A study of paranormal belief, magical ideation as an index of schizotypy and cognitive style

This study examined the proposal that the association between paranormal belief and magical ideation may be mediated by distinctive cognitive styles for schizotypes as compared to believers in the paranormal. Schizotypes were found to differ from an atypical group of believers in the paranormal and to resemble schizophrenics in terms of cognitive style. Believers expressed a cognitive style reliant on notions of personal responsibility while schizotypes emphasised the role of randomness. Believers differed from schizotypes on more deviant aspects of schizotypy measures yet unexpectedly these groups did not differ on specific facets of paranormal belief. It is tentatively proposed that for some people certain paranormal beliefs represent a cognitive ‘defence’ against acceptance of the uncertainty of life events, while for others paranormal belief may be indicative of psychopathology.     

Temporal lobe signs and reports of subjective paranormal experiences in a normal population: a replication

Correlations (r = 0.50) were found between the numbers of different psi (paranormal) experiences and the numbers of temporal lobe signs within a population of university students (n = 99). The strongest correlation of 0.60 occurred with a cluster of signs that are similar to symptoms reported by patients who show chronic foci in the mesiobasal temporal lobe. However, there were no significant correlations between numbers of different psi experiences and clusters of control items or a lie scale. Specific analyses of the 140 items of the inventory indicated only 23 reached statistical criterion (p less than .001). Of these 17 were direct temporal lobe signs that implied deepened affect, auditory-vestibular experiences (vibrations, hearing one's name called), olfactory auras, perseveration ("forced" thinking), depersonalization, and sense of the personal. Five items involved beliefs about exotic phenomena or philosophical ideas. Only one item was from a control cluster. These results support the hypothesis that mystical or paranormal experiences are associated with transient electrical foci within the temporal lobe of the human brain. The repeated occurrence of these experiences within normal individuals may be embedded within a more complex symptomatology of temporal lobe signs.     

Freud's theory of paranoid delusion based on the Schreber case contrasted with related theories

The historic importance of Freud's analysis of the Schreber case is acknowledged, even though the theory it expounds is largely disavowed. The theory ascribes the cause of paranoid delusion to homosexual impulses unresolved in infancy or early childhood. This paper summarizes Freud's monograph on Schreber and contrasts his theory with the views of various revisionists. The writers focus on the Freudian concept of projection, which is intended to explain how much meaning can become reversed under the impetus of stress, and the reversal lead to delusional thinking. Based on their work in family therapy, where they observed one form of pathogenic relating termed learning to be possessed, the writers concluded that this form was also based on a type of projection which could culminate in delusional ideation. A relationship between learning to be possessed and H. S. Sullivan's theory of paranoid transformation is described. A learning factor is present in several of the psychological theories advanced to explain delusion, and the factor is akin to if not identical with Freud's concept of projection.Gerald Zuk, PhD, is in private practice at 25316 Pacy Street, Santa Clarita, California 91321-3343. Carmen Zuk, MD, is a child psychiatrist-partner affiliated with the Southern California Permanente Medical Group at its psychiatric clinic in Van Nuys, California. Both may be reached by telephone at (805) 252-7702.     

Order effects in research on paranormal belief

Measures of paranormal belief and emotional intelligence were given a group of 72 college students using Tobacyk's Revised Paranormal Belief Scale and Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, and Dornheim's Emotional Intelligence Scale. Order effects indicated that participants who took the Paranormal Belief Scale first had lower emotional intelligence scores than those who took the Emotional Intelligence Scale first. The study demonstrates the importance of taking order effects into account when conducting research on paranormal belief.     

