer a precise formulation
of Grelling’s Paradox which is clearly distinguished from both the Liar Paradox and Russell’s Paradox; second, to offer a
solution to Grelling’s Paradox which both resolves the paradoxical reasoning and accounts for unproblematic predications of
heterologicality; and, third, to argue that there are two lessons to be drawn from Grelling’s Paradox which have not yet been
drawn from the Liar or Russell’s Paradox. The first lesson is that it is possible for the semantic content of a predicate
to be sensitive to the semantic context; i.e., it is possible for a predicate to be an indexical expression. The second lesson
is that the semantic content of an indexical predicate, though unproblematic for many cases, can nevertheless be problematic
in some cases. 相似文献
9.
Jaroslav Peregrin 《Studia Logica》2008,88(2):263-294
The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency
of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little
doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural rules), I do not think that the
usual justification of it is satisfactory. Therefore, I will first try to clarify what exactly is meant by the question, and
then sketch a conceptual framework in which it can be reasonably handled. I will introduce the concept of ‘inferentially native’
logical operators (those which explicate inferential properties) and I will show that the axiomatization of these operators
leads to the axiomatic system of intuitionistic logic. Finally, I will discuss what modifications of this answer enter the
picture when more general notions of inference are considered.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
10.
Fabian Wendt 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):175-192
Philip Pettit’s republican conception of freedom is presented as an alternative both to negative and positive conceptions
of freedom. The basic idea is to conceptualize freedom as non-domination, not as non-interference or self-mastery. When compared
to negative freedom, Pettit’s republican conception comprises two controversial claims: the claim that we are unfree if we
are dominated without actual interference, and the claim that we are free if we face interference without domination. Because
the slave is a widely accepted paradigm of the unfree person, the case of a slave with a non-interfering master is often cited
as providing a good argument for the first republican claim and against a negative conception of freedom. One aim of this
article is to raise doubts about whether this is true. The other aim of the article is to show that the prisoner—also a paradigm
of the unfree person—presents a good argument against the second republican claim and in favour of a negative conception of
freedom. This is called the ‘prisoner-argument’. It will be argued that neither Pettit’s distinction between free persons
and free choices nor his distinction between compromising and conditioning factors of freedom can help to rebut the charge
of the prisoner-argument. 相似文献
11.
12.
Grigori Mints 《Synthese》2006,148(3):701-717
We put together several observations on constructive negation. First, Russell anticipated intuitionistic logic by clearly
distinguishing propositional principles implying the law of the excluded middle from remaining valid principles. He stated
what was later called Peirce’s law. This is important in connection with the method used later by Heyting for developing his
axiomatization of intuitionistic logic. Second, a work by Dragalin and his students provides easy embeddings of classical
arithmetic and analysis into intuitionistic negationless systems. In the last section, we present in some detail a stepwise
construction of negation which essentially concluded the formation of the logical base of the Russian constructivist school.
Markov’s own proof of Markov’s principle (different from later proofs by Friedman and Dragalin) is described. 相似文献
13.
Justin Tiwald 《Dao》2008,7(3):269-282
Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a
right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate
in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral
weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors
that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall
short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests
an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account. 相似文献
14.
Samuel Schindler 《Synthese》2011,182(1):39-55
Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation
dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward
stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and
Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness,
which has it that our observations are influenced by the theories we hold, cannot apply. On the basis of two case studies,
I want to show that this consequence of Bogen and Woodward’s account is rather unrealistic. More importantly, I also object
against Bogen and Woodward’s view that the reliability of data, which constitutes the precondition for data-to-phenomena inferences,
can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. The case studies I revisit have figured heavily in the publications of
Bogen and Woodward and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies.
I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective
(TLI) and that, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of the data (TLA).
I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI
nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward’s account. 相似文献
15.
Henry S. Richardson 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(4):419-462
Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining
to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to
deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for
the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view,
one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue.
Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device
for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation
that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets
of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a
kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues,
but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles.
This extension to Rawls’s device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions; but the paper argues that the ideal of
reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining
to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential
commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls’s thought in the 1950s. 相似文献
16.
We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple
axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this
logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision
are also discussed.
Giacomo Bonanno: I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments. A first draft of this paper
was presented at the Sixth Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT6), Leipzig, July 2004. 相似文献
17.
Kjartan Koch Mikalsen 《Res Publica》2010,16(1):23-40
It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible
with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations
have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not
considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently
substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is neither at odds with deference to a certain kind of authority, nor
with making judgements of character in rational deliberation. This view is corroborated by recent work on Kant’s epistemology
of testimony. 相似文献
18.
Robert Garner 《Res Publica》2012,18(2):159-172
This article seeks to revisit the relationship between Rawls’s contractarianism and the moral status of animals, paying particular
attention to the recent literature. Despite Rawls’s own reluctance to include animals as recipients of justice, and my own
initial scepticism, a number of scholars have argued that his theory does provide resources that are useful for the animal
advocate. The first type takes Rawls’s exclusion of animals from his theory of justice at face value but argues that animals
can still be protected within a moral realm independently of justice, or indirectly through the motivations of human contractors.
The second type adapts his theory in a way that enables animals to be included within a contractarian theory of justice. It
is argued, though, that none of the responses offered is successful in providing a sphere of protection for animals from within
Rawls’s contractarian theory. It is doubtful if Rawls’s intention was for animals to receive a significant degree of protection
within a moral realm independently of justice, and equally doubtful if the contractors in the original position would be motivated
to act on behalf of animals. In the case of the second, whilst Rawlsian resources can be utilised to justify the attempt to
amend the veil of ignorance so as to include animals, these are not dependent on a contractural agreement. Similarly, placing
emphasis on social-co-operation as a means of incorporating animals into a theory of justice is flawed, not least because,
paradoxically, it works for domesticated animals whilst they are being exploited. 相似文献
19.
Tengland PA 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(4):257-284
The starting point for the contemporary debate about theories of health should be the holistic theory of Lennart Nordenfelt,
claims George Khushf, not the refuted theory of Christopher Boorse. The present paper is an attempt to challenge Nordenfelt
and to present an alternative theory to his and other theories, including Boorse’s. The main problems with Nordenfelt’s theory
are that it is relativistic, that it leads to counter-intuitive results as to what goals can count as healthy, that it focuses
on the wrong kind of abilities, that it makes measuring health extra difficult, and that it does not give us a sufficient
account of health, at most a necessary one. The alternative theory proposed is two-dimensional. First, health is to have developed
the abilities and dispositions that members of one’s culture typically develop, and be able to use them, in acceptable circumstances;
and second, health is to experience positive moods and sensations, the kinds that have internal causes. The theory solves
the problems attached to Nordenfelt’s theory by not being individual relativistic, by eliminating the goals in the definition,
by giving an alternative interpretation of “ability,” by making health easier to measure, and by adding the dimension of well-being
that, together with health as ability, not only gives us a necessary, but also a sufficient, account of health. 相似文献
20.
Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it
makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one
that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of
posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey
conditionalization. We conclude that, under particular circumstances, Reichenbach’s approach and that of the Bayesians amount
to the same thing, thereby presenting us with a new instance in which chance and credence coincide. 相似文献