Grades of individuality. A pluralistic view of identity in quantum mechanics and in the sciences

This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian ‘reductionist’ tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of ‘primitivism’ that denies that facts of identity and individuality must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that—contrary to a widespread consensus—‘naturalised’ metaphysics supports both the acceptability of non-qualitatively grounded (both ‘contextual’ and intrinsic) identity and a pluralistic approach to individuality and individuation. A case study is offered that focuses on non-relativistic quantum mechanics, in the context of which primitivism about identity and individuality, rather than being regarded as unscientific, is on the contrary suggested to be preferable to the complicated forms of reductionism that have recently been proposed. More generally, by assuming a plausible form of anti-reductionism about scientific theories and domains, it is claimed that science can be regarded as compatible with, or even as suggesting, the existence of a series of equally plausible grades of individuality. The kind of individuality that prevails in a certain context and at a given level can be ascertained only on the basis of the specific scientific theory at hand.     

Political Implications of Confucian Familism

The family could be mobilized as a political resource for economic ‘development’. What kind of family would be compatible with a knowledge-based economy? We argue that authoritarian Confucian familism is incompatible with the knowledge-based economy; but it is possible to construct a different model of the ideal Confucian family which will be compatible with such an economy: a family ideal that emphasizes internal strengths of relationships rather than building barriers to keep out ‘undesirable influences’, that advocates a respect for authority that is authoritative rather than authoritarian.     

Reviving the Past for the Future?: The (In)compatibility between Confucianism and Democracy in Contemporary China

The issue of (in)compatibility between Confucianism and modern democracy, particularly in China, has attracted much debate over the decade. This article singles out the particular notion of Minben 民本, which is at the center of the argument for a ‘Confucian democracy’, and argues that it is fundamentally different from modern democracy. However, this does not mean that Confucianism could not be connected with modern democracy. The important question is: what exactly does it mean to ‘connect’ Confucianism to the modern society? The author argues that only by being disconnected with political power could there be meaningful ‘Confucian democracy’ today in China.     

Early Confucian Principles: the Potential Theoretic Foundation of Democracy in Modern China

The subtle and complex relation between Confucianism and modern democracy has long been a controversial issue, and it is now again becoming a topical issue in the process of political modernization in contemporary China. This paper argues that there are some quite basic early Confucian values and principles that are not only compatible with democracy, but also may become the theoretic foundation of modern democracy in China. Early Confucianism considers ‘the people's will’ as the direct representative of ‘Heaven's will’, with which it legitimizes political power. Confucian theory of ‘human nature is good’ endorses equal potential good for every man. These principles can be used in reasoning towards a system of democracy. In terms of decision-making, the Confucian ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ accords with certain democratic principles. The independent personality and committed individualism advocated by early Confucianism is a required civic merit in a democratic society. These fundamental Confucian principles, through contemporary hermeneutics, may provide a philosophic grounding for democracy and support the construction of a democratic system with a Chinese dimension. To get democracy rooted in the spirit of traditional Chinese culture will benefit the healthy and smooth development of democracy in China.     

Politics,democratic action,and solidarity

I agree with the critique of rationalism proposed by Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus in ‘Disclosing New Worlds’. Today the defence of democracy requires us to understand that allegiance to democratic institutions can only rest on identification with the practices, the language‐games, and the discourses which are constitutive of the democratic ‘form of life’, and that it is not a question of providing them with a rational justification. My comments are developed in two directions. First, as a development of their thesis concerning the centrality of practices, I suggest that in order to grasp the present crisis of democratic forms of individuality we can learn a lot from Nietzsche's analysis of ‘nihilism’. Second, I point to a dimension which I consider to be missing in the perspective put forward in the article. It fails to take account of the fact that the constitution of a ‘we’ always requires the determination of a ‘them’. This, in my view, has important consequences for the relation between solidarity and politics. I conclude by arguing for the need to introduce an agonistic element in the view of solidarity, and for the crucial role of the category of the adversary in a pluralist democracy whose aim is to transform antagonism into agonism.     

