Dual route for subtask order control: Evidence from the psychological refractory paradigm

A change in subtask order in the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm increases the effect of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on the second response. We used a paradigm with cued, randomly determined subtask order to test the hypothesis that this SOA by order switch overadditivity reflects order control, via “copying” stimulus order. In Experiments 1a and 1b, overadditivity was evident only with insufficient opportunity for cue-based order control. In Experiment 2, overadditivity was decreased by using the same set of stimuli in the two subtasks, presumably by removing the opportunity to rely on stimulus order. In Experiment 3, removing the order cue increased the overadditivity, presumably because control was based solely upon copying stimulus order. The results indicate interactive top-down and bottom-up order control. Implications to theories of the PRP paradigm are discussed.     

Dual route for subtask order control: Evidence from the psychological refractory paradigm

A change in subtask order in the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm increases the effect of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on the second response. We used a paradigm with cued, randomly determined subtask order to test the hypothesis that this SOA by order switch overadditivity reflects order control, via “copying” stimulus order. In Experiments 1a and 1b, overadditivity was evident only with insufficient opportunity for cue-based order control. In Experiment 2, overadditivity was decreased by using the same set of stimuli in the two subtasks, presumably by removing the opportunity to rely on stimulus order. In Experiment 3, removing the order cue increased the overadditivity, presumably because control was based solely upon copying stimulus order. The results indicate interactive top-down and bottom-up order control. Implications to theories of the PRP paradigm are discussed.     

Determinants of central processing order in psychological refractory period paradigms: central arrival times, detection times, or preparation?

Three psychological refractory period (PRP) experiments were conducted to assess the effect of central arrival times at the bottleneck on task order scheduling. In Experiment 1, a visual first task (plus-minus symbol discrimination) was combined with an auditory second task (left-right tone judgement) in a standard PRP paradigm with constant task order. In Experiment 2, the order of the tasks varied unpredictably. In Experiment 3, visual-auditory dual-task trials were randomly mixed with single-task trials. To dissociate central arrival times from stimulus detection times, the perceptual stage of the visual task was extended using stimulus degradation. Most importantly, no evidence for a first-come, first-served principle at the central bottleneck was found with the employed paradigms. Instead, the results indicated that preparation (Experiment 1) and the detection times of the stimuli (Experiments 2 and 3) were the main determinants of central processing order in the present study. In the light of previous research, the results indicate that central processing order can be influenced by various factors. The interplay between these factors seems to depend highly on the conditions and requirements of the employed experimental paradigm.     

Evidence for a response preparation bottleneck during dual-task performance: Effect of a startling acoustic stimulus on the psychological refractory period

The present study was designed to investigate the mechanism associated with dual-task interference in a psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm. We used a simple reaction time paradigm consisting of a vocal response (R1) and key-lift task (R2) with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between 100 ms and 1500 ms. On selected trials we implemented a startling acoustic stimulus concurrent with the second stimulus to determine if we could involuntarily trigger the second response. Our results indicated that the PRP delay in the second response was present for both control and startle trials at short SOAs, suggesting the second response was not prepared in advance. These results support a response preparation bottleneck and can be explained via a neural activation model of preparation. In addition, we found that the reflexive startle activation was reduced in the dual-task condition for all SOAs, a result we attribute to prepulse inhibition associated with dual-task processing.     

The preparation effect in task switching: Carryover of SOA

A common finding in task-switching studies is switch preparation (commonly known as the preparation effect), in which a longer interval between task cue and trial stimulus (i.e., a longer stimulus onset asynchrony, or SOA) reduces the cost of switching to a different task. Three experiments link switch preparation to within-subjects manipulations of SOA. In Experiment 1, SOA was randomized within subjects, producing switch preparation that was more pronounced when the SOA switched from the previous trial than when the SOA repeated. In Experiment 2, SOA was blocked within subjects, producing switch preparation but not on the first block of trials. In Experiment 3, SOA was manipulated between subjects with sufficient statistical power to detect switch preparation, but the effect was absent. The results favor an encoding view of cognitive control, but show that any putative switching mechanism reacts lazily when exposed to only one SOA.     

