Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effects

Previous studies have suggested that people holding protected values (PVs) show a bias against harmful acts, as opposed to harmful omissions (omission bias). In the present study, we (1) investigated the relationship between PVs and acts versus omissions in risky choices, using a paradigm in which act and omission biases were presented in a symmetrical manner, and (2) examined whether people holding PVs respond differently to framing manipulations. Participants were given environmental scenarios and were asked to make choices between actions and omissions. Both the framing of the outcomes (positive vs. negative) and the outcome certainty (risky vs. certain) were manipulated. In contrast to previous studies, PVs were linked to preferences for acts, rather than for omissions. PVs were more likely to be associated with moral obligations to act than with moral prohibitions against action. Strikingly, people with strong PVs were immune to framing; participants with few PVs showed robust framing effects.     

Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响

解释水平理论是一种解释心理距离怎样影响个体的思维决策的社会认知理论。研究基于解释水平理论,探查了心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响。实验从心理距离的四个维度入手,每个维度均采用2（解释水平高、低）×2（正框架、负框架）的被试间设计,用于检验解释水平是否调节框架对被试决策任务的选择。结果表明,当心理距离越远,解释水平越高时,被试产生明显的框架效应;而当心理距离越近,解释水平越低时,框架效应明显减弱。除了大概率情况下的框架效应削弱至不显著,其余维度的高、低解释水平下的框架效应均显著。     

Choice,Rating, and Ranking: Framing Effects with Different Response Modes

In a typical risky choice framing task, people have to choose among two options, which are either positively or negatively framed. Choices in the two framing conditions are then compared. However, different preferences between the conditions can be due to changes in the evaluation of the single constituent options or due to specific processes triggered by the choice task. In order to clarify the source of the framing effect, we investigate the effect with different response modes: choice, rating, and ranking. The rating and ranking findings indicate that what is commonly called a risky choice framing effect is actually a framing effect that changes the evaluation of only the riskless option, although there is little or no effect on the risky option. According to these findings, risky choice framing might be construed as a process of attribute framing, which is independent of risk preference in choice contexts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

More Than Two Choices: The Influence of Context on the Framing Effect

The framing effect demonstrates that two options with different risk levels affect people??s risk preferences, even if both options are logically equivalent. However, in reality we are almost always confronted with more than two choices, rather than a single manipulated message. In this paper, we simultaneously manipulate the framing effect and the context effect, including the attraction effect and the compromise effect, to examine the influence of context on framing. The results of two studies show that context influences the original choice preference arising from the framing effect. Moreover, the framing effect is reduced when context effects are introduced to the original choice set.     

Group size and the framing effect:

Past research provides conflicting evidence for the role of value in the appearance of framing effects. In this study, the effects of frame and group size were examined using scenarios about less valuable and more valuable groups (animal vs. human). In addition, two picture manipulations, intended to increase the value of the group, were presented. Choice patterns differed for the human and animal groups, with participants exhibiting greater risk seeking overall for the human scenario and showing a framing effect for humans but not animals when no pictures were presented. A small group size increased the proportion of risky choices for both the animal and human scenarios. Presenting pictures with names did lead to framing effects for animals, but providing pictures or pictures and names eliminated framing effects for the human scenario. These findings suggest that the relationship between value and framing effects is a matter of degree.     

Who Takes the Lead in Risky Decision Making? Effects of Group Members' Risk Preferences and Prototypicality

In two experiments, we studied the effects of (a) the extent to which group members are risk seeking in comparison with others in the group and (b) group member prototypicality (the extent to which individuals hold group-typical risk preferences) on the likelihood that group members will take the lead in risky decision making. Participants were led to believe that they engaged in a four-person group discussion and received bogus feedback about their own risk preferences, the risk preferences of the other group members, and the risk preferences of their group as a whole. In Experiment 2, we also manipulated the framing of the decision problem (gain vs. loss frame). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) more risk seeking members are more likely to take the lead and (b) prototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is ambiguous (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are incongruent), whereas nonprototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is relatively clear-cut (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are congruent).     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

任务框架、损益值大小对自恋者风险偏好的影响

以234名大学生为被试,探讨了任务框架、损益值大小对显性/隐性自恋者风险偏好的影响。结果表明：(1)框架效应较稳定的出现在中等风险水平情境下,且在大损益值条件下更易出现。(2)在获益框架下,被试为小金额决策更冒险,在损失框架下,则为大金额决策更冒险。(3)在损失框架下,高显性自恋者比低显性自恋者更为冒险,在获益框架下,高隐性自恋者比低隐性自恋者更为保守;高隐性自恋者的风险偏好受到任务框架和损益值大小的共同影响。     

Effects of problem frame and gender on principals’ decision making

Research indicates people’s decisions can sometimes be influenced by seemingly trivial differences in the framing (i.e., wording) of alternative options. The tendency to prefer risk averse options when framed positively and risky options when framed negatively is known as the framing effect. The current study examined the susceptibility of school principals to the framing effect. Additionally, analytical and intuitive decision styles, the degree to which one’s typical goal is to maximize (rather than satisfice), gender, and years of experience as a principal were measured to assess whether they are predictive of principals’ choices, and to test whether they moderate the effects of framing on choice. Seventy-one principals completed six decision problems (framed either positively or negatively) and instruments assessing decision style, typical decision goal, gender, and experience. Analyses demonstrated that principals are influenced by framing. Although the positively and negatively framed versions of the decision problems were objectively identical, negative framing resulted in more risky choices. Additionally, regardless of frame, men made more risky choices than women. There was no evidence that experience, decision style, or the degree to which one’s typical decision goal was to maximize, decreased framing effects. Several potential debiasing strategies are described, and limitations are noted.     