Inglehart‐Welzel's Traditional vs. Rational index revisited: A comparison between China and the West

Inglehart‐Welzel's ‘Traditional‐Rational’ Index has been widely accepted as a way to summarize changes in values between agricultural and industrial societies. An empirical re‐examination of the Index using the most recent World Values Survey data, however, suggests that it fails to represent the value profiles of mainland Chinese. I introduce a five‐item measurement called ‘Confucian Index of interpersonal relations’. It aims to capture some salient values in Chinese culture and show that, in China, Confucian values that govern interpersonal relations within one's immediate social environment are not in conflict with support for democratic government and social liberal values, such as tolerance and trust. The opposite is very much true in the rich West, where those who endorse ‘Confucian’ values are less tolerant of social diversity and where Inglehart's Index does make a lot of sense.     

Hyperpluralism,political liberalism,and Confucian democracy

In his recent book, Zhuoyao Li presents one of the most pointed criticisms of Confucian democracy from a political liberal standpoint. Li’s central argument is that liberal democracy, predicated on Rawlsian political liberalism, is the only legitimate form of democracy in East Asia’s pluralist societal context. Li advances his normative argument against Confucian democracy, first by reaffirming Rawls’s public conception of morality, then shifting his point of reference from Rawls to Alessandro Ferrara, and finally, defending a multivariate democracy in East Asia’s pluralist societal context from the viewpoint of Ferrara’s idea of hyperpluralism. In this paper, I defend Confucian democracy as a viable political theory in pluralist East Asia by critiquing Li’s change of the point of reference from Rawls to Ferrara, his imposition of the condition of hyperpluralism on East Asia, and his sweeping logical framework that allows no normative space for Confucian democratic theory.     

Is Confucianism a religion? Modern Confucian theories on the ethical nature of classical discourses

When dealing with the study of diverse Confucian traditions in eastern Asia, we are often confronted by the issue of the religious dimension of Confucianism and how can it be compared to the Western (or ‘general’) connotations of the term. Proceeding from the basic question as to how Confucianism sees itself, the paper focuses on the approaches of two representatives of the Modern Confucian intellectual movement, namely Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. In addition, we shall also take into consideration the various contemporary Confucian interpretations of the previously delineated problems, for instance Liu Shu-hsien’s or Chen Lai’s. Based on these discourses, the paper clarifies the reasons for Modern Confucian interpretations, according to which Confucianism is not a religion in the Western sense but a discourse that represents both a practical moral teaching and an abstract philosophy of immanent transcendence.     

Not quite dead yet: a liberal response to Van Heerden

In this article I challenge Derick van Heerden's prediction of ‘the demise of liberal political theory’. I point out several misinterpretations and misunderstandings of liberal theory in his article and take issue in particular with his claims regarding ‘embedded individuality’.     

An Emerging New Component of Cognitive Abilities in Human Resources Selection: Preliminary evidence to the existence of a ‘process‐analytic’ factor in selection batteries

New evidence in Human resource selection, may suggest the existence of a factor of cognitive ability termed here ‘process analytic.’ This new factor pertains to the ability to construct symbolic processes, identify major decision‐making junctures, locating and correcting errors and faults within the process. Two studies, conducted in large‐scale samples of candidates undergoing individual psychological assessment for selection purposes, provide evidence supporting the existence of the above‐mentioned factor, in addition to the ‘traditional’ ones (verbal‐logical and quantitative‐performance). The implications for theoretical and psychometric developments in the field of aptitude assessment for vocational purposes is discussed as well as the need for further research to establish the preliminary direction pointed out in these studies.     

