不作为惯性产生的原因、条件及应用

不作为惯性指如果个体先前已错过了一个更优的机会, 当次一些的类似机会再出现时(但仍好于一般情况), 个体会倾向于继续放弃这一机会。本文首先简要介绍了不作为惯性的概念、操作定义和基本研究方法; 然后着重探讨了导致不作为惯性的原因及相关实证研究, 目前研究者普遍认为后悔情绪和估价是导致不作为惯性的两个主要原因; 随后探讨了不作为惯性产生的条件及在市场营销及股票市场中的应用研究; 最后未来研究需要更加注重研究方法上的改进以及对不作为惰性的原因探讨。     

Inaction Inertia in the Stock Market1

Based on the inaction inertia effect, it was hypothesized that investors who missed an opportunity to leave a “bear market” will be less likely to sell the stock at a later opportunity when facing a grave loss. Participants in a stock‐market computer game were given an opportunity to sell their stock for a moderate gain. Having missed this initial opportunity and now facing a grave loss, these participants were less likely to sell their stock compared to participants whose potential loss was not as grave, or compared to participants facing the same magnitude of loss who had no previous opportunity to leave the market. Analysis of the time spent by participants on reading relevant information concerning the stock market suggests that this tendency toward continued inaction was not the result of careful deliberation over market trends. The results are discussed in terms of counterfac‐tual thinking and anticipated regret.     

Action/Inaction and Regret: The Moderating Effect of Closeness1

Kahneman & Tversky (1982 ) demonstrated that actions are regretted more than inactions. It was conjectured that (a) when action shared the same closeness as inaction but was neither to approach nor to retreat the desired outcome, the action was seen as futile so that it would evoke stronger reactions of regret; and (b) closeness moderated the effect of action such that the effect was stronger when the acting target was closer to a good outcome, but weaker when the acting target was further away from a good outcome. A total of 5 regret‐triggering problems were presented to 150 undergraduates who rated actors' intensity of regret. The findings support that closeness is the moderator of the increased regret effect.     

不作为惰性的影响机制:有中介的调节模型

本研究旨在考察前后机会比较对不作为惰性的影响,探索社会比较的调节作用以及预期作为后悔和价值评估的中介作用。本研究采用问卷法和实验法,以842名大学生为研究对象进行调查,采用Bootstrap方法对中介效应进行分析。结果显示:(1)社会比较在前后机会比较与不作为惰性之间的调节效应显著;(2)预期作为后悔和价值评估在前后机会比较与不作为惰性之间起中介作用。(3)社会比较的调节效应以预期作为后悔和价值评估为中介变量。     

先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性的调节机制

在以往涉及不作为惯性的研究中,个体通常只是错失了1个先前选项.本研究旨在考察当之前错失了多个选项后,不作为惯性是否仍会出现,并深入探讨估价和后悔因素在不作为惯性产生或消失中的作用.结果发现,先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性具有调节作用:当先前只错失了1个选项时,出现了不作为惯性,当先前已错失了两个选项时,不作为惯性消失了.中介分析发现,这一调节作用可被预期后悔所中介.结果表明,预期后悔是导致个体在错失多个选项后不作为惯性消失的主要原因.     

Justification,Attachments and Regret

Abstract: In The View From Here, Jay Wallace emphasises that an agent's capacity to regret a past decision is conditioned by the attachments that she may have developed as a result. Those attachments shape the point of view from which she retrospectively deliberates. Wallace stresses, however, that not every normative aspect of her decision is affected by this change in perspective, because her decision will remain as unjustified as it was in the past. I will argue, however, that this approach to justification is inconsistent with the normative import that Wallace ascribes to the actual dynamics of our attachments in his defence of the rationale of regret. If I am right, Wallace's approach is caught in the following dilemma: Either he renounces a nonperspectival approach to justification or he revises his view about the normative import of the actual dynamics of our attachments.     

Effect of Regret on Post-choice Valuation: The Case of More Than Two Alternatives

The author examines the influence of experienced regret on the selection of the reference point used in post-choice valuation. He incorporates two reference points, expected performance and performance of the forgone alternative, the former affecting the amount of satisfaction and the latter affecting the amount of regret experienced by a decision maker. Prior research on regret has assumed only a two-alternative choice set with the forgone alternative being the reference point for measuring regret. The author relaxes that assumption and develops hypotheses to examine the selection of the reference point in cases that more closely represent real-life experience (i.e., choice sets with more than two alternatives). Two studies are reported. The results from the first study support most of the hypotheses. The second study further investigated the selection of a reference point. Several theoretical and managerial implications are discussed and future research directions are suggested.     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

Reactance, Compliance, and Anticipated Regret

The current work explored the relations among reactance, regret, and behavioral choice. A possible mechanism for reactance in opposition to persuasion attempts involves people anticipating greater regret for negative outcomes after complying with an agent of persuasion than for negative outcomes after reacting against an agent of persuasion. Some participants were asked to anticipate regret prior to making a behavioral choice in the face of an influence attempt. These participants anticipated greater regret for negative outcomes that would be experienced after reacting against rather than complying with the influence attempt. Accordingly, these participants subsequently exhibited behavioral compliance. On the other hand, participants who made choices without explicitly being asked to anticipate possible future regret showed far greater reactance. Interestingly, in all cases compliance led to significantly greater regret than did reactance once a negative outcome actually occurred. These data indicate that people do not spontaneously anticipate the regret that they may experience in an influence situation. Furthermore, when asked to anticipate such regret, they misanticipate their future feelings. The implications of complying with and reacting against the demands of others are discussed.     