Forecasting one's future based on fleeting subjective experiences

When we forecast our futures, to what extent do we rely on explicit and concrete facts versus implicit and fleeting subjective experiences? Results from two studies reveal that forecasting judgments hinge on at least two fleeting experiences: the specific incidental emotions one happens to feel at the time of forming a judgment and the subjective ease-of-thought-generation. Results also reveal that imposing accountability for the accuracy of one's forecast provides no simple remedy. Incidental emotions, the ease-of-thought-generation, and accountability combine multiplicatively in a three-way interaction. Although accountability attenuates the respective effects of incidental fear and incidental anger, doing so has the undesirable effect of amplifying the ease-of-thought-generation effects that fear otherwise suppresses. In no instance does accountability completely eliminate the unintended effects of these fleeting subjective experiences. Discussion addresses implications for theories of affect and social cognition as well as for applications to risk perception.     

The logic of delusion

Piagetian concepts explaining normal mental development are applied to delusion, a major psychiatric disorder of thought which can result in bizarre conduct. Piaget constructed problems in which the errors of six to eight year old children fit the standard textbook definition of delusion surprisingly well. When we examined cases of delusional individuals, we concluded that their apparent irrational and bizarre conduct could be explained as problem-solving errors like those of Piaget's young children. In contradistinction to existing theories, we define delusion as a regression under stress to the logic of children of a particular age range, and that what appears bizarre and irrational is the result of an adult attempting to filter experience through a child's logic.Under a different title this paper was presented at the Biennial Congress of the World Federation for Mental Health in Mexico City in August, 1991.     

Effect of restriction of working memory on reported paranormal belief

56 college students completed Tobacyk's 1988 Revised Paranormal Belief Scale and Watson, Clark, and Tellegen's 1988 Positive and Negative Affect Scale. Experimental group participants, but not control group participants, rehearsed a five-digit number while completing the Paranormal Belief Scale. Analysis showed higher reported paranormal belief for experimental group participants but no differences on the Positive and Negative Affect Scale. Results are discussed in terms of the effect of restriction in working memory on the critical evaluation of paranormal phenomena.     

Capgras delusion: a window on face recognition

Capgras delusion is the belief that significant others have been replaced by impostors, robots or aliens. Although it usually occurs within a psychiatric illness, it can also be the result of brain injury or other obviously organic disorder. In contrast to patients with prosopagnosia, who cannot consciously recognize previously familiar faces but display autonomic or covert recognition (measured by skin conductance responses), people with Capgras delusion do not show differential autonomic activity to familiar compared with unknown faces. This challenges traditional models of the way faces are identified and presents some epistemological questions concerning identity. New data also indicate that, contrary to previous evidence, covert recognition can be fractionated into autonomic and behavioural/cognitive types, which is consistent with a recently proposed modification of the modal face recognition model.     

Dermatozoon delusion in hypoparathyroidism--reflections on the genesis of delusions

Firstly two female patients with hypoparathyroidism and basal ganglia calcifications are described who developed after long course of illness delusions of parasitosis. The pathological cerebral changes responsible for delusions of parasitosis are mostly localized in the brain-stem. Regarding the two case histories and the former literature the relationship between peripheral paresthesias and a supposed disturbance of central processing is discussed.     

Multidimensionality of the relationship between perceived control and belief in the paranormal: spheres of control and types of paranormal phenomena

The relationship between belief in the paranormal and perceived control was examined in the light of recent multidimensional analyses of these constructs. The Paulhus Spheres of Control battery, which measures perceived control expectancies separately for the personal, interpersonal and sociopolitical spheres of action, and the Tobacyk-Milford Belief in Paranormal Phenomena questionnaire, which assesses belief in seven different types of paranormal phenomena, were administered to 95 college students. A canonical correlation analysis revealed two significant orthogonal variates; the first linking expectancies of external personal and sociopolitical control with belief in religion, superstitions and spiritualism; the second linking expectancies of internal personal and interpersonal control with belief in witchcraft and psi phenomena. These findings provide support for a more differentiated view of the role of perceived control in paranormal belief systems.     

