Collective Affordances

Abstract

This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her “embodied social identity” of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.     

Affordances,context and sociality

Affordances, i.e. the opportunity of actions offered by the environment, are one of the central research topics for the theoretical perspectives that view cognition as emerging from the interaction between the environment and the body. Being at the bridge between perception and action, affordances help to question a dichotomous view of perception and action. While Gibson’s view of affordances is mainly externalist, many contemporary approaches define affordances (and micro-affordances) as the product of long-term visuomotor associations in the brain. These studies have emphasized the fact that affordances are activated automatically, independently from the context and the previous intention to act: for example, affordances related to objects’ size would emerge even if the task does not require focusing on size. This emphasis on the automaticity of affordances has led to overlook their flexibility and contextual-dependency. In this contribution I will outline and discuss recent perspectives and evidence that reveal the flexibility and context-dependency of affordances, clarifying how they are modulated by the physical, cultural and social context. I will focus specifically on social affordances, i.e. on how perception of affordances might be influenced by the presence of multiple actors having different goals.

     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts

Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.     

“具身”涵义的理论辨析

“具身”是当代心理学和认知科学领域的热门话题, 其基本涵义是指认知对身体的依赖性。经典认知科学主张“非具身”, 认为认知是一种信息的表征与加工, 从本质上讲与承载它的身体无关。“弱具身”强调了认知对身体的依赖性, 但是却保留了认知的计算和表征功能。“强具身”则极力主张认知是被身体作用于世界的活动塑造出来的, 身体的特殊细节造就了认知的特殊性。在怎样理解“具身”方面, 存在着不同的解释。从本文作者的观点来看, 具身的性质和特征表现在4个方面：(1)身体参与了认知, 影响了思维、判断、态度和情绪等心智过程。(2)我们对于客观世界的知觉依赖于身体作用于世界的活动, 身体的活动影响着关于客观世界表象的形成。(3)意义源于身体, 抽象的意义有着身体感觉—运动系统的基础。(4)身体的不同倾向于造就不同的思维和认识方式。有关具身的研究将从理论和实践两个层面对心理学产生冲击。     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

Embodied experience and linguistic meaning

What role does people's embodied experiences have in their use and understanding of meaning? Most theories in cognitive science view meaning in terms of propositional structures that may be combined to form higher-order complexes in representing the meanings of conversations and texts. A newer approach seeks to capture meaning in terms of high-dimensional semantic space. Both views reflect the idea that meaning is best understood as abstract and disembodied symbols. My aim in this article is to make the case for an embodied view of linguistic meaning. This view provides a challenge to traditional approaches to linguistic meaning (although may not necessarily be entirely incompatible with them). I discuss several new lines of research from both linguistics and psychology that explore the importance of embodied perception and action in people's understanding of words, phrases, and texts. These data provide strong evidence in favor of the idea that significant aspects of thought and language arises from, and is grounded in, embodiment.     

具身双加工观点：解析具身效应的边界条件

为了找出具身效应在认知加工上的边界条件,在综合分析具身理论中的双加工内涵和具身实验研究中的双加工证据基础上,提出了具身双加工观点：具身效应与直觉性的一型加工更为契合,会被反思性的二型加工所抑制。具体而言,抽象思维的发展程度、认知加工的无意识状态、认知负荷和心理冲突性均可能会导致两种加工类型之间的转换,从而调节具身效应。该观点对提高具身实验操控的有效性,解决具身效应的可重复性危机具有指导意义。     

具身认知:身体主题在心身关系研究中的回归

上世纪80年代以来,随着经典认知研究的步履维艰,认知研究逐渐显示出具身化的特点。具身认知是第二代认知科学的代表,它强调身体在认知形成中的重要性,认为身体对认知有限制、分配和调节作用,并具有与经典认知不同的运动观。近年来研究者们以实验手段力求为具身认知的存在提供证据,着力考察认知与身体感知运动状态的相互影响。具身认知理论在认知构建、生态效度等方面具有自己的优势,但目前具身认知还是一个新兴的研究领域,有待进一步的深入探讨。     

Affordances as constraints on the control of stance

In this article we present an ecological treatment of the control of stance by multi-segment organisms. We treat the organism as a black box, and the organism-environment interaction as a closed-loop system. We argue that different ways of controlling stance can have differing utility (affordances) for perception and action. We further argue that the affordances of a particular control strategy are in part determined by (a) the mechanical properties of the organism, (b) the mechanical properties of the surface on which stance takes place, and (c) the goals of behavior. Our conclusion is that the control of stance is based on, or constrained by, perception of the kinematic consequences, or affordances, of control actions. Finally, we argue that the relationship between affordances and constraints on control actions should be investigated using geometrical methods.     

