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1.
Mengwei Yan 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(4):557-571
The epistemological problems that are implicit in Marx’s theory on the “sensible world” indicate that Marx’s philosophy in
fact contains within itself the topics of pure philosophy, but Marx did not involve himself in these topics. Through comparing
with Husserl’s epistemological critique and Heidegger’s existentialism, we can clearly see that there are theoretical spaces
in which we can develop Marx’s philosophy to the realm of pure philosophy, however, we must devote our creative efforts to
the exploration of the spaces.
Translated by Yang Xiaohua from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究(Philosophical Research), 2006, (6): 20–26 相似文献
2.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
3.
Lauren Freeman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(4):545-568
An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time, in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological
level—to metontology. Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were
excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s
argument for metontology, and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s
thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis
is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams. 相似文献
4.
W. P. S. Dias 《Science and engineering ethics》2006,12(3):523-532
This paper describes how some aspects of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy resonate strongly with an engineering outlook. He argued
that practice was more “primordial” than theory, though preserving an important role for theoretical understanding as well,
thus speaking to the gap between engineering education (highly theoretical) and engineering practice (mostly empirical). He
also underlined the reality of “average” practices into which we are socialized, though affirming the potential for original
work and action too, thus providing the grounds for self-actualization whether within the routine or in transcending it. His
notion of “thrownness” emphasizes the importance of context, with which engineers are constantly engaged. While all this relates
to the idea of our “being”, Heidegger also dealt with the influence of time on our practices. Future death could be seen as
spurring innovation, cultural history as a source for critiquing current practice and the present “situation” as the immediate
context for corrective action. His major book is appropriately called “Being and Time”.1 相似文献
5.
Søren Overgaard 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):307-330
In various publications, Stanley Cavell and Stanley Rosen have emphasized the philosophical importance of what they both call
“the ordinary.” They both contrast their recovery of “the ordinary” with traditional philosophy, including the phenomenological
philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In this paper, I address Rosen’s claims in particular. I argue that Rosen turns the real situation
on its head. Contra Rosen, it is not the case that the employment of Husserl’s epoché distorts the authentic voice of “the” ordinary—a voice
that is clearly audible only from within everyday life. For (pace both Cavell and Rosen) there is no single “voice” of the ordinary: There are many such “voices,” not all of which are to be relied upon. Therefore, if we want to achieve
an adequate grasp of ordinary experience, and Rosen does want this, we precisely need the epoché to curtail the misleading
messages of certain other “voices of the ordinary.” Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, this positive evaluation of the Husserlian
epoché finds support in Heidegger’s writings from the twenties. I argue that Heidegger, too, believed that the epoché was
an indispensable tool for the philosophical attempt to capture ordinary experience. 相似文献
6.
Richard Tieszen 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):31-52
In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”)
sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt G?del began to study Husserl’s
work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with G?del, Hao Wang tells us that “G?del’s own main aim in philosophy
was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help
of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From G?del to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this
paper I explore some prospects for a G?delian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of
G?del and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology. 相似文献
7.
Thing, Value, Time, and Freedom: A Consideration of Some Key Concepts in Marx’s Philosophical System
Wujin Yu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):114-123
Criticizing the misunderstanding and wrong explanation of Marx’s philosophical system made by recent Chinese textbooks on
Marxist philosophy, the author argues that Marx’s philosophy has practical, economical-philosophical, and ontological dimensions
and stresses on reconstructing Marx’s philosophical system through synthesizing the above three dimensions. This paper intends
to set up a new outline of Marx’s philosophical system, in terms of the following four concepts—thing, value, time, and freedom.
Translated by Tang Jie from Zhexue Yanjiu, 2004:11 相似文献
8.
E. M. Swiderski 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):329-343
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation.
A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski
appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself.
I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this
account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves
and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought
for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that
is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted
human power. 相似文献
9.
Ping He 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(2):219-229
From the point of view of the development of Chinese Marxist philosophy, this paper comprehensively analyzes the current phenomenon
of “Return to Marx” by pointing out: (1) the phenomenon of “Return to Marx” meets the need to reconstruct ideology during
the time of social change in China and it is a theoretical manifestation of the shift from planned economy to market economy
in China; (2) the phenomenon of “Return to Marx” embodies the academic path of the past ten years of Chinese Marxist philosophy;
(3) the phenomenon of “Return to Marx” places too much emphasis on logic while too little emphasis on history. This understanding,
the epistemological root of “Return to Marx”, has caused the negative effect and is also worth our attention and further study.
