Variety‐Seeking and Perceived Expertise

People often infer expertise from the choice of unique, rare, or sophisticated options. But might mere variety‐seeking also serve as a signal of expertise, and if so, how? Six studies show that the relationship between variety‐seeking and perceived expertise is not unidirectional and depends on the perceiver's own level of expertise. Category experts perceive lower variety‐seeking as indicative of discernment, which in turn increases perceived expertise in that category. Consequently, experts choose less variety to portray themselves as experts. In contrast, novices perceive high variety‐seeking as indicative of category breadth knowledge, which in turn increases their perception of category expertise. Consequently, novices choose more variety to portray themselves as experts. The findings make novel theoretical contributions to research on variety‐seeking, consumer expertise, and social perception, as well as practical contributions for marketers of product assortments and bundles.     

Expert memory: the interaction of stimulus structure,attention, and expertise

This experiment focuses on the three‐way interaction between domain‐relevant structure, attention to domain‐relevant structure, and expertise in their effect on recall for field‐hockey information. It was predicted that experts' recall would decrease with the amount of domain‐relevant structure, but only when they were able to attend to the structure within the stimuli. Novices' recall was not predicted to vary with these factors. The study used a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed‐design with one between‐subjects factor, field hockey expertise (expert and novice), and two within‐subjects factors, domain‐relevant structure (high, moderate and low) and attention to structure (attending and non‐attending). Twenty‐four experts and 24 novices each listened to six audio‐taped scenarios (1 in each of the 6 structure × attention conditions) describing a sequence of field hockey play and recall was tested. The results demonstrated significant main effects for expertise, structure, and attention, and interactions of (a) structure and expertise, and (b) structure and attention. Importantly, the significant structure, attention, and expertise interaction provided the first direct empirical support for the constraint attunement hypothesis (Vicente and Wang, 1998 ) and for that aspect of the template theory (Gobet and Simon, 1996a , b ). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of expertise on collaborative problem solving

Why do some groups succeed where others fail? We hypothesise that collaborative success is achieved when the relationship between the dyad's prior expertise and the complexity of the task creates a situation that affords constructive and interactive processes between group members. We call this state the zone of proximal facilitation in which the dyad's prior knowledge and experience enables them to benefit from both knowledge-based problem-solving processes (e.g., elaboration, explanation, and error correction) andcollaborative skills (e.g., creating common ground, maintaining joint attention to the task). To test this hypothesis we conducted an experiment in which participants with different levels of aviation expertise, experts (flight instructors), novices (student pilots), and non-pilots, read flight problem scenarios of varying complexity and had to identify the problem and generate a solution with either another participant of the same level of expertise or alone. The non-pilots showed collaborative inhibition on problem identification in which dyads performed worse than their predicted potential for both simple and complex scenarios, whereas the novices and experts did not. On solution generation the non-pilot and novice dyads performed at their predicted potential with no collaborative inhibition on either simple or complex scenarios. In contrast, expert dyads showed collaborative gains, withdyads performing above their predicted potential, but only for the complex scenarios. On simple scenarios the expert dyads showed collaborative inhibition and performed worse than their predicted potential. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of collaborative problem solving.     

Chronometric comparisons of imagery to action: visualizing versus physically performing springboard dives

Motor imagery research emphasizes similarities between the mental imagery of an action and its physical execution. In this study, temporal differences between motor imagery and its physical performance as a function of performer expertise, skill complexity, and spatial ability were investigated. Physical execution times for springboard dives were compared with visualized execution times. Results indicate that physical and visualized performance times were not identical: Their relation is a function of dive complexity and diver expertise, but not their interaction. Relative to physical time, visualization time increased with increased complexity, suggesting the involvement of capacity-limited working memory. A nonmonotonic relation was found for expertise: Unlike experts or novices, visualization time for intermediates was significantly slower than physical time. These temporal differences are most consistent with schematic differences in skill representation. Intermediates may be relatively slowed by greater amounts of nonautomatized knowledge, as compared with the automatized knowledge of experts or the sparse knowledge of novices.     

Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation

Reputations are socially constructed labels that provide representations (or schema), which organize our images of another person. We look at how reputations influence negotiations by examining their impact on negotiator cognitions, behaviors, and subsequent outcomes. We randomly paired relative novices with relative experts to negotiate over email, telling half the novices that their counterparts were experts in distributive negotiation (i.e., the art of claiming value). Findings supported our predictions that novices whose counterparts had a distributive reputation judged these counterparts' intentions in a more negative light and used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than the control group novices. This resulted in lower joint gains in the distributive reputation condition than in the control condition. Notably, the more experienced negotiators were able to extract more individual value from the deal, but not when they had a reputation for being distributive. In other words, the fictitious distributive reputation prevented participants from capitalizing on their real negotiation expertise advantage.     

