Abandon the dead donor rule or change the definition of death?

Research by Siminoff and colleagues reveals that many lay people in Ohio classify legally living persons in irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state (PVS) as dead that additional respondents, although classifying such patients as living, would be willing to procure organs from them. This paper analyzes possible implications of these findings for public policy. A majority would procure organs from those in irreversible coma or in PVS. Two strategies for legitimizing such procurement are suggested. One strategy would be to make exceptions to the dead donor rule permitting procurement from those in PVS or at least those who are in irreversible coma while continuing to classify them as living. Another strategy would be to further amend the definition of death to classify one or both groups as deceased, thus permitting procurement without violation of the dead donor rule. Permitting exceptions to the dead donor rule would require substantial changes in law--such as authorizing procuring surgeons to end the lives of patients by means of organ procurement--and would weaken societal prohibitions on killing. The paper suggests that it would be easier and less controversial to further amend the definition of death to classify those in irreversible coma and PVS as dead. Incorporation of a conscience clause to permit those whose religious or philosophical convictions support whole-brain or cardiac-based death pronouncement would avoid violating their beliefs while causing no more than minimal social problems. The paper questions whether those who would support an exception to the dead donor rule in these cases and those who would support a further amendment to the definition of death could reach agreement to adopt a public policy permitting organ procurement of those in irreversible coma or PVS when proper consent is obtained.     

Reconsidering the dead donor rule: is it important that organ donors be dead?

The "dead donor rule" is increasingly under attack for several reasons. First, there has long been disagreement about whether there is a correct or coherent definition of "death." Second, it has long been clear that the concept and ascertainment of "brain death" is medically flawed. Third, the requirement stands in the way of improving organ supply by prohibiting organ removal from patients who have little to lose--e.g., infants with anencephaly--and from patients who ardently want to donate while still alive--e.g., patients in a permanent vegetative state. One argument against abandoning the dead donor rule has been that the rule is important to the general public. There is now data suggesting that this assumption also may be flawed. These findings add additional weight to proposals to abandon the dead donor rule so that organ supply can be expanded in a way that is consistent with traditional notions of ethics, law, public policy, and public opinion.     

The Ohio study in light of national data and clinical experience

The Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner study in Ohio is strikingly consistent with data from a national study. Both suggest that there might be significant public acceptance of future policies that violate the dead donor rule, or that further extend the boundary between life and death to include brain-damaged patients short of "brain death." Experience with donation suggests that many individuals would donate their loved ones' organs when they have concluded that the brain injury is not survivable, even if all the criteria for "brain death" are not met. It would be very helpful to have research on those who have gone through the real-life clinical situation. Based on the findings of this study and the increasing demand for organs, it may be appropriate for public policy to allow for ways to increase organ procurement from individuals who are not fully "brain dead" beyond the current method of procurement after cardiac death, but any change in this area should go slowly and with significant public input.     

The dead donor rule and the concept of death: severing the ties that bind them

One goal of the transplant community is to seek ways to increase the number of people who are willing and able to donate organs. People in states between life and death are often medically excellent candidates for donating organs. Yet public policy surrounding organ procurement is a delicate matter. While there is the utilitarian goal of increasing organ supply, there is also the deontologic concern about respect for persons. Public policy must properly mediate between these two concerns. Currently the dead donor (dd) rule is appealed to as an attempt at such mediation. I argue that given the lack of consensus on a definition of death, the dd rule is no longer successful at mediating utilitarian and deontologic concerns. I suggest instead that focusing on a particular person's history can be successful.     

Bioethics in a Global Village

One goal of the transplant community is to seek ways to increase the number of people who are willing and able to donate organs. People in states between life and death are often medically excellent candidates for donating organs. Yet public policy surrounding organ procurement is a delicate matter. While there is the utilitarian goal of increasing organ supply, there is also the deontologic concern about respect for persons. Public policy must properly mediate between these two concerns. Currently the dead donor (dd) rule is appealed to as an attempt at such mediation. I argue that given the lack of consensus on a definition of death, the dd rule is no longer successful at mediating utilitarian and deontologic concerns. I suggest instead that focusing on a particular person's history can be successful.     