Effects of repetition and foreknowledge in task-set reconfiguration

To examine the roles of executive control and automatic activation in task switching, we manipulated foreknowledge as well as task transitions. In Experiments 1 and 2, performance with foreknowledge was faster than performance with no foreknowledge, but the amount of switch cost did not depend on foreknowledge. This result suggests that switch costs primarily reflect persisting activation rather than inadequate preparation. In Experiment 3, switch cost was greater with foreknowledge about task transition alone than with foreknowledge about both task transition and identity, suggesting that foreknowledge about specific task identity did allow preparation for a switched task. We argue that task repetition and foreknowledge effects are independent. Although foreknowledge allows preparation for both repeated and switched tasks, repeating the same task has benefits over task switching regardless of foreknowledge.     

Age Influences on Multi-Dimensional Set Switching

Using a task switching paradigm, we investigated age effects on switch costs as a function of the number of sets to be switched. In Experiment 1, younger and older subjects determined a color or shape of an object presented on the computer screen, responding either by moving the joystick or by pressing a button on the joystick. The switch costs were assessed with differences between switch trials (task-set switch, response-set switch, and double switch) and non-switch trials. Contrary to the prediction that age would negatively influence performance on the double switch trials, age effects on switch costs were observed only for the single switch trials (i.e., response-set switch condition). Additionally, both younger and older adults were capable of preparing for task and response-set switches in parallel. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the time available to prepare for a task and response-set switch. Both younger and older adults were able to utilize extra time to reduce switch costs. Furthermore, the age deficit found in Experiment 1 for response-set switching was eliminated in the second experiment in which preparation for task and response-set switching was temporally decoupled. The data are discussed in terms of task component coordination across the adult lifespan.     

Separate and shared sources of dual-task cost in stimulus identification and response selection

There is often strong interference if a second target stimulus (T2) is presented before processing of a prior target stimulus (T1) is complete. In the "Psychological Refractory Period" (PRP) paradigm, responses are speeded and interference manifests as increased response time for T2. In the "Attentional Blink" (AB) paradigm, stimuli are masked and responses unspeeded; interference manifests as reduced T2 accuracy. While different causes have usually been considered for PRP and AB phenomena, recent evidence has supported a unified account based on a single, shared restriction on concurrent processing. Here we show that a full assessment of separate and shared resource limitations requires direct comparison of hybrid PRP/AB trials with corresponding pure PRP and AB cases. Randomizing trial types in such a comparison also brings substantial benefit in addressing possible changes in task preparation or readiness. The data from two such experiments--combining speeded auditory (SA) and unspeeded visual (UV) task events--provide clear evidence for both separate and shared resource limitations. Often interference is strongest for T1 and T2 events of the same type, reflecting predominantly different limitations in SA and UV processing. With modest increases in demand, however, interference between different event types can also be made arbitrarily large, reflecting arbitrarily important shared limitations. For even such simple tasks as these, T--T2 interference reflects a combination of relatively local and relatively global sources.     

Effects of deviant trials on precue-based versus memory-based switching among two or four tasks

In two experiments, the effects of an introduction of deviant trials on precue-based and memory-based task switching were investigated. Deviant trials were trials that deviated from task foreknowledge as induced either by precues or memory of the task sequence. The experiments differed with respect to the number of tasks to be switched among (two in Experiment 1, four in Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, the introduction of deviant trials had a detrimental effect on precue-based task preparation, but had little impact on memory-based preparation. The latter observation was due to the fact that there was little evidence for memory-based preparation at the outset. In Experiment 2, introducing deviant trials had little effect on either precue-based or memory-based preparation. In contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 memory-based preparation was as effective as precue-based preparation.     

Dissociating sources of dual-task interference using human electrophysiology

In the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, two unmasked targets are presented, each of which requires a speeded response. Response times to the second target (T2) are slowed when T2 is presented shortly after the first target (T1). Electrophysiological studies have previously shown that the P3 event-related potential component is not delayed during T2 response slowing in the PRP paradigm, but that the lateralized readiness potential is delayed, which suggests a bottleneck on response selection operations but not on stimulus identification. Recently, researchers (Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Jolicoeur & Dell'Acqua, 1999) observed T2 response slowing in an encoding-speeded response (ESR) paradigm where T2 followed a masked T1 that required identification but not a speeded response. T2 response slowing in the ESR paradigm is often indistinguishable from that in the PRP paradigm, prompting some researchers to postulate a common processing bottleneck for the two paradigms. With the use of the ESR paradigm, we observed T2 response slowing and, in contrast to the PRP paradigm, we also observed corresponding P3 delays. The results suggest that dissociable bottlenecks underlie the dual-task costs from the two paradigms.     

