Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over-emphasizing the fostering of students' critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic.     

Priming Prejudice How Stereotypes and Counter-Stereotypes Influence Attribution of Responsibility and Credibility among Ingroups and Outgroups

The research examines the effect of priming negative stereotypic and positive counter-stereotypic portrayals of African Americans (Study 1) and women (Study 2) on interpretations of actual media events. A counter-stereotypic portrayal of an African American male led participants to subsequently make more external or situational attributions of responsibility to other African American males involved in unrelated media events (i.e., Rodney King and Magic Johnson), whereas stereotypic portrayals led to more internal or personal attributions. Similarly, a counter-stereotypic portrayal of a female tended to increase the perceived credibility of females involved in unrelated media events (i.e., the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings and the William Kennedy Smith/Patricia Bowman rape trial) whereas stereotypic portrayals decreased their perceived credibility. Study 2 also revealed an ingroup-outgroup bias in the interpretation of media events, with females tending to be more sympathetic toward other females. Implications of these findings are discussed and suggestions made for future research.     

计算机、证明和证据(英文)

有论者认为以电脑辅助进行之数学证明其实包含了经验性之前提,因此要接受此类证明,就得修改传统的"数学证明"的概念。本文审视此说法;以讨论Thomas Tymoczko的一篇关于四色定理得哲学意义的论文为发端,进而论及Tyler Burge等人的相关观点,并由此对上述说法提出质疑。     

Relativism,Disagreement and Testimony

This article brings together two sets of data that are rarely discussed in concert; namely, disagreement and testimony data. I will argue that relativism yields a much more elegant account of these data than its major rival, contextualism. The basic idea will be that contextualists can account for disagreement data only by adopting principles that preclude a simple account of testimony data. I will conclude that, other things being equal, we should prefer relativism to contextualism. In making this comparative point, I will also defend self‐standing relativist accounts of disagreement and testimony data.     

Testimony,simulation, and the limits of inductivism

Although theorists disagree about precisely how to characterize the link between anger and moral judgment, that they are linked is routinely taken for granted in contemporary metaethics and philosophy of emotion. One problem with this assumption is that it ignores virtues like patience, which thinkers as different as Cassian, ?āntideva, and Maimonides have argued are characteristic of mature moral agents. The patient neither experience nor plan to experience anger in response to (at least some) wrongs. Nevertheless, we argue, they remain capable of judging such actions to be wrong. This indicates that a different account of the relationship between anger and moral judgment is required. We conclude by proposing one such account, showing how a metaethicist who was more attentive to the normative ethics of anger might set about reconstructing her position.     

Testimony,Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals

Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know'.     

Trans Prejudice in Sport: Differences from LGB Prejudice,the Influence of Gender,and Changes over Time

The purpose of our study was to examine prejudice toward trans individuals in sport. Questionnaire data were collected from separate, albeit demographically similar, samples of students in 2007 (n = 199) and 2014 (n = 124). Results indicate that trans prejudice was higher than prejudice expressed toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals and that these differences remained over time. There were no gender differences as women and men expressed the same degrees of trans prejudice. Finally, trans prejudice significantly decreased over time, although the magnitude of the change was not as large as the corresponding decrease in LGB prejudice. Study findings suggest that although prejudice against trans individuals has decreased, additional interventions and prejudice reduction efforts are needed.     

Testimony,testimonial belief,and safety

Philosophical Studies - Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way...     

Prejudice, Prodigality, and the Precariousness of Life

In this essay, I focus on James Dittes' Bias and the Pious (1973), which addresses the relationship of religion and prejudice from a psychological perspective. I give particular attention to his discussion of the needs that underlie prejudice, his suggestion that religion may meet these needs better than the prejudice itself, and his distinction between contractual and prodigal faith. The incident discussed in the book involving conflict between the minister and church leaders of Augustana Lutheran Church in Omaha is highlighted because of my personal association with this church.     

Ad Hominem Fallacies, Bias, and Testimony

An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized.     

Testimony,epistemic egoism,and epistemic credit

It is generally acknowledged that testifiers can play a central role in the production of knowledge and other valuable epistemic states in others. But does such a role warrant any form of epistemic credit and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I here propose an affirmative answer to both questions. The core of the current paper consists in a sustained defense of this proposal against a series of objections. I further argue that the proposal allows us to recognize an important additional epistemic harm that arises in cases of testimonial injustice beyond those described by Miranda Fricker. Finally, I conclude by distinguishing between four kinds of credit—distinctions that allow us to avoid inappropriately attributing epistemic credit in problematic cases. If the current proposal is correct, our understanding of successful epistemic agents needs to be significantly modified in order to take into account their role in producing epistemically valuable states in others.