Episodic future thought: Contributions from working memory

The ability to imagine hypothetical events in one’s personal future is thought to involve a number of constituent cognitive processes. We investigated the extent to which individual differences in working memory capacity contribute to facets of episodic future thought. College students completed simple and complex measures of working memory and were cued to recall autobiographical memories and imagine future autobiographical events consisting of varying levels of specificity (i.e., ranging from generic to increasingly specific and detailed events). Consistent with previous findings, future thought was related to analogous measures of autobiographical memory, likely reflecting overlapping cognitive factors supporting both past and future thought. Additionally, after controlling for autobiographical memory, residual working memory variance independently predicted future episodic specificity. We suggest that when imagining future events, working memory contributes to the construction of a single, coherent, future event depiction, but not to the retrieval or elaboration of event details.     

The true and the false

A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be explained in terms of these fundamental dispositions. The supposed ability of fundamental dispositions to ground natural laws is one of the most attractive features of the dispositional essentialist position. In this paper, however, I cast doubt on the ability of dispositional essences to ground the laws of nature. In particular I argue that the dispositional essentialist position is not able to coherently respond—sympathetically or otherwise—to Cartwright's challenge that there are no true general laws of nature.     

Episodic future thought and its relation to remembering: evidence from ratings of subjective experience

The goal of the present study was to examine the hypothesis that the ability to construct vivid mental images of the future involves sampling the contents of memory. In two experiments, participants envisioned future scenarios occurring in contextual settings that were represented in memory in varying degrees of perceptual detail. In both experiments, detailed contextual settings were associated with more detailed images of the future and a stronger subjective experience. Our findings suggest that the contents of memory are routinely sampled during the construction of personal future scenarios.     

Mood-congruent true and false memory: effects of depression

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm was used to investigate the effect of depression on true and false recognition. In this experiment true and false recognition was examined across positive, neutral, negative, and depression-relevant lists for individuals with and without a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Results showed that participants with major depressive disorder falsely recognised significantly more depression-relevant words than non-depressed controls. These findings also parallel recent research using recall instead of recognition and show that there are clear mood congruence effects for depression on false memory performance.     

Mood-congruent true and false memory: Effects of depression

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm was used to investigate the effect of depression on true and false recognition. In this experiment true and false recognition was examined across positive, neutral, negative, and depression-relevant lists for individuals with and without a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Results showed that participants with major depressive disorder falsely recognised significantly more depression-relevant words than non-depressed controls. These findings also parallel recent research using recall instead of recognition and show that there are clear mood congruence effects for depression on false memory performance.     

Episodic repetitive thought: dimensions, correlates, and consequences

Repetitive thought (RT) - attentive, prolonged, or frequent thought about oneself and one's world - plays an important role in many models of psychological and physical ill health (e.g., rumination and worry), as well as models of recovery and well-being (e.g., processing and reminiscing). In these models, repetitive thought is typically treated as stable or trait-like. In contrast, episodic RT reflects what people have "on their minds" at a particular point in time. In four studies, young women (N=94), college students (N=166), first-year law students (N=73), and older adults (N=174) described their episodic RT, which was then rated for qualities including valence, purpose, and theme. Episodic RT valence was associated with mood and depressive symptoms both between (Studies 1-4) and within people (Studies 3-4), and it mediated the effects of dispositional coping through emotional approach (Study 1). The effect of episodic RT valence in turn was moderated by other properties of episodic RT, including purpose, "trait" valence, and theme (Studies 1-4). The study of episodic RT complements that of trait RT and allows for observations of how RT and psychological adjustment change in concert and in context, as well as examining how the RT qualities that are not reflected in trait measures affect adjustment.     

Emotional content of true and false memories

Many people believe that emotional memories (including those that arise in therapy) are particularly likely to represent true events because of their emotional content. But is emotional content a reliable indicator of memory accuracy? The current research assessed the emotional content of participants' pre-existing (true) and manipulated (false) memories for childhood events. False memories for one of three emotional childhood events were planted using a suggestive manipulation and then compared, along several subjective dimensions, with other participants' true memories. On most emotional dimensions (e.g., how emotional was this event for you?), true and false memories were indistinguishable. On a few measures (e.g., intensity of feelings at the time of the event), true memories were more emotional than false memories in the aggregate, yet true and false memories were equally likely to be rated as uniformly emotional. These results suggest that even substantial emotional content may not reliably indicate memory accuracy.     