Holistic processing of musical notation: Dissociating failures of selective attention in experts and novices

Holistic processing (i.e., the tendency to process objects as wholes) is associated with face perception and also with expertise individuating novel objects. Surprisingly, recent work also reveals holistic effects in novice observers. It is unclear whether the same mechanisms support holistic effects in experts and in novices. In the present study, we measured holistic processing of music sequences using a selective attention task in participants who vary in music-reading expertise. We found that holistic effects were strategic in novices but were relatively automatic in experts. Correlational analyses revealed that individual holistic effects were predicted by both individual music-reading ability and neural responses for musical notation in the right fusiform face area (rFFA), but in opposite directions for experts and novices, suggesting that holistic effects in the two groups may be of different natures. To characterize expert perception, it is important not only to measure the tendency to process objects as wholes, but also to test whether this effect is dependent on task constraints.     

Mechanisms and neural basis of object and pattern recognition: a study with chess experts

Comparing experts with novices offers unique insights into the functioning of cognition, based on the maximization of individual differences. Here we used this expertise approach to disentangle the mechanisms and neural basis behind two processes that contribute to everyday expertise: object and pattern recognition. We compared chess experts and novices performing chess-related and -unrelated (visual) search tasks. As expected, the superiority of experts was limited to the chess-specific task, as there were no differences in a control task that used the same chess stimuli but did not require chess-specific recognition. The analysis of eye movements showed that experts immediately and exclusively focused on the relevant aspects in the chess task, whereas novices also examined irrelevant aspects. With random chess positions, when pattern knowledge could not be used to guide perception, experts nevertheless maintained an advantage. Experts' superior domain-specific parafoveal vision, a consequence of their knowledge about individual domain-specific symbols, enabled improved object recognition. Functional magnetic resonance imaging corroborated this differentiation between object and pattern recognition and showed that chess-specific object recognition was accompanied by bilateral activation of the occipitotemporal junction, whereas chess-specific pattern recognition was related to bilateral activations in the middle part of the collateral sulci. Using the expertise approach together with carefully chosen controls and multiple dependent measures, we identified object and pattern recognition as two essential cognitive processes in expert visual cognition, which may also help to explain the mechanisms of everyday perception.     

Using segmentation to support the learning from animated soccer scenes: An effect of prior knowledge

ObjectivesWe used a cognitive load perspective to investigate the effects of levels of learner expertise and different forms of segmentation in learning from animated soccer scenes.MethodExpert and novice players (N = 48) completed a recall reconstruction-test and rated their invested mental effort after studying a continuous animation, a macro-step and a micro-step segmented animation.ResultsFindings demonstrated an expertise reversal effect for segmentation. It positively affected learning outcomes of novices but not experts (even though they still invested less mental effort and repeated the animation less often in the two segmented conditions). Additionally, novices benefited more from micro-step segmentation than from macro-step segmentation, while experts performed at the same level with both forms of segmentation.ConclusionsStudy results suggested that adapting instructional animation formats to players with different levels of expertise should be a crucial part of successful training.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influence of Expertise on the Intentional Transfer of Motor Skill

Intentional transfer of expert knowledge is an important issue in cognitive science and motor skills. How subjects deliberately transfer expertise in karate when learning a closely related motor skill (tai chi) was examined in this study. Subjects (N = 20) learned a videotaped sequence of self-defense movements, evaluated their learning, and then performed the sequence. Self-regulation of learning is believed to be central to effective transfer. The measures of self-regulation were accuracy of self-evaluation, video use, and approach to learning. Results showed that unlike novices, experts used self-regulation, learning strategies, and the video player in more complex ways in self-regulation. Experts, as compared with novices, demonstrated their greater knowledge through the higher quality of their performance and their better comprehension of movement meaning; but both groups recalled an equal number of moments, suggesting that both experts and novices transferred general knowledge about learning.     

Expertise in the Game of Go and Levels of Visuospatial and Pattern Recognition Abilities

The results of existing research indicate higher levels of visuospatial and pattern recognition abilities in experts in the game of Go compared to novices. However, the tasks included in the research have been focused only on Go‐game situations. This study aimed to verify the hypothesis that experts in the game of Go would achieve higher scores, compared to novices, on behavioral tests measuring visuospatial abilities and that pattern recognition tests would be a predictor of group membership (experts, low‐skill players, novices). We consider that the game of Go can be treated as a special case of tasks related to visuospatial abilities and pattern recognition. Sixty men participated in the study, including 17 experts in the game of Go, 13 low‐skill players, and 30 novices. The results of behavioral tests—the advanced version of Raven's Progressive Matrices and the APIS‐Z Test's Visuospatial Abilities subscale, which measure pattern recognition and visuospatial abilities, respectively—confirmed the hypotheses.     

