Semantics,experience and time

The computational hypothesis, with its inherent representationalism, and the dynamical hypothesis, with its apparent absence of representations and its commitment to continuous time, stand at an impasse. It is unclear how the dynamical stance can handle representational thought, or how computationalism can deal effectively with a tightly coupled, reciprocally causative agent–environment system in continuous transformation. Underlying this dilemma is the complex relation of mind to time, a relation encoded in the word experience. We must ask if any hypothesis describes a ‘device’ capable of experience? Yet what is an intelligence and its thought without experience? Is a computational device, whether supporting a symbolic processor or connectionist net, intrinsically condemned to a zero degree of experience? What is required of a dynamical device? It is argued here that ‘semantic’ intelligence and thought rests upon experience, fundamentally upon the invariance laws defined over time within conscious perception. The structure of experience is intrinsically unavailable to the computational device, limiting it to a ‘syntactic’ intelligence. An alternative conception of a device is offered, based on Bergson conjoined with Gibson, which supports the qualitative and structural aspects of experience and the semantic. It frames a dynamical model of perception and memory in which invariance laws are intrinsic, creates a deeper notion of situatedness, and supports a concept of semantically based, representative thought founded upon perception.     

Logical dynamics of belief change in the community

In this paper we explore the relationship between norms of belief revision that may be adopted by members of a community and the resulting dynamic properties of the distribution of beliefs across that community. We show that at a qualitative level many aspects of social belief change can be obtained from a very simple model, which we call ‘threshold influence’. In particular, we focus on the question of what makes the beliefs of a community stable under various dynamical situations. We also consider refinements and alternatives to the ‘threshold’ model, the most significant of which is to consider changes to plausibility judgements rather than mere beliefs. We show first that some such change is mandated by difficult problems with belief-based dynamics related to the need to decide on an order in which different beliefs are considered. Secondly, we show that the resulting plausibility-based account results in a deterministic dynamical system that is non-deterministic at the level of beliefs.     

Functions and Mechanisms in Structural-Modelling Explanations

One way social scientists explain phenomena is by building structural models. These models are explanatory insofar as they manage to perform a recursive decomposition on an initial multivariate probability distribution, which can be interpreted as a mechanism. Explanations in social sciences share important aspects that have been highlighted in the mechanisms literature. Notably, spelling out the functioning the mechanism gives it explanatory power. Thus social scientists should choose the variables to include in the model on the basis of their function in the mechanism. This paper examines the notion of ‘function’ within structural modelling. We argue that ‘functions’ ought to be understood as the theoretical underpinnings of the causes, namely as the role that causes play in the functioning of the mechanism.     

The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction

There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature of embodiment. To illustrate the explanatory potential of this approach, we replicate an agent-based model of embodied social interaction. An analysis of the model demonstrates that the extended body can be explained in terms of mutual dynamical entanglement: inter-bodily resonance between individuals can give rise to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioral capacities of isolated individuals by modulating their intra-bodily conditions of behavior generation.     

Where grounding and causation part ways: comments on Schaffer

Does the notion of ground, as it has recently been employed by metaphysicians, point to a single unified phenomenon (the “Unity Hypothesis”)? Jonathan Schaffer holds that the phenomenon of grounding exhibits the unity characteristic of a single genus. In defense of this hypothesis, Schaffer proposes to take seriously the analogy between causation and grounding. More specifically, Schaffer argues that both grounding and causation are best approached through a single formalism, viz., that utilized by structural equation models of causation. In this paper, I present several concerns which suggest that the structural equation model does not transfer as smoothly from the case of causation to the case of grounding as Schaffer would have us believe. If it can in fact be shown that significant differences surface in how the formalism in question applies to the two types of phenomena in question, Schaffer’s attempt at establishing an analogy between grounding and causation has thereby been weakened and, as a result, the application of the Unity Hypothesis to the case of grounding once again stands in need of justification.     

