The strong programme for the sociology of science,reflexivity and relativism

David Bloor has advocated a bold hypothesis about the form any sociology of science should take in setting out the four central tenets of his ‘strong programme’ (SP). The first section of this paper discusses how three of these tenets are best formulated and how they relate to one another. The second section discusses how reasons can be causes of belief and how such reasons raise a serious difficulty for SP. The third section discusses how SP is committed to a form of relativism about truth. The fourth section discusses how one might deal with the problem of SP applying both to itself and to other sociological theories. In addition there is, throughout, a discussion of how rules of inference, methodologies, and philosophical doctrines either apply to SP or are exempt from applying. It is argued that SP must be a severely limited doctrine impotent to make evaluative claims about the worth of any theory, including itself.     

Surface form and memory in question answering

Speakers tend to repeat materials from previous talk. This tendency is experimentally established and manipulated in various question-answering situations. It is shown that a question's surface form can affect the format of the answer given, even if this form has little semantic or conversational consequence, as in the pair Q: (At) what time do you close. A: “(At)five o'clock.” Answerers tend to match the utterance to the prepositional (nonprepositional) form of the question. This “correspondence effect” may diminish or disappear when, following the question, additional verbal material is presented to the answerer. The experiments show that neither the articulatory buffer nor long-term memory is normally involved in this retention of recent speech. Retaining recent speech in working memory may fulfill a variety of functions for speaker and listener, among them the correct production and interpretation of surface anaphora. Reusing recent materials may, moreover, be more economical than regenerating speech anew from a semantic base, and thus contribute to fluency. But the realization of this strategy requires a production system in which linguistic formulation can take place relatively independent of, and parallel to, conceptual planning.     

The science question in intelligent design

Intelligent Design creationism is often criticized for failing to be science because it falls afoul of some demarcation criterion between science and non-science. This paper argues that this objection to Intelligent Design is misplaced because it assumes that a consistent non-theological characterization of Intelligent Design is possible. In contrast, it argues that, if Intelligent Design is taken to be non-theological doctrine, it is not intelligible. Consequently, a demarcation criterion cannot be used to judge its status. This position has the added advantage of providing reasons to reject Intelligent Design creationism without invoking potentially philosophically controversial demarcation criteria.     

Reframing the question of forbidden knowledge for modern science

In this paper I use the concept of forbidden knowledge to explore questions about putting limits on science. Science has generally been understood to seek and produce objective truth, and this understanding of science has grounded its claim to freedom of inquiry. What happens to decision making about science when this claim to objective, disinterested truth is rejected? There are two changes that must be made to update the idea of forbidden knowledge for modern science. The first is to shift from presuming that decisions to constrain or even forbid knowledge can be made from a position of omniscience (perfect knowledge) to recognizing that such decisions made by human beings are made from a position of limited or partial knowledge. The second is to reject the idea that knowledge is objective and disinterested and accept that knowledge (even scientific knowledge) is interested. In particular, choices about what knowledge gets created are normative, value choices. When these two changes are made to the idea of forbidden knowledge, questions about limiting or forbidding lines of inquiry are shown to distract attention from the more important matters of who makes and how decisions are made about what knowledge is produced. Much more attention should be focused on choosing directions in science, and as this is done, the matter of whether constraints should be placed on science will fall into place.     

What you get out of memory depends on the question you ask

Following study, participants received 2 tests. The 1st was a recognition test; the 2nd was designed to tap recollection. The objective was to examine performance on Test 1 conditional on Test 2 performance. In Experiment 1, contrary to process dissociation assumptions, exclusion errors better predicted subsequent recollection than did inclusion errors. In Experiments 2 and 3, with alternate questions posed on Test 2, words having high estimates of recollection with one question had high estimates of familiarity with the other question. Results supported the following: (a) the 2-test procedure has considerable potential for elucidating the relationship between recollection and familiarity; (b) there is substantial evidence for dependency between such processes when estimates are obtained using the process dissociation and remember-know procedures; and (c) order of information access appears to depend on the question posed to the memory system.     

