Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness.     

AGNOSTIC MEDITATIONS ON BUDDHIST MEDITATION

I first attempt a taxonomy of meditation in traditional Indian Buddhism. Based on the main psychological or somatic function at which the meditative effort is directed, the following classes can be distinguished: (1) emotion‐centered meditation (coinciding with the traditional samatha approach); (2) consciousness‐centered meditation (with two subclasses: consciousness reduction/elimination and ideation obliteration); (3) reflection‐centered meditation (with two subtypes: morality‐directed reflection and reality‐directed observation, the latter corresponding to the vipassanā method); (4) visualization‐centered meditation; and (5) physiology‐centered meditation. In the second part of the essay I tackle the problem of the epistemic validity and happiness‐engendering value of Buddhist meditation. In my highly conjectural view, the claim that meditation represents an infallible tool for realizing the (Supreme) Truth as well as a universally valid method for attaining the highest forms of happiness is largely based on the crēdō effect, that is, a placebolike process. I do not deny that meditation may have some positive effects on mental and physical health or that its practice may bring changes to the mind. Meditation may be a valuable alternative approach in life and clinical treatment, but it is far from being a must or a panacea.     

Animal expertise, conscious or not

Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossanos argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.     

Suffering without subjectivity

This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that those animals dont suffer, and arent appropriate objects of sympathy and concern.     

Buddhism and Science: Allies or Enemies?

Buddhist teachings and modern science are analogous both in their approach to the search for truth and in some of the discoveries of contemporary physics, biology, and psychology. However, despite these congruencies and the recognized benefits of science, Buddhism reminds us of the dangers of a tendency toward scientific reductionism and imperialism and of the sciences' inability to deal with human moral and spiritual values and needs. Buddhism and science have human concerns and final goals that are different, but as long as the boundaries between them are not trespassed, they can be mutually corrective and allied to benefit humankind. Buddhism must be open to the discoveries of science about the physical world as must all religions today, but no matter how much it may have to modify some of its ancient beliefs, its basic truths—the truths about human suffering and its release—will remain untouched.     

A price above rubies: Patriarchy and the feminine

Jung's understanding of individuation as the way consciousness develops in some people in the second half of life is not well conveyed by images suggesting the heroic capture or sacrifice of consciousness by an ego seeking to gain a broader standpoint. Such images derive from Jung's writings in the first half of his professional career, when his own psychological horizon was rapidly enlarging, but he had not yet arrived at a conception of the Self. What he means by individuation once the Self enters the picture becomes clearer if we turn to Chinese philosophy, whose three main traditions, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, all influenced Jung's mature psychology. That the move from ego to Self involves a change in perspective as to the nature and origin of consciousness is made evident by the process of “turning the light around,” described in The Secret of the Golden Flower, which has been identified as a practice of Buddhist meditation. As a consequence of the successful cultivation of the Self, individuation also entails a difference in the level of a person's consciousness, a difference that the Confucian Classic of Change, the I Ching, recommends that the person take into account. Finally, the consciousness produced by individuation, because it hovers between ego and Self, is often uncertain of its ground. This paradoxical development is beautifully conveyed by the Taoist philosopher Chuang-Tzu, whose famous dream of himself as a butterfly led him, upon waking, to question his true identity.     

Jung's Affinity for Buddhism: Misunderstandings and Clarifications

Much of the West's understanding of Jung's thinking about Buddhism comes from reading his essays on Tibetan and Zen Buddhism, in which his commentary focuses upon particular doctrinal teachings of these two forms of Mahayana Buddhism. However, his writings about the figure of the Buddha and the Buddha's earliest sermons, as they are collected in the Pali Canon, are less well known. By looking closely at what Jung had to say about the Buddha, his early discourses, and his comments in other works that have a correspondence with these discourses, we can clarify some common misconceptions about Jung's thinking in this area. Such an examination offers a better understanding of Jung's depth of feeling for the essential teachings of the Buddha. In order to accomplish these aims, the article begins with a discussion of the historical and cultural background in which Jung was writing and his concerns about the West's infatuation with Eastern ideas. Moving from this discussion to an examination of Jung's reflections on Buddhism, taken directly from Jung's writings, conclusions are drawn regarding Jung's hermeneutic method of approaching the Buddhist canon.     

