Three Facets Of Consciousness

Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distinction in ontology among the form,appearance, and substrate of any entity. Applying this three-facet ontology toconsciousness, we distinguish: the intentionality of consciousness (its form),the way we experience consciousness (its appearance, including so-called qualia),and the physical, biological, and cultural basis of consciousness (its substrate).We can thus show how these very different aspects of consciousness fit togetherin a fundamental ontology. And we can thereby define the proper domains ofphenomenology and other disciplinesthat contribute to our understanding of consciousness.     

Time as Process and Ground: Temporality Is Not Content

This appreciative response to the commentaries clarifies the plastic quality of temporality, at the core of consciousness. Efforts to represent “it” will always remain elusive. This approach brings phenomenological philosophy to bear to broaden the usual psychoanalytic emphasis on content in the direction of core processes of consciousness that are not usually observed.     

Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness

The view that the fetus' potential for human consciousness confers upon it the right to life has been widely criticised on the basis that the notion of potentiality is so vague as to be meaningless, and on the basis that actual rights cannot be deduced from the mere potential for personhood. It has also been criticised, although less commonly, on the basis that it is not the potential to assume consciousness, but rather the potential to resume consciousness which is morally significant, and on the basis that the fetus does not really possess the potential for consciousness. In response, I argue that these criticisms are mistaken and that the potential for human consciousness is a sufficient condition not simply of potential, but actual, personhood. Since it possesses this potential from the moment of conception, the fetus should be considered an actual person from the moment of its conception.     

Theoretical,and epistemological challenges in scientific investigations of complex emotional states in animals

This review brings to light critical epistemological and theoretical considerations when studying complex emotional states in animals. We discuss anthropomorphic and Umwelt perspectives of nonhuman animals and the ways in which distinct theories of consciousness and neural processing may restrict the potential for the development of knowledge on the topic. Within the same line of argumentation, we consider influences of the debate between monism and dualism and psychology’s behaviorism and cognitive theories. Finally, we contrast the affective consciousness, higher-order emotional consciousness, and constructed emotion theories to further our understanding of complex emotional states in animals.     

Entheogens in the Study of Religious Experiences: Current Status*

This article addresses the potential significance of archetypal and mystical experiences sometimes reported when entheogens are employed in supportive, legal research contexts. This area of research, which has been difficult to pursue in recent decades due to Federal legislation and concerns about drug-abuse, is presented as a frontier in the psychology of religious experience that could prove to have profound implications for advancing our understanding of spiritual dimensions of consciousness. Consideration is given to how the action of entheogens may be understood, the question of experiential validity, the apparent universality of both archetypal and mystical experiences, and initial theological reflections.     

Neuroimaging and disorders of consciousness: envisioning an ethical research agenda

The application of neuroimaging technology to the study of the injured brain has transformed how neuroscientists understand disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states, and deepened our understanding of mechanisms of recovery. This scientific progress, and its potential clinical translation, provides an opportunity for ethical reflection. It was against this scientific backdrop that we convened a conference of leading investigators in neuroimaging, disorders of consciousness and neuroethics. Our goal was to develop an ethical frame to move these investigative techniques into mature clinical tools. This paper presents the recommendations and analysis of a Working Meeting on Ethics, Neuroimaging and Limited States of Consciousness held at Stanford University during June 2007. It represents an interdisciplinary approach to the challenges posed by the emerging use of neuroimaging technologies to describe and characterize disorders of consciousness.     

The irrelevance of folk intuitions to the "hard problem" of consciousness

Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system - System One - that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.     

Paradoxical effects of thought suppression

In a first experiment, subjects verbalizing the stream of consciousness for a 5-min period were asked to try not to think of a white bear, but to ring a bell in case they did. As indicated both by mentions and by bell rings, they were unable to suppress the thought as instructed. On being asked after this suppression task to think about the white bear for a 5-min period, these subjects showed significantly more tokens of thought about the bear than did subjects who were asked to think about a white bear from the outset. These observations suggest that attempted thought suppression has paradoxical effects as a self-control strategy, perhaps even producing the very obsession or preoccupation that it is directed against. A second experiment replicated these findings and showed that subjects given a specific thought to use as a distracter during suppression were less likely to exhibit later preoccupation with the thought to be suppressed.     

