Bending perception to desire: Effects of task demands,motivation, and cognitive resources

Determinants of motivated judgments were examined in this research. Three experiments investigated how dominant motivation, biasing difficulty and mental resources combine to produce motivationally congruent judgments. Studies 1 and 2 showed that where a biasing motivation is dominant the presence of resources can augment a motivational bias in judgment. Study 3 replicated that result and showed that resources contribute to the formation of biased judgments only where biasing is difficult to accomplish, but not where it is relatively easy to accomplish. In addition, Study 3 showed that where the accuracy motivation is dominant and biasing is the easy default, unbiased judgments will occur only in the presence (vs. absence) of resources. In contrast, where unbiased judgments are easy to come by, such judgments occur irrespective of resources.     

Instrumental Bias in Motivated Reasoning: More When More Is Needed

Decision makers must often make judgments in an environment in which they have a strong motivation to reach a particular conclusion. While normative theory would indicate that they should use available information to make their most accurate judgment without being influenced by the conclusion or outcome it may imply, evidence from the social judgment literature suggests that motivation does bias the judgment process. Specifically, decision makers motivated to support a particular conclusion tend to adopt information processing strategies most likely to yield the desired conclusion. We propose and empirically demonstrate two extensions to the motivation literature. First, we argue that motivated reasoning isinstrumental,meaning motivated decision makers bias their judgments more or less as needed to support the desired conclusion, subject to “reasonableness” constraints. Second, we propose that motivated decision makers exhibitconfidence bolsteringand thereby remain at least as confident as non-motivated decision makers in their biased estimates. We illustrate that motivated subjects even report confidence in utilizing these estimates outside the original motivating context. We investigate motivational effects within a business context involving forecasting, strategic decision making, and new product introductions. We explore the impact of motivation on quantitative forecasts and estimates, rather than on social judgments and perceptions. In addition, we go a step beyond the judgment phase to demonstrate that motivation influences choice.     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.     

Rational learning and information sampling: on the "naivety" assumption in sampling explanations of judgment biases

Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are "naive": They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this "naivety" assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Direct-comparison judgments: when and why above- and below-average effects reverse

Above-average and below-average effects appear to be common and consistent across a variety of judgment domains. For example, several studies show that individual items from a high- (low-) quality set tend to be rated as better (worse) than the other items in the set (e.g., E. E. Giladi & Y. Klar, 2002). Experiments in this article demonstrate reversals of these effects. A novel account is supported, which describes how the timing of the denotation of the to-be-judged item influences attention and ultimately affects the size or direction of comparative biases. The authors discuss how this timing account is relevant for many types of referent-dependent judgments (e.g., probability judgments, resource allocations) and how it intersects with various accounts of comparative bias (focalism, generalized-group, compromise between local and general standards [LOGE]).     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Accuracy and Bias in Social Perception Research

How do perceivers make accurate social judgments? A substantial amount of evidence suggests that perceivers' judgments are often quite accurate even when they do not have direct access to the truth, in part because they make judgments through biased processes. In the present article, we examine the dynamic relationship between bias and accuracy in social perception research. We outline how bias and accuracy are theoretically and empirically distinct processes and describe the importance (and difficulty) of defining and measuring both truth variables and bias variables in order to make empirical conclusions in accuracy research. Additionally, we examine how both bias variables (e.g., stereotypes, perceivers' own beliefs) and truth variables exert an influence on how perceivers make social judgments, as well as the extent to which judgments are accurate. Lastly, we provide steps that researchers can take in order to examine the relationship between bias and accuracy in their own research.     

Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment

Human judgment and decision making is distorted by an array of cognitive, perceptual and motivational biases. Recent evidence suggests that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment - except when that bias is their own. Aside from the general motive to self-enhance, two primary sources of this 'bias blind spot' have been identified. One involves people's heavy weighting of introspective evidence when assessing their own bias, despite the tendency for bias to occur nonconsciously. The other involves people's conviction that their perceptions directly reflect reality, and that those who see things differently are therefore biased. People's tendency to deny their own bias, even while recognizing bias in others, reveals a profound shortcoming in self-awareness, with important consequences for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation

Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational.     

Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation of Responsibility Judgments

This article analyzes the process through which partisan bias arises during the formation of citizens' judgments of political responsibility. Informed by theories of motivated political reasoning, it argues that exposure to partisan cues motivates partisans to pursue directional goals, goals which bias the cognitive processing of information and, in turn, overall judgments of responsibility. It further argues that the nature of this biased processing will be such that partisans devalue information inconsistent with their partisan affect. Using a pair of experiments, I test these hypotheses by manipulating both objective evidence concerning gubernatorial responsibility for a state's fiscal imbalance and the presence of partisan cues. Findings support both sets of expectations. The results also suggest that the effects of partisan bias are greater in judgments tied to institutional actions than in those tied to institutional roles and expectations.     

The ideologically objectionable premise model: Predicting biased political judgments on the left and right

This paper introduces the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), which predicts that biased political judgments will emerge on both the political left and right, but only when the premise of a judgment is not ideologically objectionable to the perceiver. The IOPM generates three hypothesized patterns of bias: biases among both those on the left and right, bias only among those on the right, and bias only among those on the left. These hypotheses were tested within the context of the dual process motivational model of ideological attitudes (DPM; Duckitt, 2001), which posits that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are related but distinct ideological attitudes. Across two studies, all three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported on the RWA ideological attitude dimension, and two of the three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported on the SDO dimension. These findings indicate that the context of the judgment is an important determinant of whether biases emerge in political judgment.     

