Is saccade-induced retrieval enhancement a potential means of improving eyewitness evidence?

Saccade-induced retrieval enhancement (SIRE) is the effect whereby making bilateral saccades enhances the subsequent retrieval of memories. Two experiments explored SIRE's potential to improve eyewitness evidence. Participants viewed slideshows depicting crimes, and received contradictory and additive misinformation about event details either once (Experiment 1) or three times (Experiment 2). Participants then performed saccades or a fixation control task before being tested on their memory for the slideshows and making confidence judgements. Saccades increased discrimination between seen and unseen event details regardless of whether or what type of misinformation was presented. Because prior studies indicated that SIRE might be more robust for individuals who are strongly right-handed versus not, we examined SIRE as a function of handedness and found that saccades improved memory for event details regardless of participants' handedness. However, participants who were not strongly right-handed had fewer false memories than participants who were strongly right-handed, extending previous findings of superior memory among individuals who are not strongly right-handed. Saccades also increased confidence in true memories (Experiment 1) and decreased confidence in false memories (Experiment 2). The results support SIRE's potential to improve eyewitness evidence.     

Assessment of calibration for reconstructed eye-witness memories

Two experiments examined confidence judgments associated with eyewitness memory for events to misinformation [Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 560-572]. Participants in each experiment watched videos depicting crimes and either responded to questionnaires (Experiment 1) or read narratives (Experiment 2) containing veridical or non-veridical information. Upon testing for memory performance 24 h later, participants exposed to misinformation accepted the misinformation as part of their memory of the events in the videos. In both experiments, confidence judgments of participants subjected to misinformation were high and comparable to those of participants not subjected to misinformation. The relationship between accurate responding and confidence was assessed via calibration analysis [Yates, J. F. (1990). Judgments and decision making. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall]. Performance on various measures of calibration was generally better for participants who were not exposed to misinformation. We conclude that confidence judgments can depend on factors other than those that improve the accuracy of memory, such as the retrieval fluency of one’s memories.     

Post‐event information presented in a question form eliminates the misinformation effect

This study investigated the influences of sentence surface forms on the misinformation effect. After viewing a film clip, participants received a post‐event narrative describing the events in the film. Critical sentences in the post‐event narrative, presented in either a statement or a question form, contained misinformation instead of questions with embedded false presuppositions; thus participants did not have to answer questions about the original event. During the final cued‐recall test, participants were informed that any relevant information presented in the post‐event narrative was not in the original event and that they should not report it. Consistent with previous findings, Experiment 1 demonstrated that post‐event information presented as an affirmative statement produced the misinformation effect. More importantly, post‐event information presented in a question form, regardless of whether it contained a misleading or studied item, increased the recall of correct information and reduced false recall. Experiment 2 replicated the main finding and ruled out an alternative explanation based on the salience of misleading items. Post‐event information presented in a question form created a condition similar to that which produces the testing effect.     

Misled subjects may know more than their performance implies

Many studies have demonstrated that subjects exposed to misleading postevent information are likely to report the misinformation with confidence on subsequent tests of memory for the event. The purpose of the present studies was to determine whether subjects exposed to misleading postevent information come to believe they remember seeing the misinformation at the original event. A second question addressed by the present studies is whether exposure to misinformation reduces subjects' ability to remember the source of items they witnessed at the original event. In two experiments, subjects viewed a slide sequence depicting an event, were subsequently exposed to misleading information or neutral information about selected aspects of the event, and were later tested on their memory for the source of original and misleading details. The results showed that exposure to misinformation did not lead subjects to believe they remembered seeing the misinformation, nor did it reduce subjects' ability to accurately identify the source of originally seen details. The same pattern of results was obtained whether subjects were tested immediately (Experiment 1) or after a 1-day delay (Experiment 2). Collectively, the results suggest that subjects may report misinformation even if they know they do not remember seeing it.     