Beyond sincerity and pretense: role-playing and unstructured self in the Zhuangzi

This article engages with a recent view that the Daoist Classic Zhuangzi advances an alternative to the Confucian role-ethics. According to this view, Zhuangzi opposes the Confucian idea that we should play our social roles with sincerity and instead argues that we should take the liberty to detach ourselves from the roles we play and ‘pretend’ them. It is argued in this article that Zhuangzi’s ideal of role-playing is based neither on sincerity nor on pretense. Instead, it is akin to the excellence of theatre actors when they enact a role: they are able, for a limited time, to restructure their personality into a particular role, but de-structure it again when the performance is over. The prerequisite for this ability is to keep one’s self fundamentally unstructured, or, as Zhuangzi puts it, ‘empty’ (xu 虛). This reading of Zhuangzian role-playing provides a fresh perspectives on ‘playing’ or ‘rambling’ (you 遊) as the central philosophical concept in the Zhuangzi.     

Nature and Self in New Age Pilgrimage

Several scholars have argued that New Age spirituality is best understood as a form of ‘self-spirituality’ and as an expression of the consumer capitalist tendency to commodify all things, in the process converting religion into a ‘spiritual marketplace’. This article examines the phenomenon of New Age pilgrimage, especially pilgrimage to natural ‘power places’, with a focus on New Age practices at Sedona, Arizona, USA. The author assesses New Age notions of sacred space, nature, and the self, and compares pilgrim practices and sensorial interactions with Sedona's red rock landscape to forms of tourist practice and commodification more prevalent in Sedona. He argues that New Age pilgrimage, in theory and sometimes in practice, rejects the consumerist impulse, and that the New Age ‘self’ is both more open-ended and ‘postmodern’, and less central to New Age practice, than is suggested by the characterisation of New Age as ‘self-spirituality’.     

Guo Xiang on Self-so Knowledge

The perspective on zhi 知 (‘knowledge’) is often identified as a key distinction between the Zhuangzi 莊子 and its most famous commentator, Guo Xiang 郭象. Many scholars who recognize this distinction observe that zhi almost always has negative connotations in Guo Xiang’s writing, whereas certain types of knowledge can be positive in the Zhuangzi (e.g. da zhi 大知 ‘greater knowledge’ or zhen zhi 真知 ‘genuine knowledge’.) In this way, Guo Xiang’s comments on zhi seem to stray from the ‘original meaning’ of the Zhuangzi, and are often dismissed as inaccurate mis-readings, imbued with mysticism and relativism. However, by taking into consideration some aspects of Guo Xiang’s socio-historical context, and the larger structure of his complex philosophical system, we find a project quite distinct from that of the Zhuangzi. Like many other Wei-Jin period thinkers, Guo aims bridging some of the gaps the Daoist classic creates between itself and the Confucian tradition. This exposes Guo Xiang’s first goal, which, like his intellectual contemporaries, is to unify Daoist and Confucian ideas. In addition, I will argue that if we look at the larger context of Guo Xiang’s own philosophical approach, and interpret his notion of zhi within this framework, then we find a strong argument for an alternative to the epistemological perspectives in the Zhuangzi – one that includes mysticism and relativism, but goes beyond them.     

Western ‘sincerity’ and Confucian ‘Cheng’

In philology, both ‘sincerity’ and ‘cheng’ primarily mean, ‘to be true to oneself’. As a philosophical term, ‘sincerity’ roots in Aristotle's ‘aletheutikos’. In medieval Europe, it is regarded as a neutral value that may either serve or disserve for ‘truth.’ As for Romantics, it is a positive value, and an individualistic concept whose two elements ‘true’ and ‘self’ refer to a person's ‘true feeling’ and ‘individuality’. In contrast, both ‘self’ and ‘true’ in Confucianism are universalistic concepts, meaning ‘good nature’ common to all humans, and ‘true feeling’ distinguishing them from beasts. Cheng itself means to face one's universal self with universal true feeling.     

