Enfleshing the Erotic

Abstract

An embodied theological ethic of human sexuality must engage two specific tasks: (1) articulate a theological explanation of the body that can frame critical reflection on the right ordering of relationships at the macro, social-relational level and (2) celebrate the erotic as an essential, creative contour of human sexual experience at the micro, interpersonal level. This essay is divided into two sections. In the first section, I explore the significance of the body in theological and ethical reflection in an attempt to distill an embodied theological ethic of human sexuality that can level a critique against the sinful social realities of heterosexism and sexism. In the second part, I develop the ethic further so as to carry moral weight within sexual practices. I celebrate the erotic as the creative dimension of human sexuality that encompasses desire and pleasure. I reflect on desire and pleasure individually in light of embodied experience and ground each within an ethic of mutuality to ensure goodness, rightness, and the doing of justice in all sexual relationships.     

Parental desire and fertility preservation in assigned male at birth transgender people living in Belgium

Abstract

Introduction: Transgender people who chose to proceed with gender affirming hormonal and/or surgical therapy, may face reduced options for fulfilling their parental desire in the future. The ideas and concerns of adult transgender people regarding fertility preservation and parental desire have never been reported in a large, non-clinical sample of assigned male at birth (AMAB) transgender people.

Methods: A web-based survey on fertility and parenthood in (binary and non-binary) transgender people was conducted in Belgium. AMAB people were selected for this analysis.

Results: We included 254 AMAB persons, of which 196 (77.2%) self-identified as transgender women (TW), 14 (5.5%) as cross-dressers and 44 (17.3%) as gender non-binary (GNB) people. Fifty-five (21.6%) respondents had a current/future parental desire, parental desire was already fulfilled in 81 (31.9%) and not present in 57 people (22.4%) (other: 19.2%). TW were more likely to express a parental desire, compared to GNB people and cross-dressers (P?=?0.004). In total, 196 AMAB people previously sought medical assistance, of which 30 (15.3%) considered the loss of fertility due to the transitioning process undesirable. The majority (68.2%) did not want fertility preservation (FP). Fourteen people (9.8%) had proceeded with FP. The main reasons not to proceed with FP included not feeling the need (70; 68.0%), not desiring a genetic link with (future) child(ren) (20; 19.4%) and having to postpone hormone treatment (15; 14.6%). TW were more likely to have a parental desire and to have cryopreserved or to consider cryopreserving gametes, compared to GNB people.

Conclusion: Parental desire and FP use were lower in the current non-clinical sample than in previous research on clinical samples. This can possibly be explained by the barriers transgender people face when considering fertility options, including postponing hormone therapy. Also, GNB persons have different needs for gender affirming treatment and FP.     

The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive.     

Capitalism and the Banality of Desire

ABSTRACT

This paper elaborates on Todd McGowan’s perspicacious, psychoanalytic explanation of capitalism’s resilience, due to its formidable ideological insinuation into the banal micro-desires of consumers. I outline his contention that capitalism’s false promise of future satisfaction is subverted by the psychical change indicated by Freud’s re-evaluation of the desire/satisfaction relationship. This is elaborated on via Lacan’s claim, somewhat underplayed in McGowan’s reflections, that desire is essentially narcissistic. Lacan’s claim raises the stakes of capitalism’s psychic appeal, but also indicates how Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a point of intervention. I briefly point to the consistency between Lacan’s conception of the actualized subject and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s articulation of desire in terms of “the process” and the complex metaphor of “desiring machines”. I finally turn to ?i?ek’s conception of the developing world as “the place of rupture” and a major fault line internal to capitalism that threatens to disrupt its operation.     

The Lure of Pan(en)theism

Abstract

This response to Karmen MacKendrick’s work follows the thematic trail of desire through Divine Enticement (2012), seeking to clarify the relationship in MacKendrick’s work between God and creation. While MacKendrick expresses an initial desire for an “immanent divine,” especially in relation to the work of St. Augustine, she later feels more drawn to “a world that in its beauty calls out the name of its creator” than to a world “in which the creator is simply present.” This brief engagement explores MacKendrick’s logic of seduction in relation to the panentheist and pantheist theologies of Cusa and Bruno, ultimately suggesting that “immanence” only collapses the distance of desire if creation is understood to be finite and self-identical.     