Inhibition of response mode in task switching

Task inhibition was explored in two experiments that employed a paradigm in which participants switched among three tasks. Two tasks required manual choice responses based on numerical judgment (parity or magnitude), whereas a third task required an unconditional double-press of both response keys. Both experiments showed that switching to a just-abandoned task (n-2 task repetition) generally leads to a performance cost relative to switching to another task. Specifically, this task inhibition effect also occurred for the double-press task, suggesting inhibition of response mode. Prolonging the task-cuing interval showed that advance task preparation reduced only inhibition of the double-press task but not of the choice tasks (Experiment 1). Prolonging the response-cue interval led to a decrease of the inhibition effect in all tasks (Experiment 2), suggesting a time-based release of task inhibition. Together, the experiments support the notion of a response-related component of task inhibition.     

准备时间和预先信息对任务切换的影响

两个实验采用任务线索范式,考察了准备时间和预先信息对任务切换的影响。实验1的准备时间为可预测,实验2的为不可预测,以考察准备时间的可预测性对任务切换的影响。以被试执行重复任务、切到任务和切离任务的正确反应时为主要指标,结果：（1）在准备时间可预测和不可预测两种条件下,准备时间和预先信息之间存在显著交互作用。在可预测条件中,重复和切到任务的反应时随着准备时间的增加而减少,但切到代价无显著变化,切离任务的反应时不受准备时间的影响,切离代价表现出反准备效应;不可预测条件下,三种任务的反应时都随着准备时间的增加而减少,但是切到和切离代价表现出反准备效应;（2）切离任务的反应时和代价显著高于切到任务的反应时和代价;（3）在这两种条件下,都没有出现切换代价的准备效应     

When and how did you go wrong? Characterizing mild functional difficulties in older adults during an everyday task

ABSTRACT

Mild functional difficulties associated with cognitive aging may be reliably measured by coding “micro-errors” during everyday tasks, like meal preparation. Micro-errors made by 25 older adult and 48 younger adults were coded on four dimensions to evaluate the influence of: 1) poor error monitoring; 2) goal decay; 3) competition for response selection when switching to a new subtask; and 4) interference from distractor objects. Micro-errors made by young adults under a dual task load also were analyzed to determine the influence of overall performance level. Older adults’ micro-errors were observed when switching to a new subtask and to unrelated distractors. Slowed error monitoring and goal decay also influenced micro-errors in older adults, but not significantly more so than younger adults under the dual task. Interventions to reduce interference from distractors and to increase attention at critical choice points during tasks may optimize everyday functioning and preclude decline in older adults.     

刺激类型与预先信息对任务切换的影响

为揭示联结竞争与任务设置重构在切换加工过程中的关系,以切换代价为指标,研究了刺激类型与预先信息对任务切换的影响效应,结果发现:(1)无信息的切换代价显著高于部分信息和全部信息的切换代价,而后二者之间无显著差异;(2)单向刺激的切换代价显著高于双向刺激的切换代价;(3)预先信息和刺激类型对切换代价的影响无交互作用。这表明任务设置重构与联结竞争是两个具有相加效应的序列认知活动。     

预知任务转换的内源性准备和外源性调节

采用ERP探究在预知条件下任务转换的神经机制。使用“任务转换”实验范式,以汉字（名词/动词）或数字（奇数/偶数）的归类为任务。被试执行任务重复（AA,BB,…）或在两个任务间转换（AB,BA,…）,每个任务序列为连续的两个任务（任务1,任务2）。结果发现,任务1中,在刺激呈现后300ms左右,数、词的转换序列与重复序列出现显著差异;在中央区,320ms左右,任务1中转换序列比重复序列、任务2中转换任务比重复任务都产生一个更为负走向的波。这些结果表明,在预知条件下,简单任务转换的内源性准备可能开始于任务1呈现后300ms左右;内源性准备和外源性调节可能都反映了认知冲突过程,此认知冲突可能是转换代价的主要来源     