An Ethics of Propriety: Ritual,Roles, and Dependence in Early Confucianism

This study examines the normative foundations of early Confucian ethics and suggests that rather than attempting to understand Confucian ethics in the language of ‘morality’ a more productive way would be to appreciate Confucianism as an ethics of propriety that can be articulated in terms of social roles, ritual decorum, and relational dependence. I argue that Western notions of ‘morality’ betray a thicker, more culturally loaded concept that possesses a limited utility in regard to comparative study. We can appeal to a kind of methodological charity where we not only maximize the sense of the text or subject's sayings but also privilege the categories of thought that are native to the text's or speaker's lexicon. With this in mind, we can understand Confucian ethics as an ethics of propriety that departs substantially from Western moral systems, including virtue ethics, and challenges our received views on justice, autonomy, and personal identity.     

Is Mencius' doctrine of ‘extending affection’ tenable?

In his doctrine of ‘extending affection’ (tui en), Mencius holds that one can transform particular consanguineous affection into universal humane love by the way of ‘taking this heart here and applying it to what is over there’. Through a critical analysis of the text of the Mencius, it is attempted to argue that although this doctrine can combine the two mainstays of Confucian thought, i.e., filiality and humaneness, into an integrated unity, it is not tenable within the Confucian framework in the light of the fundamental spirit of Confucianism, especially in the light of the principle of ‘love with distinctions’ advocated by Mencius himself, which definitely gives consanguineous affection the supreme position in human life.     

Many entities, no identity

The aim of this paper is to argue that some objections raised by Jantzen (Synthese, 2010) against the separation of the concepts of ‘counting’ and ‘identity’ are misled. We present a definition of counting in the context of quasi-set theory requiring neither the labeling nor the identity and individuality of the counted entities. We argue that, contrary to what Jantzen poses, there are no problems with the technical development of this kind of definition. As a result of being able to keep counting and identity apart for those entities, we briefly suggest that one venerable tradition concerning the nature of quantum particles may be consistently held. According to that tradition, known as the Received View on particles non-individuality, quantum particles may be seen as entities having both features: (i) identity and individuality do not apply to them, (ii) they may be gathered in collections comprising a plurality of them.     

Confucian Moral Realism

In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as ‘causally efficacious’. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. I will explain how many of the remarks by Confucius, Mencius, in Yijing, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean can be understood as implicit endorsements of these theses. I will also analyze the theses specific to Confucian moral realism. The paper will end with a brief defense of this form of realism.     

How Kierkegaard can help us understand covering in Analects 13.18

I suggest that Kierkegaard proves a helpful interlocutor in the debate about Analects 13.18 and the meaning of yin 隱. After surveying the contemporary debate, I argue that Kierkegaard and the Confucians agree on three important points. First, they both present relational selves. Second, both believe certain relationships (God for Kierkegaard and tian 天 and the sages for the Confucians) are integral for moral knowledge. Third, both present a differentiated account of love where our obligations are highest to those with whom we are closest. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s ‘covering’ in the deliberation ‘Love covers a multitude of sins’ in Works of Love of ‘covering’ suggests innovative meanings for yin 隱 that are compatible with Confucian philosophy. Finally, I argue that sagely discretion in covering on the Confucian account is like the teleological suspension of the ethical.     

Confucian ritual and modern civility

The Confucian notion of civility has for thousands of years guided all aspects of socio-ethical life in East Asia. Confucians express their central concern for civility in their notion of li, which is commonly translated ‘ritual’ and refers to the conventions and courtesies through which we submit to the socio-ethical order, as we do, for example, in performing sacrifices, weddings, and funerals, and various daily acts of deference. Since the rise of China and other East Asian countries as economic powers, it has been suggested that we have in East Asia a ‘Confucian’ ritual-based culture that is opposed to the law-based culture of the West, a culture of rites opposed to a culture of rights, and that this ritual-based culture can be carried into modernity as another way to secure social harmony. I argue that the values central to Confucian ritual – deference, repayment, and harmony – are incompatible with the freedom enacted in modern civility. It is unlikely, therefore, that Confucian ritual can be carried into modernity and, as some suggest, remedy the fragmentation, and indeed lack of civility, characteristic of modern societies.