Organ Donation After Death — Should I Decide,or Should My Family?

Who should decide about organ donation after death, the individual or the family? This paper examines why this practical question can be difficult to resolve. A comparison is made between standard decision-making in medicine and decision-making about organ donation. The questions are raised of the connection of the dead body to the person, and of who properly has autonomous control over the dead body. To understand the issues, an exploration of autonomy is needed, but at the same time this shows that a resolution depends on addressing complex spiritual and cultural issues, and questions about the autonomy of the individual versus that of the group.     

Stereotypical behavioural cues — but not their order — influence credibility judgements

To what extent stereotypical deceptive behaviours such as gaze aversion and fidgeting actually influence people's credibility judgements remain largely unknown. In this study, we directly manipulated the presence/absence of such behaviours to investigate this. Participants were shown four truthful videos in which we manipulated the presence of stereotypical cues and asked them to judge how credible the person in each video is. Moreover, research consistently shows that decision making is influenced by various cognitive biases. One example is the primacy effect, which implies that people form an opinion early in the decision process. Information acquired early will have the largest influence on how subsequent information will be interpreted. To investigate a possible primacy effect, we also manipulated whether these cues were present towards the beginning or the end of the video (i.e. the timing of the manipulation). In line with our expectations, the presence of stereotypical cues significantly lowered the observed credibility, showing that the presence of these cues indeed influences credibility judgements. The timing of the cues had no effect.     

On the Grammar of Politics—or Why Conservatives Prefer Nouns

Previous research indicates that political conservatism is associated with epistemic needs for structure and certainty (Jost et al., 2003) and that nouns elicit clearer and more definite perceptions of reality than other parts of speech (Carnaghi et al., 2008). We therefore hypothesized that conservatives would exhibit preferences for nouns (vs. verbs and adjectives), insofar as nouns are better suited to satisfy epistemic needs. In Study 1, we observed that social conservatism was associated with noun preferences in Polish and that personal need for structure accounted for the association between ideology and grammatical preferences. In Study 2, conducted in Arabic, social conservatism was associated with a preference for the use of nominal sentences (composed of nouns only) over verbal sentences (which included verbs and adjectives). In Study 3, we found that more conservative U.S. presidents used greater proportions of nouns in major speeches, and this effect was related to integrative complexity. We discuss the possibility that conservative ideology is linked to grammatical preferences that foster feelings of stability and predictability.     

Who Benefits?— Why personal identity does not matter in a moral evaluation of germ-line gene therapy

Recently it has been argued that some instances of germ-line gene therapy will change the identity of the person who receives the benefit of therapy, and that in these instances there is no good moral reason to conduct germ-line gene therapy. Against this we argue that even if gene therapy should have an effect on the identity of the resulting person, this would not diminish the urgency of the therapy. Not only would impersonal moral reasons speak in favour of such radical gene therapy, there would also be person-affecting reasons to perform it.     

“I Should not Forget the Apples!”—Mind‐Wandering Episodes Used as Opportunities for Rehearsal in an Interrupted Recall Paradigm

Mind‐wandering is mostly studied for its negative effects on ongoing cognitive tasks but may be also of adaptive value. We tested the idea of mind‐wandering providing opportunities for rehearsal by asking participants to study 20 grocery items for a recall test. After cued recall of 10 items, participants were either told that the recall task was finished or that it was interrupted for another task. All participants then performed a two‐back task during which thought contents were repeatedly probed. Cued recall of the remaining items was better in the interrupted than in the finished condition, and this effect was accompanied by a more efficient rehearsal strategy: Participants' thought‐reports in the interrupted condition revealed a stronger and more persistent engagement in shopping‐task‐related thoughts. Activating a relevant goal led to mind‐wandering episodes being persistently used as opportunities for rehearsal revealing participants' adaptive usage of off‐task thoughts.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why not to be a ‘Thomist’: A Critique of the Bañezian Reconciliation of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

Thomas Osborne has asserted that ‘No one has developed an argument against premotion that works if the distinctions made by the Thomists are granted.' This article attempts to form just such an argument. Specifically, it argues that the Thomistic system – even with the distinctions it relies on having been granted – cannot account for human freedom, at least not in a sense sufficiently strong to sustain human guilt for sin. Further, it argues that the Thomists, by their own clear though tacit admission, acknowledge this insufficiency.     

