Decision framing: moderating effects of individual differences and cognitive processing

Two studies examined the effect of an individual difference variable, need for cognition (NC), and processing of the options on the occurrence of risky choice framing effects. In Study 1 (N=206), frame interacted with NC and math skill such that no framing effect was observed among those high in both NC and math skill. No effect was found for the processing manipulation of requesting a reason for one's choices. Study 2 (N=257) enhanced the processing of the problems by asking participants to write out the options as they would describe them to a friend. Results showed that frame interacted with NC and depth of processing such that no framing effect was observed among those high in NC who were in the deep processing condition. These findings suggest that NC and depth of processing need to be considered in concert in order to understand their moderating effects on framing. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dispositional optimism,self‐framing and medical decision‐making

Self‐framing is an important but underinvestigated area in risk communication and behavioural decision‐making, especially in medical settings. The present study aimed to investigate the relationship among dispositional optimism, self‐frame and decision‐making. Participants (N = 500) responded to the Life Orientation Test‐Revised and self‐framing test of medical decision‐making problem. The participants whose scores were higher than the middle value were regarded as highly optimistic individuals. The rest were regarded as low optimistic individuals. The results showed that compared to the high dispositional optimism group, participants from the low dispositional optimism group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame, and tended to choose the radiation therapy with high treatment survival rate, but low 5‐year survival rate. Based on the current findings, it can be concluded that self‐framing effect still exists in medical situation and individual differences in dispositional optimism can influence the processing of information in a framed decision task, as well as risky decision‐making.     

Effects of valence and framing in decision making II: Estimating subjective weighting1

Abstract: In comparison between choice options, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects.” Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiment used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess the decision maker's interpretation of choice tasks under the “framing effect” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. This study examined whether preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions under which preference reversals under the framing manipulations ceased to occur were examined. The effects of valence showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision makers maintained consistent task interpretations as pertaining to gains or to losses. Most importantly, the pattern of subjective weighting under the valence effects was consistent with previous explanation of valence effects ( Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996 ). Possibilities for extending the current findings to understanding related psychological phenomena are discussed.     

Lateralized goal framing: How health messages are influenced by valence and contextual/analytic processing

The effectiveness of health messages has been shown to vary due to the positive or negative framing of information, often known as goal framing. In two experiments we altered, the strength of the goal framing manipulation by selectively activating the processing style of the left or right hemisphere (RH). In Experiment 1, we found support for the contextual/analytic perspective; a significant goal framing effect was observed when the contextual processing style of the RH – but not the analytic processing style of the left hemisphere (LH) – was initially activated. In Experiment 2, support for the valence hypothesis was found when a message that had a higher level of personal involvement was used than that in Experiment 1. When the LH was initially activated, there was an advantage for the gain- vs. loss-framed message; however, an opposite pattern – an advantage for the loss-framed message – was obtained when the RH was activated. These are the first framing results that support the valence hypothesis. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of these experiments.     

When the best appears to be saved for last: Serial position effects on choice

Decision‐makers often evaluate options sequentially due to constraints on attention, timing, or physical location of the options. Choosing the best option will therefore often depend on people's memories of the options. Because imperfect recall introduces uncertainty in earlier options, judgments of those options should regress toward the category mean as memory decays over time. Relatively desirable options will therefore tend to seem less desirable with time, and relatively undesirable options will tend to seem less undesirable with time. We therefore predicted that people will tend to select the first option in a set when choosing between generally undesirable options, and will tend to select the last when choosing between generally desirable options. We demonstrate these serial position effects in choices among paintings, American Idol audition clips, jellybeans, and female faces, provide evidence of its underlying mechanism, and explain how these findings build on existing accounts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alethic desires,framing effects,and deflationism: Reply to Asay

Jamin Asay has recently argued that deflationists about the concept of truth cannot satisfactorily account for our alethic desires, i.e., those of our desires that pertain to the truth of our beliefs. In this brief reply, I show how deflationists can draw on well-established psychological findings on framing effects to explain how the concept of truth behaves within the scope of our alethic desires.     

