How should utilitarians think about the future?

Abstract

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.     

Abstract: Scenario Planning,Art or Science?

This article will argue that there is a science of scenario planning; or at least a logos, a logic, a scenariology. Scenario planning is not predictive. But a good set of scenarios, scientifically developed, can reliably and predictably change minds. Scenario planning is both art and science. In joining the club of the sciences, scenario planning calls for a new kind of membership, or a new kind of science, one that, following Stuart Kauffman, relies on the importance of story. Hegel tells us that all stories, all narratives include a conflict between desire and the law, intention, and necessity. Scenarios provide a way for communities to frame their intentions. They thereby effect “downward causality” on the present in order to project the present toward a preferred future. In fulfilling the promise of this new kind of science, scenario planning breaks with positivistic science, but without falling into a postmodern nihilism. Without setting out to do so, the discipline of scenario planning introduces us to a new epistemology, a new way of knowing the truth. Drawing on pragmatism, Wittgenstein, and Richard Rorty, this article reaches the conclusion that, for scenario planners, the future replaces objectivity as the horizon for justification. What is true? We'll see.     

Logical information and epistemic space

Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space. Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries.     

Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts

ABSTRACT

The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what (if anything) would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors certain ways of acting and valuing. Eklund then offers a metasemantic view that he thinks can provide the best solution to this problem. In this reply to Eklund, I argue that Eklund’s treatment of the problem and his solution re-entangle metaphysical and metasemantic issues that ought to be kept separate. I also argue that there is a purely metaphysical solution to the problem at hand, which Eklund’s own solution seems to implicitly rely upon. While these criticisms do not suggest that Eklund’s positive view is false, they do undermine some of the broader lessons that Eklund hopes to draw from the view.     

Reducing the risk of bias in health behaviour change trials: Improving trial design,reporting or bias assessment criteria? A review and case study

Objective: It has been suggested that randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of health behaviour change (HBC) interventions are less rigorously designed than – for example– drug trials. This study presents an approach to clarifying whether this is due to poor trial design, incomplete trial reporting and/or the inappropriateness of commonly applied risk of bias assessment criteria.

Design: First, a framework of key sources of bias and common strategies for reducing bias risk is developed based on a literature review. Second, we describe the design of a multi-site RCT evaluating the cost-effectiveness of an HIV-treatment adherence intervention (case study). The choices made by the multidisciplinary team trying to minimise the risk of bias are compared against the risk of bias framework.

Main outcome measures: Implementation of common strategies for reducing the risk of bias in the case study; alternative or additional strategies applied; a justification for each deviation from the risk of bias framework.

Results: Most of the common strategies for reducing the risk of bias could be implemented. Alternative strategies were developed for minimising the risk of performance bias and contamination. Several additional, domain-specific risk of bias strategies were implemented.

Conclusions: The literature provides useful guidance for reducing the risk of bias in HBC trials. Yet, the case study suggests that HBC trial designers may face specific challenges that require alternative/additional measures for reducing the risk of bias. Using the risk of bias justification table (RATIONALE) could lead to better-designed HBC trials, more comprehensive trial reports and the data necessary for evaluating the appropriateness of commonly applied risk of bias assessment criteria to HBC trials.     

Kierkegaard’s Regulative Sacrifice: A Post-Kantian Reading of Fear and Trembling

Abstract

The present paper suggests to consider Kierkegaard’s use of Abraham’s story in Fear and Trembling in regulative terms, that is, to consider it as a model – not for our moral behaviour but rather for our religious behaviour. To do so, I first rely on recent literature to argue that Kierkegaard should be regarded as a distinctively post-Kantian philosopher: namely, a philosopher who goes beyond Kant in a way that is nevertheless true to the spirit of Kant’s original critical philosophy. Then, I present a post-Kantian reading of Fear and Trembling, focusing on the problematic implications that result from comparing this text with Hegel’s theory of recognition. Finally, I submit that sacrifice in Fear and Trembling is a regulative notion in a Kantian sense. This interpretation addresses some of the most problematic aspects of the text. I conclude that the regulativity of sacrifice may be regarded as an important and perhaps an essential component of Kierkegaard’s overall philosophical strategy.     

Education as hospitality: welcoming foreigners into a common world

ABSTRACT

The present article aims at examining the specific difficulties that the school form – the modern educational institution par excellence – faces in order to attain hospitality as the raison d'être of the educational process. Educational activity is here understood as a form of hospitality which involves caring for the newcomers and for the physical and symbolic place into which they arrive. A cinematographical narrative drawn from Bégaudeau’s Entre les Murs supplements this analysis of some of the challenges we are faced with when dealing with students from different national backgrounds, beliefs and forms of life.     

Semantics and the sacred

ABSTRACT

This article looks at four different scholarly perspectives on ‘sacred’ – the ineffable sacred, the experienced sacred, the polarized sacred and the contextualized sacred – in order to draw out their implicit presuppositions about meaning. The first two stances presuppose that meaning depends on what bits of language are about (referentialism), and the other two stances presuppose that meaning depends on relations between bits of language (holism). The article concludes three things: these prominent views of ‘sacred’ rest on usually implicit or unrecognized assumptions about the nature of meaning; some of those assumptions explain why certain theories are contentious and problematic and others ground more promising and productive approaches.     