Are Events and Affordances Commensurate Terms?

In this article, I argue that the dichotomy between events and affordances as Stoffregen (target article, this issue) devises is unwarranted and potentially misleading. I challenge the notion that the role of the actor distinguishes events from affordances in any useful way. The research labeled event perception is neither less ecological nor qualitatively different from research on affordances. Instead, the main distinction is constituted by affordance being a perceptual property, whereas event pertains to a different semantic category. Nonetheless, the contemplation of these concepts, in particular an elaboration of the concept of affordance, is desperately needed.     

Social Ecological Context of Conversing

The purpose of this article is to provide some groundwork about ecological social psychology as a starting point for researchers tackling neglected issues of language ecologically. I review basic principles of the ecological approach to perceiving and acting and discuss how the ecological approach has been applied beyond solo actors in an ecological niche to multiple actors acting in a niche explicitly conceptualized as social. In the last decade, researchers were inspired by tool-use research and solo action-based research on affordances (e.g., stair climbing) to take an affordance-based approach to understanding cooperation in a more embodied approach than was previously used in social psychology. Beginning at least a decade prior to that, researchers were inspired to wonder whether the dynamics of the coordinative structures of a solo actor's body movements, spontaneously emerging when different limbs engaged in rhythmic movement, might cross the bodily divide to yield similar collective dynamics when multiple actors are incidentally engaged in rhythmic movement (e.g., different people swinging their legs together). One insight from the affordance research emphasizes the role of meaning as emerging in dynamic interaction between multiple actors confronted by demands and resources of an environment: language's potential contribution to this is discussed in the context of the newest advances in theorizing about values and about the sociocultural grounding of affordances. Finally, the potential role of language for facilitating being pulled into “social eddies” of coordinated orbits of motion, as well as its potential role in joint action, is discussed.     

Perceptually Equivalent Judgments Made Visually and via Haptic Sensory-Substitution Devices

ABSTRACT

According to the ecological theory of perception–action, perception is primarily of affordances, which are directly perceivable opportunities for behavior. The current study evaluated participants’ ability to use vision and haptic sensory-substitution devices to support perceptual judgments of affordances involving the task of passing through apertures. Sighted participants made perceptual judgments about whether they could walk through apertures of various widths and their level of confidence in each judgment, using unrestricted vision and, when blindfolded, using two haptic sensory-substitution instruments: a cane-like wooden rod and the Enactive Torch, a device that converts distance information into vibrotactile stimuli. The boundary between aperture widths that were judged as pass-through-able versus non-pass-through-able was statistically equivalent across sensory modalities. However, participants were not as confident in their judgments using the rod or Enactive Torch as they were using vision. Additionally, participants’ judgments with the haptic instruments were significantly more accurate than with vision. The results underscore the need to assess sensory-substitution devices in the context of functional behaviors.     

Doggone affordances: Canine perception of affordances for reaching

Performing any behavior requires perceiving affordances—whether and how that behavior can be performed. Perception of affordances exhibits action scaling—choices about when to transition between two different modes of behavior reflect the fit between action capabilities and environmental properties. The boundary between distances that are perceived to be reachable with an arm-only reach and those that are perceived to be reachable with an arm-plus-torso reach occurs at farther distances for long-armed than for short-armed people, but at the same ratio of object-distance-to-arm length for both groups. To the extent that perception of affordances is supported by detection of invariant stimulation patterns, perception of a given affordance ought to exhibit action scaling regardless of species. We investigated the heights at which dogs chose to transition from reaching with the head only to rearing (i.e., reaching with the head plus torso). This transition occurred at a taller height for tall than for short dogs, but at the same ratio of shoulder-height-to-treat-height for both groups. The results demonstrate a similarity in perception of affordances across species and suggest that perception of affordances is supported by detection of lawfully structured stimulation patterns that may be invariant across species.     

