决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

Adult Age Differences in Dual Information Processes: Implications for the Role of Affective and Deliberative Processes in Older Adults' Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Age differences in affective/experiential and deliberative processes have important theoretical implications for judgment and decision theory and important pragmatic implications for older-adult decision making. Age-related declines in the efficiency of deliberative processes predict poorer-quality decisions as we age. However, age-related adaptive processes, including motivated selectivity in the use of deliberative capacity, an increased focus on emotional goals, and greater experience, predict better or worse decisions for older adults depending on the situation. The aim of the current review is to examine adult age differences in affective and deliberative information processes in order to understand their potential impact on judgments and decisions. We review evidence for the role of these dual processes in judgment and decision making and then review two representative life-span perspectives (based on aging-related changes to cognitive or motivational processes) on the interplay between these processes. We present relevant predictions for older-adult decisions and make note of contradictions and gaps that currently exist in the literature. Finally, we review the sparse evidence about age differences in decision making and how theories and findings regarding dual processes could be applied to decision theory and decision aiding. In particular, we focus on prospect theory ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ) and how prospect theory and theories regarding age differences in information processing can inform one another.     

The Role of Decision Making Styles in Explaining Happiness

In pursuit of happiness, individuals often choose activities which may be influenced by their general decision making styles that reflect habitual ways of choosing and making decisions. The present study investigated the associations of such tendencies, namely individuals’ temporal perspectives that included present and future focus, and maximizing, with persons’ orientations to happiness and their relevance for subjective well-being. The obtained results confirmed previous reports indicating the relevance of orientations to happiness for subjective well-being. With respect to the decision making styles, they revealed positive correlations with regard to future focus with orientations to meaning and engagement that were also negatively associated with present focus. In addition, present focus was positively correlated with orientation to pleasure. With respect to maximizing, this decision making style was positively associated with all three orientations. While assessing the relevance of decision making styles for subjective well-being, the regression analyses indicated that higher levels of maximizing directly predicted higher levels of negative affect and lower life satisfaction. Next, mediation and network methodologies revealed significant mediating effects of orientations to meaning and engagement with respect to the relationships between future focus with life satisfaction and positive affect, orientation to meaning with respect to the associations between present focus with life satisfaction and positive affect, and orientation to engagement with respect to the relationships between maximizing with life satisfaction and positive affect. These results extend previous knowledge, indicating the relevance of individuals’ decision making styles for their conceptualizations of happiness, as well as subjective well-being.     

Ceding and Succeeding: How the Altruistic Can Benefit from the Selfish in Joint Decisions

We examine how the interplay of two partners’ interpersonal orientations (selfish vs. altruistic) in a decision‐making dyad impacts the extent to which the joint decision matches each partners’ individual a priori preferences. Two experiments, in which we manipulate and measure interpersonal orientations, as well as examine real consumption decisions, demonstrate the benefit of mismatching interpersonal orientations (selfish‐altruistic) in dyadic decisions. Specifically, altruistic and selfish consumers reach joint decisions that better reflect their individual preferences when working with a partner who has the opposite interpersonal orientation (heterogeneous dyad) versus a matching one (homogeneous dyad). Initial evidence suggests that this effect occurs because homogeneous dyads are more prone to engage in negotiation (communication that involves departure from one's initial position to a mutually serving position) than heterogeneous dyads. This leads homogeneous dyads to focus more on equally preferred options than on their own most preferred options, which pushes them further down both partners’ preferences lists. This research contributes to the literature on joint decision making and has important implications for consumer well‐being.     