Effectively using death in health messages: Social loss versus physical mortality salience

Research based on the terror management health model demonstrates that highlighting death as a consequence of risky behavior can lead to unintended responses to health communications. In two studies, we investigate whether a form of social loss message frame can motivate someone to change his or her behavior to prevent negative health consequences. In Study 1, we compare social loss and physical mortality print messages in the context of “texting while driving.” Overall, social loss as opposed to physical mortality messages facilitate greater intent to reduce risky health behaviors when death‐related cognitions have been removed from conscious awareness. In Study 2, we manipulate message framing and self‐affirmation in the context of “smoking.” We find that highlighting family members' inability to cope when one dies can result in health messages that facilitate the acknowledgment of the health risk and reduce risky health behaviors. This effect is enhanced when individuals affirm on the importance of “relationships with family and friends” prior to viewing health messages. The implications for the terror management health model are discussed noting that death can be effectively used in health communication when framed as relationship protection rather than one's physical mortality.     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

Influence of deontological versus consequentialist orientations on act choices and framing effects: when principles are more important than consequences

A long tradition in decision making assumes that people usually take a consequentialist perspective, which implies a focus on the outcomes only when making decisions. Such a view largely neglects the existence of a deontological perspective, which implies that people are sensitive to moral duties that require or prohibit certain behaviors, irrespective of the consequences. Similarly, recent research has also suggested that people holding “protected values” (PVs) show increased attention to acts versus omissions and less attention to outcomes. The present research investigates the role of deontological versus consequentialist modes of thought and of PVs on framing effects and act versus omission choices. In a modification of Tversky and Kahneman's ( 1981 ) risky choice framing paradigm, we manipulated the framing of the outcomes (positive, negative), as well as whether the certain outcome was associated with an act or inaction. The main results suggest that act versus omission tendencies are linked to deontological focus and PVs. Framing effects, on the other hand, are driven by a consequentialist focus. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavioral and pharmacological variables affecting risky choice in rats.

The effects of manipulations of response requirement, intertrial interval (ITI), and psychoactive drugs (ethanol, phencyclidine, and d-amphetamine) on lever choice under concurrent fixed-ratio schedules were investigated in rats. Responding on the "certain' lever produced three 45-mg pellets, whereas responding on the "risky" lever produced either 15 pellets (p = .33) or no pellets (p .67). Rats earned all food during the session, which ended after 12 forced trials and 93 choice trials or 90 min, whichever occurred first. When the response requirement was increased from 1 to 16 and the ITI was 20 s, percentage of risky choice was inversely related to fixed-ratio value. When only a single response was required but the ITI was manipulated between 20 and 120 s (with maximum session duration held constant), percentage of risky choice was directly related to length of the ITI. The effects of the drugs were investigated first at an ITI of 20 s, when risky choice was low for most rats, and then at an ITI of 80 s, when risky choice was higher for most rats. Ethanol usually decreased risky choice. Phencyclidine did not usually affect risky choice when the ITI was 20 s but decreased it in half the rats when the ITI was 80 s. For d-amphetamine, the effects appeared to he related to baseline probability of risky choice; that is, low probabilities were increased and high probabilities were decreased. Although increase in risky choice as a function of the ITI is at variance with previous ITI data, it is consistent with foraging data showing that risk aversion decreases as food availability decreases. The pharmacological manipulations showed that drug effects on risky choice may be influenced by the baseline probability of risky choice, just as drug effects can be a function of baseline response rate.     

A New Look at Framing Effects: Distribution of Effect Sizes,Individual Differences,and Independence of Types of Effects

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) identified three distinct types of framing effects in the literature: attribute framing effects, goal framing effects, risky choice framing effects. While most previous framing studies used between-subjects manipulations of frame, the present study used two sessions, spaced one week apart, to give each of 102 participants both framing conditions and all three types of framing. Using the difference between the score for the positive framing condition and the negative framing condition as the unit of analysis for each type of framing effect, the following were found: (1) reliable framing effects for attribute framing and risky choice framing, but not for goal framing; (2) distributions of individual framing effects showing that the aggregate-level effects were representative of individuals even though some individuals showed no framing effects; (3) no significant interdependencies between the three categories of framing effects; (4) individual differences in reaction to the task scenarios related to various of the “Big Five” personality traits as well as the Faith in Intuition scale. The use of within-subject designs to assess individual differences in decision-making phenomena such as framing effects and other biases and heuristics is recommended for future research.