Yu in the Xunzi: toward a precise understanding

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others.     

Finding hope

Abstract

This paper defends a theory of hope according to which hopes are composed of a desire and a belief that the object of the desire is possible. Although belief plus desire theories of hope are now widely rejected, this is due to important oversights. One is a failure to recognize the relation that hope-constituting desires and beliefs must stand in to constitute a hope. A second is an oversimplification of the explanatory power of hope-constituting desires. The final portion of the paper uses an enhanced understanding of the psychology of hope to make progress on normative questions about hoping well.     

Response to Stuart Rennie's ‘Elegant variations’

Abstract

In Happiness, Tabensky equates the notion of happiness to Aristotelian eudaimonia. I shall claim that doing so amounts to equating two concepts that moderns cannot conceptually equate, namely, the good for a person and the good person or good life. In §2 I examine the way in which Tabensky deals with this issue and claim that his idea of happiness is as problematic for us moderns as is any translation of the notion of eudaimonia in terms of happiness. Naturally, if happiness understood as eudaimonia is ambiguous, so will be the notion of a desire for happiness, which we find at the core of Tabensky’s whole project. In §3 I shall be concerned with another aspect of the desire for happiness; namely, its alleged self-justifying nature. I will attempt to undermine the idea that this desire is self-justifying by undermining the criterion on which Tabensky takes self-justifiability to rest, i.e. its basicness, but also by shedding doubt on the idea that there is such a thing as an ultimate basic principle and, even if there were, that it is what Tabensky calls the eudaimon principle.     

Is Mother Other?

Abstract

The discourse of maternality figures a contentious site for feminist theology. If figured in terms of a fecund womb, maternality risks reinscribing women in a masculine symbolic order of world-making that has long conflated women’s differences with motherhood, narrowly defined in terms of fecundity. After considering the ways identifying female sexual difference with motherhood reifies a masculine model of subjectivity, this paper turns to Lynne Huffer’s reading of feminist psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray to suggest that maternality has the potential to interrupt the self-same movement of masculine discourse and engender an ethical space of difference of and for the other. Examining Irigaray’s interweaving of maternality with pleasure to create space for women’s desires, this paper concludes that the ambiguity of desires through which maternality is constituted challenges the care-driven, natality-centered discourse of maternality itself. As a scene of unresolved desire between flesh and discourse, immanence and transcendence, self and other, maternality can be narrated to disrupt views of mother as origin that would otherwise return motherhood to a figure of sameness and to construct a possibility of desire for intersubjective becoming that is at once beyond narration and entirely concrete. Maternality thus presents desires unrecognizable within a prevailing symbolic framework in a way that bears witness to the disruptiveness of those desires and engenders radical alterity.     

Writing Desire,or Being Seduced by Karmen MacKendrick

Abstract

This essay explores the intimate relation between writing and desire in Karmen MacKendrick’s work. It uses this relation to connect MacKendrick’s work to work from Georges Bataille and Leo Bersani.     

Who is a homosexual? A critique of the heterosexual‐homosexual dimension

Abstract

The heterosexual‐homosexual distinction as a construction inhibits appreciation of the diversity of sexual experience by encouraging use of static labels to classify people's continually evolving sexual histories. Distinguishing sexual preference may expedite comprehension of sexual acts, but is counterproductive when considering whole persons. We question the need for biological explanations of homosexuality and propose that “coming out” as homosexual is a personal choice to be celebrated, not a biological abnormality. We perceive sexuality as merely one aspect of per‐sonhood. When people instead see self‐proclaimed homosexuals as “homosexuals and only homosexuals” sexual behavior overshadows other salient individual characteristics, and sexual desire becomes inseparable from personality style.     