The effect of question type on resistance to misinformation about present and absent details

The typical misinformation effect shows that accuracy is lower for details about which people received misleading compared to non-misleading (control) information. In two experiments, we examined the misinformation effect for non-witnessed details (i.e., absent). Three question types introduced control, misleading, and absent details (closed, closed-detailed, and open questions) about a mock burglary video. On this misinformation test, participants' reports of absent details were less accurate than control details only when they were introduced using open questions. Misinformation effects in a subsequent recognition test were present for misleading details in both experiments, but for absent details only in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 also revealed that participants who avoided answering open questions containing misleading and absent details had more accurate memories for these details on the subsequent recognition test than participants who answered these questions. In both experiments, confidence was lowest for absent details. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

The Use of Recollection Rejection in the Misinformation Paradigm

The purpose of this research was to determine the role of recollection rejection in the rejection of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we examined the use of recollection rejection to reject contradictory and additive misinformation. We measured recollection rejection by comparing misinformation acceptance rates, graphing confidence‐accuracy data using phantom receiver operating characteristic curves, examining high confidence rejections of misinformation, and examining self‐report responses. These measures converged on the finding that participants used recollection rejection to reject both types of misinformation but used recollection rejection more on contradictory misinformation. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the delay between the event and misinformation and between misinformation and test. The length of both of these delays affected misinformation acceptance. Participants were more likely to use recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation after a short delay before encountering misinformation. Overall these findings indicate that people can spontaneously induce recollection rejection to reject misinformation and prevent false memories. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Correcting the misinformation effect

Decades of memory research have demonstrated a dire need for effective methods of correcting misinformation, particularly once it has been encoded. However, much of this research has exposed participants to misinformation first then provided a correction, and used indirect memory questions. Using a misinformation effect (ME) paradigm, in which participants' memory is distorted by misleading postevent information, we examine whether corrections can combat memory distortion on direct memory tests. Experiment 1 showed corrections greatly reduced the ME. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a longer lag time (3 min) between exposure to misinformation and its correction, except for participants that read only the misinformation and its correction. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that participants reported the most recent information they read, suggesting participants evaluate the correction's veracity. Finally, a meta‐analysis of the three experiments reiterates that corrections may be effective in combating misinformation.     

Brief Exposure to Misinformation Can Lead to Long‐Term False Memories

Do false memories last? And do they last as long as true ones? This study investigated whether experimentally created false memories would persist for an extended period (one and a half years). A large number of subjects (N = 342) participated in a standard three‐stage misinformation procedure (saw the event slides, read the narrations with misinformation, and then took the memory tests). The initial tests showed that misinformation led to a significant amount of false memory. One and a half years later, the participants were tested again. About half of the misinformation false memory persisted, which was the same rate as for true memory. These results strongly suggest that brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long‐term false memory and that the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of post‐identification feedback on the recall of crime and perpetrator details

The present study examines the effect of identification feedback on the quantity and accuracy of crime event details recalled, willingness to attempt misleading questions and confidence in the accuracy of these details. All participants (N = 60) viewed a short video clip of a staged building society robbery and then made a false identification of the robber from a target‐absent photospread. Eyewitnesses were next given confirming feedback (i.e. told that they had identified the suspect), disconfirming feedback (i.e. told that they had failed to identify the suspect) or no feedback. All eyewitnesses then attempted a series of short‐answer questions relating to details about the robber, accomplice, victim, building society, theft and getaway. Disconfirming feedback significantly reduced eyewitness confidence in recall accuracy but there was no significant effect of feedback on the overall quantity and accuracy of details recalled or willingness to attempt misleading questions. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using the regulation of accuracy to study performance when the correct answer is not known