The dead donor rule: how much does the public care...and how much should we care?

In this brief commentary, we reflect on the recent study by Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner of public attitudes toward "brain death" and organ donation, focusing on the implications of their findings for the rules governing from whom organs can be obtained. Although the data suggest that many seem to view "brain death" as "as good as death" rather than "dead" (calling the dead donor rule into question), we find that the study most clearly demonstrates that understanding an individual's definition of death is neither a straightforward task nor a good predictor of views about donation. Reflecting on the implications for ongoing debates over the dead donor rule, we suggest that perhaps it is not a change in policy that is warranted, but rather a change in the priorities that have garnered such intense focus on this issue within the field of bioethics.     

More dead than dead: perceptions of persons in the persistent vegetative state

Patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS) may be biologically alive, but these experiments indicate that people see PVS as a state curiously more dead than dead. Experiment 1 found that PVS patients were perceived to have less mental capacity than the dead. Experiment 2 explained this effect as an outgrowth of afterlife beliefs, and the tendency to focus on the bodies of PVS patients at the expense of their minds. Experiment 3 found that PVS is also perceived as “worse” than death: people deem early death better than being in PVS. These studies suggest that people perceive the minds of PVS patients as less valuable than those of the dead – ironically, this effect is especially robust for those high in religiosity.     

Do the myths still exist? Revisiting people's negative beliefs about organ donation upon death

The prevalence of myths preventing people partial to donation in Australia from consenting is unknown. Respondents (N?=?468: 381 donors, 26 non-donors, 61 undecided) were surveyed about their (negative) donation beliefs. Approximately 30% of donors were neutral or supported negative beliefs about organ allocation, especially donation to undesirable organ recipients and a black market organ trade. Confusion about brain death, lack of family and religious support, and discomfort with donation were negative beliefs endorsed by some respondents irrespective of donor preference. Proportionally, donors had greater trust in hospitals/doctors than other groups. Some myths still exist but may vary with donation preference.     

Dying but not killing: donation after cardiac death donors and the recovery of vital organs

Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne, and David W. Evans are critical of donation after cardiac death (DCD). Contrary to the authors' assertion that the removal of vital organs is the proximate cause of death, the eventual fulfillment of the neurological criteria of death is solely dependant on the rate of brain cell death in the absence of circulation. Consistent with the "dead donor rule," DCD is not the cause of death.There are also procedural mechanisms to address the potential conflicts of interest that concern the authors. Rather than being prohibited, DCD may be an ethically justifiable exception to the rule that organ donors must be dead prior to organ recovery.     

Development of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center policy for the care of terminally ill patients who may become organ donors after death following the removal of life support

In the mid 1980s it was apparent that the need for organ donors exceeded those willing to donate. Some University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) physicians initiated discussion of possible new organ donor categories including individuals pronounced dead by traditional cardiac criteria. However, they reached no conclusion and dropped the discussion. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, four cases arose in which dying patients or their families requested organ donation following the elective removal of mechanical ventilation. Controversy surrounding these cases precipitated open discussion of the use of organ donors pronounced dead on the basis of cardiac criteria. Prolonged deliberations by many committees in the absence of precedent ultimately resulted in what is, to our knowledge, the country's first policy for organ donation following elective removal of life support. The policy is intricate and conservative. Care was taken to include as many interested parties as possible in an effort to achieve representative and broad based support. This paper describes the development of the UPMC policy on non-heart-beating organ donation.     

Consenting to Donate Organs: Whose Wishes Carry the Most Weight?

An experimental simulation methodology examined how people weigh the wishes of the donor and the next-of-kin in recommending whether the latter should consent to donate the organs of a deceased loved one. Subjects read several brief stories, each describing a young adult who had died suddenly and whose kin faced the decision of whether to donate their loved one's organs. Each scenario had four versions, identical except for minor wording changes providing information about the organ donation wish of the potential donor and the next-of-kin. Subjects indicated "yes,""no," or "I'm undecided" about whether the kin should donate the organs. Subjects weighted the wishes of the deceased much more heavily than their own or those of the next-of-kin when those wishes were stated directly. When the deceased's wishes had to be inferred indirectly, attitudes of the next-of-kin and the experimental subject affected the decision much more. Implications for organ procurement practice are considered.     