A Model of Neutralization Techniques

ABSTRACT

Neutralizations are important explanations for the rise and persistence of deviant behavior. We can find many different and overlapping techniques of neutralizations in the literature, which may be a reason for inconsistent research findings on the use and influence of neutralization techniques. Therefore, by following both a deductive and an inductive approach, this article develops a model that covers these techniques in a logical way. This is a novel approach in studying neutralization techniques. We distinguish four categories of neutralizations: distorting the facts, negating the norm, blaming the circumstances, and hiding behind oneself. Based on a broad inventory of neutralizations that are identified in the literature – something that has not been done before – we operationalized each of the four categories into three techniques, each of which consists of five subtechniques. The resulting model aims to reduce the risk of arbitrariness in the selection of techniques for empirical research and thereby facilitates more consistent future research findings. The model also aims to help better understand how neutralizations work.     

From Experience to Relation: Laszlo and Inayatullah,Two Futurists Compared

Humans have two futures: either liberty or uncertainty. In liberty, humans can forecast a vision of the future. However, in uncertainty, humans must forecast multiple futures. This article compares Ervin Laszlo's theory of the liberty future with Sohail Inayatullah's theory of the uncertainty future. Additionally, this article analyzes these two futurists through the lens of Martin Buber, and I argue that the future represents reality not to the “I” of the combination I–It but to the “I” of Buber's preferred combination of I–Thou.     

The Livingness of God; or,the Place of Substance and Dynamism in a Theology of the Divine Perfections

Theological reflection on the divine character is serviceable to the extent that it prevents the livingness of the triune God – and so the subject matter of theology – from disappearing behind rigorous consideration of the perfections themselves. The topic of God's livingness, in other words, informs the locus de Deo as a whole. The present article begins with a biblical‐dogmatic proposal for the form and content of this livingness: God's life in and for the world, it is proposed, is at every point rooted in the life which God has from himself as Father, Son and Spirit. Two clarifications are subsequently offered. An appeal to the livingness of God should be distinguished both from an abstract rejection of ‘substance’ language and from a conceptualization of reality under a general theory of the forward advancement of the world process.     

Sufficiency and Satiable Values

This article identifies value‐satiability sufficientarianism as a distinctive version of the sufficiency view, which has been ignored in the literature on distributive justice. This is unfortunate because value‐satiability sufficientarianism is much better equipped than alternative sufficiency views to cope with the standard objections against sufficiency. Most often, sufficientarianism refers to satiability as a feature of moral principles and reasons. But value‐satiability sufficientarianism also invokes satiability in the space of value‐theory, as it determines the sufficiency threshold at the point where justice‐relevant values have been completely fulfilled. The article gives examples of how this view is widely apparent in the literature, and it provides some reasons in its favour. It then presents the two standard objections against sufficientarianism – the threshold objection and the indifference objection – and argues that these critiques do not apply to value‐satiability sufficientarianism. The general argument of the article therefore proves sufficientarianism more difficult to refute than is commonly credited.     

Leone Ebreo in Tullia d’Aragona’s Dialogo. Between Varchi’s legacy and philosophical autonomy

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the impact of the philosophical structure of Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi d’amore on the construction of Tullia d’Aragona’s Dialogo della infinità di amore. Analysing both the explicit references to and the indirect citations of Leone’s Dialoghi, I aim to demonstrate how the reinterpretation of some fundamental topics of this work – such as the re-evaluation of the sensual aspect of human love and the distinction between honest and vulgar love – lies at the heart of Tullia’s dialogue. The article also intends to shed light on the complex role of Benedetto Varchi in the elaboration of these issues by d’Aragona, who for the final revision of her text could have relied – as she did for her poems – on his collaboration.     

Exemptions,Sincerity and Pastafarianism

Because Pastafarianism – or the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster – is a parodic religion, common sense suggests its ‘adherents’ should not receive exemptions. However, the prima facie case for excluding Pastafarians is complicated by the fact that many assert their religion is as legitimate as any other religion and that their beliefs are genuine. Indeed, Pastafarians have already obtained exemptions in various countries. Taking the dominant liberal egalitarian, integrity-based approach to exemptions, this article investigates whether there is a principled, objective basis for excluding Pastafarians that accounts for their assertions. To that end, I examine four tests: a religion, seriousness, obligation, and sincerity test. I assess whether each test can actually exclude Pastafarians, and if it could, can it do so in a way that is consistent with liberal egalitarian commitments. I argue that only a sincerity test – based on consistent behaviour and a willingness to bear the costs of one's beliefs – satisfies both of these conditions, but, on a weak and contingent basis.     

