Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action?

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action.     

Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?

The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ-ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ-ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare.     

Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?

In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally override nonmoral reasons, such that even the weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination of an act’s moral status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If this is right, then it seems that these theorists have their work cut out for them. It will not be enough for them to provide a criterion of rightness that accommodates agent-centered options and supererogatory acts, for, in doing so, they incur a debt. As I will show, in accommodating agent-centered options, they commit themselves to the view that moral reasons are not morally overriding, and so they owe us an account of how both moral reasons and nonmoral reasons come together to determine an act’s moral status.

Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?

A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.     

What Is Wrong with External Reasons?

In this paper I argue that only a subset of the reason statementsWilliams defines as external must be rejected as false. `A has areason to ' is necessarily false when the ends and aimsconstitutive of A's good close off the deliberative route from her S to the conclusion she has reason to . But when less important ends are at stake, it seems that a person's needs generally provide reasons for action, contrary to Williams's internalist account. I suspect, however, that there may remain inexorable disagreementover these claims because people value things in two distinct ways. Tosupport my suspicion, I explain how people's valuation can take either an agency-prioritizing or an end-prioritizing form. I then argue thatresolving the disagreement over Williams's internalist account ofreasons depends on whether it can be established that the agency-prioritizingform is the rationally superior form of valuation.     

How Do Creative Experts Practice New Skills? Exploratory Practice in Breakdancers

How do expert performers practice as they develop creatively? This study investigated the processes involved in the practice of new skills by expert breakdancers. A great deal of evidence supports the theory of “deliberate practice” (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch‐Römer, 1993, Psychological Review, 100, 363) in skill acquisition; however, expert creative performers may emphasize other forms of practice for skill development. Four case studies collected through fieldwork and laboratory observation were analyzed to evaluate expert dancers’ practice processes as they developed proficiency in new, specific skills. We focused on three aspects of learning: the degree of skill acquisition, the content of skills included in practice, and dancers’ stated purposes for practicing. The results showed that dancers’ practice improved skills (as suggested by deliberate practice) and engaged the exploration of new, original skills, along with coordinating skills within performance. In their practice, these dance experts went beyond deliberative practice to highly exploratory processes for skill development.     

Pragmatic Psychodynamic Psychotherapy—Bridging Contemporary Psychoanalytic Clinical Practice and Evidence-Based Psychodynamic Practice

Pragmatic psychodynamic psychotherapy (PPP; Summers & Barber, 2009 Barber, J. P. 2009. Toward a working through of some core conflicts in psychotherapy research. Psychother. Res, 19(1): 1–12. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) describes the therapeutic principles and approaches found in many forms of manualized psychodynamic psychotherapies, which are being used in research studies with the aim of building an evidence-based psychodynamic practice. This article focuses on one such treatment, Supportive-expressive psychotherapy (SEP; Luborsky 1984), which employs the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme (CCRT) method to formulate core interpersonal problems and treatment goals and identify therapeutic interventions. To illustrate SEP, we describe the 40-session treatment of a patient who met diagnostic criteria for several personality disorders. The case illustrates how complex ego-syntonic character pathology is expressed in CCRT terms and worked through in the transference, gradually becoming ego-dystonic and amenable to modification. In this case, the patient became more aware of his interpersonal wishes and vulnerability. Although his anxiety increased somewhat, he had an improvement in psychosocial functioning.     

Can Politics Practice Compassion?

On realist terms, politics is about power, security, and order, and the question of whether politics can practice compassion is irrelevant. The author argues that a politics of compassion is possible and necessary in order to address human security needs. She extend debates on care ethics to develop a politics of compassion, using the example of asylum seekers to demonstrate that politics can practice compassion with (1) attentiveness to the needs of vulnerable people who are suffering, (2) an active listening to the voices of the vulnerable, and (3) open, compassionate, and appropriate responses to particular needs.     

Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk‐Psychological Explanation

Abstract

Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of one reason. Folk psychology appears to allow for this phenomenon. However, appreciation of ‘rationalization’ as a form of contrastive explanation reveals the existence of the Davidsonian possibility to the problematic. Claims that ‘I did it because of R₁, not because of R₂’ are entertained in folk psychology, and may be sincere or insincere. But as reports of conscious practical reasoning, even when sincere, they are not authoritative about the mechanism of motivation.     

Does Depression Affect Clinical Practice?

