Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.     

汉语听觉阈下启动效应：来自听觉掩蔽启动范式的证据

使用汉语双字词为实验材料,采用听觉掩蔽启动范式,通过3个实验考察汉语听觉阈下启动效应。结果发现,真词的听觉阈下重复启动效应显著,并且听觉阈下重复启动效应不受启动、目标发音者性别一致性的影响。但真词的阈下语音、语素和语义启动效应及假词的阈下重复和首字启动效应都不显著。这些结果说明,听觉通道阈下呈现的汉语双字词的词汇水平信息可以得到无意识加工。汉语双字词的听觉阈下启动效应可能是基于启动词整词表征的无意识激活。     

Faster might not be better: Pictures may not elicit a stronger unconscious priming effect than words when modulated by semantic similarity

It has been suggested that unconscious semantic processing is stimulus-dependent, and that pictures might have privileged access to semantic content. Those findings led to the hypothesis that unconscious semantic priming effect for pictorial stimuli would be stronger as compared to verbal stimuli. This effect was tested on pictures and words by manipulating the semantic similarity between the prime and target stimuli. Participants performed a masked priming categorization task for either words or pictures with three semantic similarity conditions: strongly similar, weakly similar, and non-similar. Significant differences in reaction times were only found between strongly similar and non-similar and between weakly similar and non-similar, for both pictures and words, with faster overall responses for pictures as compared to words. Nevertheless, pictures showed no superior priming effect over words. This could suggest the hypothesis that even though semantic processing is faster for pictures, this does not imply a stronger unconscious priming effect.     

Unconscious and conscious priming by forms and their parts

Using metacontrast masking techniques, in two experiments we compare unconscious and conscious response priming by targets consisting of either whole forms or else their parts. In Experiment 1 we investigate the contribution of whole forms and their figural primitives, viz., edges and corners, to the unconscious priming effect. As expected, choice RTs were fast when the invisible target and visible mask shape pairings were congruent and slower when they were incongruent. This trend, while strongest for whole-targets, also held for the target primes composed only of corners but did not hold for target primes composed only of sides. Experiment 2 showed, replicating the results of Experiment 1, that while invisible corner targets produced weaker priming effects than invisible whole targets, paradoxically visible corner target produced stronger priming effects than visible whole targets. Taken together the results of the two experiments indicate (a) that unconscious target representations and, thus, unconscious priming effects are strongest when the target is a complete rather than a partial configuration, (b) that conjunctions of line or edge orientations forming corners produce stronger unconscious target representations and priming effects than do unconscious target representations formed from nonconjoined edge or line primitives, (c) that metacontrast masking of form occurs at or beyond levels of visual processing at which feature integration of visual form primitives occurs, and (d) that, when consciously perceived, partial forms can act as stronger primes than whole forms.     

Time course of free-choice priming effects explained by a simple accumulator model

Unconscious visual stimuli can be processed by human observers and modulate their behavior. This has been shown for masked prime stimuli that influence motor responses to subsequent target stimuli. Beyond this, masked stimuli can also affect participants' behavior when they are free to choose one of two response alternatives. This finding demonstrates that an apparently free-choice between alternative behaviors can be subject to influences that are outside of awareness. We report three experiments which exhibit that the temporal dynamic of free-choice priming effects corresponds to that of forced-choice priming effects. Forced-choice priming effects were relatively robust against variations of prime stimuli but sensitive to physical features of target stimuli. Free-choice priming effects, in contrast, depended largely on the stimulus-response compatibility of the prime. A simple accumulator model which accounts for forced-choice response priming can also explain free-choice priming effects by the assumption that unconscious stimuli can initiate motor responses when participants are engaged in a speeded choice-reaction time task. According to our analyses free-choice priming results from a response selection mechanism which integrates conscious and unconscious information from external, stimulus driven sources and also from internal sources.     

