A model-theoretic criterion of ontology

Conclusion My aim has been to adapt Quine's criterion of the ontological commitment of theories couched in standard quantificational idiom to a much broader class of theories by focusing on the set-theoretic structure of the models of those theories. For standard first-order theories, the two criteria coincide on simple entities. Divergences appear as they are applied to higher-order theories and as composite entities are taken into account. In support of the extended criterion, I appeal to its fruits in treating the various examples considered above and to the healthy intuitions of the non-noneists among us. Don't O(m) and E(m) comprise just the things we should have though existed according to a particular interpretation m of a language or a theory? Whatever the answer (and it will hardly be unanimous), I hope to have pointed the way towards a recognition of ontology as a worthwhile branch of modern theory.Earlier versions of parts of this paper were read at New York University, at the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and at the University of Sydney. I am very grateful to William Barrett, Keith Campbell, Gregory Currie, Kenneth Gemes, Toomas Karmo, and Stephen Read for comments and criticisms.     

Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal Ethics

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer.     

Preferences,reasoning errors,and resource egalitarianism

In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals are prone to making systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably by egalitarians. Subsequently, I claim that the most plausible interpretation of resource egalitarianism takes preferences, not choices, as the site of responsibility. This distinction is salient, since preference-sensitive resource egalitarianism is faced with an important objection when applied to situations in which the empirically reasonable assumption that individuals have different degrees of computational abilities is introduced. I first show that this objection can be raised in cases involving individuals who have incomplete information, but that it ultimately fails for such cases since we can appeal to higher order insurance markets in order to mitigate any initial concerns. I further claim, however, that the objection is much more powerful in cases involving individuals who have different reasoning skills, since the appeal to higher order insurance markets is no longer tenable. Consequently, the ideal principle of justice proposed by Dworkin is met with a new feasibility challenge. Finally, I claim that the problem of reasoning errors and various forms of cognitive biases also affect Dworkin’s non-ideal principle of justice, skewing the outputs of the hypothetical insurance mechanism in an unjustifiable manner.     

Truth,omniscience, and the Knower

Conclusion Let us sum up.The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an auxiliary recourse to hierarchy. But the cost of hierarchy appears to be an abandonment of any notion of all truth or of omniscience. What the contradictions of the Knower seem to demand, then, is at least an abandonment of these.As noted in the introduction, the argument is complicated enough that one must be wary of dogmatic and precipitate conclusions. One may legitimately wonder whether some new response, or some variation on an old one, will yet offer a way out.Far too often, however, it is asked what has gone wrong with paradox rather than what paradox may have to teach us. What the Knower may have to teach us, I think, is that there really can be no coherent notion of all truth and really can be no coherent notion of omniscience. In its own way that conclusion is perhaps as humbling as is any traditional notion of God.I am grateful to C. Anthony Anderson, Robert F. Barnes, David Boyer, Tyler Burge, Evan W. Conyers, and Allen Hazen for correspondence and discussion regarding basic ideas, and owe a special debt to David Boyer and Evan W. Conyers for careful criticism of earlier drafts.     

Extensionality, underdetermination and indeterminacy

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Don Gustafson, Jim Higginbotham, Jerrold Katz, Joe Levine, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Hilary Putnam, Georges Rey and Bob Richardson for helpful discussions and comments on the issues discussed in this paper. Also I thank an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis for helpful comments.     

Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.     

Operators in the paradox of the knower

Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom.A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way as well: to show that mere appeal to modal operators in the sense of sentence-to-sentence devices is insufficient toescape the Paradox of the Knower. A family of systems is outlined in which closed formulae can encode other formulae and in which the diagonal lemma and Paradox of the Knower are thereby demonstrable for operators in this sense.I am deeply indebted to Robert F. Barnes and Evan W. Conyers, without whom these ideas might not have germinated and certainly would not have grown. Many of the results offered here evolved in the course of mutual discussion and correspondence. I am also grateful to an anonymous reviewer forSynthese for many very helpful suggestions.The current paper contains the technical results promised in Footnote 25 of Grim (1988) and Footnote 26, Chapter 3, of Grim (1991).     

