Developmental changes in preschoolers' ability to distinguish memories of performed,pretended, and imagined actions

The goals of the research presented in this article were to: a) examine changes in pre-schoolers' ability to distinguish among memories of performed, pretended, and imagined episodes, and b) use source monitoring as a tool for inferring the nature of preschoolers' conceptualizations of pretense. The participants, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, performed, pretended, and imagined performing actions. After a short delay, they identified the origin of their memories in a 3-alternative, forced-choice procedure. Results showed significant improvements between ages 3 and 4 in the ability to distinguish: a) performed actions from imagined actions, and b) performed actions from pretended actions. However, 4- and 5- year-olds confused memories of pretended and imagined actions. These results were replicated in a second experiment with 3- and 4-year-olds, using a simpler 2-alternative, forced-choice format. The findings suggest that, by age 4, children represent both pretense and imagination in memory according to cognitive operation features associated with generating a fictional mental state. Thus, 4-year-olds may recognize that constructing a mental, alternative reality is an important part of pretense.     

Aging and qualitative characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined complex events

Older and younger adults' memory for perceived and imagined events was examined with a procedure in which everyday situations are simulated in the laboratory. Subjects perceived some situations and imagined others. Later, they were asked to rate their memory for various aspects of these situations (e.g., amount of perceptual detail, thoughts and feelings). A recall test followed the ratings. On the rating scale, for both perceived and imagined events, older subjects reported better memory for their thoughts and feelings than did younger subjects. In addition, on the recall test, older subjects produced more thoughts and feelings than did younger subjects, whereas younger subjects produced more perceptual and spatial information. These results suggest that older subjects may not inhibit personal information (e.g., thoughts and feelings), and this information may interfere with memory for other aspects of information, such as perceptual and contextual details (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).     

Discriminating memories for actual and imagined taste experiences: a reality monitoring approach

Blindfolded subjects tasted 4 common fruits and imagined the taste of 4 others while focusing on either a few (low sensory detail [SD] or many (high SD) of the fruit's sensory qualities. One week later, subjects judged whether each of 12 fruit names represented a fruit that was previously tasted, imagined tasted, or new (reality monitoring). The major finding was a significant interaction between source (imagined, perceived) and SD level (low, high). Source monitoring was accurate for imagined and perceived fruits in the low SD condition and for perceived fruits in the high SD condition. As predicted, subjects tended to misattribute memories for imagined fruits to perception in the high SD condition. The findings are discussed with reference to the Johnson-Raye reality monitoring model and recent work on memory source confusions.     

Prototypical actions with objects are more easily imagined than atypical actions

Tool use is an important facet of everyday life, though sometimes it is necessary to use tools in ways that do not fit within their typical functions. Here we asked participants to imagine characters using objects based on instructions that fit the prototypical actions for the object or were atypical in a novel object-action imagery task. Atypical action instructions either described sensible, substitute uses of the object, or actions that were bizarre but possible. Participants were better able to imagine the prototypical than atypical actions, but no effect of bizarreness was found. We additionally assessed inter-individual differences in movement imagery ability using two objective tests. Performance in the object-action imagery task correlated with the movement imagery tests, providing a link between motor simulations and mental imagery ability.     

No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and extension

In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we argue in the current study, their claim that people develop “unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino (2016), while including several additional variables meant to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study memory for moral and immoral actions are discussed.     

False memories for script actions in a mugging account

Abstract

A number of cross-language priming experiments are reported that evaluate whether word meanings in the first and second language are represented in common or separate systems. A masked priming procedure was used on the assumption that when prime awareness is limited, any priming effects directly reveal the underlying structure of the semantic system. Primes were presented in the subjects' first language, while targets were in their second language. Priming effects were obtained for word pairs that were semantically highly similar but not translation equivalents, for example fence-haie (= hedge in French), suggesting that words in the two languages share common elements of semantic code. Priming was also obtained between translation equivalents which, in conjunction with the results for semantically similar pairs, is most naturally interpreted in terms of partially shared semantic representations. However, no masked priming effects were obtained between associated pairs of relatively low semantic similarity, for example shoe-pied (= foot in French), whereas such pairs did produce an effect when primes were unmasked. The results are discussed in terms of limitations on the semantic activation produced by masked words, and the role of collocational relationships in priming between associated words in the same language.     