We examined memory performance in multiple‐choice questions when correct answers were not always present. How do participants answer when they are aware that the correct alternative may not be present? To answer this question we allowed participants to decide on the number of alternatives in their final answer (the plurality option), and whether they wanted to report or withhold their answer (report option). We also studied the memory benefits when both the plurality and the report options were available. In two experiments participants watched a crime and then answered questions with five alternatives. Half of the questions were presented with the correct alternative and half were not. Participants selected one alternative and rated confidence, then selected three alternatives and again rated confidence, and finally indicated whether they preferred the answer with one or with three alternatives (plurality option). Lastly, they decided whether to report or withhold the answer (report option). Results showed that participants’ confidence in their selections was higher, that they chose more single answers, and that they preferred to report more often when the correct alternative was presented. We also attempted to classify a posteriori questions as either presented with or without the correct alternative from participants’ selection. Classification was better than chance, and encouraging, but the forensic application of the classification technique is still limited since there was a large percentage of responses that were incorrectly classified. Our results also showed that the memory benefits of both plurality and report options overlap.     

Combating Co‐witness contamination: Attempting to decrease the negative effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Witnesses who discuss an event with others often incorporate misinformation encountered during the discussion into their memory of the event. Two experiments were conducted to establish whether this memory conformity also occurs in the context of an interview and whether it is possible to reduce the effect. Participants viewed a crime‐video which they then discussed with a co‐witness. Some participants were warned they may have been exposed to misinformation during the discussion before all were interviewed individually. In Experiment 1, participants made remember/know judgments about each component of their free recall, and in Experiment 2 they were asked to indicate the source of their memories. Co‐witness information was incorporated into participants' testimony, and this effect could not be significantly reduced using warnings and source‐monitoring instructions. Remember/know judgments may be useful in distinguishing ‘real’ memories from false memories. We make some recommendations regarding the interviewing of witnesses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Misleading Suggestions can Alter Later Memory Reports even Following a Cognitive Interview

Taking an immediate recall test prior to misinformation exposure can increase eyewitness suggestibility—a finding termed retrieval‐enhanced suggestibility. Here, we examined whether retrieval‐enhanced suggestibility would occur when participants were administered an immediate Cognitive Interview (CI). The CI is an investigative interviewing technique that consistently elicits more correct details in memory reports than standard interviews. In this study, participants watched a video of a crime and then completed a distractor task (control condition), a free recall test, or the CI. They then heard misinformation presented in a narrative. Participants produced more accurate memory details in the CI than in free recall despite spending equal time on both tasks. However, the CI also increased the later report of misinformation relative to the control condition. These results show that initial retrieval can increase subsequent suggestibility even when such retrieval occurs under relatively ideal conditions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of self‐rated ability in the accuracy of confidence judgements in eyewitness memory and general knowledge

It is argued that confidence stems in part from self‐rated ability in a domain of knowledge and that in eyewitness memory such perceptions are erroneous. Two experiments tested these hypotheses. In both experiments participants rated their relative ability in the domains of eyewitness memory and general knowledge and subsequently took tests of each, giving confidence ratings for each item attempted. In both studies, self‐rated ability predicted performance for general knowledge, but not eyewitness memory. Across participants confidence ratings were significant predictors of accuracy for general knowledge, but not for eyewitness memory. In Experiment 1 self‐rated ability was predictive of confidence ratings for both domains, although this effect was weaker in Experiment 2. The argument that the accuracy of confidence judgements in eyewitness memory is undermined by a lack of insight into relative expertise is therefore supported. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective experience guides betting decisions beyond accuracy: evidence from a metamemory illusion

The goal of this research was to test whether subjective memory experiences drive accuracy regulation decisions above and beyond objective memory indices. In four experiments (n?=?115) subjective recollection (i.e., reporting “Remember” in the Remember-Know task) was dissociated from memory accuracy by manipulating retrieval during a two-alternative forced-choice recognition task: in the Match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of the target (e.g., a studied and an unstudied toaster) and in the Non-match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of another studied but untested item (e.g., a studied toaster and an unstudied birdhouse). Participants were more accurate on Match trials, but reported subjective recollection more frequently on Non-match trials. Critically, participants also bet more often on Non-match trials to the detriment of their score (Experiment 1). This pattern persisted when participants were additionally required to retrieve details about items (Experiment 2) and when confidence assessments were collected (Experiment 3). Finally, participants bet more on Non-match trials even when subjective judgments were not elicited, suggesting that the decision process does not require reporting on subjective experience (Experiment 4). These results indicate that subjective memory experiences guide decision-making independent of objective accuracy and thus are critical to accuracy regulation.     

