"Good enough stories": helping couples invest in one another's growth

This article utilizes key constructs of the narrative metaphor: that stories organize, structure, and give meaning to events in our lives. When stories are used as a way to understand the lives of couples, they have the potential for enhancing individual and relational growth. It is proposed that knowing both our own and our partner's story and development goals increases the likelihood of making an investment in self/other and relational growth. It is further suggested that helping couples develop narratives with a sense of "We" promotes a more generative perspective. These ideas were developed in a small qualitative pilot study with long-married, middle-class, heterosexual couples, which suggested that the synthesis of each partner's life story into a couple story promoted individual and relational development. Implications for therapeutic work with couples are presented as well as specific recommendations for ways to utilize the life story approach as an aspect of treatment. It is intended to assist clinicians and teachers in translating narrative ideas into therapeutic work with couples.     

Introduction: The Dialogical Self in a Global and Digital Age

In this article, culture and self, like society and identity, are conceived as mutually inclusive. On the basis of this premise, self and identity are discussed in the context of an evolution toward a global and digital society. The core concept is the "dialogical self" that is described as a spatial and temporal process of positioning. Examples of multivoiced and dialogical selves are given in communities and cultures that lack advanced technological means. Apparently, the dialogical self is not an exclusive feature of the present era but a general human condition. Specific to the era is that dialogue is becoming increasingly mediated as a result of technological advances. Closely related to these advances, one can witness an increasing cultural complexity, mobility, and hybridization. It is argued that technological developments and global interconnectedness provide new opportunities for innovation of the self as multivoiced and dialogical. At the same time, such developments evoke counter forces that can close the self off from such opportunities. This article ends with a short introduction to the several contributions in this special issue.     

The Cocreation of Crazy Patchworks: Becoming Rhizomatic in Systemic Therapy

In the field of systemic therapy, there has been much discussion recently about the narrative self. This concept refers to the idea that the self is narratively constructed in and through the stories which someone tells about him/herself. The story is thereby not only viewed as a metaphor for selfhood: Selfhood is not compared to a story, it is a story. But what kind of story are we talking about here? If the self is a story, what does that story look like? These questions are explored in this article. Starting from the possibilities and limitations of traditional and postmodern visions on the self as a story, an alternative vision is illustrated. By considering the self as a rhizomatic story, we not only create a useful view of the way narrative selfhood is constructed within a therapy context, but we also stimulate therapists to coconstruct—together with their clients—patchworks of self‐stories. By using story fragments of our own practice, we illustrate the rhizomatic thinking and its possibilities in therapy.     

Reading from the middle: Heidegger and the narrative self

Heidegger's Being and Time is an underappreciated venue for pursuing work on the role narrative plays in self‐understanding and self‐constitution, and existing work misses Heidegger's most interesting contribution. Implicit in his account of Dasein (an individual human person) is a notion of the narrative self more compelling than those now on offer. Bringing together an adaptive interpretation of Heidegger's notion of “thrown projection”, Wolfgang Iser's account of “the wandering viewpoint”, and more recent Anglo‐American work on the narrative self, I argue that we read our ongoing existences in the same way that, mid‐story, we read a narrative. Reading is a better master metaphor than authorship, narration, plot, or character to guide investigations of narrative's relation to the self. It is not merely a metaphor, however, as the hermeneutic structures involved in interpreting existence and a narrative from the middle are the same.     

In Search of Authenticity: A Heideggerian Quest

Martin Heidegger's conception of authentic resoluteness gives us a picture of life as an unfolding story aimed at a fulfillment of a specific sort. Such resoluteness provides a focus and continuity to a life that can help an individual find meaning and order during times of personal difficulties. This phenomenology of an attempt to live an authentic life gives an image of how such a personal quest might be worked out. In this article, I talk about how Heidegger's concept of authenticity has affected my life ever since I learned about it from lectures and secondary sources in 1961. The narrative conception of life as a story adding up to something is an idea that has helped me through difficult times, and I continue to embrace it to this day.     

