Is there life without mother?

Clinical and literary materials are presented to illustrate the compulsive need some children (frequently abused and/or deprived ones) continue to feel as they grow up for submission to and identification with the earliest parental figure. Intrapsychic loss is threatened by intense murderous hatred felt toward a parent without whom the child's survival is not possible. Conflicts over sadomasochistic fantasy, feeling, and action are used to hold on to the parent within and without the mind, and these can dominate the child's life.     

A life not worth living?

The work of Dan Brock and Helga Kuhse is typical of the current stream of thought rejecting the validity of sanctity of life appeals to instill objective inviolable worth in human life regardless of the quality of life of the patient. The context of a person's life is supremely important. In their systems life can have high value, yet the value of life can be outweighed by the force of other disvalues. The notion of quality of life has increasingly come to signify the measurement of the worth of a person's life itself. Having a life equals a personal life. Any objectivity to life resides in 'personal', 'biographical', or 'creative' life, not mere biological life. Personal life represents the minimal threshold for any objective worth. In responding to this challenge, John Finnis has argued extensively that life is an intrinsic good--a basic human good. Following from our grasp of human life as a basic incommensurable good, it cannot be practically reasonable both to affirm that (a) 'human life is a basic human good', and (b) that 'human life qua human life can be intentionally acted against to its destruction'. Yet, if the good of human life can be considered self-evident, the self-evidence of the basic human good qua good does not mean that dialectical reasoning cannot be engaged in to indirectly support the practical reasonableness of respecting the good of human life in the deliberative choices that persons make concerning their actions. It is to the use of such dialectical reasoning, supportive of the status of human life as such a basic human good, that the article is primarily concerned to draw out and articulate.     

Is life of infinite value?

It is possible and necessary to compare stretches of human life with other goods, such as the good of conserving resources for others. A minute of human life is not of infinite value; all else being equal, a minute of life is less valuable than 10 years of the same life. Nevertheless, this ability to evaluate human life does not necessarily lead to total commodification of human life.     

Are life episodes replayed during dreaming?

New phenomenological data demonstrate that integrated life episodes are incorporated in no more than 1-2% of dream reports. This appears to be at odds with the replay of temporally sequenced memory at the level of neuronal ensembles observed in some animals during sleep. This result will constrain emerging ideas on memory reactivation during sleep and the role of sleep in memory consolidation.     

A life worth giving? The threshold for permissible withdrawal of life support from disabled newborn infants

When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant's future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I present four arguments in favor of the Threshold View, and identify and respond to several counter-arguments. I conclude that it is justifiable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant to die even though the infant's life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justification for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and potentially more practical than the standard view.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Is ten years a life review?

Looking back on ten years of involvement with near-death studies and with the International Association for Near-Death Studies, I review some of the major questions and accomplishments of that decade both in our understanding of the near-death experience and in our service as an organization.International Association for Near-Death Studies (IANDS)     

Wisdom at the end of life: Hospice patients’ reflections on the meaning of life and death

The processes of aging and confronting mortality are often accompanied by unique psychological challenges. From the perspective of positive psychology, such challenges can yield opportunities for growth, including increased wisdom. This qualitative study explored 15 terminally ill hospice patients’ perspectives on wisdom, the dying process, and the meaning of life using consensual qualitative research methods. Most participants cited humility as a key component of wisdom, emphasizing that “Wisdom is when we realize ‘I don’t really know much’.” Other components of wisdom included self-knowledge, rationality, experiential learning, listening to and learning from others, and sharing knowledge with others. Participants also suggested that the process of facing illness and death presents opportunities for positive growth, including changing priorities and learning to appreciate life more fully in the present moment. In considering the sources of meaning in their lives, participants emphasized relational connections, personal growth, spirituality, vocational fulfilment, and living a full life. Participants also shared their reflections on important past experiences and regrets. Lastly, participants offered advice to others based on their experiences facing illness and mortality. Implications for psychological care of the dying and future research are discussed.     

Negative life events and depressive symptoms in late life: Buffering effects of parental and partner bonding?

The buffering function of parental and partner bonding in the relationship between negative life events and depressive symptoms at old age was examined. A community sample of 194 people aged 65 years and older was interviewed. In particular, the control dimension of both parental and partner bonding seems to be of importance in relation to elderly depression: More psychological control is related to higher depression scores, and low partner control seems to work as a protective mechanism when negative life events are faced. Developing prevention and intervention programs aimed at optimizing bonding relationships throughout life seems advisable.     

Is Jessie right to end her life?

Presupposing that our consideration of ethical issues can be enriched by examining literary works, this paper focuses on Marsha Norman's play ‘night, Mother. The play describes the last hour and a half in the life of Jessie, a young woman who decides to die by suicide. Before ending her life, Jessie explains to her mother her reasons for her suicide. In the context of the play, these are presented as quite weighty and as, perhaps, justifying her decision. Scholarly research on the play has also treated Jessie's suicide favorably. In this paper I argue that Jessie, and people in similar conditions, are wrong to die by suicide. Among other points, I criticize Jessie's arguments from the impossibility to improve life; the assured termination of suffering; the badness of the world; and the right for suicide. I also criticize arguments in the scholarly literature that view Jessie's suicide favorably, such as the arguments from independence, heroism, authenticity, and emotional closeness.     

Classifying adolescents’ conceptions of purpose in life

Motivating youth to find a purpose in life promotes positive youth development. However, it is as yet uncertain whether adolescents think of purpose in ways similar to researchers. This study addressed this deficit by asking 229 adolescents from a Catholic and a public high school to define what it means to have a purpose in life, using a free-response format. Almost all adolescents suggested that having a purpose gives one a foundation and a direction for life, and over half mentioned that it led to increased happiness. In addition, adolescents often mentioned elements from multiple coding categories, suggesting that they hold multifaceted conceptions of purpose. In addition, definitions were marked by their similarities rather than differences across the sample. Overall, these results suggest that adolescents hold mature and complex conceptions of purpose that are in line with those presented in the existing research literature.     

Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis

The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life–mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.