Abstract

While recent autobiographical accounts of women psychotherapists with depressive illnesses have provided vivid and compelling portraits of therapists' experiences in therapy (e.g., Jamison, 1995; Manning, 1995), further research is needed to clarify the impact that depression and its treatment have upon both collegial relationships and clinical practice. A subset of the membership of the Association for Women in Psychology (AWP) was surveyed concerning therapists' experiences with depression and its treatment. Of 220 respondents, 76% reported some form of depressive illness. Eighty-five percent of respondents indicated that they participated in personal therapy. When evaluating their clinical work, respondents reported both positive and negative consequences resulting from their depression. While some respondents noted improvement in collegial relationships, many felt judged and avoided.     

Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account

In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be formulated. For example, we can claim that value is a property that provides us with reasons to choose an option that has this property. I argue that none of these four other options can ultimately be defended, and therefore the buck-passing account is the one we ought to accept as the correct one. The case for the buck-passing account becomes even stronger, when we examine the weak points of the most pressing criticism against this account thus far.     

Mental Practice or Spontaneous Play? Examining Which Types of Imagery Constitute Deliberate Practice in Sport

Imagery use was examined within the deliberate practice framework (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993 Ericsson, K., Krampe, R. and Tesch-Römer, C. 1993. The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review, 100: 363–406. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Athletes (N = 150) from three competitive levels (recreational, intermediate, and elite) completed an adapted version of the Sport Imagery Questionnaire (SIQ; Hall, Mack, Paivio, & Hausenblas, 1998 Hall, C., Mack, D., Paivio, A. and Hausenblas, H. 1998. Imagery use by athletes: Development of the sport imagery questionnaire. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 29: 73–89. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Each SIQ item was scored for frequency, deliberation, relevance, concentration, and enjoyment. Eight SIQ items were deemed to be deliberate practice: five cognitive-specific images, two cognitive-general images, and one motivational general-mastery image. Motivational-specific imagery instead resembled deliberate play (Côté, Baker, & Abernethy, 2003 Côté, J., Baker, J. and Abernethy, B. 2003. “From play to practice: A developmental framework for the acquisition of expertise in team sports”. In Expert performance in sports: Advances in research on sport expertise, Edited by: Starkes, J. L. and Ericsson, K. A. 89–114. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.  [Google Scholar]). Elite and intermediate athletes used imagery more frequently and deliberately and perceived imagery to be more relevant and requiring more concentration than recreational athletes. Differences also existed regarding how deliberately the athletes engaged in various imagery types. The findings may inform applied practitioners regarding differences in imagery use between competitive levels and differences in the characteristics of imagery types.     

In the Field – The Development of Reasons in Criminal Proceedings

This paper is concerned with argumentation in legal proceedings, namely in criminal cases. My interest is to explore how in the legal realm different argumentation fields interact, the juridical field being just one of them. The paper lays out an approach of studying argumentation in the legal realm in the framework of an ethnographic methodology by identifying the “topical rules” the participants in criminal trials adhere to. Suggesting the notion of field-dependence as a good starting point for the analysis of legal argumentation, I will give several examples of different fields of argumentation interacting in criminal proceedings. The examination of what counts as a good reason and how arguments are employed, negotiated, and evaluated within a criminal proceeding might shed light on the practice of constructing facts and arriving at decisions in court. It can furthermore point at the constitution of legal rationality and how it is produced in criminal trials. I argue that rationality in criminal proceedings is interactively accomplished by negotiating different standards of validity.     

Enhancing Quality of Practice Through Theory of Change‐Based Evaluation: Science or Practice?

This paper describes the evaluation component of Partnerships for Success (PfS), a comprehensive community effort designed to address youth development issues. The evaluation component is referred to as theory of change-based evaluation. The author considers the implications of applying community practice tools such as theory of change-based evaluation to the current conceptualization of community science. More specifically, the author argues that the current conceptualization of community science pays scant attention to community practice. This paper concludes by suggesting that the current conceptualization of community science be modified to recognize the importance of community practice as an equal aspiration for community psychologists.     

Spinoza’s Announcement of Psychological Practice

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - Following Freud’s admission of his own ‘dependence on Spinoza’s doctrine’, the present paper extends psychoanalytic discernment of a...     

Clinical Ethics: Theory Or Practice?

This article starts with a brief historical account of the ongoing debate about the status of clinical ethics: theory of practice. The author goes on to argue that clinical ethics is best understood as a practice. However, its practicality should not be measured by the extent to which clinical-ethical consultants manage to mediate or negotiate resolutions to ethical conflicts. Rather, clinical ethics is practical because it is characterized by a profound concern for the well-being of individual patients as well as the moral parameters of swift and urgent medical action in the face of limited supportive information.