Engaged in Engagement: We Are Delighted We Did It

We emphasize that science and practice issues are equally salient when pursuing thinking and research on employee engagement. We agree with much of what the commentaries have to say, especially that organizational competitive advantage is the relevant focus of engagement research and practice and that engagement is not a new construct but one that required clarification vis-a-vis existing constructs. We also agree that state engagement can be highly variable, that disengagement needs study, that negative situations can induce engagement behaviors, that engagement surveys should yield actionable data, and that people can be hired who are more likely to be engaged. We disagree with the idea that all employee attitudes are essentially equal and that existing conceptualizations of performance make engagement behavior a nonuseful construct.     

Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with persons’ capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching ‘We’‐intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe’s action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency.     

The Pronoun Bias Effect Strikes Again: A Reply to Pynte and Colonna

The gender of an initial adjectival phase (AP) influences the analysis of a phrase which is a potential main clause subject in French. Pynte and Colonna (this issue) establish this generalization but analyze it without considering critical aspects of sentence structure, specifically, the fact that the AP has a null pronominal subject. If grammars contain a violable constraint requiring coreference between the pronominal subject of an initial subordinate phrase and the subject of the main clause, then in Pynte and Colonna's study perceivers must choose on-line between an analysis which satisfies the same subject constraint and one which doesn't. From this perspective, it is expected that the subject analysis of the ambiguous phrase predominates. Further, on this view, the preference fits with independent generalizations about language such as the existence of switch-reference languages which obligatorily mark the coreference relation between the initial subordinate subject and the main clause subject. It also fits with already established facts about language processing, such as Cowart and Cairns' (1987) Pronoun Bias Effect.     

How We Institute Our Psychoanalytic Education: Reply to Commentaries

In reply to Altman's and Schellekes's questions and discussion, the author explores in more depth his own theoretical-technical point of view in order to clarify—chiefly in the light of a modern application of Ferenczi's and Heimann's way of thinking—the rationale for the selection of clinical facts in his paper.     

Consent's Been Framed: When Framing Effects Invalidate Consent and How to Validate It Again

In this article I will argue first that if ignorance poses a problem for valid consent in medical contexts then framing effects do too, and second that the problem posed by framing effects can be solved by eliminating those effects. My position is thus a mean between two mistaken extremes. At one mistaken extreme, framing effects are so trivial that they never impinge on the moral force of consent. This is as mistaken as thinking that ignorance is so trivial that it never impinges on the moral force of consent. At the other mistaken extreme, framing effects are so serious that their existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. This is as mistaken as the idea that ignorance is so serious that its existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. I will argue that, instead of endorsing either of these mistaken extreme views, we should instead endorse a moderate view according to which framing effects sometimes pose a serious challenge for the validity of consent, just as ignorance does, but one which we can solve by eliminating the effect, just as we can solve the problem of ignorance by eliminating it.     

Categories We Live By: Reply to Alcoff,Butler, and Roth

The author of Categories We Live By replies to critics Linda Martín Alcoff, Judith Butler, and Abraham Sesshu Roth.     

We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups

Two studies investigated the occurrence of hindsight distortion in groups as compared to individuals. Competing predictions were derived from four theoretical positions: Memory impairment, response bias, self-presentation, and group polarization. In Experiment 1, small groups vs individuals made hypothetical predictions with or without outcome information. Both individuals and groups were found to distort their predictions in the direction of the alleged outcome. Experiment 2 employed a memory design in which individuals vs groups made a series of predictions for which they subsequently received outcome information which was either above or below their prediction or for which they received no outcome information. Subjects had to recall their initial prediction. Results indicated that (a) hindsight bias was slightly attenuated in groups compared to individuals, (b) groups were more likely to recall their original predictions correctly than individuals, (c) this recall advantage of groups disappeared when time taken to make the initial prediction was held constant, and (d) outcome information affected hindsight bias but not hit rates. Results were interpreted as supporting the response bias perspective.     

Use It—and Keep It, Longer, Probably: A Reply to Salthouse (2006)

ABSTRACT— In this article, I call into serious question Salthouse's (2006) conclusions evaluating and disparaging the validity of the "use it or lose it" hypothesis regarding mental exercise and mental aging. I do so, in some part, by using data not discussed by Salthouse. The core of my argument relies heavily on a critical assessment of the conclusions that Salthouse derived from both his theoretical reasoning and his review of the literature. The more judicious conclusion I reach is that, although the whole story regarding cognitive function and aging is not known, at some level and to some degree, "using" it often delays the eventuality of "losing" it.     

The Time Course of Attention: It Is Better Than We Thought

ABSTRACT— What is the time course of attention? Research using rapid-stimulus streams has suggested that it is rather slow: Attention takes half a second to recover from processing one thing before it can process the next. This period is referred to as the attentional blink , and it is thought to reflect a fundamental bottleneck in conscious processing. If this period does exist, such a limitation would have severe consequences in real-life situations in which multiple events may rapidly succeed each other (e.g., in traffic). However, findings that support the attentional blink are at odds with other findings indicating that attention is not reduced, but enhanced, following potentially important occurrences. The article reviews evidence that these opposite effects are actually closely related. The attentional blink is a consequence of selection mechanisms that are not severely limited, but have an adaptive function: They enhance perception in response to relevant information but suppress perception in response to irrelevant information. It means that humans are better geared for real life than was previously thought.