Translated by Zhao Bi from Xuexi Yu Tansuo 学习与探索 (Study & Exploration), 2004, (5): 1–5 相似文献
10.
John Dewey and Bertrand Russell visited China at around the same time in 1920. Both profoundly influenced China during the
great transition period of this country. This article will focus on the differences between the two great figures that influenced
China in the 1920s. This comparison will examine the following five aspects: 1. Deweyanization vs. Russellization; 2. Dewey’s
“Populism” vs. Russell’s “Aristocraticism”; 3. Dewey’s “Syntheticalism” vs. Russell’s “Analyticalism”; 4. Dewey’s “Realism”
vs. Russell’s “Romanticism”; 5. Dewey’s “Conservatism” vs. Russell’s “Radicalism”. This examination will highlight that, although
their visit left indelible impressions among Chinese intellecturals, for the radical Marx–Leninists, any Western philosophy
and socio-political theories, including Dewey’s and Russell’s, were prejudicial, outworn, and even counterrevolutionary. Soon
“Marxi–Leninization” was gradually substituted for “Deweyanization” and “Russellization.” 相似文献
11.
Curtis A. Rigsby 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):511-553
Heidegger and East-Asian thought have traditionally been strongly correlated. However, although still largely unrecognized,
significant differences between the political and metaphysical stance of Heidegger and his perceived counterparts in East-Asia
most certainly exist. One of the most dramatic discontinuities between East-Asian thought and Heidegger is revealed through
an investigation of Kitarō Nishida’s own vigorous criticism of Heidegger. Ironically, more than one study of Heidegger and
East-Asian thought has submitted that Nishida is that representative of East-Asian thought whose philosophy most closely resembles
Heideggerian thought. In words that then and now resound discordantly within the enshrined, established view of Heidegger’s
relationship to East-Asian thought, Nishida stated uninhibitedly his own view of Heidegger in the noteworthy statement: “Heidegger
is not worth your time… He…does not recognize that which is indispensible and decisive, namely, God.” This present study lays
out for the first time in English, the significant differences between the metaphysical and political stances of Nishida and
Heidegger, Nishida’s own critique of Heidegger, and Heidegger’s own rather dismal assessment of non-Western philosophy, all
of which demonstrate a remarkable, hitherto unrecognized discontinuity between Heidegger and East-Asian thought. 相似文献
12.
Richard A. Cohen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2006,60(1-3):21-39
Detailed exposition of the nine layers of signification of human mortality according to Emmanuel Levinas’s phenomenological
and ethical account of the meaning and role of death for the embodied human subject and its relations to other persons. Critical
contrast to Martin Heidegger’s alternative and hitherto more influential phenomenological-ontological conception, elaborated
in Being and Time (1927), of mortality as Dasein’s anxious and revelatory being-toward-death.
An earlier version of this paper, relating Levinas to Spinoza rather than to Heidegger, entitled “Levinas: Thinking Least
about Death—Contra Spinoza,” was presented on January 19, 2006, at an international centennial conference on Levinas held
at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel. The present paper was delivered as a lecture at St. John’s College,
Sante Fe, New Mexico, on January 27, 2006. 相似文献
13.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
14.
俞吾金 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(3):400-416
For a long time, under the influence of traditional Western philosophy, Orthodox interpreters have distorted Marx’s philosophy
as the ontology of matter, thereby concealing the essence of Marx’s philosophy, and eliminating the fundamental difference
between Marx’s philosophy and traditional philosophy. This paper proposes that Marx’s philosophy is not the ontology of matter,
but on the contrary, by examining the ontology of matter, Marx put forward his own ontological theory, i.e., the ontology
of the praxis-relations of social production, by which Marx linked the realms of phenomenon and essence, revealing the content
and essence of his philosophy.
__________
Translated by Kong Hui from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (3): 3–11 相似文献
15.
Benjamin S. Cordry 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(1):61-83
While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was
a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper,
I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess.
His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive.
I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing
on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that
his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft”
and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces
a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several
ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions. 相似文献
16.