Change blindness: past, present, and future

Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements to help separate them. In doing so, we clarify the genuine contributions of change blindness research to our understanding of visual perception and awareness, and provide a glimpse of some ways in which change blindness might shape future research.     

The relationship between consciousness,understanding, and rationality

The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from (1) the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (2) the fact that conscious access appears to involve the selective routing/broadcasting of representational content to neural systems that integrate information in order to select cognitive/behavioral intentions in conjunction with goals. Based on these premises I illustrate how a disruption to the rationality of a representation’s influence on intention formation (when it becomes consciously accessible) would also remove any evidence that a person was conscious of the content of that representation. I therefore suggest that conscious content (and associated phenomenology) may be determined by the rational, content-appropriate influences an accessed representation has on intention formation (i.e., the influences associated with understanding). I conclude by offering replies to several potential objections to this thesis.     

Jungian dialogism and the problem of depth

Notions of dialogical inquiry and of the dialogical self have become increasingly influential in contemporary psychology in response to the limitations of the traditional view of monologically encapsulated and radically disengaged consciousness. Conceptions of self and inquiry as intrinsically embedded in and constituted by our shared life with others seem to do better justice to the richly interconnected character of contemporary life. At the same time, our highly interconnected global world has also tended to foster a flattening of cultural and inter‐cultural horizons that undermines dialogical engagement in any deeply meaningful sense. What is needed is to enrich current conceptions of dialogue with an understanding of experiential and cultural depth. This paper seeks an understanding of the depth dimensions of dialogue through an engagement of dialogical self theory with Jungian dialogical thought. Critical to this engagement is to appreciate the expressive potential of Jungian dialogism beyond Jung's theoretical claims about dialogue.     

BEING AND DOING: AN INQUIRY INTO THE COLONIZATION,DECOLONIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ITS STATE,Marcus Raskin

The emerging planetary culture is viewed from an autobiographical perspective. The author discusses the importance of complex thought (Morin) and the notions of gylany and partnership (Eisler) to address the need to develop a heterogeneous, diverse context which supports creativity and mutually beneficial relations. Systems‐theoretical and feminist approaches are brought to bear on the need to develop an ecology of creativity, which focuses not simply on individual genius but on the potential for creative collaboration. Ecological concerns are viewed in the context of our understanding of gender, creativity and progress.     

CHRISTIANITY,SCIENCE, AND THREE PHASES OF BEING HUMAN

The alleged conflict between religion and science most pointedly focuses on what it is to be human. Western philosophical thought regarding this has progressed through three broad stages: mind/body dualism, Neo‐Darwinism, and most recently strong artificial intelligence (AI). I trace these views with respect to their relation to Christian views of humans, suggesting that while the first two might be compatible with Christian thought, strong AI presents serious challenges to a Christian understanding of personhood, including our freedom to choose, moral choice itself, self‐consciousness, and the relevance of God to our beginning, being, and ending.     

Consciousness or the Physical Universe – Which Came First?

Historically, many have seen the intelligibility of the physical universe as showing that it is somehow ultimately dependent upon conscious intelligent pre‐existing being – ‘God’. Today, however, many believe that modern advances in our scientific understanding of the origins and nature of the universe, and of the conscious intelligent beings it contains, render God, as Laplace said, an ‘unnecessary hypothesis’. This article considers whether the findings of modern science do indeed diminish the plausibility of belief in a creator God. Or, on the contrary, whether there are features of current scientific understanding which may reasonably be thought to support the belief that conscious intelligent being pre‐existed the physical universe and caused it to be. In short: can science reasonably be thought to support the view that consciousness created the physical universe rather than that the physical universe created consciousness?     

A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives

Abstract

Characterizing the first- and third-person perspectives is essential to the study of consciousness, yet we lack a rigorous definition of or criteria for these two perspectives. Our intuitive understanding of how personal pronouns help to specify the perspectives gives rise to mutually exclusive notions of the first-person perspective. This contradiction thwarts our progress in studying consciousness. We can resolve the current ambiguity of the first-person perspective by introducing a new distinction between the first-person and third-person perspectives, based on two modes of consciousness: reflective and non-reflective. The purpose of this paper is to explain this new proposal, to elucidate the grounds for it, and to briefly suggest benefits from its use.     