The effects of visual conspicuousness and the concept of randomness on the recognition of randomness in sequences

In a number of studies, tendencies toward nonrepetition in judgments of randomness of visually presented sequences of events have been attributed to a biased concept of randomness. The present study proposed that such bias is due to "bottom-up" visual processes rather than a concept of randomness. Experiment 1 showed that judgments of randomness were less biased when repetitions were made less conspicuous by increasing the distance between adjacent items. Experiment 2 produced comparable results for increasing dissimilarity of categorically identical items. A third experiment showed that the bias in the judgment task was not related to a more direct measure of knowledge of random processes, the assignment of probabilities of repetition to imagined random sequences. The results supported the view that judgments of randomness are determined to a high degree by the conspicuousness of repetitions and are independent of the concept of randomness.     

When mutations meet motivations: Attitude biases in counterfactual thought

The present research examines whether existing attitudes can spontaneously bias the content and direction of generated counterfactual thoughts, and whether these thoughts influence subsequent attitude-relevant judgments. Two experimental studies demonstrate that attitudes can bias the content of counterfactual thoughts, and that these biased thoughts in turn predict polarized attitudes. These effects were obtained regardless of whether explicit instructions for counterfactual generation were given. Furthermore, both studies demonstrate that these effects are mediated by judgments of future likelihood. Implications of these results for theories of counterfactual thinking and persuasion are discussed.     

Reducing bias in frequency judgment by improving source monitoring

A common finding in judgment and decision making is that people's frequency judgments often fail to map onto objective frequencies. The present research examined the possibility that one source of bias in frequency judgment is attributable to people's inability to screen out irrelevant memory traces. We used a two-list source-monitoring paradigm to investigate whether frequency judgments are influenced by "extra-experimental" experiences and whether enhancing source monitoring improves judgment accuracy. Across four experiments we found: (1) frequency judgments regarding one list were biased by the second, (2) manipulating encoding between lists improved source monitoring and resulted in more accurate judgments, (3) manipulating item context between lists improved source monitoring and resulted in more accurate judgments, but only when the context was item specific, and (4) manipulating simple-background context between lists was ineffective at improving source monitoring.     

Task bias and the accuracy of judgment: Setting a baseline for expected group performance

When a judgment task evokes unbiased estimates (i.e. the errors in individual judgments are distributed randomly around the true value), mathematical aggregation of individual estimates, even by a simple arithmetic mean, often will outperform all group members. However, when a task evokes biased estimates, mathematical aggregation does not perform so well. In this study, simulated data were accumulated to specify the expected' accuracy of mathematical aggregation relative to the accuracy of observed judgment of individual group members under varying conditions of task bias. Three types of judgment tasks were employed: (1) single-estimate, holistic tasks, (2) multiple-estimate, ranking tasks, and (3) multi-cue, decomposed tasks. Findings indicated across all task types that a large percentage of judgment-making group estimates formed strictly by computing the arithmetic mean of individual estimates performed better than their most capable members when a judgment task evoked little or no bias, a result particularly pronounced for ranking tasks. When the task was more greatly bias-evoking, a large percentage of parallel groups performed more poorly than average (or median) members, again a pattern more starkly evident for ranking tasks. These results suggest that the extent to which a judgment task evokes bias in a population of prospective group members is an important explanatory variable deserving much greater attention in the study of group performance. For example, an assertion about the efficacy of a particular group intervention based on a reliable demonstration of group performance as accurate as the most capable members may be unfounded when a task evokes no bias, since the baseline standard under such conditions should be much higher. By selecting tasks and populations that jointly produced highly biased estimates, researchers can lower the performance floor enough to detect (with reasonably small samples of groups) experimental effects should they occur.     

Metaperceptions of bias in intimate relationships

Meta-awareness of bias in intimate partner judgments was investigated in 3 studies. In Study 1, participants rated fictional partners in happier relationships as more positively biased in their partner perceptions. In Study 2, participants thought their judgments of their own current partners were positively biased and that they were judged by their partners in a positively biased fashion. Using a sample of couples, Study 3 showed that metaperceptions of bias were anchored to actual levels of bias at the individual and relationship levels. In addition, positive bias was accentuated for traits that were more relevant to mate evaluation. These findings (as expected) suggest that positive bias in partner judgments can be a normative and consciously accessible feature of intimate relationships.     

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

Biased judgments of the effects of speed change on travel time,fuel consumption and braking: Individual differences in the use of simplifying rules producing the same biases

The main purpose of this study was to identify different cognitive rules that lead to a particular judgment bias. To fulfill this purpose, a new method Spectral analysis was introduced and applied. Participants judged time saved by driving faster, fuel saved by replacing a car and braking capacity at different speeds. These problems invite the time saving bias (e.g., time saved from speed increases at higher speeds overestimated), the miles per gallon, MPG illusion (misjudgment of fuel saved by replacing a car) and the braking capacity bias (overestimation of braking capacity after speed increase). The average results replicated the biases. Spectral analysis of individual participants and problems showed that a speed difference rule explained about half of the time saving judgments and about three fourth of the MPG judgments. A difference between speeds rule described about one third of the biased braking judgments and a ratio/proportion rule about one fifth of the time saving and MPG judgments. All rules give biased judgments in all three domains. The paper ends with a discussion of hierarchies of cognitive rules, applications of the results, and how to mitigate or avoid the biases and the risks associated with the biases.