Projective identification: A theoretical investigation of the concept starting from ’Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’1

This paper submits passages from four papers‐‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’ (Klein); ‘On identification’ (Klein); ‘Analysis of a schizophrenic state with depersonalization’ (Rosenfeld); and ‘Remarks on the relation of male homosexuality to paranoia, paranoid anxiety and narcissism’ (Rosenfeld)‐to a critical reading, enabling the theoretical premises which have produced the current, differing views on projective identification to be traced. These views revolve both around the role assigned to identification in the process and around the meaning of the expression‘to identify oneself with’ which in ‘On identification’ goes from ‘to feel similar to, or identical to the other’ to ‘to take another person as a model’. This legitimizes the inclusion of very different phenomena into the concept of projective identification. The author describes some uses of the term ‘projective identification’ and proposes the hypothesis that the process constitutes a way for managing otherness and the separateness of the object (be it external or internal, real or imaginary) that can compromise its reality to a greater or lesser degree. Covering a large set of phenomena, the author poses the question of whether it is useful to retain the term ‘projective identification’. She proposes an answer in the last part of the paper.     

An existential-phenomenological perspective on the concept of ‘resistance’ in counselling and psychotherapy

The various phenomena that are categrised under the label of ‘Resistance’ are of central concern to most models of counselling and psychotherapy. The manner in which resistance is conceptualised has vital implications for therapists approach to the therapeutic relationship. The theory of resistance in classical Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (and particularly Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy) is examined and then compared to the radical reinterpretation possible in an Existential-Phenomenoogical perspective which promotes the rejection of the role of ‘therapist as expert change agent’.     

From embodied to socially embedded agents – Implications for interaction-aware robots

First, this article proposes a minimal definition of embodiment that can be applied across animals and artefacts. We discuss the potential contributions of this operational definition with respect to assessing and measuring the degree of embodiment in different biological and artificial systems. Second, we outline how this definition can be extended to lead to the particular notion of social embeddedness. Socially embedded agents are structurally coupled with their social environment, in that their sensorimotor activity is grounded in the social environment that the agent is surrounded by. Lastly, based on research in the social sciences on human–human interaction, we discuss perceptual requirements for interaction-aware robotic agents—agents whose identification and interpretation of the (social) environment is facilitated by awareness of the structure of agent–agent interactions (including humans ‘in the loop’). We suggest relevant concepts and heuristics that can contribute to studies of degrees of embodiment of robots that interact with social environments. Manipulating and systematically investigating these heuristics permits variation of the degree of embodiment of such interaction-aware robots.     

Autonomous recovery from hostile code insertion using distributed reflection

In a hostile environment, an autonomous cognitive system requires a reflective capability to detect problems in its own operation and recover from them without external intervention. We present an architecture in which reflection is distributed so that components mutually observe and protect each other, and where the system has a distributed model of all its components, including those concerned with the reflection itself. Some reflective (or ‘meta-level’) components enable the system to monitor its execution traces and detect anomalies by comparing them with a model of normal activity. Other components monitor ‘quality’ of performance in the application domain. Implementation in a simple virtual world shows that the system can recover from certain kinds of hostile code attacks that cause it to make wrong decisions in its application domain, even if some of its self-monitoring components are also disabled.     

Applying Science and Applied Science: What’s the Difference?

Prandtl’s work on the boundary layer theory is an interesting example for illustrating several important issues in philosophy of science such as the relation between theories and models and whether it is possible to distinguish, in a principled way, between pure and applied science. In what follows I discuss several proposals by the symposium participants regarding the interpretation of Prandtl’s work and whether it should be characterized as an instance of applied science. My own interpretation of this example (1999) emphasised the degree of autonomy embedded in Prandtl’s boundary layer model and the way it became integrated in the larger theoretical context of hydrodynamics. In addition to extending that discussion here I also claim that the characterization of applied science which formed the basis for the symposium does not enable us to successfully distinguish applied science from the general practice of ‘applying’ basic scientific knowledge in a variety of contexts.     