Causality, Explanatoriness, and Understanding as Modeling

The paper investigates the question as to which features of hypotheses make them explanatory. Given the intuitive appeal of causal explanations, one might suspect that explanatoriness is deeply connected with causation. I argue in detail that this is wrong by showing that none of the dominant analyses of causation are suited for general accounts of explanatoriness. In the second part, I provide the outlines of an account of explanatoriness that connects it with scientific understanding, which in turn is argued to be analyzable as the cognitive realization of scientific models.     

Knowledge,context, and social standards

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc.A shorter version of this paper, entitled Knowledge and Context, was presented as a symposium at the 1986 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association and appeared in the Journal of Philosophy 83 (October 1986) 574-83. Because of space limitations, much of the material in sections 1 and 2 of this longer version was compressed into footnotes. Section 3 and many of the footnotes were deleted entirely and the argument of section 5 was presented in a condensed form. I am grateful to Frederick Schmitt and the editors of Synthese for the opportunity to present the paper in its original form.     

The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.     

Reply to Sober and Waters

Elliott Sober and Ken Waters both raise interesting and difficult challenges for various aspects of the position I set out in Evolution and the Levels of the Selection. I am grateful to them for their penetrating criticisms of my work, and find myself in agreement with many of their points.     

States, state types, and the causation of behavior

An earlier version of this paper has been read at a conference on Mental Causation which was held on March 12–14, 1990, at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), University of Bielefeld, as an integral part of the work of the research group Mind and Brain. I am very grateful to ZiF for the financial support that made it possible for me to take part in the research group. Thanks also to the organizers of the conference Peter Bieri and Jaegwon Kim.     

EXPLANATORY MODESTY

Although I certainly have differences with some of my commentators, I am grateful for the time, effort, and attention that each has devoted to my book, Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. They have helpfully pointed out features of my positions that need clarification and elaboration. I am also grateful to the editor of Zygon, Willem Drees, for this opportunity to undertake that task here.     

Leibniz's complete propositional logic

Conclusion I have shown (to my satisfaction) that Leibniz's final attempt at a generalized syllogistico-propositional calculus in the Generales Inquisitiones was pretty successful. The calculus includes the truth-table semantics for the propositional calculus. It contains an unorthodox view of conjunction. It offers a plethora of very important logical principles. These deserve to be called a set of fundamentals of logical form. Aside from some imprecisions and redundancies the system is a good systematization of propositional logic, its semantics, and a correct account of general syllogistics. For 1686 it was quite an accomplishment. It is a pity that Leibniz himself did not fully appreciate what he had achieved. It does seem to me that this was due in part, as the Kneales urge (Note 4), to his having kept the focus of his attention on traditional syllogistics. It is a great pity that he did not polish GI 195–200 for publication. The publication of GI 195, 198, and 200 would have most likely promoted further research.This paper was conceived in a Seminar on the Generales Inquisitiones offered by Professor Klaus Jacobi at the University of Freiburg during the 1987 winter semester. I am grateful to him for having allowed me to participate in that exciting seminar. I am grateful to all the seminar participants, especially to Professor Jacobi, Professor Klaus Erich Kaehler, Doctor Helmut Pape, and Herr Hans-Peter Engelhart for sustained and illuminating discussions of some passages of the GI. Jacobi was extremely kind in reading the second version of this paper with a highly refined comb. I am most grateful to him for having pointed out typos, stylistic infelicities, and conceptual obscurities. He also provided advice on the translation, and, most generously and cooperatively, offered suggestions for improving the exposition and the arguments.     

A systematical approach to Leibniz's theory of relations and relational sentences

I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung for support during the years 1983–84 in which I worked by the Leibniz-Forschungsstelle at Münster collecting the materials for the present essay.     