“All‐or‐None” Versus “Most‐or‐Some” Options in Risky Choice: Effects of Domain and Handedness

Two methodological variants of Kahneman and Tversky's Asian disease scenario were investigated. One variant involved replacing the “all‐or‐none” outcome scenarios of the risky choice with “most‐or‐some” scenario outcomes, and the second variant involved replacing the negative domain of lives lost with a positive domain of jobs created. In addition, the effects of strength of handedness, a variable related to individual differences in risk perception, were examined. Results indicated that standard framing effects were obtained across both domains, with a decrease in risky choice under the gain domain. Scenario type also interacted with handedness, such that the all‐or‐none scenario yielded framing effects for consistent (strong)‐handers only, whereas the most‐or‐some scenario yielded framing effects for inconsistent (mixed)‐handers only (consistent‐handers are those who use the same hand exclusively for almost all activities). These results demonstrate that framing effects are strongly influenced by the presence versus absence of extreme/absolute outcomes and that individuals (in this case, decision makers with varying degrees of handedness strength) are differentially sensitive to different pieces of information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

决策者的认知特征对决策过程及企业战略选择的影响

在不确定环境下,企业的最高决策者的个人特性和行为对于企业的战略决策起着关键的作用。本研究探讨决策者的认知特征对于战略决策的过程以及最终形成的战略决策的影响。研究采用情境实验法,根据某企业的实际情形编写了一个商业案例,案例提供了决策者所需要的信息,并制造出高不确定的情境。148名来自大学管理学院的学生被要求对于该案例进行分析并填写有关量表。对数据进行结构方程模型的分析后得到如下结果：决策者的认知复杂性和认知需要与他们对企业内外环境的周密分析具有显著的正向关系,而且通过后者影响到对于环境中蕴含的机会的判断,并最终影响是否进入某项业务的决策。     

When not to accentuate the positive: Re-examining valence effects in attribute framing

While the expanding body of attribute framing literature provides keen insights into individual judgments and evaluations, a lack of theoretical perspective inhibits scholars from more fully extending research foci beyond a relatively straightforward examination of message content. The current research applies construal level theory to attribute framing research. The authors conduct a meta-analysis of 107 published articles and then conceptually expand this knowledge base by synthesizing attribute framing research and construal level concepts. Results suggest that attribute framing is most effective when there is congruence between the construal level evoked in a frame and the evaluator’s psychological distance from the framed event. A follow-up experiment confirms that the congruence between a frame’s construal level and psychological distance—not simply its valence—appears to be driving attribute framing effects. This research proposes to shift the focus in attribute framing research from that of message composition to a more complex relationship between the message and the recipient.     

Outwitting the rational mind: How effortful thinking influences price cognition

Prior research presents mixed findings on how people's degrees of effortful thinking influence their reliance on heuristics and biases. Although the tenets of dual process theory would argue that effortful thinking should attenuate people's reliance on heuristics, a number of contemporary findings suggest otherwise: Effortful thinking may, in fact, enhance biased processing of information in certain instances. This research shows how, in the context of pricing, people's degrees of effortful thinking can amplify their inclination towards biased processing of price information. In five studies (n = 1,339), we find that effortful thinking induces a greater preference for nine‐ending (vs. zero‐ending) prices, and the effect is mainly driven by people's greater propensity for argument‐based decision making. Such predilection to nine‐endings attenuates with lower cognitive effort in processing price information. Moreover, when locus of deliberation shifts from price to quality, consumers' preference for nine‐ending priced options is subdued.     

Perceived social context and risk preference: A re-examination of framing effects in a life-death decision problem

This study examines the effects of perceived group context on subjects risk attitudes and their sensitivity to the framing of choice outcomes in a ‘life-death’ decision problem. It seeks to uncover the psychological mechanisms underlying decision-making biases by systematically manipulating the decision context in which the ‘life-death’ problem was described. The study revealed that subjects risk preferences varied as a function of the experimental manipulations. Previously observed reversals in preferences (framing effects) appeared in large-group contexts and disappeared in small-group and family contexts. When considering the fate of small groups, subjects unambiguously favored the probabilistic outcome, no matter how the ‘life-death’ decision problem was framed. The empirical data obtained from the present study suggest that human choice patterns are behaviorally distinguishable across large-group, small-group, and family social contexts.     