Killing Humans and killing Animals

It is one thing to say that the suffering of non‐human animals ought to be considered equally with the like suffering of humans; quite another to decide how the wrongness of killing non‐human animals compares with the wrongness of killing human beings. It is argued that while species makes no difference to the wrongness of killing, the possession of certain capacities, in particular the capacity to see oneself as a distinct entity with a future, does. It is claimed, however, that this is not the only factor to be taken into account: pleasant or happy life is in itself good. The application of these conclusions to killing animals for food is then considered, with some passing reflections on infanticide.     

DOES DESCARTES DENY CONSCIOUSNESS TO ANIMALS?

Contrary to longstanding opinion, Descartes does not deny all feeling and awareness to non‐human animals. Though he undoubtedly denies that animals think, a case can be made that he nonetheless would allow them organism consciousness, perceptual consciousness, access consciousness and even phenomenal consciousness. Descartes does not employ or accept an ‘all‐or‐nothing’ view of consciousness. He merely denies (not that this is a small thing) that animals have the capacity for self‐conscious reflective reception or awareness of sensations and feelings.     

Deity practice in the FPMT: understanding the nature of the Tibetan Buddhist deity from the Western practitioner’s perspective

ABSTRACT

In contrast to forms of Buddhism popular in the West such as Vipassana meditation and Zen Buddhism which emphasize doctrinal study, meditation practice, and personal transformation above traditional rituals of deity yoga and merit-making, and Buddhist cosmology, Tibetan Buddhism retains its traditional framework of belief and practice. The worldwide Gelugpa Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (FPMT) teaches the traditional practice of deity visualization, during which the meditator generates the view of the visualized deity as that of emptiness, the understanding that all objects, including buddhas, bodhisattvas, and deities are ultimately empty of inherent existence. Data obtained from fieldwork conducted at two FPMT centres: Vajrayana Institute in Sydney, Australia, and Kopan Monastery in Nepal, suggests an interpretation of the manner in which practitioners come to an appreciation of deity practice in the broader context of the FPMT's teachings. In outlining how this occurs, I discuss the role of doctrine including the ontological status of the deity, and the role of personal experience and both personal and traditional religious authority in this interpretive process. Here, I aim to add to scholarly understanding of how Western practitioners come to accept the traditional elements of non-Western religions such as forms of Tibetan Buddhism.     

Secular Buddhism and Justice

Abstract

Starting point: The core idea of secular Buddhism is to grasp the spirit of early Buddhism and transpose it into the present. The best known approach to implement this idea is Stephen Batchelor’s Buddhism Without Beliefs, an approach which advocates an agnostic stance with regard to the doctrine of rebirth and denies its relevance for daily practice.

Type of problem:

? Is there a way to revise the doctrine of rebirth, instead of completely dropping it?

? What is the impact on the notion of justice?

Result: The doctrine of rebirth cannot be revised in a strict sense, but there are some striking similarities between the ancient and modern (biological) view on the topic. Since the stream of genetic and epigenetic information has the power to create consciousness and reflects experiences of past lives, it can be associated with the stream of consciousness (cittasantāna) in the Mahayana model of rebirth. Parents not only determine the genetic constitution of their children, they also transfer character traits by means of epigenetic heredity. If genetic inheritance is associated with karma, then genes become an element of synchronic and diachronic connectedness (pratītya-samutpāda). Instead of an individual learning process across successive lives, there is a collective learning process across successive generations.

Given the biological model of rebirth, the belief in cosmic justice turns into a quest for mundane justice. There is a thought experiment for constructing such a concept, which complies well with the secular Buddhist spirit. John Rawls assumes that the legislative deliberation is taking place ‘behind a veil of ignorance’, so that the participants of the deliberation do not know their future genetic constitution and their future position within the society. If the participants imagine that their future self is contingent and impermanent – in accordance with the Buddhist doctrine of anātman and anitya – then the resulting principles of justice will be impartial.     

From Brahmanism to Buddhism

It is argued that early (canonical) Buddhism to a very considerable extent can and should be seen as reformed Brahmanism.

Speculations about cosmogony in Buddhist sÛtras can be traced back to Vedic sources, above all Rígveda 10.129 & 10.90—two hymns that play a similar fundamental role in the early Upanisads.

Like the immortal and unmanifest Brahman and the mortal and manifest Brahmā, the Buddha, as a mythological Bhagavat, also had two forms (or bodies). In his highest form he is “the profound” beyond being and non‐being, like Brahman. As a teacher, he is like Brahmâ. By suppressing mind and by getting rid of desire a Buddhist should “swim” back to the profound beyond the duality of life and death, which is also suffering. One becomes real and true by seeing the causal identity of tat and tvam, i.e. of macrocosm and microcosm. The spiritual ideals of early Buddhism are thus founded on natural philosophy.     

