Synchronicity,the infinite unrepressed,dissociation and the interpersonal

This paper uses the logic derived by Matte Blanco to provide an Archimedean point and a mathematics, both of which Jung complained of lacking, with which to validate the notion of synchronicity and to demonstrate that it is one of the inevitable properties of an unconscious which is unrepressed such as Jung's collective unconscious, and that such an unconscious will also be affective and interpersonal as well as intrapersonal. These have important clinical implications. After an exposition of Matte Blanco's thinking, some clinical material is presented of an episode in which patient and author both suffered the same psychosomatic symptom some time just prior to a session. Correspondences between Matte Blanco's logically derived ideas and Jung's phenomenological observations are made.     

Clinical applications of Matte Blanco's thinking

Ignacio Matte Blanco (1908–1995) left very few specific indications about the applications of his theoretical notions to his interpretative style. The author shows how he uses Matte Blanco to formulate some of his own interpretations. The first part of the paper uses clinical vignettes to illustrate some of Matte‐Blanco's concepts. Their theoretical vocabulary is thus made explicit. Then two psychoanalytic sessions are discussed at greater length, together with one from a therapy, so that the use of Matte‐Blanco's notions can be seen clearly, allowing for a fresh perspective on areas of psychoanalytic theory, particularly dreams, psychopathology viewed according to the proportions of asymmetrical and symmetrical functioning in the patient's bi‐logical mental system, the multidimensionality of the unconscious, the structural unconscious, the emotion‐thought relationship, projective identification, resistance, and negative therapeutic reaction. The practical consequences of all this are elaborated, particularly the ensuing possibility of ‘thinking with the patient' in the session. This enables the patient to introject a form of mental functioning in which the asymmetrical mode is not invaded by the symmetric mode (a parallel can be seen here with the Bionian concept of dialogue between the psychotic and non‐psychotic parts of the mind).     

Jules Verne's Journey to the Centre of the Earth: The Secret of Counterdepressive Narratives1

The author interprets Jules Verne's Journey to the centre of the Earth with the help of Matte Blanco's theoretical framework, which describes the principle of symmetry and the principle of generalization. The fi rst states that, from the moment an element or a proposition becomes conscious, it coexists in the unconscious with its symmetrically opposite form. The second refers to the confusion of elements once they have been apprehended by thought as containing a common point; they are put into larger and larger groups which merge into an indivisible whole. Verne's novel is built on paired elements which become symmetrized (e.g. distinct minerals vs molten lava; scientifi c rationality vs madness; the living vs the dead, etc.). These elements in turn become confused with one another, thanks largely to the novel's atmosphere of oral incorporation. This allows the fusion between subject and object, and, in particular, between the orphaned hero and his dead (Earth) mother. The novel's narrative evolution through three stages (separation, fusion and de‐fusion, which are paralleled by rational, irrational and rational thought) can thus be understood as a mourning process. Similar processes can be found in other literary works.     

Is the Self other to the self? Why does the numinosum feel like another? The relevance of Matte Blanco to our understanding of the unconscious

Using Ignacio Matte Blanco’s approach to the unconscious, this paper attempts to explain why the experience of the Self or the unconscious, for example in dreams, is difficult for the ego to understand. Matte Blanco believes that the logic of the unconscious is radically different from the logic of consciousness. The unconscious uses processes that Matte Blanco refers to as symmetry and generalization. Symmetry means that the converse of any relationship is identical to it, so that asymmetrical relationships are treated as if they were symmetrical. Generalization means that the unconscious treats any object as belonging to a larger class of objects that is a subset of an even larger class which is in turn a subset of a wider class ad infinitum. Hence Matte Blanco’s idea of the unconscious as infinite sets. These unconscious mechanisms, combined with the possibility that the unconscious has more dimensions than consciousness, contribute to the difficulty of understanding dreams, and help to explain why the Self is experienced as other to the ego.     

The four antinomies of the death instinct1

Matte Blanco examines four paradoxical positions that arise out of Freud's writings on the death instinct. He notes that death is not a content known to the unconscious. Furthermore, the absence of time and space in the unconscious means that the conditions necessary for any process such as instinct are similarly absent. Matte Blanco demonstrates the way in which the antinomies that he explores can be explained in terms of the logics that obtain in the unconscious, and he suggests that the concept of the death instinct is one of the most profound expressions of the relationship between the modes that underlie conscious and unconscious logic.     

