On feeling understood and feeling well: The role of interdependence

The present research examined whether people feel happier and healthier when they feel more understood in daily social interactions. A two-week diary study showed that people reported greater life satisfaction and fewer physical symptoms on days in which they felt more understood by others. Moreover, we found that individuals who tend to see themselves in relations to others (i.e., women or those scored high on interdependent self-construal measure) showed a stronger association between daily felt understanding and daily life satisfaction or physical symptoms. These findings demonstrate that daily social experiences, such as felt understanding, are associated with daily well-being, particularly for individuals with greater interdependent self-construal.     

The cognitive antecedents and motivational consequences of the feeling of being in the zone

The feeling of being in the zone (related to “flow”) is marked by an elevated yet effortless sense of concentration. Prior research suggests that feelings of being in the zone are strongest when the demand posed by a task matches one’s level of ability (i.e., the balance hypothesis). In the present article, we tested this hypothesis using a novel experimental paradigm. By collecting numerous zone judgments for each participant, we were able to examine intra-individual sources of variance that explain why people often feel more or less in-the-zone on the same task from one moment to the next. The results of two experiments provide support for what we have termed the balance-plus hypothesis, which posits that zone experiences are strongest (Experiments 1–2) and have the greatest motivational force (Experiment 2) when the balance between task demand and ability is accompanied by positive assessments of one’s own performance.     

The traumatic element in the typical dream of feeling embarrassed at being naked

Material is presented from three cases, where analysis of repetitive dreams of feeling embarrassment at being partially or totally naked was an important feature of the treatment. The indifference by the other people in the dream to the dreamer's nakedness was initially linked to perceived transference slights at the hands of the analyst, and later to repeated episodes of actually being treated indifferently at the hands of the parents. This indifference was related to latency or adolescent attempts by the patients to gain love or attention from the parents by exhibitionistic means. The stereotypical presentation of the manifest content of these dreams is seen as evidence for their underlying traumatic roots. Such dreams are likened to the typical examination dreams described by Freud, which have also been noted by others to have traumatic roots. This finding is consistent with my own work with certain repetitive manifest dream configurations and with Freud's (1920) reevaluation of his theory of dreams in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, wherein he noted that dreams of patients suffering from traumatic neurosis often manifestly repeated the traumatic situation in an attempt to master it retrospectively.     

Distant intentionality and the feeling of being stared at: Two meta‐analyses

Findings in parapsychology suggest an effect of distant intentionality. Two laboratory set‐ups explored this topic by measuring the effect of a distant intention on psychophysiological variables. The ‘Direct Mental Interaction in Living Systems’ experiment investigates the effect of various intentions on the electrodermal activity of a remote subject. The ‘Remote Staring’ experiment examines whether gazing by an observer covaries with the electrodermal activity of the person being observed. Two meta‐analyses were conducted. A small significant effect size (d =.11, p = .001) was found in 36 studies on ‘direct mental interaction', while a best‐evidence‐synthesis of 7 studies yielded d = .05 (p = .50). In 15 remote staring studies a mean effect size of d = 0.13 (p = .01) was obtained. It is concluded that there are hints of an effect, but also a shortage of independent replications and theoretical concepts.     

On being motivated

Merleau-Ponty’s notion of being motivated or solicited to act has recently been the focus of extensive investigation, yet work on this topic has tended to take the general notion of being motivated for granted. In this paper, I shall outline an account of what it is to be motivated. In particular, I shall focus on the relation between the affective character of states of being motivated and their intentional content, i.e. how things appear to the agent. Drawing on Husserl’s discussion of perceptual awareness, I suggest that the intentional content of states of being motivated has a horizonal structure, in which both affective and perceptual features are implied. In states of being motivated, the agent becomes aware of certain possibilities for action, towards which they feel drawn. This structure is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the “intentional arc” (1962, 136).     

On being attached

We often use the term “attachment” to describe our emotional connectedness to objects in the world. We become attached to our careers, to our homes, to certain ideas, and perhaps most importantly, to other people. Interestingly, despite its import and ubiquity in our everyday lives, the topic of attachment per se has been largely ignored in the philosophy literature. I address this lacuna by identifying (a type of) attachment as a rich “mode of mattering” that can help to inform certain aspects of agency and emotion. First, drawing on insights from Ancient stoicism and developmental and clinical psychology, I suggest that the relevant form of attachment involves a felt need for its object and a particular relationship between the object and the attached agent’s sense of security. I then argue that these features serve to distinguish the attitude from the more philosophically familiar notion of caring. Finally, I show that recognizing this form of attachment as a distinct mode of mattering has important implications for understanding grief.     

On being and holding responsible

In his Responsibility and the moral sentiments, Wallace develops the idea that we should think of what it is to be morally responsible for an act in terms of norms for holding someone responsible for that act. Smith has recently claimed that Wallace's approach and those like it are ‘fundamentally misguided’. She says that such approaches make the mistake of incorporating conditions for ‘actively blaming’ others into the basic conditions for being responsible, when in fact the conditions for active blame ‘go beyond’ the basic conditions. In this essay, I argue that Smith's otherwise illuminating discussion of these ‘Normativist’ approaches does not undermine them. Specifically, I maintain that being actively blamable by certain persons with the relevant standing is actually constitutive of being responsible for at least some acts. By distinguishing between persons with different sorts of standing, a Normativist approach can avoid Smith's challenge. My larger aim is thus to clarify and defend the Normativist approach.     

On feeling and emotion in religious experience and understanding

Although most if not all human activities may be matters of passionate pursuit, it is less clear that emotions and feelings are inherently implicated in such pursuit: on the contrary, chemistry, cookery, sculpture or football might be effectively pursued without any significant or substantial emotional involvement. On the other hand, it seems less easy to see how religious experience or even religious understanding might be an entirely dispassionate or emotionally disengaged affair. That said, it is far from easy to identify the role of emotion and feeling in religious faith or understanding on some familiar conceptions of religious knowledge and discourse. This paper sets out to explore the place of feeling and emotion in religious experience and understanding via specific attention to the basically narratival form of religious discourse and its connections to wider forms of literary expression.     

Thinking about thinking and feeling about feeling

Traditional clinical psychology generally posits "mental" events that differ from "behavioral" events. Mental events are not publicly observable, take place in a different dimension from overt behavior, and are the topic of primary concern. For example, mental events are often taken to be causes of troublesome overt behavior. In addition, the mental events themselves may be regarded as troublesome, independent of their relation to any specific overt behavior. Therapy is usually aimed at fixing these troublesome mental events, under an assumption that improvement in the client's status will follow in due course. Behavior analysis has its own position on the relations among clinical matters, overt behavior, and such private events as thinking and feeling. In a behavior-analytic view, private events are behavioral phenomena rather than mental phenomena. They are not initiating causes of behavior; rather, they are themselves caused by antecedent conditions, but they may contribute to discriminative control over subsequent behavior, both verbal and nonverbal. Verbal processes are viewed as vitally important in understanding troublesome behavior. However, the circumstances that cause both the troublesome private events and the troublesome behavior in the first place still need to be addressed. Finally, clinical behavior analysis will need to market its insights into diagnosis and treatment very adroitly, because it rejects the mentalism upon which most traditional forms of therapy are predicated and the mentalism that most consumers expect to encounter.