Mechanisms of theory formation in young children

Research suggests that by the age of five, children have extensive causal knowledge, in the form of intuitive theories. The crucial question for developmental cognitive science is how young children are able to learn causal structure from evidence. Recently, researchers in computer science and statistics have developed representations (causal Bayes nets) and learning algorithms to infer causal structure from evidence. Here we explore evidence suggesting that infants and children have the prerequisites for making causal inferences consistent with causal Bayes net learning algorithms. Specifically, we look at infants and children's ability to learn from evidence in the form of conditional probabilities, interventions and combinations of the two.     

"If only…": when counterfactual thoughts can reduce illusions of personal authorship

Illusions of personal authorship can arise when causation for an event is ambiguous, but people mentally represent an anticipated outcome and then observe a corresponding match in reality. When people do not maintain such high-level outcome representations and focus instead on low-level behavioral representations of concrete actions, illusions of personal authorship can be reduced. One condition that yields specific action plans and thereby moves focus from high-level outcomes to low-level actions is the generation of counterfactual thoughts. Hence, in the present research we tested whether thinking counterfactually can reduce illusory authorship. In line with predictions, generating behavior-regulating counterfactuals reduced susceptibility to the illusion (Study 1). Importantly, this only occurred when people expected to re-encounter the situation to which the counterfactuals applied (Study 2). These findings extend existing research on the boundary conditions of illusory experiences of personal authorship and might hint at a relationship between the illusion and behavior regulation.     

The causal psycho-logic of choice

Choices do not merely identify one option among a set of possibilities; choosing is an intervention, an action that changes the world. As a result, good decision making generally requires a model specifying how actions are causally related to outcomes. Interventions license different inferences than observations because an event whose state has been determined by intervention is not diagnostic of the normal causes of that event. We integrate these ideas into a causal framework for decision making based on causal Bayes nets theory, and suggest that deliberate decision making is based on simplified causal models and imaginary interventions. The framework is consistent with what we know so far about how people make decisions.     

"If only I had done better": Perfectionism and the functionality of counterfactual thinking

Although a recent update on the functional theory of counterfactual thinking suggests that counterfactuals are important for behavior regulation, there is some evidence that counterfactuals may not be functional for everyone. Two studies found differences between maladaptive and high personal standards perfectionism in the functionality of counterfactuals and variables relevant to behavior regulation. Maladaptive but not personal standards perfectionism predicted making more upward counterfactuals after recalling a negative event and was linked to a variety of negative markers of achievement. Maladaptive perfectionism was associated with making controllable, subtractive, and less specific counterfactuals. High personal standards perfectionism moderated the effects of maladaptive perfectionism on counterfactual controllability. Generating counterfactuals increased motivation for personal standards perfectionists relative to a noncounterfactual control group but had no effect on motivation for maladaptive perfectionists. The findings suggest a continuum of counterfactual functionality for perfectionists and highlight the importance of considering counterfactual specificity and structure.     

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's ( 2003 ) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.     

Lowe's Argument Against the Psychoneural Token Identity Thesis

E. J. Lowe argues that the mental event token cannot be identical to the complex neural event token for they have different counterfactual properties. If the mental event had not occurred, the behavior would not have ensued, while if the neural event had not occurred, the behavior would have ensued albeit slightly differently. Lowe's argument for the neural counterfactual relies on standard possible world semantics, whose evaluation of such counterfactuals is problematic. His argument for the mental counterfactual relies on a premise that is plausibly false. My arguments support other counterfactuals, which are consistent with identity theories.     

Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as

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Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals

The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.     

Counterfactuals and Historical Possibility

We show that truth conditions for counterfactuals need not always be given in terms of a vague notion of similarity. To this end, we single out the important class of historical counterfactuals and give formally rigorous truth conditions for these counterfactuals, employing a partial ordering relation called “comparative closeness” that is defined in the framework of branching space-times. Among other applications, we provide a detailed analysis of counterfactuals uttered in the context of lost bets. In an appendix we compare our theory with the branching space-times based reading of counterfactuals recently proposed by Belnap.     

Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning

In this paper, it is argued that single function dual process theory is a more credible psychological account of non-monotonicity in human conditional reasoning than recent attempts to apply logic programming (LP) approaches in artificial intelligence to these data. LP is introduced and among other critiques, it is argued that it is psychologically unrealistic in a similar way to hash coding in the classicism vs. connectionism debate. Second, it is argued that causal Bayes nets provide a framework for modelling probabilistic conditional inference in System 2 that can deal with patterns of inference LP cannot. Third, we offer some speculations on how the cognitive system may avoid problems for System 1 identified by Fodor in 1983. We conclude that while many problems remain, the probabilistic single function dual processing theory is to be preferred over LP as an account of the non-monotonicity of human reasoning.     

The laws of modality

Philosophical Studies - Nomic realists have traditionally put laws to work within a theory of natural modality, in order to provide a metaphysical source for causal necessitation, counterfactuals,...     