Reality monitoring of performed and imagined interactive events: developmental and contextual effects

Age differences in reality monitoring of interactive events were examined among 4-year-olds, 8-year-olds, 12-year-olds, and adults. Participants engaged in some interactions and imagined others. Afterward, they were asked to determine whether each action was performed, imagined, or new. This memory test was repeated 1 week later. The 4-year-olds had more difficulty discriminating imagined actions than the two oldest age groups. Imagined actions were more often confused with performed ones than the reverse, though this bias was significant only for the two younger age groups. Reality monitoring decreased over time, especially for imagined items. Activities in which the participant was the agent of action were discriminated better than those in which someone else was the agent of action. Object use during the activity increased the discrimination of imagined actions, especially after the delay. Similarity among actions had no effect. Implications for child eyewitness testimony are discussed.     

Memory of imagined actions: Imagining oneself or another person

Summary In two experiments, three modes of action encoding were compared: overt enactment, self-imagination, and imagination of another person performing the actions. Overt enactment and imagining self-performance of an action are mainly assumed to involve motor-kinesthetic representations, whereas imagining another person is thought to place more demands on the visual representational system. Previous paired-associate learning data on memory of action verbs showed that motor-kinesthetic imagery hinders pair integration, but that pair integration is facilitated by visual imagery. The comparison of free and cued recall of actions learned from lists of concrete nouns supports the assumption that the representational properties of overt enactment and self-imagination differ from those involved in the imagining of another person.     

The reminiscence bump without memories: The distribution of imagined word-cued and important autobiographical memories in a hypothetical 70-year-old

The reminiscence bump is the disproportionate number of autobiographical memories dating from adolescence and early adulthood. It has often been ascribed to a consolidation of the mature self in the period covered by the bump. Here we stripped away factors relating to the characteristics of autobiographical memories per se, most notably factors that aid in their encoding or retention, by asking students to generate imagined word-cued and imagined ‘most important’ autobiographical memories of a hypothetical, prototypical 70-year-old of their own culture and gender. We compared the distribution of these fictional memories with the distributions of actual word-cued and most important autobiographical memories in a sample of 61–70-year-olds. We found a striking similarity between the temporal distributions of the imagined memories and the actual memories. These results suggest that the reminiscence bump is largely driven by constructive, schematic factors at retrieval, thereby challenging most existing theoretical accounts.     

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting of performed and observed bizarre and familiar actions

To investigate whether people show retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) for bizarre and familiar actions that they performed or observed, three experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, participants performed bizarre and familiar actions with different objects during learning (e.g., pencil: balance the pencil across the cup, sharpen the pencil). They repeatedly performed a set of the bizarre or familiar actions during retrieval practice. After a distracter task, participants' cued recall was tested. Participants showed RIF for both bizarre and familiar actions. In Experiment 2, half of the participants performed the bizarre and familiar actions themselves; the other half observed the experimenter performing the actions. Replicating the results of Experiment 1, participants who performed the actions showed RIF for bizarre and familiar actions. In contrast, participants who observed the actions did not show RIF for either action type. Experiment 3 examined whether this lack of RIF for observed actions occurred due to a lack of active recall during retrieval practice; it did. Overall, the three experiments demonstrated RIF for both bizarre and familiar performed and observed actions. A distinctiveness account of the results is provided.     

Infants' understanding of actions performed by mechanical devices

Recent research suggests that 9-month-old infants tested in a modified version of the A-not-B search task covertly imitate actions performed by the experimenter. The current study examines whether infants also simulate actions performed by mechanical devices, and whether this varies with whether or not they have been familiarized with the devices and their function. In Experiment 1, infants observed hiding and retrieving actions performed by a pair of mechanical claws on the A-trials, and then searched for the hidden toy on the B-trial. In Experiment 2, infants were first familiarized with the experimenter and the claws but not their function. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with the function of the claws. The results revealed that search errors were at chance levels in Experiments 1 and 2, but a significant proportion of the infants showed the A-not-B error in Experiment 3. These results suggest that 9-month-old infants are less likely to simulate observed actions performed by mechanical devices than by human agents, unless they are familiarized with the function of the devices so that their actions are perceived as goal-directed.     