Personality,Resilience, and Psychopathology: A Model for the Interaction between Slow and Fast Network Processes in the Context of Mental Health

Network theories have been put forward for psychopathology (in which mental disorders originate from causal relations between symptoms) and for personality (in which personality factors originate from coupled equilibria of cognitions, affect states, behaviours, and environments). Here, we connect these theoretical strands in an overarching personality–resilience–psychopathology model. In this model, factors in personality networks control the shape of the dynamical landscape in which symptom networks evolve; for example, the neuroticism item ‘I often feel blue’ measures a general tendency to experience negative affect, which is hypothesized to influence the threshold parameter of the symptom ‘depressed mood’ in the psychopathology network. Conversely, events at the level of the fast-evolving psychopathology network (e.g. a depressive episode) can influence the slow-evolving personality variables (e.g. by increasing feelings of worthlessness). We apply the theory to neuroticism and major depressive disorder. Through simulations, we show that the model can accommodate important phenomena, such as the strong relation between neuroticism and depression and individual differences in the change of neuroticism levels and development of depression over time. The results of the simulation are implemented in an online, interactive simulation tool. Implications for research into the relationship between personality and psychopathology are discussed. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

The Quantum-Like Approach of Psychosomatic Phenomena in Application

The quantum-like approach of psychosomatic phenomena suggests an explanation of the correlations between mind and body in terms of quantum-like entanglement, that is, without appealing to any concept of psychophysical, efficient causality. This approach is developed within the Hilbert space formalism and its general consequences are drawn. It is first illustrated by a simple, qualitative model of the placebo effect which shows that representing psychosomatic states by entangled states can explain that purely psychological factors can produce a-causal changes of physiological parameters. Then, a dynamical, quantitative and predictive model of bipolar disorder which makes use of the unitarity of the temporal evolution of psychosomatic states due to biological and psychological rhythms is worked out. This model can explain some current observations, like for example the severe fluctuations in mood between depression and mania, and it can forecast the moment of shifting. In addition, it justifies the efficiency of chronotherapy on theoretical basis.     

Inviting affordances and agency

Recently several authors have suggested that affordances are not mere possibilities for action but can also invite behavior. This reconceptualization of affordances asks for a reconsideration of the ecological approach to agency. After a portrayal of the role of agency in ecological psychology, we draw upon phenomenology to reveal what it means for an agent to be invited by affordances. We sketch a dynamical model of the animal-environment relationship that aims to do justice to this analysis. In the model, agency is conceptualized as the capacity to modulate the coupling strength with the environment—the agent can influence to what extent he or she is influenced by the different invitations. This account of agency keeps us far from the Cartesian idea that the agent imposes behavior. Indeed, by modulating the coupling strength, the agent simply alters the dynamics of the animal-environment interactions and thus the behavior that emerges.     

On strong anticipation

We examine Dubois’s [Dubois, D., 2003. Mathematical foundations of discrete and functional systems with strong and weak anticipations. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2684, 110–132.] distinction between weak anticipation and strong anticipation. Anticipation is weak if it arises from a model of the system via internal simulations. Anticipation is strong if it arises from the system itself via lawful regularities embedded in the system’s ordinary mode of functioning. The assumption of weak anticipation dominates cognitive science and neuroscience and in particular the study of perception and action. The assumption of strong anticipation, however, seems to be required by anticipation’s ubiquity. It is, for example, characteristic of homeostatic processes at the level of the organism, organs, and cells. We develop the formal distinction between strong and weak anticipation by elaboration of anticipating synchronization, a phenomenon arising from time delays in appropriately coupled dynamical systems. The elaboration is conducted in respect to (a) strictly physical systems, (b) the defining features of circadian rhythms, often viewed as paradigmatic of biological behavior based in internal models, (c) Pavlovian learning, and (d) forward models in motor control. We identify the common thread of strongly anticipatory systems and argue for its significance in furthering understanding of notions such as “internal”, “model” and “prediction”.     