On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An Essay in Bridging Neuroscience and Faith

The article begins at the intellectual fissure between many statements coming from neuroscience and the language of faith and theology. First I show that some conclusions drawn from neuroscientific research are not as firm as they seem: neuroscientific data leave room for the interpretation that mind matters. I then take a philosophical‐theological look at the notions of soul, self, and freedom, also in the light of modern scientific research (self‐organization, neuronal networks), and present a view in which these theologically important notions are seen in relation both to matter (brain) and to God. I show that religious insights expressed with soul and free will bear a remarkable resemblance to certain insights from neuroscience and the science of complex, self‐organizing systems, including emphasis on corporeality and emphasis on organization as a form of that corporeality, and that they also show an interesting parallel — albeit described in different terms — concerning the crucial role of a valuation principle that generates attraction. With that, the common‐sense idea that freedom simply is the same as indeterminism is refuted: freedom primarily means self‐determination. I bring to the fore that the self is not a static thing but a “longing.” Such longing springs from something, and it is the relationship to this source that constitutes the self. The main concern is to point out the crucial role of attraction with respect to being and to life, and to draw attention not only to the astonishing parallel on this point between Thomas Aquinas and Alfred North Whitehead but also to a surprising — albeit more implicit — analogy between these philosophical‐theological views and scientific theories of self‐organization (such as those concerning neuronal networks). In short, being attracted toward what appears as “good” is what constitutes us as selves and what thereby signifies the primary meaning of our freedom.     

后现代叙事心理治疗探幽

近15年来国际心理治疗界出现一种由科学隐喻向叙事隐喻转变的潮流。它突出了心理问题的多维性和生活方式的多样性,强调整体联系的视角,与中国文化中的“大人”思想相契合。对叙事心理治疗做探讨,分为三个部分:什么是叙事心理治疗,介绍对叙事心理治疗的整体理解;叙事心理治疗的哲学渊源,介绍叙事心理治疗的理论基础;伦理问题,探讨叙事心理治疗在组织实施过程中权力关系与责任分布。     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Mediated Identity in the Parasocial Interaction of TV

Electronic media contributes toward modifying the self as they shape it as a multivoiced construction. Television talk shows function as a space of parasocial interaction where ordinary people represented on the screen offer involving images of subjectivity for the home viewers. Through interpretative procedures, viewers integrate screen suggestions in the positions' repertoire of their self. This study hypothesized that viewers co-construct identities through involvement in what they are watching and employed focus group discussions and content analysis to investigate this hypothesis. The results demonstrate recurrent comparisons contrasting the screen "other" and the real self. This categorization marks a strong involvement of participants and an interpretative reconstruction of television images. As such, identity is constructed in the dialogical relation between others and selves in a mediated relation whose only result is a self traveling through different repositionings.     

Sweet taste preferences and experiences predict prosocial inferences, personalities, and behaviors

It is striking that prosocial people are considered "sweet" (e.g., "she's a sweetie") because they are unlikely to differentially taste this way. These metaphors aid communication, but theories of conceptual metaphor and embodiment led us to hypothesize that they can be used to derive novel insights about personality processes. Five studies converged on this idea. Study 1 revealed that people believed strangers who liked sweet foods (e.g., candy) were also higher in agreeableness. Studies 2 and 3 showed that individual differences in the preference for sweet foods predicted prosocial personalities, prosocial intentions, and prosocial behaviors. Studies 4 and 5 used experimental designs and showed that momentarily savoring a sweet food (vs. a nonsweet food or no food) increased participants' self-reports of agreeableness and helping behavior. The results reveal that an embodied metaphor approach provides a complementary but unique perspective to traditional trait views of personality.     

MULTIPLE FRACTURES IN TIME: REFLECTIONS ON A CAR CRASH

This essay offers a story of a traumatic event experienced by the author on September 6, 1999. Presented here in autoethnographic and multivoiced form, the author narrates a fraction of time in her life that has left her forever changed: a near-death car crash. She uses literary mode in the crash story and recollected dialogue in the rescue story. In the effort to engage readers into the particulars of such a horrific experience, she seeks to connect with trauma survivors and perhaps offer illumination for those who (for their own reasons) seek further understanding in what will, hopefully for them, never be a first-order experience.     

Tomorrow is the start of the rest of their life — so who cares about health? Exploring constructions of weight-loss motivations and health using story completion

ABSTRACT

In Western societies, health is closely associated with body weight and weight loss, achieved through individual health behaviour. I examined such associations in constructions of weight-loss motivations and health in stories generated using the novel method of story completion. The story stem featured either a female or male protagonist deciding to lose weight; 148 women and 22 men (ages 18–24) provided stories in response. A social constructionist thematic analysis identified five themes: health as clothing size and means to an end; weight-loss activity as good for every woman; tomorrow is going to be the start of the rest of their life; tell me when I’m okay — it’s not about wellbeing; and weight loss as signifier of the “true self.” Considering the adverse social and psychological consequences reflected in the stories and the longstanding elusiveness of successful weight-loss methods, I support calls to review the dominant weight-focused approach to public health.     

Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

Heartless Bimbo or Subversive Role Model?: A Narrative (Self) Critical Reading of the Character of Esther

Abstract :  She has been described as weak, beautiful but brainless, and "the scab undermining the impact of a striking worker's sacrifice." This article engages such opinions, but takes a different view of the character of Esther. It is a narrative critical reading that is nuanced with 'realistic empathy', from the perspective of someone whose life story has much in common with Esther's tale. Given away as a child by my biological parents in a society that preferred boys, like Esther, I was adopted by a single parent and raised in a strongly patriarchal society. I am now an Asian immigrant in New Zealand, a predominantly Western society, while Esther was a diasporic Jew in Persia. ¹     

“Should I Also Make a Garden Out of the Desert?”: Camus' Story of Janine

This article explores Albert Camus’ short story “The Adulterous Woman” as a nature-based initiation into deeper complexity. Rich with archetypal and alchemical imagery, we are taken through a day in the life of Janine, where we can see, reflected in her experience, those places that beckon to greater authenticity within ourselves. The image of the desert invites us to consider, for Janine, the same kinds of questions that Jung asked in The Red Book: “Why is my self a desert? Have I lived too much outside of myself in men and events? Why did I avoid my self? Was I not dear to myself? But I have avoided the place of my soul” (2009, par. 72).     

The Life Story Schema

Current work on autobiographical memory does not take the term autobiographical seriously enough. Doing so requires taking not just single events, but the whole life and its coherence, into account: Only memories that are linked to self through their emotional or motivational significance over one's life are truly autobiographical. We introduce a new construct, the life story schema, a skeletal mental representation of life's major components and links. The life story schema provides 5 conceptual extensions to current models of autobiographical memory. The conclusion that results from these extensions is that the life story schema serves to bind autobiographical memory and the self over time. Research needed to substantiate our claims and further questions generated by the life story schema construct are discussed.     

Towards a new philosophy of education: Extending the conversational metaphor for thinking

Recently, feminists like Jane Roland-Martin, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, and others have advocated a conversational metaphor for thinking and rationality, and our image of the rational person. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl refers to thinking as a constant interconnecting of representations of experiences and an extension of how we hear ourselves and others. There are numerous disadvantages to thinking about thinking as a conversation.We think there are difficulties in accepting the current formulation of the conversational metaphor without question. First, there is danger that we will lose important dialectical connections like that between the self and society. Second, the conversational metaphor alone cannot fully express the way conversations are constructed. We will want to take up the notion of narrative as a metaphor for thinking advocated by Susan Bordo, Alasdair MacIntyre, Jerome Bruner, and others, including Mary Belenky and her colleagues.Eventually, we want to champion narrative and the dramatic narrative of culture as a metaphor for thinking that involves such expressions as sights, insights, silences, as well as sounds, moments of mood and poetic moments. The dramatic narrative provides the structural possibilities needed to criticize certain kinds of conversations, in order to talk about the relations of public and private, self and society and most importantly, about the drama of our lives within and without.The dramatic narrative for thinking helps dispel the dangerous dualisms of mind and body that not even conversation or narration alone can banish, and allows us to frame questions about education that do not require us to separate mind from body. The dramatic narrative metaphor for thinking lets us show who we are, act out what we think, and reconstruct rationality to reflect what many women, and some men, do.     

DOUBLE-VOICE IN S. Y. AGNON'S “HANIDAḤ”: OVERTURES TO A DEVELOPING DISCOURSE

It is widely acknowledged that S.Y. Agnon's story, “Hanida?” (1919), represents a significant artistic transition for the author. Beyond the transitional and inaugural aspects of the story's themes and structure, I wish to consider how its discursive style itself constitutes a significant development in Agnon's literary work. Particular qualities in the story's narrative discourse, more so than in his previous work, anticipate Agnon's later literary achievements. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of discourse in the novel, I will also seek to demonstrate how the story's dialogic, polyphonic qualities, not only anticipate these later works, but suggest some new hermeneutic avenues to reading Agnon.