On a recent argument for the impossibility of a statistical explanation of single events, and a defence of a modified form of Hempel''s theory of statistical explanation

An argument has been recently proposed by Watkins, whose objective is to show the impossibility of a statistical explanation of single events. This present paper is an attempt to show that Watkins's argument is unsuccessful, and goes on to argue for an account of statistical explanation which has much in common with Hempel's classic treatment.I am very grateful to Peter Clark for many helpful discussions of these issues.     

Human rights,harm, and climate change mitigation

Abstract

A number of philosophers have resisted impersonal explanations of our obligation to mitigate climate change, and have developed accounts according to which these obligations are explained by human rights or harm-based considerations. In this paper I argue that several of these attempts to explain our mitigation obligations without appealing to impersonal factors fail, since they either cannot account for a plausibly robust obligation to mitigate, or have implausible implications in other cases. I conclude that despite the appeal of the motivations for rejecting the appeal to impersonal factors, such factors must play a prominent role in explaining our mitigation obligations.     

Contracting Intuitionistic Theories

I reformulate the AGM-account of contraction (which would yield an account also of revision). The reformulation involves using introduction and elimination rules for relational notions. Then I investigate the extent to which the two main methods of partial meet contraction and safe contraction can be employed for theories closed under intuitionistic consequence. I would like to thank the organisers, Heinrich Wansing, Sergei Odintsov and Yaroslav Shramko, of the Dresden Workshop on Constructive Negation, July 2–4, 2004, for providing the opportunity to present the ideas in this paper for the first time to a constructively critical audience. I am grateful to Sven Ove Hansson for useful comments on an earlier draft. A special note of thanks is owed also to Joongol Kim, who spotted a mistake in an earlier attempt of mine to prove a stronger form of Theorem 8.6. The results in this paper were presented to the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Chicago in April 2005.     

Psychological Type and Attitude towards Celtic Christianity among Committed Churchgoers in the United Kingdom: An Empirical Study

This article takes the burgeoning interest in Celtic Christianity as a key example of the way in which churches may be responding to the changing spiritual and religious landscape in the United Kingdom today and examines the power of psychological type theory to account for variation in the attitude of committed churchgoers to this innovation. Data provided by a sample of 248 Anglican clergy and lay church officers (who completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales together with the Attitude toward Celtic Christianity Scale) demonstrated that intuitive types, feeling types, and perceiving types reported a more positive attitude towards Celtic Christianity than sensing types, thinking types, and judging types. These findings are interpreted to analyse the appeal of Celtic Christianity and to suggest why some committed churchgoers may find this innovation less attractive.     

The syntax of English idioms: Can the dog be put on?

An idiom is a collection of words whose meaning as a whole cannot be determined from the meanings of the individual words. As such, idioms pose a problem for the psychological process of interpretation, but psychologists have shown interpretation of idioms to be fast. A hallmark of idioms is their resistance to syntactic variation, and some idioms are more resistant than others. Idioms that are low in resistance are termedflexible, and they tend to be more familiar to users of the language, combinedr=.401, combinedp=.02. Some syntactic variations are moredisruptive than others are, and the disruptiveness of variations agrees well with a prediction by Fraser (1970), combinedr=.897,p<.01. Furthermore, 86% of the judgments of the acceptability of 41 idioms in 7 to 8 syntactic variations by 103 Harvard undergraduates agree with a strong proposal by Fraser (1970) that if a particular syntactic variation of an idiom is acceptable, then all relevant variations equally or more disruptive are also acceptable. The localization of the 14% disagreement in either competence or performance will have considerable implications for cognitive psychology and linguistics.This research was funded in part by a graduate student research fund provided by the Department of Psychology, Harvard University. The article is a short version of the author's doctoral thesis with the same title. I am sincerely grateful to Keith Holyoak, Donna Jo Napoli, Miriam Schustack, and Roger Brown for their advice on various stages of experimental design. I am also grateful to Roger Brown, Monica Harris, Robert C. Crowder, Peter C. Gordon, Eliott Mordkowitz, and Elizabeth Weiss for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Douwe Yntema, Robert Rosenthal, and Don Rubin graciously provided helpful suggestions on data analysis for which I am also grateful.