The costs of crossing paths and switching tasks between audition and vision

Switching from one functional or cognitive operation to another is thought to rely on executive/control processes. The efficacy of these processes may depend on the extent of overlap between neural circuitry mediating the different tasks; more effective task preparation (and by extension smaller switch costs) is achieved when this overlap is small. We investigated the performance costs associated with switching tasks and/or switching sensory modalities. Participants discriminated either the identity or spatial location of objects that were presented either visually or acoustically. Switch costs between tasks were significantly smaller when the sensory modality of the task switched versus when it repeated. This was the case irrespective of whether the pre-trial cue informed participants only of the upcoming task, but not sensory modality (Experiment 1) or whether the pre-trial cue was informative about both the upcoming task and sensory modality (Experiment 2). In addition, in both experiments switch costs between the senses were positively correlated when the sensory modality of the task repeated across trials and not when it switched. The collective evidence supports the independence of control processes mediating task switching and modality switching and also the hypothesis that switch costs reflect competitive interference between neural circuits.     

Advance task preparation reduces task error rate in the cuing task-switching paradigm

Advance preparation reduces RT task-switching cost, which is thought to be evidence of preparatory control in the cuing task-switching paradigm. In the present study, we emphasize errors in relation to response speed. In two experiments, we show that (1) task switching increased the rate at which the currently irrelevant task was erroneously executed ("task errors") and (2) advance task preparation reduced the task error rate to that seen in nonswitch trials. The implications of the results to the hypothesis concerning task-specific preparation are discussed.     

Strategic adaptation to performance objectives in a dual-task setting

How do people interleave attention when multitasking? One dominant account is that the completion of a subtask serves as a cue to switch tasks. But what happens if switching solely at subtask boundaries led to poor performance? We report a study in which participants manually dialed a UK‐style telephone number while driving a simulated vehicle. If the driver were to exclusively return his or her attention to driving after completing a subtask (i.e., using the single break in the xxxxx‐xxxxxx representational structure of the number), then we would expect to see a relatively poor driving performance. In contrast, our results show that drivers choose to return attention to steering control before the natural subtask boundary. A computational modeling analysis shows that drivers had to adopt this strategy to meet the required performance objective of maintaining an acceptable lateral position in the road while dialing. Taken together these results support the idea that people can strategically control the allocation of attention in multitask settings to meet specific performance criteria.     

Advance preparation in task switching: what work is being done?

The preparation effect in task switching is usually interpreted to mean that a switching process makes use of the interval between task-cue onset and trial-stimulus onset (the cue-stimulus interval, or CSI) to accomplish some of its work ahead of time. This study undermines the empirical basis for this interpretation and suggests that task activation, not task switching, is the functional process in cognitive control. Experiments 1 and 2 used an explicit cuing paradigm, and Experiments 3 and 4 used a variation in which the trial after a task cue was followed by several cueless trials, requiring retention of the cue in memory. Experiments 1 and 3 replicated the preparation effect on switch cost, and Experiments 2 and 4 showed that this effect vanishes when CSI is manipulated between subjects, leaving only a main effect of CSI when the task cue is a memory load.     

Specialization and semantic organization: Evidence for multiple semantics linked to sensory modalities

The present article reviews the case for multiple systems in semantic memory and empirically evaluates a multiple semantics proposal based on sensory modalities. In the experiments, a conceptual switching cost paradigm was used (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003), in which participants verified properties for concepts and verification time was compared for target trials (e.g., a dog can bark) that were preceded by context trials of either the same or a different modality (e.g., a bee can buzz or a horse can have spots). Experiment 1 involved a modality switch while controlling for the concept's category and demonstrated that when modalities were switched, a processing cost was incurred that could not be attributed to the latter dimension. Experiment 2 further supported this conclusion by showing that, in a reverse situation, the cost incurred when category was switched was at least smaller. The results are discussed by considering possible alternative amodal explanations and other data that have shown the influence of sensory information in conceptual processing.