共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Quassim Cassam 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):3-18
I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless.
I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the
first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of
self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny
that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient
to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.
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Quassim CassamEmail: |
2.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
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Christian MillerEmail: |
3.
Michael B. Gill 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):215-234
4.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
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Derk PereboomEmail: |
5.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |
6.
Peter H. Schwartz 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(3):199-213
With the growing focus on prevention in medicine, studies of how to describe risk have become increasing important. Recently,
some researchers have argued against giving patients “comparative risk information,” such as data about whether their baseline
risk of developing a particular disease is above or below average. The concern is that giving patients this information will
interfere with their consideration of more relevant data, such as the specific chance of getting the disease (the “personal
risk”), the risk reduction the treatment provides, and any possible side effects. I explore this view and the theories of
rationality that ground it, and I argue instead that comparative risk information can play a positive role in decision-making.
The criticism of disclosing this sort of information to patients, I conclude, rests on a mistakenly narrow account of the
goals of prevention and the nature of rational choice in medicine.
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Peter H. SchwartzEmail: |
7.
Luca Ferrero 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):403-430
There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent’s capacity
to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits
us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by
satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive
view of the diachronic will: the rationale for it is that it makes possible to engage in activities with a radically novel
temporal structure, activities that are not merely continuous over time, but temporally integrated and unified. These activities
are essential to our form of life and to our existence as temporally unified agents. The instrumental and cognitive benefits,
if any, are merely secondary to the ontological ones.
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Luca FerreroEmail: |
8.
Sven Bernecker 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):107-121
This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p, is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of
the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p. Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content
of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding
identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected
upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity.
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Sven BerneckerEmail: |
9.
Chrisoula Andreou 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):415-422
A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical
rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with
the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality
and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice
situation—which I refer to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just
described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality
than current debate suggests.
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Chrisoula AndreouEmail: |
10.
Ira Newman 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):43-54
Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived
from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits
of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of
a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already
accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the
form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional
literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect.
And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point.
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Ira NewmanEmail: |
11.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
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Harold LangsamEmail: |
12.
13.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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Melissa FrankelEmail: |
14.
Terry Murray 《Journal of Adult Development》2009,16(2):108-128
This article explores graduate students’ experiences of a self-knowledge development course that is framed by the Heroic Journey
model. Through a consideration of several theorists’ perspectives and through the voices of 13 study participants, this article
examines the nature of this self-study experience and its impact on participants’ lives. In light of feminist critiques of
the traditional Heroic Journey model, the author pays particular attention to the experiences of women in this course. The
author identifies three major findings: First, when the Heroic journey model is understood as a process and not just a theoretical
construct, it gains significant power as an inclusive tool for fostering self-knowledge development. Second, self-knowledge
development is not solely an individual endeavor. Self-knowledge is socially constructed through interaction with others.
Third, self-knowledge development has critical spiritual dimensions, and this deeper level of knowing can lead to significant,
long-lasting growth and change.
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Terry MurrayEmail: |
15.
Christopher Cowley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):495-504
Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.
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Christopher CowleyEmail: |
16.
17.
Nathan Miczo 《Human Studies》2008,31(2):133-155
Hannah Arendt’s exposition of the human condition provides the basic framework for a theoretical perspective on close relationships.
According to Arendt, the human condition is comprised of three modes of activity: labor, work, and action. Labor is need-driven
behavior, work concerns goal-directed activity and the fabrication of things, and action involves the mutual validation of
unique individuals. Within this framework, the gift is the means by which relational ties are made concrete. I propose a model
of gift-giving organized by two axes: whether or not the partner is singularized by the gift and whether or not the gift is
given with an expectation of a return gift. I then apply this model to the three modes of the human condition.
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Nathan MiczoEmail: |
18.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
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Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
19.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
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John Martin FischerEmail: |
20.
Sanford C. Goldberg 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):105-117
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary
condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some
of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate
solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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Sanford C. GoldbergEmail: |