An embodied cognitive science?

The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely physically embodied, environmentally embedded science of the mind is still unclear. In this article I will raise a number of critical questions concerning the nature and scope of this approach, drawing a distinction between two kinds of appeal to embodiment: (1) ‘Simple’ cases, in which bodily and environmental properties merely constrain accounts that retain the focus on inner organization and processing; and (2) More radical appeals, in which attention to bodily and environmental features is meant to transform both the subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science.     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

When is a Deleuzian becoming ?

Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently across the trajectory of Deleuze's work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuze's work, and specifically in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of the concept in general.     

When is a Concrete Property Basic?

We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B + C. This paper examines composition in the case of concrete natural properties. It explains why property composition is so much less straightforward than object composition. Then it distinguishes strictly basic properties (like the mass of an electron), compositely basic properties (like the mass of a planet), and fully non-basic properties (like the saltiness of blood). It shows how strictly basic properties compose, or result in, compositely basic and fully non-basic properties, which differ from, yet depend for their natures on, the strictly basic properties they result from. It explains the characteristics and differences of these types of properties. It notes that the existence of compositely basic and non-basic properties grounds an argument for the genuine existence of composite properties as well as the composite objects they characterize. Finally, it defends the usefulness of these distinctions by identifying projects they assist, and by applying them both to mark off distinct metaphysical views too often conflated and to correct sundry metaphysical mistakes.     

When is a weight not illusory?

Weight illusions occur whenever some aspect of an object--such as its size, material or colour--arouses the expectation that its weight will be heavier or lighter than it actually is. The direction of the illusion normally contrasts with the expected weight. When objects are hidden from sight and lifted by strings they can provide no misleading cues, and a correct weight-expectation should be achieved after one or two trials. When a visible object has the same physical and apparent weight as a hidden object, it can be defined as non-illusory. Weighted tins and polystyrene blocks of various sizes were compared with hidden weights. Tins were found to be non-illusory when their density was about 1.7, and polystyrene blocks when their density was about 0.14.

Weight illusions may be due to a central scaling process which enables a wide range of weights to be estimated, different ranges being selected according to the expected value of the weight. If the selected range is inappropriate an illusion occurs. Changes in expected value could also allow for the operation of “weight-constancy” during changes in proprioceptive stimulation.     

Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?

In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions.

     

When is a counselor …?

A work experience project for low income adults is described. “Counselors” in this project were found to have little experience; little training in interviewing, statistics, psychological analysis, or other guidance and counseling techniques; and inadequate supervision. Results on aptitude tests were reported on the average 26 days after test administration. Occupational information was sadly lacking. The question is raised: When is a counselor… ?     

What is so special about embodied simulation?

Simulation theories of social cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear what simulation means and how it works. The discovery of mirror neurons, responding both to action execution and observation, suggested an embodied approach to mental simulation. Over the past few years this approach has been hotly debated and alternative accounts have been proposed. We discuss these accounts and argue that they fail to capture the uniqueness of embodied simulation (ES). ES theory provides a unitary account of basic social cognition, demonstrating that people reuse their own mental states or processes represented with a bodily format in functionally attributing them to others.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko

Studia Logica - A 1971 paper by Roman Suszko, ‘Identity Connective and Modality’, claimed that a certain identity-free schema expressed the condition that there are at most two objects...     

When is motion 'motion'?

Examples of visual motion have become more and more abstract over the years, leading up to 'third-order' stimuli where direction is actually determined by the observer through top - down attention. But how far can this be pushed--are there motion stimuli that are yet more arbitrary and abstract? Actually, there is a broad class of 'conceptual motion' stimuli--things like a moving grating of faces, or a shifting pattern of words--that are perfect analogs to traditional 'perceptual motion' stimuli, solvable by the same motion computation and for which observers can readily make direction-of-motion judgments. Interestingly though, these do not produce a sensation of motion (among other automatic consequences of motion detection). Here we compare a luminance-based perceptual motion stimulus to a semantic-based conceptual motion stimulus to contrast the psychophysical hallmarks of these motion categories.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

When is a compliment not a compliment? Evaluating expressions of positive stereotypes

Unlike negative stereotypes, positive stereotypes are often perceived as admirable qualities, and expressions of such beliefs may be intended as compliments toward group members. Two experiments were conducted to examine how the targets of positive stereotypes evaluate others who express such stereotypic “compliments.” In Study 1, Black participants evaluated a White student who praised the athletic ability of African Americans more negatively than a control condition. In Study 2, Black and White participants watched an interracial interaction that involved the White actor expressing positive stereotypes or a control interaction with no stereotypes. In the positive stereotype condition, Black participants evaluated the White actor and the interaction as a whole more negatively than did White participants, but there were no differences in the control condition. The implications for the perpetuation of interracial distrust and avoidance are discussed.     

Theoretical note: When is a coping strategy not a coping strategy?

Abstract

This paper discusses the issue of differentiating between cognitive coping behaviors and appraisal processes. Although these can be separated in theory, and experimental procedures can manipulate appraisals independantly of coping, it is difficult to separate these constructs in naturalistic studies on appraisal and coping responses to real life stressors. The ability to separate these constructs requires knowledge of an individual's precise motivation, an age-old stumbling block in psychological research. It is proposed that, at least in naturalistic studies on stress, appraisal and coping, perhaps the best that can be achieved is to record a particular behavior and report it as such, without attempting to guess at the motivation underlying it.     

When is cataphoric reference recognised?

Pronouns typically have explicit antecedents in the prior discourse otherwise processing difficulty is experienced. However, it has been argued [Gordon, P. C., & Hendrick, R. (1997). Intuitive knowledge of linguistic co-reference. Cognition, 62, 325–370; Gordon, P. C., & Hendrick, R. (1998). The representation and processing of co-reference in discourse. Cognitive Science, 22, 389–424] that when a pronoun appears in a preposed subordinate clause (as in, Before she began to sing, Susan stood up), incremental interpretation is suspended and no antecedent is immediately sought, since the pronoun cannot be resolved until the main clause is encountered. We report results from an eye-tracking study showing that on encountering a pronoun that has no prior antecedent (compared to cases where there is an explicit prior antecedent), readers experience immediate difficulty whether or not the pronoun appears in a preposed subordinate clause, suggesting that attempted incremental interpretation is not suspended in these cases.     

How cognitive is psychomotor slowing in depression? evidence from a meta-analysis

Abstract

The current meta-analysis explores the hypothesis that many of the apparently specific deficits that depressed subjects show on speeded cognitive tasks are actually the result of general (i.e., task-independent) slowing. Results of three analyses provided strong support for this hypothesis. the reaction times (RTs) of the depressed groups were consistently slower than those of the control groups. Moreover, the degree of cognitive slowing was approximately the same regardless of the task or condition. Regression analyses revealed a proportional relation between the RTs of the two depressed and control groups, suggesting that depression slows sensory/motor and cognitive processes to approximately the same degree. the regression-based approach used in the present analyses has implications for the study of other neurological disorders and also may have important applications in the assessment of both general and specific cognitive deficits in individual patients.