The ‘Holy Mother’ and the shadow: revisiting Jung's work on the quaternity

Through a series of clinical vignettes, this paper considers the impact of religious belief, specifically Roman Catholicism, on the psyche and development of mind; in particular, there will be a focus on the influences of the conflation of maternal beliefs with a Catholic belief system when the loss or absence of the father is a primary factor. Further, it will be shown in case examples that split off aspects of the personal shadow such as conflicted and aggressive emotions related to mother and father can conflate with the collective numinous and religious aspects of the ‘dark side’ of the God‐representation and result in ‘religious’ persecutory symptoms. This has a debilitating effect on the emerging personality, leaving it prone to fears, anxieties and psychotic pockets of experience when there is a numinous persecutory shadow in the background that affects and limits the individual's development. The implications and findings drawn from the clinical vignettes are used to consider the impact of an interrelationship and conflation between aspects of the psyche and religious beliefs. Jung's work on the Trinity and the ‘problem of the fourth’ (Jung 1942/1948/1991) is also reconsidered in relation to the role of the feminine, the maternal and the ‘reality of matter’. A diagram of the multiple levels of the quaternity is used to elaborate and expand on Jung's concept. © 2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology     

A revolution of the mind: some implications of George Hogenson's ‘The Baldwin Effect: a neglected influence on C.G. Jung's evolutionary thinking’ (2001)

George Hogenson's 2001 paper ‘The Baldwin Effect: a neglected influence on C.G. Jung's evolutionary thinking’ developed the radical argument that, if archetypes are emergent, they ‘do not exist in the sense that there is no place that the archetypes can be said to be’. In this paper, I show how Hogenson's thinking has been seminal to my own: it is not just archetypes but the mind itself that has no ‘place’. The mind is a dynamic system, emergent from the cultural environment of symbolic meanings to which humans are evolutionarily adapted. Drawing on the work of philosopher John Searle, I argue that symbols constitute the realities that they bring forth, including the imaginal realities of the psyche. The implications for clinical work include a rejection of structural models of the psyche in favour of the emergence of symbolic realities in the context of psychoanalysis as a distributed system of cognition.     

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

A Lesson in ‘Psycholese,’ or How to ‘Get a Feel For’ Where Your ‘Helper’ Is ‘Coming From’

Oftentimes/frequently the consumers/clients/patients of community/private mental health agencies/facilities experience/encounter difficulty communicating with the mental health professionals/paraprofessionals. Presented is a glossary that should aid novice clients to better communicate with their helpers/therapists/counselors/ caregivers. On the other hand (at the same time), it might just confuse the clients further. This is clearly a risk with counseling.     

‘Bound in a nutshell’: Thoughts on complexity,reductionism, and ‘infinite space’1

Pluralism is the hallmark of 21st century psychoanalytic discourse. Nevertheless, an unpleasant byproduct of pluralism is a tendency in some quarters to retreat into orthodoxy, stemming from a perceived need to shore up theoretical boundaries in the service of differentiating one theory from another. The delineation of borders places us at a risk of losing sight of the fact that genuine psychoanalytic thinking is fundamentally non‐reductionistic. Moreover, the core psychoanalytic notion of overdetermination, which Freud never abandoned throughout his career, has recently been neglected as authors argue in their communications that one point of view is better than another. Both analysts and their patients secretly are drawn to simple formulations that eschew complexity. The need to remain open to the ‘infinite space’ of meaning, motive, and causation should be a hallmark of clinical psychoanalytic practice. The author considers the implications for technique, and provides case material to illustrate some of the challenges inherent in approaching psychoanalytic work as a complex phenomenon.     

Peter Winch on ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Socratic’ Reasoning

Peter Winch often returned to questions about the nature of logic. In the context of his work on Wittgenstein and political philosophy in the 1990s, Winch described a contrast between ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Socratic’ reasoning. Aristotelian conceptions of reasoning, attributed to Frege and Russell, would see logic as a formal science and rationality as consistency with pre‐existent rules of inference. The Socratic conception, attributed to Wittgenstein, understands rational argument as a form of socially embedded dialogue that involves moral relationships and a dimension of depth. Rational persuasion may also involve use of persuasive images and examples.