Experience of traumatic events and personal myths of birth

ABSTRACT

Focusing on the analysis of a clinical case, this article studies the manner in which certain traumatic events can induce some individuals to produce auto-traumatic processes. In parallel, it demonstrates how the foundations of a subject’s origins can, at an early stage, find themselves undermined by an environment that does not recognise the subject, and that sends out messages that seem to exclude him or her from their filiation. What can follow is a partial breakdown in the ideation of origins that leads some individuals to create a personal myth of birth. This myth, that borrows some elements from collective myths, can to some extent substitute itself for the representation of filiation. This process will be differentiated here from delusional phenomena, or the ‘sexual theories of children’. This article also demonstrates the important role of the analysis of ‘anxiety dreams’ in these traumatic configurations: this analysis has the power to bring to light the different conflicting elements with which the ego identifies, so as to put an end to the auto-traumatic process, as well as giving clues for lifting the amnesia regarding a childhood personal myth of birth. Under these conditions ‘acts of birth’ can become inscribed into the analysis.     

A Piagetian perspective on mathematical construction

In this paper, we offer a Piagetian perspective on the construction of the logico-mathematical schemas which embody our knowledge of logic and mathematics. Logico-mathematical entities are tied to the subject's activities, yet are so constructed by reflective abstraction that they result from sensorimotor experience only via the construction of intermediate schemas of increasing abstraction. The ‘axiom set’ does not exhaust the cognitive structure (schema network) which the mathematician thus acquires. We thus view ‘truth’ not as something to be defined within the closed ‘world’ of a formal system but rather in terms of the schema network within which the formal system is embedded. We differ from Piaget in that we see mathematical knowledge as based on social processes of mutual verification which provide an external drive to any ‘necessary dynamic’ of reflective abstraction within the individual. From this perspective, we argue that axiom schemas tied to a preferred interpretation may provide a necessary intermediate stage of reflective abstraction en route to acquisition of the ability to use formal systems in abstracto.     

Pragmatic enrichment: beyond Gricean rational reconstruction – a response to Mandy Simons

It has been claimed that pragmatic effects that arise in embedded clauses pose a problem for the Gricean reasoning procedure. I maintain, however, that the real issue these phenomena raise for Grice, as he himself acknowledged, is their violation of his saying/implicating distinction. While these effects can be accounted for by Gricean reasoning, which Mandy Simons clearly demonstrates, there is no way round this latter problem other than a major revision of Grice’s notion of ‘saying’ and hence of the saying/implicating distinction.     

Deontic Interpreted Systems

We investigate an extension of the formalism of interpreted systems by Halpern and colleagues to model the correct behaviour of agents. The semantical model allows for the representation and reasoning about states of correct and incorrect functioning behaviour of the agents, and of the system as a whole. We axiomatise this semantic class by mapping it into a suitable class of Kripke models. The resulting logic, KD45_n ^i-j, is a stronger version of KD, the system often referred to as Standard Deontic Logic. We extend this formal framework to include the standard epistemic notions defined on interpreted systems, and introduce a new doubly-indexed operator representing the knowledge that an agent would have if it operates under the assumption that a group of agents is functioning correctly. We discuss these issues both theoretically and in terms of applications, and present further directions of work.     

ACTIONS,HABITS AND CONSTITUTION

In this paper I offer a critique of the view made popular by Davidson that rationalization is a species of causal explanation, and propose instead that in many cases the explanatory relation is constitutive. Given Davidson’s conception of rationalization, which allows that a huge range of states gathered under the heading ‘pro attitude’ could rationalize an action, I argue that whilst the causal thesis may have some merit for some such ‘attitudes’, it has none for others. The problematic ‘attitudes’ are those which can be attributed to the agent only on the basis of her history of doing a certain sort of thing. In other words, they are among the agent’s habits. I argue that such temporally extended states cannot be the causes of any present occurrence. Instead, I suggest we should think of the present action as partly constituting the state in question, and give a corresponding interpretation of the explanatory relation. Such explanations invite us to abandon a conception of agency narrowly based on psychology, in favour of an enriched one which takes an agent’s habits to partly constitute the agent.