Primary Process Thinking,Divergent Thinking,and Coping in Children

The relationships among primary process thinking, divergent thinking, and coping were investigated in fifth-grade children. Specifically, it was hypothesized from psychodynamic theory that access to and integration of primary process thinking would be positively related to divergent thinking and that both integration of primary process and divergent thinking would be predictive of coping ability. The Rorschach (Holt's scoring system) and Alternate Uses Test (spontaneous flexibility score) were administered to 53 fifth-grade children. Zeitlin's Coping Inventory, a teacher's rating scale, was the coping measure. Results confirmed the hypotheses for boys in that the percentage of primary process and the Adaptive Regression score on the Rorschach were significantly related to divergent thinking, r(27) = .33, p < .05 and r(27) = .34, p < .05, respectively. Divergent thinking was significantly related to teachers' ratings of coping ability for boys, r(27) = .58, p < .01. There were no significant relationships among the variables for girls. These sex differences in the pattern of correlations are consistent with previous findings.     

Thinking animals, disagreement, and skepticism

According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified principles, drawing out some general morals in defending animalism.     

Thinking,Acting, Considering

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show (1) that such examples are not easily resisted; (2) that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and (3) that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through?     

Thinking styles, self-esteem, and socio-economic status

The present study aimed at examining the nature of thinking styles. Six hundred and ninety-four students (ages ranging from 17–45) from the University of Hong Kong participated in the study. The participants responded to the Thinking Styles Inventory and the Self-Esteem Inventory (Adult Form) and provided a range of socio-economic status (SES) indicators. It was found that when age was controlled, thinking styles and self-esteem overlap. Furthermore, regardless of age, those students who reported using thinking styles that are creativity-generating and more complex, and those who reported higher self-esteem tend to be students from higher SES families. Discussion was made in relation to these findings' practical implications for teachers.     

Creative Thinking: Processes,Strategies, and Knowledge

Creative achievements are the basis for progress in our world. Although creative achievement is influenced by many variables, the basis for creativity is held to lie in the generation of high‐quality, original, and elegant solutions to complex, novel, ill‐defined problems. In the present effort, we examine the cognitive capacities that make creative problem‐solving possible. We argue that creative problem‐solving depends on the effective execution of a set of complex cognitive processes. Effective execution of these processes is, in turn, held to depend on the strategies employed in process execution and the knowledge being used in problem‐solving. The implications of these observations for improving creative thinking are discussed.     

Racism,Counterfactual Thinking,and Judgment Severity1

Two contrasting models of the effects of motivational influences on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and social judgment were tested, using a modified version of Wells and Gavanski's (1989) cab driver vignette. Undergraduates (N= 208) assigned blame to a negligent white or black target after imagining how the target's alternative behavior could have either easily or improbably averted two accident-related fatalities. Results suggested that motivational variables such as racism moderate the relationship between counterfactual thinking and judgment severity rather than directly affect the counterfactual thinking process itself. Implications for current conceptions of both counterfactual thinking and racism are discussed.     

Anxiety, Attributional Thinking, and the Primary Process

In earlier publications, experimental evidence was provided for the existence of the primary vs. secondary process mental organization posited by Freud. A well-established cognitive categorization test based on attributional and relational similarity was found to map on to primary and secondary principles of mental organization respectively, thus offering the opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from psychoanalytic theory independent of the clinical situation. In prior work, primary process shifts occurred under three different conditions-all predicted by psychoanalytic theory: (1) when stimuli were (subliminal) unconscious; (2) when participants were 3-5 years of age; and (3) when tasks were implicit. In the current study, a fourth condition is examined dealing with the relationship of conscious anxiety to primary and secondary processes. In a naturalistic study, 120 patients waiting in medical center waiting rooms rated how anxious they felt on a 10-point scale and then completed a version of the categorization test alluded to above. Those who reported any anxiety at all showed a signifi cant shift toward primary process categorization over those participants who rated themselves as calm. The implications of this fourth fi nding are discussed with respect to signal anxiety and symptom formation.     

Salivating,and Thinking in Different Languages

This study investigated age, sex, and title of therapist as determinants of patients' preferences. In general it was found that (a) “psychologists” and “psychiatrists” were preferred to “behavioral consultants,” “emotional counselors,” and “psychoanalysts” who, in turn, were preferred to “social workers”; (b) male therapists were preferred to female therapists; and (c) 40-year-old therapists were preferred to 55-year-old therapists who, in turn, were preferred to 25-year-old therapists.     

Affective Expression in Children's Fantasy Play,Primary Process Thinking on the Rorschach,and Divergent Thinking

The relationships among expression of primary process thinking on the Rorschach, affective expression in fantasy play, and divergent thinking were investigated in first and second grade children. Sixty children received the Rorschach (Holt's scoring system), a play task (Affect in Play Scale), and the Alternate Uses Test. Major hypotheses were supported because the amount of primary process thinking on the Rorschach (frequency and percent) was significantly, positively related to amount of affective expression and primary process expression in play. Also, expression of affect in play (frequency, variety, integration, and comfort) was significantly, positively related to divergent thinking, independent of IQ for both boys and girls. On the Rorschach, percent of primary process was significantly related to divergent thinking for boys. The results suggest that the ability to think imaginatively in a free-association style and the ability to have access to affect-laden material are related processes.     

交感思维：表现、形成机理及其弱化

交感思维是人类一种基础的、直觉的思维方式, 主要基于“交感”的认知模式, 遵循相似律和触染律两个法则。相似律认为果必同因、相似相生, 表面相似的事物共享一些基本特质; 触染律认为事物“本质”可以在物体接触时传递, 事物在脱离接触后仍可以继续发生相互作用。触染效应可以是正面的, 也可以是负面的。交感效应已经在食物厌恶、消费者购物等行为中得到验证。今后研究应拓展交感思维的应用领域, 提出更有效的弱化和抑制方法, 并从意识、记忆、知觉、认知等信息加工层面对其进行深入探讨。     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the worlds needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justices scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the worlds community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the worlds needy.     

Thinking,Doing, and the Ethics of Family Therapy

In this article, we examine how family therapists develop their capacity to make ethical decisions in clinical practice. We present an approach to clinical ethics that builds upon, and integrates the central features of, professional training and development in family therapy itself. We also explore the similarities and differences between the theoretical, top-down approach of bioethics, with its emphasis on “principled decision making,” and the clinical, pragmatic, bottom-up approach discussed here.     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the world’s needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justice’s scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the world’s community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the world’s needy.