TRoPICALS: a computational embodied neuroscience model of compatibility effects

Perceiving objects activates the representation of their affordances. For example, experiments on compatibility effects showed that categorizing objects by producing certain handgrips (power or precision) is faster if the requested responses are compatible with the affordance elicited by the size of objects (e.g., small or large). The article presents a neural-network architecture that provides a general framework to account for compatibility effects. The model was designed with a methodological approach (computational embodied neuroscience) that aims to provide increasingly general accounts of brain and behavior (4 sources of constraints are used: neuroscientific data, behavioral data, embodied systems, reproduction of learning processes). The model is based on 4 principles of brain organization that we claim underlie most compatibility effects. First, visual perception and action are organized in the brain along a dorsal neural pathway encoding affordances and a ventral pathway encoding goals. Second, the prefrontal cortex within the ventral pathway gives a top-down bias to action selection by integrating information on stimuli, context, and goals. Third, reaction times depend on dynamic neural competitions for action selection that integrate bottom-up and top-down information. The congruence or incongruence between affordances and goals explains the different reaction times found in the experiments. Fourth, as words trigger internal simulations of their referents, they can cause compatibility effects as objects do. We validated the model by reproducing and explaining 3 types of compatibility effects and showed its heuristic power by producing 2 testable predictions. We also assessed the explicative power of the model by comparing it with related models and showed how it can be extended to account for other compatibility effects.     

Action goal selection and motor planning can be dissociated by tool use

The preparation of eye or hand movements enhances visual perception at the upcoming movement end position. The spatial location of this influence of action on perception could be determined either by goal selection or by motor planning. We employed a tool use task to dissociate these two alternatives. The instructed goal location was a visual target to which participants pointed with the tip of a triangular hand-held tool. The motor endpoint was defined by the final fingertip position necessary to bring the tool tip onto the goal. We tested perceptual performance at both locations (tool tip endpoint, motor endpoint) with a visual discrimination task. Discrimination performance was enhanced in parallel at both spatial locations, but not at nearby and intermediate locations, suggesting that both action goal selection and motor planning contribute to visual perception. In addition, our results challenge the widely held view that tools extend the body schema and suggest instead that tool use enhances perception at those precise locations which are most relevant during tool action: the body part used to manipulate the tool, and the active tool tip.     

Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency

The concept of agency has been central to ecological approaches to psychology. Gibson, one of the founders of this movement, made room for this concept by arguing against the mechanistic conceptions in psychology. In his view, the environment is not a collection of causes that pushes the animal around, but consist of action possibilities, which he coined affordances. In making their way in the world, animals regulate their behavior with respect to these possibilities. Reed later developed this ecological conception of agency, following Gibson in conceiving of affordances as action possibilities. However, drawing upon industrial design, architecture, and phenomenology, we argue that affordances are not mere action possibilities but that they can also invite behavior. We suggest a mutualist perspective on invitations, suggesting that they depend on the animal-environment relationship in multiple dimensions. The implications of this new conception of affordances for the ecological account of agency are explored.     

语言理解中的动作知觉：基于具身认知的视角

具身认知理论是目前认知科学领域中最新的研究范式和取向, 它认为人的认知过程依赖于感知和动作系统, 强调身体在认知中发挥重要作用。具身语言理解则认为, 身体、动作和知觉系统在语言认知中也起着不可或缺的作用。文章在简要回顾具身语言理解的相关理论如索引假设、浸入式经历者框架、语言神经理论的基础上, 重点从语言理解的四个层面的实证研究, 即音位、单词、句子、语篇, 证实具身语言理解的观点。未来的研究应该着眼于用具身认知观点来解释更高级的抽象语言表征, 具身单词、句子、语篇的具体表征形式, 并利用具身语言认知的观点进行认知的本土化研究。     

The Separation of Action and Perception and the Issue of Affordances

Michaels's (2000) reassessment of the relation between action and perception is endorsed. In alignment with Milner and Goodale (1995), she proposed a separation between action (i.e., control of movement) and perception (i.e., the explicit knowledge of environmental properties, including animal-referential ones), the separation being based on the reliance on different optical variables. However, how should the concept of affordances be incorporated into this scheme? We present data showing that affordances, both when perceived and acted on, are not susceptible to optical illusions. Because action and perception are distinguished on the basis of information used, but are also proposed to interact, it is hypothesized that, dependent on the task goal, "information for action" may be used in perception, and "information for perception" may be used in action. Participants may become more attuned to information for action when perception serves to acquire explicit knowledge about what the environment affords for action.     

对话心智与身体：具身认知的内感受研究转向

具身认知观念试图强调心智是根植于身体的,身体经验会对认知过程产生重要影响。但对于心智与身体的对话是如何进行的？身体通过何种渠道如何影响心智？等问题困扰着具身认知的支持者。传统的具身认知研究遭遇可重复性危机,身体状态改变影响高级认知的结论受到质疑。近年来,越来越多的证据表明内感受与身体表征、具身情绪以及社会认知等存在着密切的联系,因而内感受很有可能在身体加工和高级认知过程中起着重要的调节作用。