Parts outweigh the whole (word) in unconscious analysis of meaning

In unconscious semantic priming, an unidentifiable visually masked word (the prime) facilitates semantic classification of a following visible related word (the target). Three experiments reported here provide evidence that masked primes are analyzed mainly at the level of word parts, not whole-word meaning. In Experiment 1, masked nonword primes composed of subword fragments of earlier-viewed targets functioned as effective evaluative primes. (For example, after repeated classification of the targets angel and warm , the nonword anrm acted as an evaluatively positive masked prime.) Experiment 2 showed that this part-word processing was potent enough to oppose analysis at the whole-word level. Thus, smile functioned as an evaluatively negative (!) masked prime after repeated classification of smut and bile . Experiment 3 found no priming when masked word primes contained no parts of earlier targets. These results suggest that robust unconscious priming (a) is driven by analysis of part-word information and (b) requires previous classification of visible targets that contain the fragments later serving as primes. Contrary to a widely held view, analysis of subliminal primes appears not to function at the level of analysis of complete words.     

Associative and repetition priming with the repeated masked prime technique: No priming found

Wentura and Frings (2005) reported evidence of subliminal categorical priming on a lexical decision task, using a new method of visual masking in which the prime string consisted of the prime word flanked by random consonants and random letter masks alternated with the prime string on successive refresh cycles. We investigated associative and repetition priming on lexical decision, using the same method of visual masking. Three experiments failed to show any evidence of associative priming, (1) when the prime string was fixed at 10 characters (three to six flanking letters) and (2) when the number of flanking letters were reduced or absent. In all cases, prime detection was at chance level. Strong associative priming was observed with visible unmasked primes, but the addition of flanking letters restricted priming even though prime detection was still high. With repetition priming, no priming effects were found with the repeated masked technique, and prime detection was poor but just above chance levels. We conclude that with repeated masked primes, there is effective visual masking but that associative priming and repetition priming do not occur with experiment-unique prime-target pairs. Explanations for this apparent discrepancy across priming paradigms are discussed. The priming stimuli and prime-target pairs used in this study may be downloaded as supplemental materials from mc.psychonomicjournals. org/content/supplemental.     

Negative priming with masked distractor-only prime trials: awareness moderates negative priming

The literature yields inconsistent evidence for negative priming (NP) following masked distractor-only prime trials. We contrast two different hypotheses on the inconsistent findings: one - which is most compatible with the temporal discrimination theory - that relates the sign of priming effects to the absence vs. presence of prime awareness and one -which is most compatible with the inhibition and episodic retrieval accounts - that relates the sign of priming effects to the prime event being categorized as a to-be-attended vs. to-be-ignored event. In two experiments, it turned out that participants' awareness of the masked stimuli caused the different results (with participants being not aware of the primes showing NP), whereas the factor prime color = probe target color vs. prime color = probe distractor color (i.e., the prime contains the to-be-attended vs. the to-be-ignored signal) did not moderate NP. These findings are discussed with regard to theories of negative priming and the debate on conscious vs. unconscious perception.     

Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: evidence from masked priming

Recent results from “subliminal priming” experiments have shown that masked prime stimuli which can not be consciously perceived can trigger response activation processes, but that these response activations can later be subject to inhibition. Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition were investigated by manipulating the visibility of masked prime stimuli, from clearly visible primes to prime stimuli that were inaccessible to conscious perception. Response inhibition was observed with unperceived prime stimuli, but not for suprathreshold primes. Correlations between individual prime identification thresholds and the onset of response inhibition indicate that the absence or presence of conscious awareness can predict whether or not response inhibition is elicited. These results demonstrate qualitative differences in the effects of conscious and unconscious information. It is argued that response facilitation produced by consciously available perceptual information can counteract automatic effects of self-inhibitory motor control circuits.     

Unconscious color priming occurs at stimulus- not percept-dependent levels of processing

Although past studies have shown that visual information can be processed without awareness, the types and levels of this processing have yet to be determined. We used metacontrast masking to explore unconscious priming effects of white, blue, and green stimuli generated on a color video display. We found that a white prime tends to act more like a green than a blue one. Color confusions among unmasked and masked primes and calibrations of the display phosphors show that physical rather than perceptual properties of the stimuli best explain the white prime's effects. We conclude that unconscious color priming in normal observers occurs at early wavelength-dependent levels of processing prior to later color-percept-dependent levels.     