The effects of schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects

We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schema‐consistent actions and schema‐inconsistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects and schema‐inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent items than for schema‐consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema‐inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema‐consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema‐inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item‐specific information of schema‐inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema‐consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters than for schema‐consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema‐consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

Long-term memory for performed and observed actions: Retrieval awareness and source monitoring

The self-performed task (SPT) paradigm was employed to investigate incidental memory for action events, focusing on states of awareness at retrieval (Remembering–Knowing) and source monitoring in performed and observed actions, at delays of 1 and 2 weeks. Recognition was better for performed than observed actions, but this effect was visible only after 1 week of retention. Conversely, observed actions were associated with better source memory at both delays. When the source was correctly identified, performed and observed actions were accompanied by equal proportions of Remember judgements. However, when source monitoring was incorrect, performed actions were more frequently associated with a feeling of re-experiencing the original event, thus suggesting an enactment-related recollective superiority, although secondary to the availability of reliable contextual information.     

Long-term memory for performed and observed actions: retrieval awareness and source monitoring

The self-performed task (SPT) paradigm was employed to investigate incidental memory for action events, focusing on states of awareness at retrieval (Remembering-Knowing) and source monitoring in performed and observed actions, at delays of 1 and 2 weeks. Recognition was better for performed than observed actions, but this effect was visible only after 1 week of retention. Conversely, observed actions were associated with better source memory at both delays. When the source was correctly identified, performed and observed actions were accompanied by equal proportions of Remember judgements. However, when source monitoring was incorrect, performed actions were more frequently associated with a feeling of re-experiencing the original event, thus suggesting an enactment-related recollective superiority, although secondary to the availability of reliable contextual information.     

How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals.

The authors explore whether people explain intentional actions performed by groups differently from actions performed by individuals, A theoretical framework is offered that distinguishes between 2 modes of explanation: the agent's reasons (beliefs or desires in light of which the agent decided to act) and causal histories of reasons (CHRs; factors that preceded and brought about the agent's reasons). The authors develop the hypothesis that people use more CHR explanations when explaining group actions than when explaining individual actions. Study 1 demonstrates this asymmetry. Studies 2 and 3 explore 2 necessary conditions for the asymmetry: that the group be perceived as an aggregate of individual actors rather thin as a jointly acting group and that explainers have general information available about the group. Discussion focuses on people's perception of groups as entities and agents.     

Opposite actions of dopamine on aversive and appetitive memories in the crab

The understanding of how the reinforcement is represented in the central nervous system during memory formation is a current issue in neurobiology. Several studies in insects provide evidence of the instructive role of biogenic amines during the learning and memory process. In insects it was widely accepted that dopamine (DA) mediates aversive reinforcements. However, the idea of DA being exclusively involved in aversive memory has been challenged in recent studies. Here, we study the involvement of DA during aversive and appetitive memories in the crab Chasmagnathus. We found that DA-receptor antagonists impair aversive memory consolidation, in agreement with previous reports in insects, while administration of DA facilitates memory formation after a weak training protocol. In contrast, DA treatment during appetitive training was found to impair formation of long-term appetitive memory. In addition, as a first step in elucidating the neuroanatomical correlates of DA action on memory, we mapped dopaminergic neurons in the central nervous system of the crab. Results of the current study, together with those obtained in a previous work about the role of octopamine (OA), suggest that both amines (DA and OA) play a dual action in memory processes. On the one hand, DA and OA mediate the aversive and the appetitive signals, respectively, throughout training, while on the other hand, they interfere with the formation of memory of the opposite sign (DA in appetitive and OA in aversive). Our results support a new understanding about the way appetitive and aversive stimuli are processed during memory formation to ensure adaptive behavior.     

Cues for self-recognition in point-light displays of actions performed in synchrony with music

Self–other discrimination was investigated with point-light displays in which actions were presented with or without additional auditory information. Participants first executed different actions (dancing, walking and clapping) in time with music. In two subsequent experiments, they watched point-light displays of their own or another participant’s recorded actions, and were asked to identify the agent (self vs. other). Manipulations were applied to the visual information (actions differing in complexity, and degradation from 15 to 2 point-lights within the same clapping action) and to the auditory information (self-generated vs. externally-generated vs. none). Results indicate that self-recognition was better than chance in all conditions and was highest when observing relatively unconstrained patterns of movement. Auditory information did not increase accuracy even with the most ambiguous visual displays, suggesting that judgments of agent identity depend much more on motor cues than on auditory (action-generated) or audiovisual (synchronization) information.