A Research Inquiry into Some American Women's Sexual Concerns and Problems

Abstract

The New View of Women's Sexual Problems is supported by findings of the 1993-94 Ellison/Zilbergeld sexuality survey of 2,632 mostly white, college-educated women born 1905-1977 (Ellison, 2000; see questionnaire at www.womenssexualities.com). Sexual experiences of women with previous year sexual partners are reported. The most important sexual concerns or problems in the previous year of 1,637 women are categorized: 34% desire/frequency (low sexual desire, desire discrepancy); 28.5% physical responsiveness (female arousal, orgasm; male partners' erectile difficulties, ejaculatory control); 16% lovemaking (sexual technique); 7.5% finding a partner; < 5% sexual relationship, fertility, pregnancy, STDs/safe sex, the woman's body/health, non-monogamy, orientation; 547 others reported none. Exemplary quotes from respondents are included. Sex therapy for low sexual desire is addressed. Recommended solutions emphasize individual differences and the multidimensionality of sexuality.     

When insecurity dampens desire: Attachment anxiety in men amplifies the decline in sexual desire during the early years of romantic relationships

Sexual desire is typically high during early relationship stages and decreases gradually over time. In the present research, we adopted an attachment-theoretical perspective to investigate why sexual desire for romantic partners erodes more rapidly for some people than others. We employed two samples of developing relationships (dating couples, N = 62; and newlyweds, N = 175) and examined the effects of attachment insecurities on sexual desire in prospective longitudinal designs. Results showed that attachment anxiety moderated the trajectory of men's sexual desire, such that over time, highly anxious men declined in desiring their partner, whereas less anxious men's desire did not drop. Attachment avoidance also predicted lower levels of initial desire in both sexes. These findings suggest that avoidance generally interferes with relationship initiation for both sexes, whereas anxiety in men interferes with the maintenance of desire over time, possibly because of sensitivity to increasing interdependence.     

Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases

I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I then clarify the nature of the moral distinction in double effect cases and how it can be used to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of agents rather than the moral status of acts. The agent's blameworthiness is reduced not by his lack of intention but by his desire not to bring about the side-effect, and the 'counterfactual test' can be used to determine whether he desires the effect in acting. In my version, the DDE has its rationale in virtue ethics; it is not liable to abuse as the traditional version is; and it makes more plausible distinctions when applied to standard examples.     

Affect,Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation

Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.     

Hope as an irreducible concept

I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I question the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope.     

Maternal intrusion: Its roots and consequences

Abstract

Behind an intrusive mother’s view of her actual child lies a disproportionate, hidden desire to revive an ideal relationship with a perfect mother. The resulting image of an idealized child then becomes a strategic aspect of the mother’s own identity, representing an idealized figure from her own past. As the mother’s idealization is disturbed by the reality of the child, the mother experiences the situation between herself and the baby as “pathological,” that is, disruptive to her. She then attempts to repair the idealization by resisting any change in the status of her relationship to her child, even as the child grows older. Her rigidity in this regard necessarily excludes a paternal presence that could challenge or change the mother–infant idealized dyad. The mother’s orientation is also contradictory to, and acts as a resistance to, psychoanalytic therapeutic interventions, which aim at any “change.”     

Can desires determine ends?

According to a common view of human agency, desires determine at least some of the ends that agents set for themselves. In this paper, I argue that this view is false. I show that without reason’s ability to determine the means to an end it is impossible to determine ends. Furthermore, even when an end is determined in light of a desire, only reason can make sense of the distinction between an end and merely a means to that end. In fact, in many cases the end which is determined in light of desires is to remove these desires, rather than to “serve and obey” them. Hence, reason is necessary for determining our ends, and thus explaining the teleological aspect of agency.     

Age moderates the link between relationship desire and life satisfaction among singles

Higher desire for a romantic partner has been shown to be associated with lower life satisfaction for singles, but research has not considered whether the strength of this association might vary across age groups. We collected data from single participants (N = 3057) across a broad age range (18 to 75 years of age, mean = 36.12, standard deviation [SD] = 12.34) to examine age as a moderator of the relationship between desire for a partner and singles' life satisfaction. Our results suggest that having greater desire for a partner is associated with lower life satisfaction for older (1 SD above the mean or 48.46 years) versus younger (1 SD below the mean or 23.78 years) individuals. We also found some evidence that this age-dependent association was stronger for women than men. Further, this interaction effect remained largely unchanged controlling for participants' attachment anxiety or avoidance. This study highlights the importance of considering how singlehood may play out differently for individuals at different life stages.