Metacognitive effects of initial question difficulty on subsequent memory performance

In two experiments, we examined whether relative retrieval fluency (the relative ease or difficulty of answering questions from memory) would be translated, via metacognitive monitoring and control processes, into an overt effect on the controlled behavior—that is, the decision whether to answer a question or abstain. Before answering a target set of multiple-choice general-knowledge questions (intermediate-difficulty questions in Exp. 1, deceptive questions in Exp. 2), the participants first answered either a set of difficult questions or a set of easy questions. For each question, they provided a forced-report answer, followed by a subjective assessment of the likelihood that their answer was correct (confidence) and by a free-report control decision—whether or not to report the answer for a potential monetary bonus (or penalty). The participants’ ability to answer the target questions (forced-report proportion correct) was unaffected by the initial question difficulty. However, a predicted metacognitive contrast effect was observed: When the target questions were preceded by a set of difficult rather than easy questions, the participants were more confident in their answers to the target questions, and hence were more likely to report them, thus increasing the quantity of freely reported correct information. The option of free report was more beneficial after initial question difficulty than after initial question ease, in terms of both the gain in accuracy (Exp. 2) and a smaller cost in quantity (Exps. 1 and 2). These results demonstrate that changes in subjective experience can influence metacognitive monitoring and control, thereby affecting free-report memory performance independently of forced-report performance.     

Wilhelm Windelband and the problem of relativism

This paper analyzes the shifts in Wilhelm Windelband’s ‘critical philosophy of values’ as it developed hand in hand with his understanding of relativism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by analyzing the role that relativism played in his philosophical project, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Windelband's intellectual development in the context of historicism and Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, by highlighting Windelband’s contribution to the understanding of relativism, it sheds light on an important episode in the history of that problem. The paper distinguishes between three phases in Windelband’s thinking and shows that his views about relativism changed in close connection with his conception of history. The early Windelband thought that historicism was compatible with absolute validity because he was firmly convinced of historical progress. The mature Windelband rejected progress as a means for justifying validity and put the problem of relativism into sharp relief. In response to the failure of his mature philosophy to fend off relativism, the later Windelband strengthened the role of history again. The paper concludes that Windelband’s significance lies not in his arguments against relativism, but rather in having furthered philosophical understanding of the problems at stake.     

Historical relativism and the essence of Christianity

This article is a series of reflections by a historian who is also a theologian on some of the theological challenges raised by historicism and the historical study of Christianity. In particular, the question is raised as to whether it is still meaningful to speak of Christianity as having some form of normative “core” given at some point in the past, or an unchanging normative “essence” by which all forms of Christianity can be evaluated. The article begins with a brief look at Adolf von Harnack’s lectures on the essence of Christianity from 1900, before moving into reflections on historical change, relativity and normativity. The author rejects the idea of a religion having an unchanging normative core or essence. Like any other human institution, Christianity has been continually changing and adapting to new contexts, even though its representatives might claim an unchanging continuity. The article concludes with some reflections on the possible contours of a modest theology informed by these historicist reflections.     

The hegemony of the practical in embodied cognitive science and the question of bodily vulnerability

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - When perception is made the subject of philosophy, it is primarily understood as pre-theoretical sensual knowledge, and the question of its truth content...     

Misconduct in science: Controversy and progress

Conclusion It is clear that the concept of scientific misconduct continues to evolve. As always it is the goal of Science and Engineering Ethics to move the discussion forward, to encourage and facilitate discussion of the ethical issues and problems that practicing scientists and engineers encounter in the course of pursuing their professions. This collection of articles and commentaries provides a variety of perspectives that we expect will facilitate communication among and within the groups who must participate in this evolution. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Office of Research Integrity, the Department of Health and Human Services, or any other Federal agency.     

Realism and relativism in modern physics

The standpoint of realism has been widely used to argue in favour of, or against, particular physical theories. An analysis is made of the adequacy of such arguments, taking an argument by Einstein as a starting point.Some reflexions are given on relativism and invariance. Invariances can be seen as generators of both regularity and paradox in physics.Work on this paper was supported by the Swedish Natural Science Research Council (contract no. F-TV 4775-300).     

Cultural relativism and the recognition of cultural differences

The demand for the recognition of cultural differences is central to a number of debates associated with multiculturalism. Following Charles Taylor's analysis of the relation between modernity and cultural pluralism, it is argued that the demand of cultural relativism, namely, that the equal value of cultures should be recognised, is not justifiable. This however should not serve as an excuse for underestimating the significance of cultural differences or for ethnocentric indifference towards the claim for recognition. The prerequisites for claims towards recognition are further explored by distinguishing between two justifiable claims: on the one hand the claim that the right to differ should be recognised and on the other hand the claim that the inherent value of the difference should be recognised. It is argued that the possibilities of granting recognition are in most cases restricted to the first claim. Although the second claim may also be justified, it is in most cases not possible to meet it. The conclusion is that we here encounter an aporetic ground for both cultural critique and intercultural tolerance; in fact a better ground for tolerance than cultural relativism which easily leads to indifference.