Value Education: Eastern and Western Human Value and Virtues

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The present education system is mainly object oriented material in nature but not subjective or spiritual. We study mainly subject viz. physic,...     

The Full Unity of the Virtues

The classical doctrine that the moral virtues are unified is widely rejected. Some argue that the virtues are disunified, or even mutually incompatible. And though others have argued that the virtues form some sort of unity, these recent defenses of unity are always qualified, advocating only a partial unity: the unity of the virtues is limited to certain practical domains, or weak in that one virtue implies only moral decency in the fields of other virtues. I argue that something like the classical doctrine—a full unity of the virtues thesis—remains defensible. After reviewing the arguments of partial unity theorists for the claim that the virtues form at least some sort of unity, I examine their main arguments for thinking that this unity is only partial (limited or weak). I then show that these arguments fail, and address some further criticisms (such as the argument that full unity implausibly requires that a person must attain the virtues “all at once”). I do not seek here to prove the truth of the full unity thesis (in fact I suggest a modification of it), but only to refute important extant criticisms of it, and thus to show that it remains a plausible view.     

The Virtues of Evidence

Evidence-based medicine has been defined as the conscientious and judicious use of current best evidence in making clinical decisions. This paper will attempt to explicate the terms "conscientious" and "judicious" within the evidence-based medicine definition. It will be argued that "conscientious" and "judicious" represent virtue terms derived from virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. The identification of explicit virtue components in the definition and therefore conception of evidence-based medicine presents an important starting point in the connection between virtue theories and medicine itself. In addition, a unification of virtue theories and evidence-based medicine will illustrate the need for future research in order to combine the fields of virtue-based approaches and clinical practice.     

野外休闲的美德

A.利奥波德的土地伦理,作为环境美德伦理的一个实例,已经越来越受到关注。古典的对休闲的看法,最初在亚里士多德的《政治学》中表明,为检查野外休闲提供了一个好的出发点。利奥波德认为野外休闲是重要的,而且与他的土地伦理有关系。利奥波德对野外休闲的看法,集中在对生态学教育和对美德习惯的感知作用上。当野外休闲习惯于古典克制力的美德时,就变成了生态学道德心所必需的主要美德。野外休闲正是培养那些有智力的,以及优雅的感知和审慎所必需的科学美德。这种美德在好的公民身份与土地公民身份之间提供了诸种关系。     

The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues

If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves.     

The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

The Virtues of Feminist Empiricism

Despite the emergence of new forms of feminist empiricism, there continues to be resistance to the idea that feminist political commitment can be integral to hypothesis testing in science when that process adheres strictly to empiricist norms and is grounded in a realist conception of objectivity. I explore the virtues of such feminist empiricism, arguing that the resistance is, in large part, due to the lingering effects of positivism.     

传统与现代交织中的公民道德建设——郑州市公民道德素质调查

郑州作为河南省省会和全国区域性中心城市,其市民的道德素质与中部经济社会发展相关。通过调查,我们发现,郑州市民的道德状况表现为社会公德意识和职业道德感较强、家庭道德变化明显、诚信状况乐观等。同时,针对存在的问题,建议多管齐下、不断提升市民道德素质,包括,建立一套郑州市民道德素质样本,并制定相应的评价标准与考评体系,加强多种载体建设,有重点、分层次地做好道德规范的普及工作,政府主导着力解决好现实中存在的突出问题等。     

Redeeming the Acquired Virtues

The probing readings of Putting On Virtue offered by Sheryl Overmyer, Darlene Weaver, and James Foster provide a welcome opportunity for further reflection on key questions: Was Aquinas really concerned with the status of pagan virtues? Can we properly understand a thinker whose driving questions are not the same as our own without taking up a stance of pure deference? Can an inquiry into hyper‐Augustinian anxiety over acquired virtue assist us in arriving at an account of positive self‐regard? Can an account that stresses the graced character of all virtue formation be coherent? And can it do justice to the ways in which Christians reached for accounts of infused virtue precisely in order to affirm how grace overcomes the ways in which fortune hounds acquired virtue? I respond affirmatively to all of the above.     

Unifying the Intellectual Virtues

The intellectual virtues include two seemingly quite different types of traits: reliable faculties on the one hand and inquiry‐regulating traits of intellectual character like conscientiousness and openmindedness on the other. Extant virtue theories do not appear to have provided a single account that adequately covers both types of virtue. In this paper, I examine the different ways in which a trait or disposition can contribute to our cognitive goal of acquiring significant true beliefs. I propose that the two types of virtues can be understood as contributing in different ways to our cognitive goal, and develop a general framework for understanding their value.     

Fostering the Virtues of Inquiry

This paper examines what constitute the virtues of argumentation or critical thinking and how these virtues might be developed. We argue first that the notion of virtue is more appropriate for characterizing this aspect than the notion of dispositions commonly employed by critical thinking theorists and, further, that it is more illuminating to speak of the virtues of inquiry rather than of argumentation. Our central argument is that learning to think critically is a matter of learning to participate knowledgeably and competently in the practice of inquiry in its various forms and contexts. Acquiring the virtues of inquiry arises through getting on the inside of the practice and coming to appreciate the goods inherent in the practice.     

The professional engineer: Virtues and learning

The ethical codes of the professional engineering bodies identify the responsibilities of the engineer. Of equal importance to the codes are the virtues which enable the engineer to fulfil these responsibilities. After briefly reviewing such virtues this paper argues that the systematic learning of virtues is possible in a formal way through learner centred learning. Central to this learning experience is the development of integrity which focuses the other major virtues and enables reflection upon them. A review of undergraduate courses suggests how this can be achieved. Rev’d. Dr. Simon Robinson is a lecturer in the Centre for Business and Professional Ethics at the University of Leeds.     

Rational Choice Virtues

In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness.