Bermúdez on Self–Consciousness

I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self–consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self–consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self–consciousness and 'I'–thoughts.     

Shoemaker, Self–Blindness and Moore's Paradox

I show how the 'inner–sense' (quasi–perceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from self–blindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be self–blind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and self–knowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is third–person evidence available to the self–blind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.     

Intelligible Realism about Consciousness: A Response to Nagel's Paradox

Is the location of consciousness in the objectively represented world intelligible? The paper examines the grounds for Nagel's negative answer, which can be presented as a response to the following paradox. (1) We are realists about consciousness. (2) Realism about a domain of reference requires commitment to the possibility of an objective, perspective‐free conception of it. (3) The phenomenal character of an experience can only be captured by means of perspectival concepts. According to Nagel, we can have either realism about consciousness or the link between realism and objectivity. He opts for the former, where this leads to the postulation of an essentially perspectivally reality inhabited by consciousness. I argue, contra Nagel, that questions about the intelligibility of locating consciousness in the objectively representable world should be asked relative the kinds of objectivity provided for by our spatial thought. Not only does this formally dissolve the paradox, as such thought allows for essential reliance on perspectival concepts; but it also shows how we do in fact make sense of the objective location of consciousness, in virtue of the link between spatial thought and something Strawson calls our ‘commonsense realism’ about physical objects, which ascribes ‘phenomenally‐laden’ properties to such objects. 1 1 For extended discussion, over the years, of the issues raised here I am much indebted to Bill Brewer, Steve Butterfill, John Campbell, Quassim Cassam, Christoph Hoerl, Hemdat Lerman, Guy Longworth, Adrian Moore, Johannes Roessler and Matt Soteriou. For helpful comments on the current version of the paper I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
     

Divine Transcendence and Human Transformation: Gregory of Nyssa's Anti–Apollinarian Christology

Gregory of Nyssa's treatment of the person of Christ has puzzled modern scholars, because it does not fit easily into the dogmatic categories that have been developed, in the light of the Chalcedonian definition, to distinguish orthodox from heretical or deficient Christology. This essay argues that the main focus of Gregory's Christology, even in his debate with the Apollinarian school, is not so much on the unity and distinctions to be observed in Christ's person, but on the transformation Christ has accomplished in his own humanity by irradiating it with his own divine presence, a transformation that is the "first–fruits" of a divinization which will include the whole human race.     

Rhetorical processes in therapy: the bias for self–containment

This paper argues that therapy tends to reproduce a particular version of personhood, identified by Sampson's notion of the self–contained indi–vidual. The self–contained individual is a contemporary Western construction, which requires a denial of the interactive processes that permit its appearance and idealization. Focusing on constructionist therapies, it is argued that therapists use rhetorical strategies to more or less systematically argue for self–containment as a preferred way of being. These rhetorical manoeuvres render different aspects of self–containment plausible, practicable and 'real', while alternative versions of the self and behaviour are discursively minimized, becoming less plausible in the process. An analysis of two family therapy sessions is then used to illustrate these processes. It is suggested that therapy may reproduce Western ideals about being human.     

The Inaugural Address: Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism

In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following.
When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted in various ways by illusions. The question therefore arises as to how can we answer the sceptic who suggests the following: although the viewer appears to be seeing the green apple in front of him, he is actually suffering a bizarre illusion of a blue car situated somewhere behind him. The sceptic is not concerned with epistemic problems about how we know which object, if any, the subject is seeing; the sceptic is raising the more fundamental question: what fact of the matter underlies a person's perceptual relation to the physical world, in virtue of which that person may be justified in arriving at a perceptual belief about the environment?
Among the various different issues raised by the sceptic, I focus on the question: what determines the perceiving relation? I canvass a number of possible proposals in answer to it, concentrating mainly on two opposed accounts: the Disjunctive View and the Causal Theory of Perception. I argue in particular for the following two claims:
that the paradox highlights the fact that the Disjunctive View fails to provide a coherent positive account of what perceiving is.
that the problem of 'deviant causal chains', often thought to raise particular difficulties for the Causal theorist, can also be raised against other accounts of perception, including versions of the Disjunctive View.
I conclude that unless the Causal Theory of Perception can be upheld, there will be no way of answering the sceptic.     

Psychology in Indian Tradition

In the Indian tradition, psychology is the study of the person (jiva). The person is a composite of consciousness, mind and body, a unique blend of thought, passion and action. Consciousness is perceived as changeless and the permanent base of all knowledge and awareness. Mind is the interfacing instrumentality, a necessary link between consciousness and the body. The body is the physical base, and the frame that constrains and moulds consciousness reflected in the mind of the person. The person, in the existential condition, is seen as conditioned, her consciousness is clouded and consequently unable to know the truth and realize her full potential. This is considered to be a state of ignorance and suffering that needs to be overcome. The goal of Indian Psychology is to understand the human condition and to explore ways to elevate it to higher levels of being, to clear the clouds of ignorance, and to enable the person to attain a state of bliss where the truth is known and the person becomes perfect. Three ways of achieving such a state are suggested: work (karma marga), worship (bhakti marga), and wisdom (jnana marga), which appear to cater to the three basic aspects of the mind: volition, emotion and cognition. In essence, each of these is a distinct way of deconstructing the ego, which is believed to be the main obstacle to transcending existential limitations. The applications of IP include (1) holistic understanding of human nature, (2) exploring the extended spectrum of the human condition, (3) exploiting the hidden potentials for the common good, and (4) cultivating altruism in the person and conflict-free conditions in society.     

Fiction,Pleasurable Tragedy,and the HOT Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radford's view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagin's approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.     

The Interplay Of Autonomy And Relatedness In Hong Kong Chinese Single Mothers

The mediating effects of autonomy and relatedness on the relationship between self–esteem and life satisfaction were investigated among 49 single mothers. Among all tested variables in the dimension of relatedness, only network orientation (propensity to utilize one's available social support) was a mediator of the positive relationship between self–esteem and life satisfaction. No variable in the dimension of autonomy was a mediator. Three components of self–actualization contributed to the model: self–regard mediated the relationship between self–esteem and network orientation, spontaneity contributed to network orientation, self–acceptance contributed to life satisfaction directly and indirectly by contributing to self–regard. Findings suggest that Chinese single mothers' psychological adjustment can be enhanced by fostering their self–regard, self–acceptance, and readiness to seek help from trusted others.     

Second person thought

There are modes of presentation of a person in thought corresponding to the first and third person pronouns. This paper proposes that there is also thought involving a second person mode of presentation of another, which might be expressed by an utterance involving ‘you’, but need not be expressed linguistically. It suggests that co-operative activity is the locus for such thought. First person thought is distinctive in how it supplies reasons for the subject to act. In co-operative action there is first person plural intending and judging. So there is a way of thinking of another, when openly co-operating with him or her, which plays the distinctive role of giving reason for contribution to the co-operative activity. In slogan form, ‘you’ is ‘we minus I’. The way children learn to use second and third person pronouns is naturally explained on this view. Contrasting less sophisticated kinds of co-operative activity with more sophisticated forms, and considering some issues about common knowledge and common purpose, help to fill out the proposal.     

XII—Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again

The complex way Meno's paradox is presented in the Meno forces reflection on both the external conditions on inquiry—its objects—and its internal conditions—the state of mind of the person who inquires. The theory of recollection does not fully account for the internal conditions—as Plato makes clear in the critique of Meno's puzzle to be found in the Euthydemus. I conclude that in the Euthydemus Plato is inviting us to reject the externalist account of knowledge urged on Socrates by the sophists in favour of a more richly internalist epistemology.     

The skeptical paradox and the indispensability of knowledge-beliefs

Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is a belief that a person or a group of people know that p, where p is an empirical proposition about the world). I then go on to argue for the indispensability of knowledge-beliefs. The first line of argument appeals to the practical aspects of our employment of the concept of knowledge, and the second line of argument draws on some Davidsonian ideas concerning understanding and massive agreement.     

Truth and Nonsense: A Unified Reading of the Tractatus

Upon reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, readers might be confused about the nature of the book, since there seems to be a paradox introduced by the author’s two claims: a) the book conveys truths; b) propositions in the book are nonsense. Commentators disagree as to how best to resolve this paradox. Some hold that there are ineffable truths conveyed by nonsense propositions. Others deny this kind of truth, arguing that the book is not all nonsense, for there are some propositions in the book expressing at least the therapeutic truth that philosophical propositions are just nonsense. Recently, some interpreters have claimed that there is no truth at all. While the incoherence of the context is genuine, the purpose of the book is ethical. By diagnosing these interpretations, this paper intends to provide a new perspective toward reading the book by resolving the paradox. The truth of the Tractatus is not a propositional truth, but a specific true thought. The nonsense of the Tractatus is a transcending nonsense, rather than a pure nonsense. The book intends to attain the true thought about the mystical ethics by way of transcending nonsense. In this case, the Tractatus is not an incoherent work at all, since the paradox is not genuine. The fact that the nonsense part is a means to fulfill its ethical purpose makes the book a unified whole.     