Jonathan Neufeld 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2012,31(1):61-76
Emerging research shows that undergraduate students are searching for a deeper meaning in their lives from their university
studies. Leading students forth into this kind of meaningful action is the primary responsibility of the Philosopher of Education.
This paper describes how such meaningful action can be accomplished by integrating the pedagogical ontology of Martin Heidegger
into a course in the history and philosophy of Education. The course challenges students to engage in the cooperative project
of what John Sallis calls “world building” by posing strategic questions, designing appropriate content, and demonstrating
artful signs. Heidegger expects his students to rethink what it means for them to be a human being. When this identity is
transformed, a new calling to think and an invocation to teach that calling can flow from that instruction. This paper describes
this kind of instruction in practice by specifically characterizing what a “professor of learning to think” would be. 相似文献
17.
Jeff A. Snapper 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):45-56
In this paper I show that two arguments for the inconsistency of skeptical theism fail. After setting up the debate in “Introduction”
section, I show in “The initial debate” section why Mylan Engel’s argument (Engel 2004) against skeptical theism does not
succeed. In “COST” section I strengthen the argument so that it both avoids my reply to Engel and parallels Jon Laraudogoitia’s
argument against skeptical theism (Laraudogoitia 2000). In “COST*” section, I provide three replies—one by an evidentialist
theist, one by a closure-denying theist, and one by a necessitarian theist, and argue that the necessitarian’s reply successfully
rebuts the inconsistency charge. I conclude that skeptical theism which accepts God’s necessary existence is immune to both
kinds of arguments for its inconsistency. 相似文献
18.
David Botting 《Argumentation》2012,26(2):213-232
From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical
refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’
and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem. (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione. (AMB&ID-ME) The set of fallacies due to ambiguity and fallacies in dictione together comprise the set of arguments said to be “dependent on mere expression”. Being “dependent on mere expression” and
“dependent on language” are not the same (instances of the latter form a proper subset of instances of the former). (nME-FACT)
All arguments that are not against the expression are “against the fact.” (FACT-ED) All fallacious arguments against the fact
are fallacies extra dictionem (it is unclear whether the converse is true). (MAN-ARG) The solutions of fallacious arguments are exclusively either “against the man” or “against the argument.” (10) (F-ARG) Each (type of) fallacy
has a unique solution (namely, the opposite of whatever causes the fallacy), but each fallacious argument does not. However,
each fallacious argument does have a unique solution against the argument, called the ‘true solution’ (in other words, what
fallacy a fallacious argument commits is determined by how it is solved. However, if the solution is ‘against the man’ then
this is not, properly speaking, the fallacy committed in the argument. It is only the ‘true solution’—the solution against
the argument, of which there is always only one—that determines the fallacy actually committed). 相似文献
19.
Shane Mackinlay 《Sophia》2010,49(4):499-507
In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain,
and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van
Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to ‘nothing’, which is a key term in Heidegger’s essays
leading up to The Origin of the Work of Art. This paper extends a similar analysis to the Greek temple as a way of offering an exposition of Heidegger’s concerns in
the essay. It begins by briefly outlining Thomson’s argument that Heidegger relates Van Gogh’s painting to ‘nothing’, and
indicating the way this argument can be extended to the Greek temple. It then discusses three ways in which ‘nothing’ can
open up the significance of the temple as a work of art in which truth happens: (1) it is not concerned with objective representation;
(2) it depicts the primal strife of earth and world, concealing and unconcealing; (3) it is fundamentally historical. 相似文献
20.
Ulrich Charpa 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(1):61-84
This paper discusses some philosophical and historical connections between, and within, nineteenth century evolutionism and
microscopical research. The principal actors are mainly Darwin, Schleiden, Whewell and the “London Doctors,” Arthur Henfrey
and Edwin Lankester. I demonstrate that the apparent alliances—particularly Darwin/Schleiden (through evolutionism) and Schleiden/Whewell
(through Kantian philosophy of science)—obscure the deep methodological differences between evolutionist and microscopical
biology that lingered on until the mid-twentieth century. Through an understanding of the little known significance of Schleiden’s
programme of microscopical research and by comparing certain features of his methodology to the activities of the “London
Doctors,” we can identify the origin of this state of affairs. In addition, the outcome provides an insight into a critique
of Buchdahl’s view on Schleiden’s philosophical conception. 相似文献