The scapegoat — or the one that got away

The scapegoat is the focus of projections. It may be an individual or a group, an obvious misfit or a concealed one, a temporary phenomenon or a permanent lifestyle (adopted willingly or unwillingly). The scapegoat makes it possible for man to live at peace with God, himself or his society by acting as symbolic recipient of qualities which man is unwilling to recognise in himself. The scapegoater by his treatment tries to reduce the scapegoat into something not human; for this reason a scapegoat which shows only small divergences from the norm evokes particular hostility. The individual scapegoat in a small group may accept his role fairly happily, but group scapegoats find few compensations. A variety of defence mechanisms will be adopted in these circumstances, but generally mature adjustment is impossible. The scientific and artistic achievements of scapegoats in the past have helped to liberalise society and extend the range of our compassion. So perhaps a society without scapegoats would lose its capacity for moral growth.     

Why There Cannot be Any Such Thing as “Time Travel”

Extending work of Wittgenstein, Lakoff and Johnson I suggest that it is the (spatial) metaphors we rely on in order to conceptualise time that provide an illusory space for time‐travel‐talk. For example, in the “Moving Time” spatialisation of time, “objects” move past the agent from the future to the past. The objects all move in the same direction – this is mapped to time always moving in the same direction. But then it is easy to imagine suspending this rule, and asking why the objects should not start moving in the opposite direction. This is one way of generating the idea of time‐travel “back” into the past. Time‐travel‐talk essentially involves the unaware projection of fragments of our time‐talk – taken from powerful conceptual metaphors – onto the nature of reality itself. Understanding this dissolves away the charm and attractions of such talk.     

‘It's not supposed to be this way’: Psychological aspects of a premature menopause

Background: Premature menopause (menopause diagnosed at 40 years or under) is a challenging condition with no prevention or cure. Causes can be the result of surgical intervention or spontaneous and largely unknown. It affects 1–6% of women aged 14–40. Aim: This study investigated women's experience of diagnosis, perception of cause, treatment received, main concerns, perceived long‐term consequences and impact on psychological wellbeing. Method: A cross‐sectional single group design questionnaire study that included both quantitative and qualitative measures was used. It was distributed to women on the database of two specialist London clinics and an internet‐based patient support group. A thematic analysis was undertaken. Findings: The response rate was 62%. Women's experiences varied but showed common themes regardless of timing of diagnosis and services accessed. Improved understanding by health professionals could help this group accept and adjust to the condition more effectively as could psychological support. Fertility was a primary concern regardless of parity and there were several secondary impacts both physiological and psychological. Discussion: A clear need for the offer of emotional support was indicated for all, but particularly for teenage girls and single women who tended not to access support from their own social network. Conclusion: Young women with this diagnosis could benefit from the offer of counselling, though uptake may be influenced by individual factors and vary according to age and circumstances. A good understanding of the physical aspects of this condition is important in the counselling of this group.     

“I Am Moral,But You Are Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law1

This research examined the different attributions that individuals make for law‐abiding behavior by different people. Experiment 1 reveals that individuals believe that they and other highly moral people are motivated to obey laws because of internal reasons (e.g., laws reflect valued rules and moral behavior), whereas they believe that criminals are motivated by external reasons (e.g., fear of punishment). However, Experiment 2 shows that even some criminals are seen as motivated to obey laws regarding particular types of crimes because of internal factors. Experiment 3 replicates these general findings using a between‐subjects design. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that individuals believe that they are motivated to obey laws regarding minor transgressions (e.g., speed limits) for both internal and external reasons. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for both psychological theory and social policy.     

Children lose confidence in their potential to “be scientists,” but not in their capacity to “do science”

Over the course of middle childhood, children's interest and beliefs about their own capacities for success in science often decline. This pernicious decline is especially evident among underrepresented groups, including girls, members of some racial and ethnic minorities, and children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The present research (N = 306, ages 6–11) found that while children lose interest and feelings of efficacy about their potential to “be scientists” across middle childhood, they maintain more robust interest and efficacy about “doing science.” These patterns were confirmed in both longitudinal and cross‐sectional analyses; effects were stable or increased across time and age. Mediation analyses revealed that the positive effect of action framing is partially accounted for by children's views that the group of people who do science is more inclusive than the category of scientists. These findings suggest that using action‐focused language to encourage children in science is more inclusive and may lead to more science engagement across middle childhood than language that emphasizes scientists as an identity category. Implications for educational practices will be discussed.