Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom

Abstract: In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics – his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the “well‐founding” of those bodies in simple substances.     

Spinoza's Formal Mechanism

I defend a new reading of Spinoza's account of causation that reconciles the strengths of the mechanist and formal cause interpretations by locating instances of nature's fixed and unchanging laws inside individual natures; natures are efficacious because that's where the laws are. God's necessity, for instance, follows from certain logical principles contained within God's nature. Causes between finite particulars likewise stem entirely from finite natures. They do so, I argue, because finite instances of nature's fixed and unchanging laws are inscribed within those natures. In each of these instances, effects follow from natures on account of laws contained within them.     

Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism

This paper consists of four sections. The first section considers what the proof of necessitarianism in Spinoza's system requires. Also in the first section, Jonathan Bennett's (1984) reading of lpl6 as involving a commitment to necessitarianism is presented and accepted. The second section evaluates Bennett's suggestion how Spinoza might have been led to conclude necessitarianism from his basic assumptions. The third section of the paper is devoted to Don Garrett's (1991) interpretation of Spinoza's proof. I argue that Bennett's and Garrett's interpretations of Spinoza's necessitarianism have shortcomings which justify an attempt to offer an alternative proof. In the proof given in the fourth section, it is argued that Spinoza derived necessitarianism from the conjunction of the following principles: (i) necessary existence of the substances; (ii) substance-property ontology; (iii) superessentialism; and (iv) the 'no shared attribute'thesis.     

Spinoza's theory of knowledge

This paper is a discussion of which kinds of knowledge Spinoza himself employs in developing the system of the Ethics. The problem is raised by Professor D. Savan and further discussed by G. H. R. Parkinson. The thesis is (1) that no occurrence of the first kind of knowledge is to be found in the Ethics (against Parkinson), (2) that the main part of the analysis in the Ethics is conducted on the level of the second kind of knowledge (in agreement with Parkinson), and (3) that the third kind of knowledge occurs frequently and plays a most important role in the Ethics (in part against Parkinson). The relation between knowledge and language, the distinction between two types of imagination, or two ways of imagining things, the translation of knowledge of modes of extension into knowledge of the mind, and the relation between the second and third kind of knowledge are main parts of the argument. The third kind of knowledge derives its significance in the Ethics from the definitions and axioms, particularly in Part 1. These definitions and axioms form the basis of the whole system of the Ethics, and at least some of them, it is suggested, belong to the third kind of knowledge.     

控制论的目的论思想与高血压病诊治

20世纪中叶以来,随着控制论的兴起与广泛应用,目的论问题成为生物学哲学以及系统科学哲学的重要议题。运用控制论原理及其目的论思想对高血压病诊治中的有关问题进行了分析和探索,以期对高血压病做到更有效的控制。     

Basic concepts in Spinoza's social psychology

Spinoza's philosophical anthropology is reconstructed with a view to its relevance to theoretical and practical problems in social psychology. An attempt is made to show how he conceives the interrelations between cognitions, sentiments (i.e. emotions and attitudes), and interests (i.e. drives and desires) as relational concepts and as anchored in social interaction rather than in a purely individualistic conception of man. Spinoza's determinism is interpreted as a personal and social causation, rather than a physical, causal determinism, and his theory of cognition is interpreted partly in relation to the Hegelian distinction between undialectical and dialectical thinking.     

控制论的目的论思想与高血压病诊治

20世纪中叶以来,随着控制论的兴起与广泛应用,目的论问题成为生物学哲学以及系统科学哲学的重要议题.运用控制论原理及其目的论思想对高血压病诊治中的有关问题进行了分析和探索,以期对高血压病做到更有效的控制.     

"生物学转向"与新目的论

在人类思想史上,恐怕没有哪一种理论或学说的命运像目的论那样富有戏剧性。在西方古代和中世纪,目的论在柏拉图、亚里士多德等人的呵护下,俨然成了权威的解释模式。到了近现代,随着自然科学和科学主义精神的发展,目的论又几乎成了所有理论中最“臭名昭著”的理论。然而,在当今心灵哲学、认识论和科学哲学等领域的自然化运动中,目的论不仅被“平反”了,而且成为人们谈论的主要话题,有关概念的使用频率趋高,其地位不断攀升,至少成了各种竞争理论中占据重要地位的一种理论。最低限度上,在相应的领域中,几乎再没有人把经过重新阐释的新目的论看…