The telltale heart: public policy and the utilization of non-heart-beating donors

The transplant community has quietly initiated efforts to expand the current pool of cadaver organ donors to include those who are dead by cardiac criteria but cannot be pronounced dead using brain-based criteria. There are many reasons for concern about "policy creep" regarding who is defined as a potential organ donor. These reasons include loss of trust in the transplant community because of confusion over the protocols to be used, blurring the line between life and death, stress on family members, and burdens imposed on health care providers when a long-standing policy regarding who can serve as a cadaver organ donor is unilaterally changed. While these concerns are not sufficient reason for abandoning efforts to broaden existing eligibility standards for cadaver donation, they are sufficient reasons for the transplant community to desist in changing existing standards without widespread professional and public discussion.     

Death, organ transplantation and medical practice

A series of papers in Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine (PEHM) have recently disputed whether non-heart beating organ donors are alive and whether non-heart beating organ donation (NHBD) contravenes the dead donor rule. Several authors who argue that NHBD involves harvesting organs from live patients appeal to "strong irreversibility" (death beyond the reach of resuscitative efforts to restore life) as a necessary criterion that patients must meet before physicians can declare them to be dead. Sam Shemie, who defends our current practice of NHBD, holds that in fact physicians consider patients to be dead or not according to physician intention to resuscitate or not. We suggest that criteria for a concept are not necessarily truth conditions for assertions involving the concept. Hence, non-heart beating donors may be declared dead without meeting the criterion of strong irreversibility even though strong irreversibility is implied by the concept of death. Our perception that a concept applies in a given case is determined not by the concept itself but by our necessary skill and judgment when using it. In the case of deciding that a patient is dead, such judgment is learned by physicians as they learn the practice of medicine and may vary according to circumstances. Current practice of NHBD can therefore be defended without abandoning death as an empirical concept, as Shemie appears to do. We conclude that the dead donor rule continues to be viable and ought to be retained so as to guarantee what the public most cares about as regards organ donation: that physicians can be trusted to make determinations of eligibility for organ donation in the interests of patients and not for other purposes such as increasing the availability of organs.     

Defining the vital condition for organ donation

The issue of organ donation and of how the donor pool can or should be increased is one with significant practical, ethical and logistic implications. Here we comment on an article advocating a paradigm change in the so-called "dead donor rule". Such change would involve the societal and legal abandonment of the above rule and the introduction of mandated choice. In this commentary, we review some of the problems associated with the proposed changes as well as the problems associated with the current model. We emphasize the continuing problems with the definition of death and the physiological process of dying; we discuss the difficulties associated with a dichotomous view of death; we review the difficulties with non-beating heart donation and emphasize the current limitations of society's understanding of these complex issues. We conclude that public education remains the best approach and that such education should not be merely promotion of a particular ideology but honest debate of what is socially and morally acceptable and appropriate given the changes in vital organ support technology and the need to respect patient autonomy.     

Earning points for moral behavior: organ allocation based on reciprocity

Anticipating the reevaluation of the Dutch organ procurement system, in late 2003 the Rathenau Institute published a study entitled 'Gift or Contribution?' In this study, the author, Govert den Hartogh, carries out a thorough moral analysis of the problem of organ shortage and fair allocation of organs. He suggests there should be a change in mentality whereby organ donation is no longer viewed in terms of charity and the volunteer spirit, but rather in terms of duty and reciprocity. The procurement and allocation of donor organs should be seen as a system of mutually assured help. Fair allocation would imply to give priority to those who recognize and comply with their duty: the registered donors. The idea of viewing organ donation as an undertaking involving mutual benefit rather than as a matter of charity, however, is not new. Notwithstanding the fact that reference to charity and altruism is not required in order for the organ donation to be of moral significance, we will argue against the reciprocity-based scenario. Steering organ allocation towards those who are themselves willing to donate organs is both an ineffective and morally questionable means of attempting to counter organ shortage.     