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

The present study examined age‐related differences in the misinformation effect for objects that were consistent or inconsistent with their environmental settings. Young and older adults viewed one of two slide sequences, each containing context‐consistent items (e.g., a blender in a kitchen setting or a saw in a woodshop setting) and context‐inconsistent items (a saw in a kitchen setting or a blender in a woodshop setting). After receiving misinformation through post‐event narratives, participants received tests of yes/no recognition requiring remember/know judgments (Experiments 1–3) and source monitoring (Experiments 2 and 3) for slide details. Although age‐related differences in the misinformation effect were nonreliable, older adults tended to report misinformation as remembered more often than young adults, and source monitoring tests reduced the misinformation effect for both age groups. Misinformation effects were equivalent or larger for inconsistent objects than for consistent objects. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trauma and memory: effects of post-event misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval

The present study concerned effects of misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval on eyewitness memory for a traumatic event (a vivid murder). Relations between misinformation acceptance and compliance were also examined. The classic three-stage misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1979) was employed, with a multi-component recognition test added. Either immediately or 2 weeks after viewing a distressing film, 232 adults read a narrative (misleading or control) about the murder and then took a recognition test that tapped memory for central and peripheral details. Test-item order either matched the chronology of the film or was randomly determined. Significant misinformation effects were obtained. Moreover, control participants were more accurate in response to questions about central than peripheral information; however, this was not so for misinformed participants. Sequential but not random retrieval order resulted in a higher proportion of correct responses for central as opposed to peripheral misinformation questions. Compliance was significantly related to misinformation effects. Delay increased participants' suggestibility, impaired memory accuracy, and produced higher confidence ratings for misinformed participants compared to controls. Findings indicate that even for a highly negative event, adults' memory is not immune to inaccuracies and suggestive influences.     

Improving the Accuracy of Eyewitnesses in the Presence of Misinformation with the Plurality Option

Misinformation has negative effects in the accuracy of eyewitnesses' reports. We investigated whether those negative effects could be reduced when participants are allowed to decide how many answers to include in their answers, that is, to regulate the plurality option. Participants watched a slideshow and received misinformation through a narrative. In the recognition memory test, participants had to select, out of five alternatives, one (single) and then three alternatives (plural answer) and to indicate which one they preferred to report if they were in a courtroom. Perceived likelihood ratings were also collected. Results showed that the regulation of the plurality option increased accuracy even in the presence of misinformation and highlighted the importance of the perceived likelihood ratings in the decision to select a single or plural answer. In general, the results suggest that better testimonies could be obtained if witnesses are given some control over their answers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Developmental Reversals in Report Conformity: Psycho‐Legal Implications

Young children, young adults, and older adults witnessed a scene in groups of four same‐aged acquaintances. Unbeknownst to the group, a technology allowed the scene to appear differently to one member (minority) than to the others (majority), which obviated the need to rehearse confederates or to artificially provide misinformation for the report conformity effect. After viewing, participants had public recollections, and 3 days later, their cued memory and confidence (for adults) were tested privately. Majority members' reports influenced the minority members' but only for adults, not for children (17% conformity compared with 35% for adults), thus providing evidence of developmental reversals in memory reports of verbatim details. Answer changes between the sessions were dramatically higher for minority participants at all three ages (6.7 vs. 66.7% for children, 10 vs. 50% for younger adults, and 26.7 vs. 63.3% for older adults). We discuss the implications of these findings for questioning cowitnesses.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.