Regret appraisals, age, and subjective well-being

This study examined whether regrets are associated with age and subjective well-being in a sample of 176 participants ranging in age 19 to 82 years. Participants were asked to name unattained goals or events which they currently regret, and appraise these along a number of dimensions such as changeableness and consequences. The results showed that those who appraised their regret-related goals or events as having an impact on their present lives, reported a lower level of life satisfaction and more physical symptoms than those who appraised their regrets as having less consequence. There were also age differences in the regret appraisals. The older adults evaluated their regret-related goals or events as being less likely to change than did the younger adults.     

Outcome Knowledge,Regret, and Omission Bias

Subjects made or evaluated decisions in hypothetical scenarios. We manipulated knowledge about the outcome and act vs omission in four cases. In case 1 (production processes), acts (changing the process) were considered better than omissions when the decision maker did not know the outcome or knew that it was better than the status quo. Acts were considered worse than omissions once the decision maker learned that the foregone option would have led to an even better outcome. In case 2 (medical treatment), act vs omission again interacted with gain vs loss (relative to the status quo) unless the outcome of the foregone option was known, in which case act vs omission interacted with better vs worse (of the two options). In case 3 (fetal testing), subjects tolerated less risk of miscarriage when a potential for regret was present (because the test with the risk of miscarriage, although better, might miss disorders that another test would detect). This effect was greater for actions than omissions. In case 4 (vaccination), subjects showed less tolerance of vaccine risk when the decision maker would know about the outcome of vaccination or nonvaccination. Thus, the bias toward omission (not vaccinating) is greater when potential regret is present, and potential regret is greater when knowledge of outcomes is expected.     

Regret,Remorse and the Twilight Perspective

I examine the ‘momentous’ choices that one makes early in life – about career or spouse, for example – and I ask what it means to regret such choices at the end of one’s life (in one’s twilight). I argue that such regrets are almost meaningless because of the difficulty of imaginatively accessing a much earlier self. I then contrast long-term regret to remorse, and argue that the two are qualitatively different experiences because remorse involves another person as victim.     

Inaction inertia,regret, and valuation: A closer look

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. So far, all published work has assumed a causal role for the emotion regret in this effect. In a series of 5 experiments we found no support for this regret explanation. In these experiments factors that influenced regret did not influence inaction inertia, and factors that influenced inaction inertia did not influence regret. In addition, in two experiments we found evidence that missing the initial opportunity leads to a devaluation of the later offer. We propose that, in some cases, regret may be a by-product of this devaluation, rather than a cause of inaction inertia.     

Inertia,Optimism and Beauty

The best arguments for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem all require that when Beauty awakes on Monday she should be uncertain what day it is. I argue that this claim should be rejected, thereby clearing the way to accept the 1/2 solution.     

Regret resolution, aging, and adapting to loss

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that people who have unresolved regrets experience lower levels of well-being than do those who resolve their regrets. In this study, the authors examined the role of regret resolution during bereavement by assessing whether (a) regret resolution would aid in adapting to the death of a loved one and (b) older adults would be more successful at resolving their bereavement-related regrets than would younger adults. Mixed models were run with longitudinal data from an age-heterogeneous sample of 147 men and women who were eventually bereaved after providing care for a loved one through a hospice. As expected, regret resolution contributed to adjustment as indicated by postloss patterns of depressive symptoms, well-being, and rumination; further, older adults were more likely to resolve their regrets than were younger adults. Implications for encouraging regret resolution early in bereavement are discussed.     

Inaction inertia in retirement saving

In retirement saving, many people miss out on early opportunities to save and subsequently fail to take adequate actions for a long time thereafter. We examined whether these two observations—the initial failure to act and the subsequent inertia—could be related through the phenomenon of inaction inertia. In Experiment 1 (N = 180), participants were less likely to save for retirement when the difference in annual return between the current opportunity and the missed opportunity was large versus small. In Experiment 2 (N = 180), participants were less likely to start saving for retirement when reminded of a missed opportunity 10 years ago versus 1 year ago. These data constitute the first demonstration of inaction inertia in retirement saving: People's reluctance to act on attractive saving opportunities may be induced by their previous inaction. In Experiment 3 (N = 340) and Experiment 4 (N = 628), we find that the observed inertia is the product of a tendency to underestimate exponential growth combined with a focus on past opportunities. Building on this mechanism, Experiment 5 (N = 916) provided evidence for a potential remedy; the inaction inertia effect completely disappeared when focus was shifted from required contributions to future outcomes.