Taking Stock in Taking Stock

In "Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going To? Taking Stock in Creativity Research," the author attempted to use 2 recent handbook publications as a basis for drawing some general conclusions about the current state of affairs in creativity research. The commentaries provided by Eisenberger, Kaufmann, Runco, and Russ with regard to this review not only aptly illustrate some key points made in this feature article, but also provide some thought-provoking extensions of this review. In this reply, the author considers these commentaries with respect to both points of agreement and disagreement. With regard to points of disagreement, he stressed in his initial review, and would continue to stress, the practical, social aspects of creative work, as well as the need to reference creativity against products as opposed to potential. In agreement with the commentators, however, he would argue that creativity research has now progressed beyond the provisional hypotheses generation stage. Thus, the challenge confronting us is to bring about integration while simultaneously conducting research evidencing greater specificity with regard to processes, tasks, domains, and requisite dispositional characteristics.     

Reply to Commentaries

In this brief reply to commentaries from Professor Etzel Cardeña and Professor Anssi Peräkylä on my paper, I try to extend some of the themes they raise, and sketch areas for subsequent research. In particular, I focus on Peräkylä’s observation that poetic confluence may serve a range of socio-relational functions, and Cardeña’s remarks on the metaphorical dimensions of mind. My discussion is developed around a brief consideration of a case that, while retaining key features of poetic confluence, departs from the pattern described in my paper.     

Creativity,Spontaneity, Impasse,and Leaps of Faith: Reply to Commentaries

In my reply to the commentaries, I address several points of convergence with and divergence from Drs. Danielle Knafo and Philip A. Ringstrom. I clarify my view that while shame can drive the creative process, the thrust of my paper is about ways in which shame can close down access to one's creative potential, as well as creating obstacles to vitality and intimacy in relationships. I expand on how it was indeed a visceral, embodied sense of my own shame which served as an “informant,” as Ringstrom suggests, of Julia's chronic experience of shame, opening a door to our exploration of the repetitive enactments between us. Grounding my understanding of therapeutic action and enactments in a relational perspective, I describe how I view enactments as inevitable and co-created, and reflecting on them collaboratively as a potentially useful opportunity in analytic work. I resonate with Ringstrom and Knafo's belief in the creativity inherent in the psychoanalytic process, and the importance of spontaneity and risk taking, particularly in negotiating impasses in treatment. Finally, I describe Julia's poetic reflections upon reading the paper.     

Reply to critics

Philosophical Studies - I reply to commentaries by Justin Bruner, Robert Sugden and Gerald Gaus. My response to Bruner focuses on conventions of bargaining problems and arguments for characterizing...     

Further Development of the Interpersonal Contingencies Model: Our Reply to the Mezulis & Funasaki and Burwell & Shirk Commentaries

In our reply to the commentaries on Cambron, Acitelli, & Pettit’s paper (this issue), we address the issue discussed in both commentaries: the need to take a developmental approach to the study of gender differences in depression. In response to Mezulis and Funasaki (this issue), we attempt to specify where the Cambron et al. paper supports their point that vulnerability, stress, and vulnerability-stress interaction may vary across domains. We also enumerate several hypotheses that are derived from our model of gender differences in depression. In response to Burwell and Shirk (this issue), we agree with the need to investigate the origin of self-esteem contingencies, and that the measurement of self-esteem contingencies is fraught with problems. We also remind readers that whether examining interpersonal relationship or physical appearance risk factors for depression, we must focus on the extent to which one’s self-esteem is based on that domain.     

In Defence of Direct Realism

In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception (henceforth, PP), Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense-datum theorist has two options–what she calls the "complex sense-data option" and the "two-factor option"–that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic and independent sources of perceptual consciousness: an issue I take up in my third section. Thirdly, she expresses reservations about my response to the argument from hallucination. In particular, she argues that the phenomenological considerations on which I put so much weight cannot settle the fundamental issue here. I address this criticism in the fourth section of this reply. Finally, she spends a certain amount of time discussing the notion of a "veridicality-rele-vant property", a topic to which I devote the concluding section of this reply.     

Enigmatic Masculinities: A Reply to Swartz and Grossmark

In reply to Swartz and Grossmark’s commentaries on my paper about encounters with the masculine, I elaborate from a reflexive stance on the notions of context, positionality, and warrants to speak in my writing and the responses. My account is part of an unfolding exploration of how I stand as a gendered being within psychotherapeutic praxis, and in line with that, how what was intimated in my original paper points to Laplanche’s theorizing on the sexual and to his notion of enigmatic seduction in ongoing gendering processes. The reply finds itself haunted by the abject and its position within the postcolony, and with a desire for what is an illusory transcendence.     

Toward a theory of verbal behavior

This paper is a reply to an accompanying set of six commentaries by Sidman; Hayes and Barnes; Schusterman, Kastak, and Reichmuth; Tonneau and Sokolowski; Lowenkron; and Moerk. Those commentaries were prompted by our article “On the Origins of Naming and Other Symbolic Behavior” (1996), which was, in turn, followed by 26 commentaries and a reply. In the course of the present reply, we further develop the naming account to embrace more complex verbal relations such as same, different, more, and less. We also examine what we see as the lack of conceptual coherence in equivalence theories, including relational frame theory, and the disparities between these accounts and the findings from empirical research.     

Debating Forgiveness: A Reply to My Critics

In this essay I offer a detailed reply to three critics (whose commentaries are included in this issue of Philosophia) of my Forgiveness: a Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The topics explored include the nature and limits of forgiveness; its unconditional or conditional character; the problem of distinguishing between central and marginal cases; the analysis of political apology; and questions of philosophical methodology.     