Truth holds as such only if we do not torment it

Abstract

Christopher Bollas: Being a Character: Psycho-analysis and Self Experience. London: Routledge, 1993.

“Unconscious Logic. An Introduction to Matte Blanco's Bi-Logic and its Uses” by Eric Rayner. London: Routledge 1995.     

The Rise of the Machines: Deleuze's Flight from Structuralism

In this paper, I offer an account of the conceptual shift that occurs between the work completed by Gilles Deleuze prior to 1969 and his later work with Félix Guattari, beginning in 1972 with Anti‐Oedipus. Against previous interpretations, which have concentrated on the developments initiated by Deleuze, I argue for the primary importance of Guattari's influence, especially his insistence on a theory of “machinic processes.” The importance of these processes is made manifest in Deleuze and Guattari's move away from theories of structuralism. In order to carry out this task, I offer a close reading of Guattari's essay “Machine and Structure.” This essay was first written as a review of Deleuze's acclaimed work in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense and formed the basis for Deleuze and Guattari's first meeting. In the concluding sections of the paper, I show how the integration of the concept of the machine allows Deleuze and Guattari to develop a theory of the unconscious that operates outside of the boundaries traditionally set by structuralist analysis.     

The Most Human of All People

This is a meditation upon a puzzling incident of unconscious communication involving a remark of Harry Stack Sullivan's. The essay explores some of Sullivan's views on unconscious communication and the nature of client pathology and then relates them to the theoretical issue of whether (as Hanna and others have recently contended) therapists ought aim at helping clients construct a complex intersubjective reality, rather than hierarchically offering to replace client's views with the therapist's truth. Relying upon the work of Searles, Casement, and Schafer, I side cautiously with the intersubjectivist position, while acknowledging its potential romanticism and concomitant dangers of sentimentality and irrationalism.     

Accessibility of the subliminal mind: Transcendence vs. immanence

It has long been taken for granted in modern psychology that access to the unconscious is indirectly gained through the interpretation of a trained psychoanalyst, evident in theories of Freud, Jung and others. However, my essay problematizes this very indirectness of access by bringing in a Yogācāra Buddhist formulation of the subliminal mind that offers a direct access. By probing into the philosophical significance of the subliminal mind along the bias of its access, I will argue that the different views of the subliminal consciousness correspond to different models of “transcendence” and “immanence.” We will see that the involvement of the transcendence principle in Freud’s and Jung’s conceptualizations of the unconscious results in the denial of direct access to the unconscious; only the Buddhist immanence-based formulation provides direct access. This East-West comparative approach is an attempt to examine how different models of reasoning, vis-à-vis transcendence and immanence, can lead to drastically different theories as well as the practices they instruct.     

On Musical Cognition and Archaic Meaning Schemata

In clinical psychoanalytic work, one often encounters psychical material that is devoid of form or shape. This kind of material is often manifest as concrete somatic sensations on the border of the body and mind. At the same time, it is a primitive body-related self-experience that functions as a background, an essential requirement for more developed, differentiated self-experiences. Bi-logic is a theoretical method by which one can outline these early, partially formless processes and states of mind. This paper includes an overview of the main hypotheses of Matte Blanco's bi-logical vertex, which focuses on the extreme symmetrization of mental phenomena that emanate from the body. Clinical vignettes illustrate ways in which analysis can gradually bring forth such form from the previously formless, dissociated traumatic material into the range of the conscious mind. In this way, the capacity for thinking and reflection increases and the early elements of self-experience are enlivened.     

A Loss of Judgment: The Dismissal of the Judicial Conscience in Recent Christian Ethics

Christian ethicists have neglected conscience, understood as an individual's moral self‐awareness before a locus of accountability and judgment, over the last few decades. The aim of this essay is to suggest how this neglect came about. I draw on the work of Paul Lehmann and Oliver O'Donovan to illustrate how ethicists in the twentieth century became suspicious of conscience because of its association with the alleged ahistorical individualism of Immanuel Kant's work. I argue that a social‐historicist conception of conscience, such as H. Richard Niebuhr offered, attempts to save conscience from this suspicion. Ironically, however, Stanley Hauerwas's development of Niebuhr's historicist, communitarian approach to conscience, appears to have led to a dismissal of conscience. I conclude with a brief comment about what this dismissal has cost contemporary Christian ethics, namely the Christian tradition's basic commitment to the singularity of an individual's accountability before God.     