A passion of the soul: an introduction to pain for consciousness researchers

Pain is an important focus for consciousness research because it is an avenue for exploring somatic awareness, emotion, and the genesis of subjectivity. In principle, pain is awareness of tissue trauma, but pain can occur in the absence of identifiable injury, and sometimes substantive tissue injury produces no pain. The purpose of this paper is to help bridge pain research and consciousness studies. It reviews the basic sensory neurophysiology associated with tissue injury, including transduction, transmission, modulation, and central representation. In addition, it highlights the central mechanisms for the emotional aspects of pain, demonstrating the physiological link between tissue trauma and mechanisms of emotional arousal. Finally, we discuss several current issues in the field of pain research that bear on central issues in consciousness studies, such as sickness and sense of self.     

Why using “consciousness” in psychotherapy? Insight,metacognition and self-consciousness

Since its early development, clinical psychology has questioned the impact of “consciousness” on the determination of human responsibility across psychiatric disorders. In recent years, specific clinical approaches have focused on “consciousness” work that could play a key role in psychotherapy. We focused our research on clinical psychology's consciousness-related concepts of insight, self-consciousness, and metacognition. Insight and metacognition, for example, have prompted increased interest in schizophrenia (SZ), bipolar disorder (BD), and, more recently, borderline personality disorder (BPD) treatments as representative of the latest advances in the cognitive and behavioral therapy field. Here we review cognitive, social, and clinical psychology research measuring “consciousness” in BPD, SZ, and BD, exploring the implications of different conceptualizations of consciousness-like concepts for treatment adherence, symptom evolution, and related aspects of psychotherapy. Our results show the overall relevance of using measures of clinical and cognitive insight, emphasizing the more central role of cognitive insight and metacognition in psychotherapy, as it appears that consciousness can remain useful if understood as a cognitive skill. The inclusion of a conceptualization of self-consciousness is important in order to address the social component of psychotherapy, as it does in biopsychosocial approaches. We discuss the implications of such results for global efficacy, for the relevance of the “consciousness” concept to clinical psychology, and for the potential need to keep operationalizing different conceptualizations of it in psychotherapy. We open the debate on the definition of consciousness to motivational aspects of change and to general considerations of both legal and ethical aspects.     

冲突适应独立于意识：来自行为和ERP的证据

尽管已有研究发现诸如抑制控制和任务转换等认知控制功能独立于意识, 但是对冲突适应是否需要意识的参与目前还存在激烈的争论。为了进一步探讨此问题, 本研究记录了18名被试在完成箭头偏对比掩蔽任务(meta-contrast masking task)时的行为和脑电数据。结果显示, 在有意识和无意识条件下在反应时和额中N2和中顶P3波幅上均表现出了显著的冲突适应效应。这不仅表明冲突控制独立于意识, 而且也表明先前无意识经验对人类信息加工系统的适应性调节作用。本研究对认识认知控制和意识的本质具有重要意义, 也为建构认知控制与意识关系的理论提供了启示。     

Consciousness and identity: who do we think we are?

This article proposes that the epistemological concerns raised by the inherent incoherence of thought requires a dialogical approach to understanding consciousness and identity. It is argued that such an approach leads to (a) a fundamentally spiritual view of self, (b) a radical view of consciousness as a non-local field that shapes the limits of our perception, and (c) a determination of the degree of gap between reality and thought's representation of it. A method of measuring this kind of consciousness is examined, and examples of insights gained through this methodology are provided. Implications of this perspective are explored, and conclusions arising from this inquiry are presented.     

Freud's divided heart and Saraha's cure

This paper has three aims: first, to redeem some of Freud's most fundamental insights, so courageous and revolutionary that they were not even entirely appealing and intelligible to Freud himself; not understanding their teacher, Freud's disciples systematically distorted or suppressed his boldest speculations. By concentrating on an early Buddhist text of great profundity it is hoped to push our understanding of Freud beyond Freud himself. The exotic nature of this text makes it an especially powerful instrument for cutting through the conservatism and resistance of venerable Freudian doctrine; secondly, to make more accessible a text which will encourage Western thinkers to do some serious thinking in the Buddhist way; and thirdly to examine the relationship between id and ego; it is shown why and how the egological construction (ego/superego) blocks the spontaneity of libidinal fulfillment. The role of representation in time‐consciousness is also explored.