Walking through interaction. Comments on Harold H. Kelley's: ‘Expanding the analysis of social interactions by reference to the sequential-temporal structures of situations’

Kelley proposes to analyse social orientations in terms of decision making. Social orientations are defined by classes of decision rules which an individual adopts when entering and developing an interaction with another person. Contrary to the most traditional approach, outcome allocation decisions are only an element of a chain of decisions made by the individual. The new theory broadens our view of interactions, draws our attention to their complexity and their dynamics. On the other hand, Kelley's man behaves as if he or she processed information in a systematic way, perceived long-term outcomes and as if he or she controlled the interaction to achieve desirable outcomes. The vision of man as an internally consistent decision-maker is questionable. Many choices made in interaction with others are spontaneous and emotion driven rather than a result of deliberate information processing. Kelley's theory offers a highly sophisticated tool for a temporal analysis of social interactions even though it cannot be applied to the entire spectrum of interdependence situations. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice/Matching Preference Reversals in Groups: Consensus Processes and Justification-Based Reasoning

Individual preferences can vary significantly by the mode in which they are elicited. Thus, the seemingly benign procedural issue of elicitation mode (i.e., choice, buying price, rating, matching) could have a profound effect on group decisions, although elicitation mode has not been much studied as a group procedural variable. Individual preferences differ by elicitation mode when the elicitation contexts differentially emphasize particular aspects of the decision. Emphasis on explainability, for example, may produce decisions that are based only on a few, important, attributes. Because group consensus processes also can encourage particular reasoning strategies, grouping may interact with elicitation mode; that is, group consensus processes may moderate or exacerbate preference reversals. The present study explored a particular elicitation effect, choice versus matching preference reversals, for decisions with both low and high social significance. The results confirmed both that elicitation mode can affect group decisions and that group consensus processes moderate choice/matching preference reversals. Further, evidence from both preference measures and rating scales suggested that the moderation was due to an increase in easily defended, justifiable decisions. Social significance did not affect individual or group decisions, but decreased members′ post group commitment to the group decision. These results have implications both for group decision making and for the study of the role of explanation-based strategies in preference formation.     

Ethical? Toward whom?

Comments on the original article, "Nonrational processes in ethical decision making" by M. D. Rogerson et al (see record 2011-19198-001). Among the many insightful points made by Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren (October 2011) regarding nonrational processes in ethical decision making, one deserves further explication: Many of psychologists' ethical decisions lead to actions done to someone. Unfortunately, frameworks and models of ethical decision making frequently neglect this fact by implying that the decisions happen in the abstract, but in truth, these decisions often affect a specific recipient. Importantly, the characteristics of that specific recipient, especially as perceived by the psychologist, can have a powerful impact on the process of ethical decision making (Caughron et al., 2011). It would be wise to add such a hypothetical to the list of specific questions that Rogerson et al recommended psychologists ask themselves: Would I make the same ethical decision if the person(s) toward whom the decision is directed had different characteristics?     

Affective bias in complex decision making: Modulating sensitivity to aversive feedback

The present study investigated the conflict between well-developed attitudes and incentive rewards using the Iowa Gambling Task. In particular, the incorporation of emotional labels allowed us to model the role of affective biases and their impact on complex decision making over time. Two experiments manipulated the class of deck label (emotional pictures and racial faces) using both congruent and incongruent association to the deck incentives. Both experiments demonstrated that an incongruent association can lead to striking and persistent decision making biases. Thus, a common theme was a general inability to tolerate conflict between rewards and goal-irrelevant labels. Notably, Experiment 2 demonstrated that this ‘incongruency’ effect appeared to result from positive labels interfering with aversive experiences from bad decks. More generally, sensitivity to accumulating losses from punishing decks was primarily associated with successful performance on these Gambling Task variants. These results suggest emotional biases are readily harmful in complex decision making, and that flexibility in the extent to which we permit emotional influences to guide our decisions is crucial.     

Think different: the merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making

The role of unconscious and conscious thought in decision making was investigated in 5 experiments. Because of the low processing capacity of consciousness, conscious thought was hypothesized to be maladaptive when making complex decisions. Conversely, unconscious thought was expected to be highly effective. In Experiments 1-3, participants were presented with a complex decision problem in which they had to choose between various alternatives, each with multiple attributes. Some participants had to make a decision immediately after being presented with the options. In the conscious thought condition, participants could think about the decision for a few minutes. In the unconscious thought condition, participants were distracted for a few minutes and then indicated their decision. Throughout the experiments, unconscious thinkers made the best decisions. Additional evidence obtained in Experiments 4 and 5 suggests that unconscious thought leads to clearer, more polarized, and more integrated representations in memory.     