Self-Regulation and Personality Science: Reply to the Commentaries

The authors reply to commentaries on their target article "Self-Regulation: Reminders and Suggestions from Personality Science". Substantial consensus is evident across the target article and multiple commentaries. The message conveyed is that personality science and the study of self-regulation are mutually complementary and that applied efforts to enhance people's self-regulatory capacities can be enhanced via study of the intra-individual architecture of social-cognitive and affective personality systems.     

More thoughts on the unconscious: reply to Brody and to Lewicki and Hill

Brody (1989) and Lewicki and Hill (1989) present commentaries on my central thesis (Reber, 1989) that there exist powerful induction routines that operate largely independently of awareness and yield rich and complex tacit knowledge that resists attempts to make it conscious, although these commentaries are of dramatically different kinds. Because there is a fairly clear basis of agreement between Lewicki and Hill and the points that I made, this reply deals almost entirely with the issues raised by Brody. The focus is on two classes of issues: (a) those of a methodological nature that surround the general problem of doing experiments on unconscious cognition and (b) those that derive from considerations of evolutionary biology that provide a basis for arguing that implicit operations are primary and form the foundation for conscious processes.     

Starting small: Revisiting young children's perceptions of social withdrawal in China

In this reply to the commentaries by Xinyin Chen, Charissa Cheah, Yiyuan Xu, and Dawn Watling, we further discuss the conceptual and methodological challenges that arise when attempting to study beliefs about social withdrawal (1) in the unique cultural context of China and (2) in the unique developmental age period of early childhood.     

Impasse and Resonance Across Multiple Relational Realms: Reply to Commentaries

In my response to the commentaries by Anthony Bass, Irwin Hirsch, and Margaret Crastnopol, I focus on conscious and unconscious factors that open or close potential space across relational realms, including that of analyst and patient, parent and child. I then extend these notions to the supervisory relationship. I describe how these issues affected the writing process for me, and explore the impact that writing has had on the ongoing treatment with my patient. I consider too the ways in which shame travels intersubjectively, shutting down transitional space and interfering with aliveness, authenticity, and creativity.     

Selecting among extraordinary informants

In our reply to the commentaries by Jacqui Woolley and Rebekah Richert, we discuss the following: (1) possible effects that religious educations have on individual differences and (2) how older children may construe mind‐readers.     

What Transits in an Identity Status Transition: A Rejoinder to Commentaries

This reply reviews main themes which formed the framework for my introductory article and then responds to the following general issues which appeared across commentaries from the four groups of contributors: the nature of any intrapsychic structures underlying Marcia's (1966) identity statuses, the developmental sequence of such structures, and the relation of structure to context. I conclude with suggestions for both broadening and refining lenses for the study of ego identity status development both during and beyond the years of late adolescence.     

Constructing and Expanding a Framework: Opportunities for Developing Acculturation Research

Reading the seven commentaries has provided me with an opportunity to reflect further on many of the issues confronting researchers and practioners in the field of migration studies. Because the area is so complex, it is not surprising that there is great diversity in coverage and in perspectives. However, many of the points made are similar in that they all suggest emphasis, elaboration, or addition to the text and figures that I presented. My reply is that no text (no matter how generous the word allocation), nor figure (no matter how complicated), can represent every aspect of the realities of the acculturation process. I (and others) have previously written on many of the points made, and I will take this opportunity to refer to them, and to link them to what I presented in the lead article.     

Personality Process-Structure Duality: Reply to Two Commentaries

In two commentaries, Kostromina and Grishina (2018) and Mironenko (2018) offered constructive thoughts and questions in response to an article by Giordano (2018, Culture & Psychology, 23, 502–518) on the merits of an approach to understanding individual personality that focuses on the processes rather than structures of personality. In this reply, the authors seek to clarify some of the points made in the original article. The authors also describe a personality process-structure duality, whereby personality is conceptualized in terms of processes or structures based on the methods used to study it. If the goal is to understand the dynamic and emergent properties of individual personality, the authors continue to argue for the merits of a process-centric approach and the avoidance of structural thinking.     

Encoding specificity: a reply to Croker (1981)

Crocker's (1981) comment on the Lee and Hirota (1980) paper essentially raises two issues. First, objection is made to the applicability of the encoding specificity principle to the resuits found in our study. Second, on a more general level, Crocker questions the heuristic value of utilizing theoretical issues in non-motor domains to guide scientific experimentation in the study of motor behavior. In this reply I posit that Crocker's reservations about encoding specificity are based upon improper theoretical and methodological considerations. Regarding the more philosophical issue however, I argue that Crocker's view may be counterproductive to progress in the area of memory research.     

Local pragmatics in a Gricean framework,revisited: response to three commentaries

There are two central themes that occupy the commentaries, and hence this response. The first is the character and role of what is said, both in my account, and in pragmatic theory in general. In response, I lay out in more detail the proposal from my original paper that the starting point for Gricean reasoning should be not what is said, but the pragmatically uncommitted what is expressed. As part of this argument, I restate and provide further arguments for my claim that global and local pragmatic effects are continuous. The second central theme of the commentaries concerns the value of a Gricean account, which is not intended to model the psychological processes of interpretation. I respond to this concern in Section 5, ‘Pragmatics, psychology and processing’.     

Rejoinder to Commentaries on Malevolent Creativity: A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime,Cropley, Kaufman,and Cropley

In this rejoinder Cropley et al. respond to commentaries made regarding the article “Malevolent Creativity: A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime.” Each commentary adds valuable additional insight into the issue of creativity that does harm.