Toward a ‘Catholic’ Reading of Kierkegaard

Historically, some Catholic readers have been suspicious of Kierkegaard's writings; viewing him as an irrational Protestant irreconcilably at odds with Catholic thought. Nevertheless, the unexpected yet favorable mention of Kierkegaard in John Paul II's Fides et Ratio is an indication that Kierkegaard's writings are not so easily dismissed. One may be justified in asking: what account can be given to explain such a shift in how the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard changes from a polemical rejection to a papal endorsement during the 20th century? In this review essay, I will explore some recent Kierkegaard research that provides – or at least, provides some of the groundwork for – a positive ‘Catholic’ reading of Kierkegaard. Space does not permit an exhaustive exposition of each book, so I will highlight the salient features of each to underscore a new trend that is emerging in Kierkegaard studies.     

The Analyst's Anticipatory Fantasies: Aid and Obstacle to the Patient's Self-Integration

In this paper I explore instances of enactment related to the analyst's feelings and fantasies about how analysis will proceed. As I discuss a patient who was developing a new capacity to experience conflict, I explore how the analyst's fantasies about the impact of his interpretations may be utilized in helping him to elaborate and understand the patient's unconscious fantasies and identifications and unintegrated feeling states. In so doing, we sometimes discover how we are unwittingly influencing or avoiding understanding our patient's own version of their psychic catastrophe. As we develop language where there was previously no integrative language for the patient's internalized and interactive version of catastrophe, we always project particular kinds of expectations into the therapeutic situation.     

A word about words

The title of my paper comes from an essay by Václav Havel. In his essay, Havel addressed most evocatively the question of the unique power of words for thinking and to influence, for good or for harm, as well as to inform and to educate. As analysts our medium is the word. I suggest that it is of inestimable importance that we are able to listen deeply to our patients' words and to be aware of our own. The quality of our ability to think deeply and consistently about the unconscious experience of our patient is intimately related to our ability to hear what is being said. The effect of our own words upon the patient likewise cannot be overstated. I offer my reflections on words in the analytic relationship and I give some clinical examples that I hope will illustrate my thoughts as to the power and the importance of what and how we hear and of what we say.     

Kant's Synthetic and Analytic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Distinction between Philosophical and Mathematical Syntheses

This article addresses Kant's distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method in philosophy. I will first consider how some commentators have accounted for Kant's distinction and analyze some passages in which Kant defined the analytic and the synthetic method. I will suggest that confusion about Kant's distinction arises because he uses it in at least two different senses. I will then identify a specific way in which Kant accounts for this distinction when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical syntheses. I will examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind. I will evaluate if he uses the analytic or the synthetic method and if the synthetic method is able to identify, without a previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our knowledge.     

Reply to Commentaries

Questions of historical context resonate with an Independent view of the importance of history. The historical backgrounds of North American and British psychoanalysis are relevant. Some American analysts may be seen as belonging to the Independent tradition, and the relation between Independent analysis in Britain and Relational analysis in America needs further consideration. I ask how far Relational analysis is taking on an institutional identity, and link this to Poland's discussion of “outsiderness.” Responding to Bass's and Berman's comments on my clinical examples I discuss why I sometimes do think analysts need to ascribe meaning to a patient's material. In other instances an analyst will invite the patient more into the process by which meaning evolves between them. To move freely between these positions is central to my view of clinical technique. I express doubts about analysts asking patients for their emotional reaction to an analyst's interventions. This risks being intrusive, and may tend to keep the exchange at the conscious level of a patient's mind. The analytic relationship is an interpersonal one between real people, but the analyst needs also to remain symbolically available as an object of unconscious fantasy and projection.     

A mismatch of meaning and intentionality between analyst and analysand

In this paper, I will consider a type of misunderstanding in the analytical dialogue and the possible unconscious motivations underlying this. I will also make reference to the patient's use of the analyst's words for the purpose of narcissistic enactment and will explore the extent of the analyst's involvement in this. The subjects of misunderstanding and narcissistic enactment will be dealt with in relation to a patient's way of processing certain interpretations at the beginning of analysis and the concealment of her way of processing the analyst's words. By contributing dreams and other significant material in the sessions, the patient gradually revealed her phantasies which enabled the analyst to uncover the possible factors which determined her particular attribution of meaning to the analyst's words and her retention of information about how she had initially construed his interpretations.