The Impact of Depression on Self–Other Discrepancies in Decision Making

Although there is a small but growing body of literature on how people make risky decisions for others and predict others' decisions, results seem to be contradictory. The authors contribute to the understanding of these mixed results by investigating how depression affects self–other discrepancies in decision making and the psychological processes that underlie these discrepancies. In an experiment, depressed and nondepressed individuals read a series of scenarios involving decisions about health, money, and interpersonal relationships. They then indicated which of two options they would choose for themselves or for another person, or predicted which option this person would choose for himself or herself. Finally, participants reported benefits and drawbacks of the decisions (i.e., cognitions) and feelings about risk. Depressed individuals were less prone to bias when they predicted others' decisions than nondepressed individuals. Feelings about risk played a key role in determining the direction and the magnitude of this bias. In contrast, both depressed and nondepressed individuals showed bias when they made decisions for others. This bias affected their decisions in opposing ways and was determined by cognitions. This bias is consistent with literature showing that depression is associated with an increased sensitivity to social risks. The authors provide a theoretical explanation of self–other discrepancies in decision making in depressed and nondepressed individuals and conclude that the results support the assumption that depression is associated with psychological processes whose role is to increase sensitivity to social threats rather than with a more general negative bias in cognitive functioning. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"Leaky" Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

ABSTRACT— For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to "irrational" decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to "leak" into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.     

Gender-Role Differences in Decision-Making Orientations and Decision-Making Skills1

The relationship between gender role identification and decision making orientations was examined. Decision making was analyzed in terms of decision making orientation (behavioral, cognitive, and emotional) and decision making skills (problem definition and formulation, generation of alternative solutions, choice process, solution implementation, and verification). The results revealed a 2-factor characterization of general decision making in terms of approach-avoidance tendencies and self-appraisals of decision skills. A masculinity model was supported for decision making orientation, with masculinity serving as the only significant predictor. In contrast, an androgyny model was supported for decision making skills, with masculinity and femininity serving as significant predictors.     

“Either a medal or a corporal”: The effects of success and failure on the evaluation of decision making and decision makers

This paper is concerned with judgment by outcomes—justifying decisions and rewarding decision makers in case of success, and condemning both in case of failure. Officers in the Israel Defense Forces evaluated four versions of the same case of decision making in a military setting. In two versions the decision maker obeys his orders, in two he disobeys them to take a normatively appropriate action; one of each decision is successful, one of each fails. Though the cases are identical except for the above differences, successful decisions are considered more justified and to follow from superior decision making processes; decision making processes are perceived as more satisfactory when they lead to success, and successful decision makers are perceived more favorably than their unsuccessful counterparts. Role expectations regarding appropriate action influenced the justification of decisions and perceived favorability of decision makers and interacted with outcome valence in determining the allocation of reward and punishment and the evaluation of the decision making process. The paper discusses implications of the findings to Behavioral Decision Theory, Attribution Theory, and Organizational Learning.     

Self‐regulation principles underlying risk perception and decision making within the context of genomic testing

Advances in theory and research on self‐regulation and decision‐making processes have yielded important insights into how cognitive, emotional, and social processes shape risk perceptions and risk‐related decisions. We examine how self‐regulation theory can be applied to inform our understanding of decision‐making processes within the context of genomic testing, a clinical arena in which individuals face complex risk information and potentially life‐altering decisions. After presenting key principles of self‐regulation, we present a genomic testing case example to illustrate how principles related to risk representations, approach and avoidance motivations, emotion regulation, defensive responses, temporal construals, and capacities such as numeric abilities can shape decisions and psychological responses during the genomic testing process. We conclude with implications for using self‐regulation theory to advance science within genomic testing and opportunities for how this research can inform further developments in self‐regulation theory.     