Predictors of willingness to register as an organ donor among dutch adolescents

Abstract

In order to identify relevant determinants of organ donor registration among Dutch adolescents, a school-based cross-sectional survey was conducted among 145 high school students. Fifty-one percent of respondents indicated they were willing to register as organ donors and 80% reported a positive general attitude towards registration. Various misconceptions about the registration and donation procedure were identified. On average only moderate knowledge levels related to organ donation were found. In order of strongest association, negative outcome expectancies, past behaviour and experience, positive outcome expectancies, and social outcome expectancies proved to be significant predictors of willingness to register as organ donors. Self-efficacy was indirectly associated with willingness via outcome expectancies. Knowledge about organ donation was not significantly associated with willingness. The results suggest that in order to persuade adolescents to register as organ donors, refutational messages will have to be developed to counterargue the prevailing negative outcome expectancies related to organ donation and registration as an organ donor.     

Policy issues in a non-heart-beating donor protocol

The Pittsburgh protocol is ethically and legally acceptable as written, but more research is needed to determine if it can be implemented in ways that will observe the procedures that make it ethically acceptable. If so, its desirability as public policy will depend on the number of organs it is likely to generate and its effects on public attitudes toward organ donation generally. In the final analysis, the controversial aspects of this protocol concern symbolic issues about respect for the dead and near dead, rather than substantive concerns that real patient interests will be harmed.     

Blood donation is an act of benevolence rather than altruism.

OBJECTIVES: Blood donation is described as an archetypal altruistic behavior, and recruitment/retention campaigns emphasize altruism. Here, a benevolence hypothesis for blood donation (both the donor and recipient benefit) rather than the altruism hypothesis (only the recipient gains) is proposed. DESIGN: Three United Kingdom-based studies contrasted benevolence and altruism: (a) a 6-month prospective study of blood donor behavior (Study 1: N = 957), (b) a cross-sectional study of blood donors' intentions (Study 2: N = 333), and (c) an experimental study examining the effect of benevolent and altruistic messages on willingness to help across high- and low-cost helping behaviors for committed and noncommitted blood donors (Study 3: N = 200). MAIN OUTCOME: Donor behavior and intentions-willingness. MEASURES: Beliefs in personal and societal benefit (Time 1) and actual donations (Time 2) were assessed in Study 1; beliefs in benevolence, altruism, hedonism, and kinship along with donation intentions were assessed in Study 2; and empathy, donor commitment, and willingness to donate blood, money, fund-raise, and staff a telephone helpline were assessed in Study 3. RESULTS: Beliefs in personal rather than societal benefit predicted actual future donation. A path model showed that only beliefs in benevolence were associated with intentions to donate. Committed blood donors were more willing to donate blood when exposed to a benevolent message rather than an altruistic one. This effect was not observed for other forms of helping. CONCLUSIONS: The benevolence hypothesis is supported, suggesting that blood donor motivation is partly selfish. Blood donation campaigns should focus on benevolent rather than purely altruistic messages.     

Clarifying the paradigm for the ethics of donation and transplantation: Was 'dead' really so clear before organ donation?

Recent commentaries by Verheijde et al, Evans and Potts suggesting that donation after cardiac death practices routinely violate the dead donor rule are based on flawed presumptions. Cell biology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, critical care life support technologies, donation and transplantation continue to inform concepts of life and death. The impact of oxygen deprivation to cells, organs and the brain is discussed in relation to death as a biological transition. In the face of advancing organ support and replacement technologies, the reversibility of cardiac arrest is now purely related to the context in which it occurs, in association to the availability and application of support systems to maintain oxygenated circulation. The 'complete and irreversible' lexicon commonly used in death discussions and legal statutes are ambiguous, indefinable and should be replaced by accurate terms. Criticism of controlled DCD on the basis of violating the dead donor rule, where autoresuscitation has not been described beyond 2 minutes, in which life support is withdrawn and CPR is not provided, is not valid. However, any post mortem intervention that re-establishes brain blood flow should be prohibited. In comparison to traditional practice, organ donation has forced the clarification of the diagnostic criteria for death and improved the rigour of the determinations.