On an Argument for Humility

Considerations upon the nature of properties and laws have led some philosophers to claim that the correct epistemic attitude with regards to the intrinsic properties of particulars is scepticism. I examine one particularly clear version of this line of argument, and contend that a serious form of scepticism is not established. However, I argue that the theories of properties and laws underlying the argument have unwanted metaphysical implications. These provide a stronger reason to jettison the analyses. I end by sketching an alternative view that avoids these difficulties.     

Operational interpretations for the G and Gm indexes of agreement

Operational proportional increase in agreement (PIA) and proportional reduction in error (PRE) interpretations are given for Holley and Guilford's G index of agreement and Holley and Lienert's G_m index of agreement.     

On the generalization of the G index of agreement, Go, for use with ordinal scores

Abstract.— Presents a G index generalization for items where each has a predetermined number of response alternatives on an ordinal level. Shows that G_o is equal to the G index based on another set of dichotomous data. The problem that items with many response levels will be given more weight than those with few response levels is pointed out. An alternative index, G _0e, which does not have such characteristics, is presented and also proves to be equal to the G index based on a set of equivalent dichotomies.     

On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis

In a number of writings, Cass Sunstein has argued that we should use cost-benefit analysis as our primary approach to risk management, because cost-benefit analysis corrects for the cognitive biases that mar our thinking about risk. The paper critically evaluates this ‘cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis’ and finds it wanting. Once we make distinctions between different cognitive errors and between different aspects of cost-benefit analysis, it becomes apparent that there are really two cognitive arguments, neither of which is successful as arguments for cost-benefit analysis as a whole. One argument shows that the analysis aspect of cost-benefit analysis is warranted because it corrects for false beliefs about the magnitudes of risk and for the neglect of some costs. While this is a sound argument, it does not provide an argument for other aspects of cost-benefit analysis. The second argument purports to show that commensurating and monetizing the values of the effects of regulation is warranted because it corrects for the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life. This argument fails because the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life is not a cognitive error: It is neither precluded by considerations of instrumental rationality, nor by the requirement of treating like cases alike.     

CHINESE AND WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF JENb (HUMANITY)1

The concept of jen (humanity, love, humaneness; pronounced ren ) is a central concept of Confucian thought and has gone through a long evolution of more than 2000 years. The story of that evolution has been told elsewhere. The purpose here is to see how the Chinese have understood the concept and how the West has interpreted it. We shall discuss the Chinese understanding under seven headings.     

The Main Argument for Value Incommensurability (and Why It Fails)

Arguments for value incommensurability ultimately depend on a certain diagnosis of human motivation. Incommensurablists hold that each person's basic ends are not only irreducible but also incompatible with one another. It isn't merely that some goals can't, in fact, be jointly realized; values actually compete for influence. This account makes a mistake about the nature of human motivation. Each value underwrites a ceteris paribus evaluation. Such assessments are mutually compatible because the observation that there is something to be said for an outcome from a particular perspective allows for any ultimate evaluation of that outcome; Values can be irreducible without thereby being incommensurable.     

Defending (a modified version of) the Zygote Argument

Think of the last thing someone did to you to seriously harm or offend you. And now imagine, so far as you can, becoming fully aware of the fact that his or her action was the causally inevitable result of a plan set into motion before he or she was ever even born, a plan that had no chance of failing. Should you continue to regard him or her as being morally responsible—blameworthy, in this case—for what he or she did? Many have thought that, intuitively, you should not. Recently, Alfred Mele has employed this line of thought to mount what many have taken to be a powerful argument for incompatibilism: the “Zygote Argument”. However, in interesting new papers, John Martin Fischer and Stephen Kearns have each independently argued that the Zygote Argument fails. As I see it, the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns reveal some important questions about how the argument is meant to be—or how it would best be—understood. Once we make a slight (but important) modification to the argument, however, I think we will be able to see that the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns do not detract from its substantial force.     

On The Validity of a Simple Argument for Moral Error Theory

In The Myth of Morality Richard Joyce presents a simple and very influential argument for the truth of moral error theory. In this paper I point out that (i) the argument does not have the form Joyce attributes to it, (ii) the argument is not valid in an extensional propositional logic and (iii) on the most natural way of explicating the meanings of the involved terms, it remains invalid. I conclude that more explanation is needed if we are to accept this particular argument for moral error theory.     

The Euthyphro Argument (9d–11b)

A sizable literature exists concerning the structure of Socrates' argument at Euthyphro 9d–11b. Although there is some dispute, a substitutional reading has emerged as a leading interpretation. However, some rear‐guard maneuvers are in order to defend this reading against its competitors. In this paper, I articulate a substitutional reading and argue that it is invalid on two counts: one, Socrates oversteps the logic of his reductio ad absurdum, and two, he illicitly substitutes coreferring expressions in explanatory contexts. Next, I defend the substitutional reading by (1) rebutting its leading contender, Sharvy's formal causation interpretation, and (2) showing how a similar substitutional argument is made in the Protagoras.     

Psychometric properties of scales in the General Nordic Questionnaire for Psychological and Social Factors at Work (QPSNordic): Confirmatory factor analysis and prediction of certified long-term sickness absence

Psychometric properties, particularly predictive validity, of scales in the General Nordic Questionnaire for Psychological and Social Factors at Work (QPS_Nordic) were assessed. The analysis is confined to the scales in the QPS_Nordic, and 24 of the 26 scales are included. A large group of Swedish county council employees ( n = 3,976; response rate = 65%) participated in a study and were given the QPS_Nordic. Register data for long-term sick leave (>90 days), with diagnosis, were used for predictive analysis. The following main results were obtained: Reliability was generally satisfactory, confirmatory factor analysis indicated good fit, concurrent validity was good, some less often investigated organizational variables predicted sickness absence, and scales were differentially associated with absence due to psychiatric and musculoskeletal disorders. In conclusion, the psychometric testing of the QPS_Nordic so far suggests that it is a good instrument for assessing health-related factors at work.