Unconscious priming by color and form: different processes and levels

Using a metacontrast masking paradigm, prior studies have shown (a) that a target's color information and form information, can be processed without awareness and (b) that unconscious color processing occurs at early, wavelength-dependent levels in the cortical information processing hierarchy. Here we used a combination of paracontrast and metacontrast masking techniques to explore unconscious color and form priming effects produced by blue, green, and neutral stimuli. We found that color priming in normal observers is significantly reduced when an additional paracontrast mask precedes the target at optimal masking SOAs. However, no reduction of form-priming effects was obtained at similar optimal paracontrast SOAs. We conclude that unconscious color priming depends on an early, wavelength- or stimulus-dependent response of color neurons located at early cortical levels whereas unconscious form priming occurs at later levels.     

The relationship between the objective identification threshold and priming effects does not provide a definitive boundary between conscious and unconscious perceptual processes

The Objective Threshold/Strategic Model (OT/S) proposes that strong, qualitative inferences of unconscious perception can be made if the relationship between perceptual sensitivity (typically priming effects) and stimulus visibility is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. The model proposes a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold (identification d′ = 0). These predictions were tested with masked semantic priming and repetition priming of a lexical decision task. The visibility of the prime stimuli was systematically varied above and below the objective identification threshold. The obtained relationship between prime visibility and priming facilitation was nonlinear, but the results failed to confirm a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold. We conclude that the objective identification threshold does not necessarily indicate the point where presumably unconscious priming effects might be inhibited by conscious cognitive processes.     

A functional disconnection between spoken and visual word recognition: evidence from unconscious priming.

The goal of the present study is to assess whether there is an automatic and obligatory activation of the phonological lexicon upon the presentation of a written word under unconscious processing conditions. We use a cross-modal version of the masked repetition priming procedure introduced by Forster and Davis (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10 (1984) 680) which consists of priming a spoken word by its written equivalent under masked conditions. These trials are randomly mixed with within-modal (visual-visual) repetition priming control trials. Our results show that cross-modal priming effects are absent unless primes are consciously perceived, as assessed by d' scores obtained with a letter/pseudo discrimination task. In contrast, priming effects within the written modality are observed under conscious as well as unconscious processing conditions. We conclude that the systems underlying written and spoken word processing are, respectively, autonomous and connected only under conscious conditions.     

Dynamic variations in affective priming

The present study investigates the dynamics of emotional processing and awareness using an affective facial priming paradigm in conjunction with a multimodal assessment of awareness. Key facial primes are visually masked, and are presented for brief (unconscious) and extended (conscious) durations. Using a preference measure, we examine whether the effects of the primes differ qualitatively (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). We show that: (a) unconscious affective priming with faces emerges strongly in initial presentations and diminishes rapidly with repetition; (b) conscious affective priming also emerges strongly in initial presentations, however it persists in strength with repetition; and (c) in contrast to other reports on the salience of negative stimuli, happy faces appear more salient than sad faces when presented outside awareness. We discuss the limits and extensions of unconscious affective priming with faces, and consider several methodological and conceptual questions concerning emotional processing out of awareness.     

Perception as evidence accumulation and Bayesian inference: insights from masked priming

The authors argue that perception is Bayesian inference based on accumulation of noisy evidence and that, in masked priming, the perceptual system is tricked into treating the prime and the target as a single object. Of the 2 algorithms considered for formalizing how the evidence sampled from a prime and target is combined, only 1 was shown to be consistent with the existing data from the visual word recognition literature. This algorithm was incorporated into the Bayesian Reader model (D. Norris, 2006), and its predictions were confirmed in 3 experiments. The experiments showed that the pattern of masked priming is not a fixed function of the relations between the prime and the target but can be changed radically by changing the task from lexical decision to a same-different judgment. Implications of the Bayesian framework of masked priming for unconscious cognition and visual masking are discussed.     