Beyond Descartes: Panpsychism Revisited

For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things – the concept of panpsychism. The traditional ‘man-alone’, or ‘man-and-higher-animals’, views of mind have come under increasing criticism of late, and their philosophical weaknesses seem increasingly insurmountable. This has caused some thinkers to reexamine the ancient and venerable concept of panpsychism, and to apply it anew in contemporary theories of mind. The present essay reintroduces panpsychism, and demonstrates something of its legacy in Western thought.     

Attitudes to suffering: Parfit and Nietzsche

Abstract

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that Nietzsche does not disagree with central normative beliefs that ‘we’ hold. Such disagreement would threaten Parfit’s claim that normative beliefs are known by intuition. However, Nietzsche defends a conception of well-being that challenges Parfit’s normative claim that suffering is bad in itself for the sufferer. Nietzsche recognizes the phenomenon of ‘growth through suffering’ as essential to well-being. Hence, removal of all suffering would lead to diminished well-being. Parfit claims that if Nietzsche understood normative concepts in Parfit’s objectivist sense, he would not disagree with the claim that suffering is bad in itself – that intrinsic facts about suffering count in favour of our not wanting it. I argue that Nietzsche would disagree. Suffering for Nietzsche is not merely instrumentally necessary for psychological growth, nor is it easy to construe it as something bad in itself that contributes value as part of a good whole. Suffering that can be given meaning through growth is something we have reason to want. Suffering that remains brute and uninterpreted is something we have reason not to want. But for Nietzsche, suffering as such has no invariant value across all contexts.     

Against Mother's Day and Employee Appreciation Day and Other Representations of Oppressive Expectations as Opportunities for Excellence and Beneficence

Appreciation and gratitude get good press: They are central virtues in many religious and secular ethical frameworks, core in positive psychology research, and they come highly recommended by the self‐improvement set. Generally, appreciation and gratitude feature as good things, in popular consciousness. Of course, on an Aristotelian model, the belief that these are virtues implies they are something people can get right or wrong. This paper examines bad appreciation and bad gratitude, characterizing forms of appreciation and gratitude at the center of some major social norms and practices, and demonstrating that they mask familiar oppressive expectations and power relations.     

Reconsidering Foucault’s dialogue with Buddhism

Against the backdrop of various interpretations and criticisms of Michel Foucault’s engagement with Buddhism, the focus of this article falls on the specific type of Zen Buddhism which he studied during his 1978 trip to Japan, and the possible relationship between its dynamics and those of his own research trajectory following the publication of The Will to Knowledge. In this regard, Foucault’s eschewal of the Engaged Buddhism of Thich Nhat Hanh and the Zen Buddhism of Taisen Deshimaru—both of which had risen to prominence in France by the late 1970s— and his concomitant interest instead in the teachings of Zen Master Omori Sōgen, in which Zen and the samurai code of bushidō were closely aligned, will be examined. Moreover, it will be argued that such preference on Foucault’s part was indicative of his eminently practical, rather than general philosophical, interest in Buddhism as a technology for the adversarial repositioning of subjectivity in relation to discourse. Finally, the implications of this for the abovementioned various interpretations and criticisms of Foucault’s engagement with Buddhism, will be considered.     

唯识精进的结构与功能――以对主观幸福感的影响为例

以588名高中生为被试,以《精进问卷》、《生活满意度量表》和《积极与消极情感量表》为工具,先考察唯识精进的结构,然后,以精进对主观幸福感的影响为例,考察精进的功能。结果表明：（1）精进是七因素的结构;（2）对于生活满意度和积极情感而言,最有力的正向预测变量是无下和披甲精进;（3）对于消极情感而言,披甲和加行精进有微弱的负向预测作用。本研究突破了唯识心理学乃至佛教心理学偏重思辨研究而忽略实证研究的局限。     

Characteristics of Buddhism in Australia

Research on Buddhism in Australia has tended to focus on demographics, ethnic identity and the migrant experience, and history. This paper uses the literature and material from Internet sites on Australian Buddhist groups to identify characteristics of Buddhism in Australia; it aims to both contribute to the understanding of the growth of Buddhism in Australia and to facilitate comparison with similar studies of American and European forms of Buddhism. New information is presented on the number of Buddhist groups in Australia, their geographical location, and the traditions and lineages represented. It is made apparent that more detailed information is needed, and suggestions are made for further research in a variety of areas.