Decisions about a crime: downward and upward counterfactuals

Deciding about people’s responsibility, intentions and need for punishment is particularly hard and it may be often associated with counterfactual thinking, which refers to the creation of mental alternatives to actual events. Ninety-three participants were asked to generate downward or upward counterfactuals regarding a given criminal event and, then, to give judgments about defendant’s predictability, responsibility, intentionality and punishment. Results showed that downward counterfactuals had led people to judge the event less intentional, the defendant less responsible and, therefore, to give him a less severe punishment (vice versa for upward). The relationship between counterfactuals and intentionality judgments was partially mediated by the perceived defendant’s predictability of the negative outcomes. Finally, downward counterfactuals were linked to a greater focus on the context (external factors), whereas upward counterfactuals on the defendant/victim’s behaviours (internal factors). Findings were discussed considering both theoretical decision-making models and applications on the judicial field.     

The effects of counterfactual defences on social judgements

Research on counterfactuals (‘If only…’) has seldom considered the effects of counterfactual communication, especially in a defensive context. In three studies, we investigated the effects of counterfactual defences employed by politicians. We assumed that self‐focused upward counterfactuals (‘If only I…, the outcome would have been better’) are a form of concession, other‐focused upward counterfactuals (‘If only they…, the outcome would have been better’) are a form of excuse, and self‐focused downward counterfactuals (‘If only I…, the outcome would have been worse’) are a form of justification. In Study 1, a counterfactual defence led to a more positive evaluation of the politician than a corresponding factual defence. Of the two types of defence, the counterfactual defence reduced the extent to which the politician was held responsible for the past event and was perceived as more convincing. In Study 2, counterfactual excuse and counterfactual justification were equally effective and led to a more positive evaluation of the politician than counterfactual concession. In Study 3, the higher effectiveness of counterfactual justification was independent from perceived ideological similarity with the politician, supporting the strength of this defence. These results show that counterfactual defences provide subtle communication strategies that effectively influence social judgements. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Impossible Worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds‐based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds‐based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources.     

A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets

The authors outline a cognitive and computational account of causal learning in children. They propose that children use specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate "causal map" of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or Bayes nets. Children's causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children construct new causal maps and that their learning is consistent with the Bayes net formalism.     

违实语义的加工机制

违实句(counterfactuals)是传递与事实相反意义的语句,广泛存在于人们的日常生活中并被用以表达对已知事实的另外假设。研究发现,相对于事实语义,违实语义能够激活双重心理表征/空间(虚拟vs.现实),需消耗更多的认知加工资源。本文分别从句法结构和语境制约两个层面详细探讨了违实语义的加工机制。语境方面,双重语义表征构建与消解的时间进程受到语境相关性的制约,充足的语境信息可以消解事实表征的干扰。句法方面,汉语违实标记的缺失使得汉语母语者更加依赖语境与语用来表达、理解违实义,但尚不明确其在线加工机制与印欧语违实义加工有何异同。后续研究应扩大语言研究范围,关注违实语义加工的个体差异,进一步厘清双重语义表征构建与消解的时间进程及其对语篇加工的影响。     

Counterfactual and semifactual conditionals prime alternative possibilities

The authors examined in 3 experiments the comprehension of counterfactuals, such as "If it had rained, the plants would have bloomed," and semifactuals, such as "Even if it had rained, the plants would have bloomed," compared with indicative conditionals, "If it rained, the plants bloomed." The first experiment showed that people read the negative conjunction, "not p and not q" faster when it was primed by a counterfactual than when it was primed by an indicative conditional. They read the affirmative conjunction, "p and q" equally quickly when it was primed by either conditional. The 2nd experiment showed that people read the negated-antecedent conjunction, "not p and q" faster when it was primed by a semifactual conditional. The 3rd experiment corroborated these results in a direct comparison of counterfactuals and semifactuals. The authors discuss the implications of the results for the mental representations of different conditionals.     

Looking on the bright side: downward counterfactual thinking in response to negative life events

Past research has found that downward counterfactual thoughts are rarely generated in response to negative life events. However, the authors suggest that under conditions in which self-enhancement motives are prominent, downward counterfactuals will be more frequent than upward counterfactuals. When motives were explicitly manipulated (Study 1), people generated more downward counterfactuals in the self-enhancement than in the self-improvement and control conditions. In Study 2, among those chronically more motivated to self-enhance (i.e., European Canadians), a manipulation of event severity led to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals. This finding was mediated by the desire for self-enhancement. In Study 3, cultural background and the opportunity for self-affirmation were related to the generation of downward counterfactuals in expected ways. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Episodic counterfactual thoughts—imagined alternative ways in which personal past events might have occurred—are frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here, participants recollected positive and negative autobiographical memories and then generated better and worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories. Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event is significantly higher than but typically positively related to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual events heightened the emotional intensity felt while simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the emotional intensity accompanying the experience of remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are discussed in relation to clinical work and functional theories of counterfactual thinking.