Real and subjective contour Poggendorff illusions: no differences based on eye color

Measures of illusion magnitude for a real contour and two subjective contour Poggendorff figures were obtained from a large number of dark-eyed and light-eyed undergraduates. Illusion magnitude varied as a function of figure type. However, eye color neither had a significant overall effect on illusion magnitude, nor did it interact with the figure-type variable. These data indicate that the presence of intersecting lines is not the basis of the iris-pigmentation effect reported by Coren and Porac.     

Attributional style in a case of Cotard delusion

Young and colleagues (e.g. Young, A. W., & Leafhead, K. M. (1996). Betwixt life and death: case studies of the Cotard delusion. In P. W. Halligan & J. C. Marshall (Eds.), Method in madness: Case studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.) have suggested that cases of the Cotard delusion (the belief that one is dead) result when a particular perceptual anomaly (caused by a disruption to the affective component of visual recognition) occurs in the context of an internalising attributional style. This hypothesis has not previously been tested directly. We report here an investigation of attributional style in a 24-year-old woman with Cotard delusion ("LU"). LU's attributional style (and that of ten healthy control participants) was assessed using the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (Kinderman, P., & Bentall, R. P. (1996). A new measure of causal locus: the internal, personal and situational attributions questionnaire. Personality and Individual Differences, 20(2), 261-264.). LU showed a significantly greater proportion of internalising attributions than the control group, both overall and for negative events specifically. The results obtained thus support an association of Cotard delusion with an internalising attributional style, and are therefore consistent with the account of Young and colleagues. The potential brain basis of Cotard delusion is discussed.     

Together we are strong: Explicit and implicit paranormal beliefs predict performance in a knowledge test of paranormal phenomena better than explicit beliefs alone

The belief in paranormal phenomena is a frequently studied topic. Studies predominantly assess explicit (i.e., conscious) parts of paranormal belief (PB) using questionnaire-based self-report measures which are prone to impression management and social desirability tendencies. In order to investigate the usefulness of measuring implicit (i.e., automatic) PB, we developed a PB Implicit Association Test (PB-IAT). Implicit PB was uncorrelated with explicit PB, but moderated the relationship between explicit PB and participants’ knowledge of paranormal phenomena. Participants with a weak implicit PB did not differ in their knowledge scores regardless of whether they had strong or weak explicit PB. But participants with strong implicit PB had higher scores when they also had strong explicit PB compared to participants with weak explicit PB. These results suggest that discrepant configurations of PB impair performance in a knowledge test about paranormal phenomena.     

Body tilt effect on the reproduction of orientations: studies on the visual oblique effect and subjective orientations

Body tilt effects on the visual reproduction of orientations and the Class 2 oblique effect (E. A. Essock, 1980) were examined. Body tilts indicate whether the oblique effect (i.e., lower performance in oblique orientations than in vertical-horizontal orientations) is defined in an egocentric or a gravitational reference frame. Results showed that the oblique effect observed in upright posture disappeared in tilted conditions, mainly due to a decrease in the precision of the vertical and horizontal settings. In tilted conditions, the subjective visual vertical proved to be the orientation reproduced the most precisely. Thus, the oblique effect seemed to be not purely gravitationally or egocentrically defined but, rather, to depend on a subjective gravitational reference frame tilted in the same direction as body tilts.     

Forming subjective representations of subjective representations: evidence of a subjective status bias

In 3 studies and 2 pilot experiments, the author examined whether attending to the subjective status of mental representations would affect the ways humans view representational contents. The author found that simple drawing tasks were executed differently depending on whether or not the subject of the drawing was defined as a mental content (belief, imagination, perception). The results challenged particular lay epistemological concepts. They were partly accounted for by Gricean conversational rules (H. P. Grice, 1975), but the author postulated a subjective status bias to fully explain them. The discussion and recommendations for research center on the nature of this bias and relate it either to a tendency to conceive subjective representations as vague shadows of reality, or to an increased impact of the law of pregnance.