Response priming driven by local contrast, not subjective brightness

We demonstrate qualitative dissociations of brightness processing in visuomotor priming and conscious vision. Speeded keypress responses to the brighter of two luminance targets were performed in the presence of preceding dark and bright primes (clearly visible and flanking the targets) whose apparent brightness values were enhanced or attenuated by a visual illusion. Response times to the targets were greatly affected by consistent versus inconsistent arrangements of the primes, relative to the targets (response priming). Priming effects could systematically contradict subjective brightness matches, such that one prime could appear brighter than the other but could prime as if it were darker. Systematic variation of the illusion showed that response-priming effects depended only on local flanker-background contrast, not on the subjective appearance of the flankers. Our findings suggest that speeded motor responses, as opposed to conscious perceptual judgments, access an early phase of lightness and brightness processing prior to full lightness constancy.     

Masked and unmasked priming in schizophrenia

Dehaene et al. (2003) showed an absence of conscious, but not masked, conflict effects when patients with schizophrenia performed a number-categorisation priming task. We aimed to replicate these influential results using a different word-categorisation priming task. Counter to Dehaene et al.’s findings, 21 patients and 20 healthy controls showed similar congruence effects for both masked and visible primes. Within patients, a reduced congruence effect for visible primes associated with longer duration of illness and more severe behavioural disorganisation. Patients, unlike controls, were no slower to respond to targets that followed visible compared to masked primes. Conscious conflict effects on priming tasks are not universally reduced in schizophrenia but may associate with chronicity and behavioural disorganisation. That patients were no slower when the preceding primes were clearly visible accords with evidence elsewhere that information processing in schizophrenia is driven more by immediate conscious experience and constrained less by prior events.     

Unconscious vision spots the animal but not the dog: Masked priming of natural scenes

The functional role of consciousness has been traditionally assumed to be related to high-level executive functions, but recent theories of visual consciousness suggest qualitative differences between conscious and unconscious processes also in lower level visual processes. We tested how specific is the information that can be extracted by unconscious processes from natural scenes. Prime images which were suppressed from consciousness by continuous flash suppression facilitated categorization of visible targets at superordinate level (animal vs. non-animal) when the prime shared a category membership with the target. Suppressed prime images did not have any effect on categorization at the basic level (e.g., horse vs. other animal). Priming occurred at basic level categorization only when the prime images were available to consciousness. This pattern supports a “coarse-to-fine” model in which the visual system can unconsciously access coarse representations, but consciousness is needed for finer analysis of visual scenes.     

Unconscious semantic priming extends to novel unseen stimuli

Many subliminal priming experiments are thought to demonstrate unconscious access to semantics. However, most of them can be reinterpreted in a non-semantic framework that supposes only that subjects learn to map non-semantic visual features of the subliminal stimuli onto motor responses. In order to clarify this issue, we engaged subjects in a number comparison task in which the target number was preceded by another invisible masked number. We show that unconscious semantic priming occurs even for prime stimuli that are never presented as target stimuli, and for which no stimulus–response learning could conceivably occur. We also report analyses of the impact of the numerical relation between prime and target, and of the impact of learning on priming, all of which confirm that unconscious utilization of semantic information is indeed possible.     

Longer is not better: nonconscious overstimulation reverses priming influences under interocular suppression

Previous research has shown that stimuli rendered invisible through masking can be sufficiently processed to induce nonconscious influences and facilitate subsequent recognition. However, masking paradigms are methodologically restricted such that stimuli cannot be presented for longer than a few tens of milliseconds, potentially restricting the strength of nonconscious influences. By adapting a masked face repetition priming paradigm to a recent interocular suppression method, we investigated whether longer periods of invisible prime stimulation lead to larger nonconscious influences on subsequent recognition. Surprisingly, we found that while brief periods of invisible prime stimulation result in classical facilitation priming, long periods of invisible stimulation lead to negative priming influences, reflecting impairment of subsequent recognition. In contrast, when the prime was visible, longer exposure resulted in classical facilitation effects, revealing qualitative differences between conscious and nonconscious processes. Altogether, the present findings reveal the existence of a nonconscious overstimulation cost, as well as an important dissociation between conscious and nonconscious processing.