Emotional content of true and false memories

Many people believe that emotional memories (including those that arise in therapy) are particularly likely to represent true events because of their emotional content. But is emotional content a reliable indicator of memory accuracy? The current research assessed the emotional content of participants’ pre-existing (true) and manipulated (false) memories for childhood events. False memories for one of three emotional childhood events were planted using a suggestive manipulation and then compared, along several subjective dimensions, with other participants’ true memories. On most emotional dimensions (e.g., how emotional was this event for you?), true and false memories were indistinguishable. On a few measures (e.g., intensity of feelings at the time of the event), true memories were more emotional than false memories in the aggregate, yet true and false memories were equally likely to be rated as uniformly emotional. These results suggest that even substantial emotional content may not reliably indicate memory accuracy.     

Drawing what lies ahead: False intentions are more abstractly depicted than true intentions

The aim of this study was to examine how people mentally represent and depict true and false statements about claimed future actions—so‐called true and false intentions. On the basis of construal level theory, which proposes that subjectively unlikely events are more abstractly represented than likely ones, we hypothesized that false intentions should be represented at a more abstract level than true intentions. Fifty‐six hand drawings, produced by participants to describe mental images accompanying either true or false intentions, were rated on level of abstractness by a second set of participants (N = 117) blind to the veracity of the intentions. As predicted, drawings of false intentions were rated as more abstract than drawings of true intentions. This result advances the use of drawing‐based deception detection techniques to the field of true and false intentions and highlights the potential for abstractness as a novel cue to deceit.     

Memory illusions and consciousness: Examining the phenomenology of true and false memories

Several recent false memory studies have addressed the question of how false memories are experienced phenomenologically. In this article we argue that it is not only possible to address questions of this sort, but it is necessary for a full understanding of memory illusions. We define memory illusions as false beliefs about the past that are experienced as memories. We then review a corpus of evidence that addresses the phenomenological experience of false memories. None of this evidence is perfect, but taken in its totality it suggests that false memories are similar to true memories but are also subtly different. We conclude with several recommendations for how the phenomenology of false memories can be fruitfully explored.     

Trust in testimony: children's use of true and false statements

The extent to which young children monitor and use the truth of assertions to gauge the reliability of subsequent testimony was examined. Three- and 4-year-old children were presented with two informants, an accurate labeler and an inaccurate labeler. They were then invited to learn names for novel objects from these informants. The children correctly monitored and identified the informants on the basis of the truth of their prior labeling. Furthermore, children who explicitly identified the unreliable or reliable informant across two tasks went on to demonstrate selective trust in the novel information provided by the previously reliable informant. Children who did not consistently identify the unreliable or reliable informant proved indiscriminate.     

Episodic generation can cause semantic forgetting: Retrieval-induced forgetting of false memories

In two experiments, we tested whether false recognition and false recall were prone to retrieval-induced forgetting, using the retrieval practice paradigm (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Participants encoded lists of cue-target word pairs associated with a nonpresented, critical theme word and then engaged in retrieval practice for half of the word pairs from half of the lists. As expected, unpracticed targets from practiced lists were recognized (Experiment 1) and recalled (Experiment 2) less well than those from unpracticed lists. In addition, false recognition and false recall of critical items associated with practiced lists was lower than false recognition and false recall of items associated with unpracticed lists. We argue that false memories are prone to inhibitory mechanisms engendered by the retrieval practice paradigm. The results are consistent with the claim that semantically activated critical themes interfere with the episodic retrieval of list words and that inhibition decreases the activation level of these interfering memory representations during retrieval practice.     

Neural correlates underlying true and false associative memories

Despite the fact that associative memory studies produce a large number of false memories, neuroimaging analyses utilizing this paradigm typically focus only on neural activity mediating successful retrieval. The current study sought to expand on this prior research by examining the neural basis of both true and false associative memories. Though associative false memories are substantially different than those found in semantic or perceptual false memory paradigms, results suggest that associative false memories are mediated by similar neural mechanisms. Specifically, we found increased frontal activity that likely represents enhanced monitoring and evaluation compared to that needed for true memories and correct rejections. Results also indicated that true, and not false associative memories, are mediated by neural activity in the MTL, specifically the hippocampus. Finally, while activity in early visual cortex distinguished true from false memories, a lack of neural differences between hits and correct rejections failed to support previous findings suggesting that activity in early visual cortex represents sensory reactivation of encoding-related processing.     

Conscious and unconscious discriminations between true and false memories

When subjects give higher confidence or memory ratings to a test word in a recognition test, do they simply raise their criterion without making better discrimination, or do they raise both criterion and true discrimination between the studied words (SW) and the lures? Given that previous studies found subjects’ false alarm responses to lures slower than to SW, and recognition latency inversely correlated with the confidence rating, can the latency difference between the lures and SW be accounted for by confidence or memory ratings? The present results showed that when subjects gave higher confidence or memory ratings, both their bias and sensitivity were raised, indicating that they could consciously distinguish the lures from the SW. However, a latency difference between true and false recognitions persisted after confidence and memory ratings were held constant, suggesting an unconscious source of discrimination between the two types of memory.