Expertise Shapes Multimodal Imagery for Wine

Although taste and smell seem hard to imagine, some people nevertheless report vivid imagery in these sensory modalities. We investigate whether experts are better able to imagine smells and tastes because they have learned the ability, or whether they are better imaginers in the first place, and so become experts. To test this, we first compared a group of wine experts to yoked novices using a battery of questionnaires. We show for the first time that experts report greater vividness of wine imagery, with no difference in vividness across sensory modalities. In contrast, novices had more vivid color imagery than taste or odor imagery for wines. Experts and novices did not differ on other vividness of imagery measures, suggesting a domain-specific effect of expertise. Critically, in a second study, we followed a group of students commencing a wine course and a group of matched control participants. Students and controls did not differ before the course, but after the wine course students reported more vivid wine imagery. We provide evidence that expertise improves imagery, exemplifying the extent of plasticity of cognition underlying the chemical senses.     

Attention and expertise in multiple target tracking

An experiment is reported examining the role of attention and expertise in multiple target tracking. It compares the ability of professional radar operators (experts) and undergraduate students (novices) to acquire and track subsets of randomly moving targets amongst distractors, and respond appropriately to a probe. Participants undertook this tracking task alone then, subsequently, in conjunction with a second, digit categorization task. For half the participants, the second task commenced prior to the tracking task's target acquisition phase, for the remainder after. Results suggest experts are better than novices across all conditions. Further, a comparison of results between the two dual task conditions indicates that attentional resources make a contribution to target tracking in both novices and experts, but only appear to make a contribution to target acquisition in novices. The results have implications for theories of multiple target tracking; the selection of radar operators; and the monitoring of their training. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Response bias in judging deceptive movements

Two not mutually exclusive explanations, perceptual and motor expertise, account for the finding that experts outperform novices in recognizing deceptive actions from bodily (kinematic) cues. The aim of the present study was twofold: First, we sought to examine the impact of motor and perceptual expertise on distinguishing deceptive and non-deceptive actions. Second, we tested the hypothesis that differences in perceptual judgments on deceptive movements vs. non-deceptive movements do not necessarily need to be caused by either perceptual or motor expertise differences, but can also be a result of response bias. Skilled handball players (field players and goalkeepers) and novices had to detect whether a penalty-taker shot or faked a shot at the goal. Signal detection theory (SDT) analysis revealed that skilled handball players outperformed novices in discriminating shots from fakes. No differences in perceptual sensitivity were found between the goalkeepers and the field players. However, SDT analysis showed that goalkeepers were significantly biased to judge movements as deceptive, while neither field players nor novices showed this response bias.     

Take-the-best in expert-novice decision strategies for residential burglary

We examined the decision strategies and cue use of experts and novices in a consequential domain: crime. Three participant groups decided which of two residential properties was more likely to be burgled, on the basis of eight cues such as location of the property. The two expert groups were experienced burglars and police officers, and the novice group was composed of graduate students. We found that experts’ choices were best predicted by a lexicographic heuristic strategy called take-the-best that implies noncompensatory information processing, whereas novices’ choices were best predicted by a weighted additive linear strategy that implies compensatory processing. The two expert groups, however, differed in the cues they considered important in making their choices, and the police officers were actually more similar to novices in this regard. These findings extend the literature on judgment, decision making, and expertise, and have implications for criminal justice policy.     

How Experts Adapt Their Gaze Behavior When Modeling a Task to Novices

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem-solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert-novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem-solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically.     

Regressive Imagery in Creative Problem‐Solving: Comparing Verbal Protocols of Expert and Novice Visual Artists and Computer Programmers

We applied computer‐based text analyses of regressive imagery to verbal protocols of individuals engaged in creative problem‐solving in two domains: visual art (23 experts, 23 novices) and computer programming (14 experts, 14 novices). Percentages of words involving primary process and secondary process thought, plus emotion‐related words, were tabulated. Visual art protocols were higher in primary process thought and emotion‐related words; those from programming were higher in secondary process thought. Almost no main effects of expertise or interactions were found. Correlations between the measures (particularly those involving emotion‐related words) also varied as a function of task. This pattern suggests cognitive processes vary considerably across different creative problem‐solving tasks or domains, and that a more domain‐specific approach to creative cognition may be advisable. Further implications for integrating and consolidating some extant lines of creativity research are discussed.     

Expertise increases the functional overlap between face and object perception

Recent studies indicate that expertise with objects can interfere with face processing. Although competition occurs between faces and objects of expertise, it remains unclear whether this reflects an expertise-specific bottleneck or the fact that objects of expertise grab attention and thereby consume more central resources. We investigated the perceptual costs of expertise by measuring visual thresholds for identifying targets embedded within RSVP sequences presented at varying temporal rates. Car experts and novices searched for face targets among face and car distractors, or watch targets among watch and car distractors. Remarkably, car experts were slower than novices at identifying faces among task-irrelevant cars, yet faster than novices at identifying watches among cars. This suggests that car expertise leads to greater functional overlap between cars and faces while reducing the functional overlap between cars and objects, a result incompatible with the notion of an encapsulated module for exclusive processing of faces.