Implicit commitment in theory choice

The proper evaluation of a theory’s virtues seems to require taking into account what the theory is indirectly or implicitly committed to, in addition to what it explicitly says. Most extant proposals for criteria of theory choice in the literature spell out the relevant notion of implicit commitment via some notion of entailment. I show that such criteria behave implausibly in application to theories that differ over matters of entailment. A recent defence by Howard Peacock of such a criterion against this objection is examined and rejected. I go on to a develop a better proposal on which, roughly speaking, a theory is counted committed to a claim if and only if its best fully explicit extension is explicitly committed to the claim. Such extensions in turn are evaluated by ordinary standards of theory choice adapted to the case of theories assumed to articulate their intended content in a fully explicit fashion.     

Subliminal perception and its cognates: theory, indeterminacy, and time

Unconscious processes, by whatever name they may be known (e.g., "subliminal," "implicit"), are invariably operationalized by the dissociation paradigm, any situation involving the dissociation between two indicators (or sets of indicators), one of availability (epsilon) and the other, of accessibility (alpha), such that, epsilon>alpha. Subliminal perception has been traditionally defined by a special case of the dissociation paradigm in which availability exceeds accessibility when accessibility is null (epsilon>alpha/alpha=0). Construct validity issues bedevil all dissociation paradigms since it is not clear what might constitute appropriate indicators that, moreover, are pure and exhaustive. Semantic and theoretic drifts in the recent literature--e.g., the confusion of different versions of the dissociation paradigm, the equation of conscious-unconscious with direct-indirect tests, and the foisting of the criterion of qualitative differences--have tended to undermine emerging theoretic parsimony. On the other hand, a crucial factor has been left out of theory development: time. Both epsilon and alpha can rise and fall over time, often asynchronously, and so dissociations may wax and wane and, even, reverse over time. Some laboratory evidence suggests that accessibility measures (e.g., d'), as they approach chance, may actually dip below chance (subchance perception). If so, d'=0 (the chance-limen or objective threshold), could be an averaging artifact of positive and negative d's. Conscious accessibility is not either-or but more or less, and variable over time.     

Risk and diversification in theory choice

How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community.     

On the role of language in social choice theory

Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory are usually compared either regarding the normative plausibility or regarding the logical strength of the axioms involved. Here, instead, we propose to compare axiomatizations according to the language used for expressing the axioms. In order to carry out such a comparison, we suggest a formalist approach to axiomatization results which uses a restricted formal logical language to express axioms. Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory then turn into definability results of formal logic. The advantages of this approach include the possibility of non-axiomatizability results, a distinction between absolute and relative axiomatizations, and the possibility to ask how rich a language needs to be to express certain axioms. We argue for formal minimalism, i.e., for favoring axiomatizations in the weakest language possible.     

On the indeterminacy of the meter

Synthese - In the International System of Units (SI), ‘meter’ is defined in terms of seconds and the speed of light, and ‘second’ is defined in terms of properties of cesium...     

Busy choice sequences refraining formulas and modalities

The purpose of this paper is to present some results instit theory, a theory of agency proposed by N. Belnap and M. Perloff. We will establish a correspondence between the numbers ofstit modalities and the complexity degrees ofbusy choice sequences in semantic structures, and consequently, a correspondence between the number of modes of actions/inactions instit theory and the complexity degrees ofbusy choice sequences in semantic structures.I would like to give thanks to professor N. Belnap for his special help and encouragement, and to the referees provided by this journal for their helpful suggestions in improving this paper.Presented byMelvin Fitting     

On the general theory of meaningful representation

The numerical representations of measurement, geometry and kinematics are here subsumed under a general theory of representation. The standard theories of meaningfulness of representational propositions in these three areas are shown to be special cases of two theories of meaningfulness for arbitrary representational propositions: the theories based on unstructured and on structured representation respectively. The foundations of the standard theories of meaningfulness are critically analyzed and two basic assumptions are isolated which do not seem to have received adequate justification: the assumption that a proposition invariant under the appropriate group is therefore meaningful, and the assumption that representations should be unique up to a transformation of the appropriate group. A general theory of representational meaningfulness is offered, based on a semantic and syntactic analysis of representational propositions. Two neglected features of representational propositions are formalized and made use of: (a) that such propositions are induced by more general propositions defined for other structures than the one being represented, and (b) that the true purpose of representation is the application of the theory of the representing system to the represented system. On the basis of these developments, justifications are offered for the two problematic assumptions made by the existing theories.Material from this paper was presented at a conference on meaningfulness in the theory of measurement held at New York University in December 1984, hosted by J. C. Falmagne. I would like to thank Patrick Suppes for arranging my invitation to this conference, and David Krantz, R. Duncan Luce, and Fred Roberts for helpful comments. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for extremely detailed and helpful comments and suggestions, the most important of which are acknowledged in footnotes.