Gender Roles,Suicide Attempts,and Substance Abuse

In this article, the focus is on a comparison of suicide attempts and substance abuse in the United States. It is argued that suicide attempts and substance abuse may function as psychologically equivalent but gender-specialized forms of self-injurious behaviors. Possible explanations for the gender segregation of suicide attempts and substance abuse are reviewed, and the benefits of crossover theories and treatments are presented.     

Thinking about decisions: An integrative approach of person and task factors

Decisions vary. They may vary in both content and complexity. People also vary. An important way that people vary is how much they think. Some prior research investigating thinking and decision making largely conflicts with most traditional decision theories. For example, if considering an array of products to choose from, thinking more about the alternative's attributes should lead to a better decision. However, some research indicates that thinking more may also lead to focusing on irrelevant aspects of the decision and a less optimal outcome. We propose that this conflict in the literature exists because of a failure to consider the interaction between the individual and the decision task. To test this, we used separate methodologies that enhance or attenuate a person's thinking. In Study 1, we selected people who were especially high or low in need for cognition and had them complete a robust decision-making inventory, which included both complex and simple tasks. In Study 2, we manipulated participant's level of glucose, which acts as the brain's fuel to enhance or attenuate thinking ability. Both studies provide insight for understanding our central tenant that more thought leads to better decisions in complex tasks but does not influence simple decisions. These findings show how the individual's thinking can interact with the constructive elements of the task to shape decision choice.     

Embracing Chance Tactically: A Different Perspective on Risk Taking

Although they value certainty, people are willing to take risks to avoid losses. Consequently, they are risk‐seeking in the domain of losses but risk‐avoidant in the domain of gains. This behavior, frequently demonstrated in framing experiments, is traditionally explained in terms of prospect theory. We suggest a different account whereby involving chance in one's decisions may serve a strategic impression‐formation function. In the domain of losses actors may embrace chance to distance themselves from the outcomes and deflect possible blame. Given potential gains, however, actors may avoid uncertainty to enhance their association with valued outcomes. We test this idea by manipulating the level of actors' personal responsibility for the decision outcomes. The results of four studies consistently showed that when personal responsibility is high, the original framing effect is replicated (i.e., greater risk‐taking when choices are framed in terms of losses rather than gains). However, when because of assigned role or decision circumstances, actors experience low personal responsibility for the outcomes, and the classic framing effect is eliminated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The sunk‐time effect: An exploration

We explored the potential for a sunk‐cost effect in the realm of time. Questionnaire studies (Experiments 1–4) obtained a sunk‐time effect that was robust to manipulations of prospective value, individual versus group consequences, and the effort or enjoyment inherent in the time. Behavioral experiments (Experiments 5–7) also suggested a sunk‐time effect and found support for a personal responsibility by sunk‐cost interaction on choice behavior. We discuss theoretical implications and a potential connection to animal sunk‐cost phenomena. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adversary effects and the tactics of violent offenders

We examine the implication of adversary effects for target choice, lethal intent, and the use of weapons and allies in violent incidents. Adversary effects refer to the tendency of offenders to make tactical decisions based on the coercive power of victims and potential victims. Using the victim's gender as a proxy for coercive power, we analyzed violent incidents from the National Incident‐Based Reporting System (2005–2014). The sample included over six million assaults, robberies, and homicides. Consistent with adversary effects, offenders who attack males (vs. females) are more likely to (a) kill victims; (b) use guns, knives, blunt objects, poison, and automobiles; (c) use male (but not female) allies; and (d) use multiple allies. The evidence for target choice is mixed: unarmed female offenders, but not unarmed male offenders, are more likely to target females than males. The evidence shows how a simple theoretical principle can parsimoniously account for basic patterns of violence in society related to gender, weapons, and group violence.