Some implications of computer networks for psychology

Computer networking as a subject of psychological research has varied facets, including the social psychology of scientists, the role of group “labeling” practices, and the paradigm development process, as well as the definitions of software, hardware, and communication systems and interfaces that fit the research styles, aspirations, and work habits specific to psychologists.     

Some implications of Jewish marriage philosophy for marital breakdown

A clarification of some of the roots of marital breakdown is sought through examining the love relationship in Viktor Frankl's logotherapy and its theological counterparts in Judaism. Frankl's implicit ethic of self-transcendence coincides with Judaism's view of the married state as shared destiny. Together these call into question the ethic of self-fulfillment which appears to underlie much marital distress.Dr. Bulka is Rabbi of Congregation Machzikei Hadas in Ottawa, Ontario, and Editor of theJournal of Psychology and Judaism. His address is: 1747 Featherston Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1H 6P4.     

After Helsinki: unresolved issues in international research

Following a long process of revision, a new version of the Declaration of Helsinki was approved by the World Medical Association in 2000. Two provisions of the Declaration address ongoing international controversies regarding research sponsored by industrialized countries and conducted in developing countries. Despite the issuance of the final version of the Declaration, opponents remain locked in debate. Moreover, the Declaration remained silent on other prominent controversies concerning international research. An analysis of these current controversies reveals reasons why they are not likely to be readily resolved, despite apparent agreement by opponents on overarching ethical principles.     

Moral philosophy and moral psychology in Mencius

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius’ moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the ‘virtue ethics’ reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius’ moral theory, in spite of Mencius’ obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.     

The psychology and philosophy of luck

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.     

The formalising tendency in philosophy and experimental psychology

This paper is an exercise in the phenomenology of science. It examines the tendency to prefer formal accounts in a familiar body of experimental psychology. It will argue that, because of this tendency, psychologists of this school neglect those forms of human cognition typical of the humanities disciplines. This is not a criticism of psychology, however. Such neglect is compatible with scientific rigour, provided it does not go unnoticed. Indeed, reflection on the case in hand allows us to refine the characterisation of the formalising tendency.