Self–Objectification and its Psychological Outcomes for College Women

The objectification of women by our society can become internalized by women, resulting in negative psychological outcomes. Using Fredrickson and Roberts' (1997) objectification theory, we tested a model of the relationships between self–objectification and disordered eating and depressive symptoms in a sample of undergraduate women ( n = 384). One postulate of self–objectification theory is that self–objectification can lead to a lack of internal awareness, which may mediate the relationship between self–objectification and restrictive eating, bulimic, and depressive symptoms. Results of structural equation modeling suggest that self–objectification has a direct relationship to restrictive eating, bulimic, and depressive symptoms. The mediational role of internal awareness was relevant for depressive symptoms but not for restrictive eating or bulimic symptoms. Depressive symptoms did, however, mediate the relationship between self–objectification and bulimic symptoms. The relevance of our findings to the understanding of objectification theory are discussed and future areas of research recommended.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

SELF–PERCEPTIONS OF ABILITY OF MATHEMATICALLY TALENTED FEMALE ADOLESCENTS

Despite their ability, many mathematically talented female adolescents do not aspire to nontraditional careers in mathematics and the sciences. According to the model proposed by Meece, Parsons, Kaczala, Goff, and Futterman (1982), self–concept of math ability is a central mediating variable in predicting long range goals and ultimate achievement in mathematics. The present study tested the hypothesis that, for a sample of 123 mathematically talented female adolescents, consideration of self–perceptions of multiple career–relevant abilities, as measured by Holland's (1977) Self Directed Search, rather than self–concept of math ability alone, is essential to understanding the ideal career aspirations of mathematically talented young women. The results indicate that it is the combined influence of self–perceptions of several career–relevant abilities that differentiates the nontraditional math and nontraditional science career aspirants from more traditional math/science and nonmath career aspiration group members. Implications for professionals working with the mathematically talented female adolescent are discussed.     

Understanding the Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox

Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler have recently discovered a two person Russell-style paradox. They show that the following configurations of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. In [7] a modal logic interpretation of this paradox is proposed. The idea is to introduce two modal operators intended to represent the agents’ beliefs and assumptions. The goal of this paper is to take this analysis further and study this paradox from the point of view of a modal logician. In particular, we show that the paradox can be seen as a theorem of an appropriate hybrid logic. Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

Rediscovering trust: Towards an alternative psychotherapy

The collapse of significant human relationships is a primary cause of psychosis. When basic trust is extinguished, a person can feel that his or her actual existence is threatened by genuine relationships. Yet, every human being has a powerful innate need for relationships. Such is the tragic paradox of psychosis: the person is, at the same time, in terror over the possibility of a relationship and in despair over the impossibility of a relationship. An alternative psychotherapy must emerge that allows the psychotherapist and the disturbed person to build a bond of mutual care. Each person unconditionally accepts and confirms the other for what he is, and for what he may become. The psychotherapist must enter the bizarre psychotic world as a partner in a journey to recover the lost wholeness of the psychotic person. This relationship can serve as a bridge which allows the psychotic person to creatively discover a way to rejoin the normal world.     

Clinging to Nothing: The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Upādāna in Early Buddhism

The concept of clinging (upādāna) is absolutely central to early Buddhist thought. This article examines the concept from both a phenomenological and a metaphysical perspective and attempts to understand how it relates to the non-self doctrine and to the ultimate goal of Nibbāna. Unenlightened consciousness is consciousness centered on an ‘I’. It is also consciousness that is conditioned by and bound up with a being in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, clinging gives birth to the illusion of self, or what is called the ‘conceit of “I am”’. From a metaphysical perspective, clinging binds consciousness to a worldly being. Seen in the first way, Nibbāna is ‘centerless’ consciousness. Seen in the second, it is unconditioned consciousness. Viewed in either way, Nibbāna is a state of consciousness reached through the eradication of clinging