The Logic of Feeling

The contribution of the feelings‐as‐information hypothesis to our understanding of the role of affect in judgment and decision making is discussed. Basic principles and regularities in how affective feelings guide judgments and decisions are then identified. Based on these principles and regularities, it is argued that the role of feelings in judgment and decision making may be more adaptive than has been assumed in most academic circles. This adaptivity transpires (a) in the variety of goal‐relevant signals that feelings convey, (b) the flexibility with which feelings are interpreted, (c) the judgmental properties of feelings, and (d) the selectivity with which feelings are invoked. It is speculated that affective feelings may tap into a separate system of judgment and decision making with its unique strengths and weaknesses.     

Time and decision making in humans

Decision making requires evaluating alternatives that differ on a number of attributes. During this evaluation process, selection of options depends on the duration of the options, the duration of the expected delay for realizing the options, and the time available to reach a decision. This article reviews the relationship between time and decision making in humans with respect to this evaluation process. Moreover, the role of psychological time, as compared with physical time, is accentuated. Five topics have been selected that illustrate how time and mental representations of time affect decision making. These are (1) the duration of options, (2) temporal decision making, (3) the time between having made a decision and experiencing the consequences of that decision, (4) the temporal perspective of decision makers, and (5) the duration of the decision process. The discussion of each topic is supplemented by suggestions for further research. It is shown that psychological time is often neglected in human decision making but seems to play an important role in the making of choices.     

Common and distinct factors in decision making under ambiguity and risk: A psychometric study of individual differences

The relation between decision making under ambiguity and risky decision making was examined. In Studies 1 and 2, choices under ambiguity were measured for a large sample receiving an Ellsberg-type Ambiguity-Probability Tradeoff Task. Participants with extreme scores were recruited for Part 2 of each study which consisted of a risky decision making task (Study 1) or a series of decisions under ambiguity in “real life” scenarios (Study 2). Despite a time gap of up to 2 months, individual differences in scores on Part 1 predicted scores on Part 2. In Study 3 participants received in a single session several risky decision making tasks, several measures of decision making under ambiguity, and several personality scales related to uncertainty and decision making style. Taken together, the findings support the existence of a stable dispositional trait to reduce uncertainty in decision making but also task-specific differences related to gains and losses.     

Age differences in financial decision making: The benefits of more experience and less negative emotions

The emerging literature on aging and decision making posits that decision‐making competence changes with age, as a result of age differences in various cognitive and noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics. In a national life‐span sample from the United Kingdom (N = 926), we examined age differences in financial decisions, including performance measures of sunk cost and credit card repayment decisions, and self‐report measures of money management and financial decision outcomes. Participants also completed four individual‐differences characteristics that have been proposed as relevant to financial decision making, including two cognitive ones (numeracy and experience‐based knowledge) and two noncognitive ones (negative emotions about financial decisions). First, we examined how age was related to the four financial decision‐making measures and the four individual‐differences characteristics. Older age was correlated to better scores on each of the four financial decision‐making measures, more experience‐based knowledge, less negative emotions about financial decisions, whereas numeracy and motivation were not significantly correlated with age. Second, we found that considering both the two cognitive and the two noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics increased predictions of financial decision making, as compared with considering either alone. Third, we examined how these four individual‐differences characteristics contributed to age differences in financial decision making. Older adults' higher levels of experience‐based knowledge and lower levels of negative emotions seemed to especially benefit their financial decision making. We discuss implications for theories on aging and decision making, as well as for interventions targeting financial decisions.     

What goes around comes around: The integrated role of emotions on consumer ethical decision‐making

The current study aims to further our understanding of the integrated role of emotions on consumer decision‐making involving ethical issues, by considering the influence of both positive and negative emotions on ethical decision‐making process. It considers not only the emotions experienced prior to ethical decision‐making (pre‐decision emotions) but also those resulting from the course of action chosen (post‐decision emotions). Scenarios are used, and the results of the structural modelling analyses support the proposed relationships between current emotions, consumers' ethical decision‐making, post‐decision emotions and future ethical behavioural intentions. The data suggest the possible existence of a “virtuous ethical cycle”, whereby positive emotions lead to more ethical consumer decisions and behaviours; and these in turn lead to more positive (post‐decision) emotions, which have a positive and significant effect on future ethical behavioural intentions. In addition, happiness emerges as exerting a pivotal role in predicting consumer ethical decisions.