Interpretive bias,repressive coping,and trait anxiety

Objectives: According to vigilance–avoidance theory, repressors have an avoidant interpretive bias, i.e., they interpret ambiguous self-relevant situations in a nonthreatening fashion. This study sought to demarcate the range of situations associated with avoidant interpretive bias in repressors. Design: Four groups of participants, representing the four combinations of low- and high-trait anxiety and defensiveness, were identified. Those low in trait anxiety and high in defensiveness were categorized as repressors. Methods: Participants (N = 163) rated their likelihood of making both threatening and nonthreatening interpretations of 32 ambiguous scenarios over four domains: social, intellectual, physical, and health. Half the scenarios were self-relevant and half were other relevant. Brief measures of state anxiety were taken after each likelihood rating. Results: Repressors displayed an avoidant interpretive bias for ambiguous threats in the social and intellectual domains but not the health or physical domains. This was due to repressors' low level of trait anxiety rather than their high defensiveness. Conclusions: Individuals high in trait anxiety are especially sensitive to situations involving social evaluation but not those characterized by danger to their health or physical well-being.     

Beyond the twee: Thuy’s practical expression of living the Mercy Education Value of hospitality

This article utilises hermeneutic phenomenology as a theoretical framework for reflecting upon and interpreting the Mercy Education Value of hospitality. It describes an incident involving the author’s encounter with a member of staff upon his new appointment in a Catholic secondary college formed in the Mercy Tradition. Through this article, the possibilities opened by such an encounter for hermeneutic phenomenology are explored using van Manen’s lifeworld existentials as guides to reflection upon the described incident. The four lifeworld existentials are lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality) and lived other (relationality). In using these as guides to reflection, it is argued that some insights into the Mercy value of hospitality may be gleaned, namely that to be Mercy involves: (1) exceeding the carefully and socially programmed how are you – fine exchange; (2) an encounter with the other – the stranger – in whom is to be found the person of Jesus Christ, in which both participants are transformed; and (3) taking a risk – pushing boundaries so as to enter into relationship with the other.     

Reading On Certainty through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism,Dogmatism and the ‘Groundlessness of our Believing’

Abstract

While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On Certainty, or so it seems, the only right response to someone with different certainties is a reproach like ‘Fool!’ or ‘Heretic!’. This article aims to show that On Certainty need not be taken to prove Cavell wrong. It explains that Wittgenstein, in line with the first two parts of The Claim of Reason, does not reject scepticism out of hand but rather questions the sceptic’s self-understanding. Using arguments from Part Three of The Claim, the article moreover argues that a confrontation with divergence calls for self-examination rather than self-righteousness. Precisely because Wittgenstein acknowledges ‘the groundlessness of our believing’ or, in Cavellian terms, ‘the truth of skepticism’, he is not the authoritarian thinker that some have taken him to be.     

Aspects of identity: From the inner-outer metaphor to a tetrapartite model of the self

Abstract

We review a program of research on identity orientations – the relative importance or value that individuals place on various identity attributes when constructing their self-definitions. We first provide a brief history of the development of our measure of identity orientations – the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ) – after which we present our tetrapartite model of the self that distinguishes among individual, relational, public, and collective aspects of identity. We then review previous research on how the four identity orientations uniquely influence cognition, emotion, and behavior, and close by highlighting what we see as interesting and important directions for future research.     

Intended responses to romantic partners’ annoying behaviours vary with willpower beliefs

When a romantic partner behaves in an annoying way – for example, by leaving a mess – we might respond with frustration or understanding. Responses may vary with contextual factors, including whether the partner could be mentally fatigued or depleted. We hypothesized that limited willpower theorists – who believe self-control diminishes with use – might be especially likely to consider their partner’s preceding mental exertion. Two preregistered studies (combined N = 428) examined participants’ responses to four hypothetical scenarios. Limited theorists responded more compassionately to infractions performed after fatiguing days than to those performed after relaxing days; non-limited theorists responded more consistently, regardless of context. Beliefs about one’s own willpower, rather than beliefs about one’s partner’s willpower, can affect how people respond to their partner’s undesirable behaviours.     

Transformational leadership,psychological empowerment,and flow at work

ABSTRACT

Frequent experiences of flow – an enjoyable state of optimal challenge – at work are associated with many positive individual and organizational outcomes. In our research, we examine how leaders affect subordinates’ flow experiences through subordinates’ work-related self-concept. Specifically, on the basis of self-concept theory, we propose that transformational leaders affect followers’ work-related self-concept, which we construe as followers’ psychological empowerment, consisting of the four sub-facets of meaning, competence, self-determination and impact. We further propose that psychological empowerment is positively related to flow experiences at work. In sum, we thus hypothesize that the effect of transformational leadership on employees’ flow experiences is mediated by psychological empowerment. Additionally, we propose that this indirect effect is moderated such that it is stronger for employees holding a formal leadership position. We tested the model with two two-wave questionnaire studies with employees (Study 1: N = 307 at time 1; N = 60 at time 2; Study 2: N = 611 at time 1; N = 271 at time 2) from different organizations. Path models reveal support for the mediation hypotheses in both samples but not for the moderated mediation hypothesis.