Human recognition memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

For many years the cognitive processes underlying recognition memory have been the subject of considerable interest in experimental psychology. To account for a broad range of behavioral findings, psychologists have put forward a variety of 'dual-process' models, all of which propose that recognition memory is supported by two forms of memory - familiarity and recollection - that differ in their speed of operation and the specificity of the retrieved information. More recently, the dual-process framework has been extended to encompass findings from studies investigating the neural basis of recognition memory. Results from neuropsychological, ERP and functional neuroimaging studies can be accommodated within the framework, and suggest that familiarity and recollection are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.     

Facial expressions of emotion: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Facial expressions are one example of emotional behavior that illustrate the importance of emotions to both basic survival and social interaction. Basic facial responses to stimuli such as sweet and bitter taste are important for species fitness and governed by simple rules. Even at this basic level, facial responses have communicative value to other species members. During evolution simple facial responses were extended for use in more complex nonverbal communications; the responses are labile. The perception and production of facial expressions are cognitive processes and numerous subcortical and cortical areas contribute to these operations. We suggest that no specific emotion center exists over and above cognitive systems in the brain, and that emotion should not be divorced from cognition.     

The emergence of social cognitive neuroscience

Social cognitive neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field of research that seeks to understand phenomena in terms of interactions between 3 levels of analysis: the social level, which is concerned with the motivational and social factors that influence behavior and experience; the cognitive level, which is concerned with the information-processing mechanisms that give rise to social-level phenomena; and the neural level, which is concerned with the brain mechanisms that instantiate cognitive-level processes. The social cognitive neuroscience approach entails conducting studies and constructing theories that make reference to all 3 levels and contrasts with traditional social psychological and cognitive neuroscientific research that primarily makes reference to 2 levels. The authors present an introduction to and analysis of the field by reviewing current research and providing guidelines and suggested directions for future work.     

Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view

The abilities to identify with others and to distinguish between self and other play a pivotal role in intersubjective transactions. Here, we marshall evidence from developmental science, social psychology and neuroscience (including clinical neuropsychology) that support the view of a common representation network (both at the computational and neural levels) between self and other. However, sharedness does not mean identicality, otherwise representations of self and others would completely overlap, and lead to confusion. We argue that self-awareness and agency are integral components for navigating within these shared representations. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in interpersonal awareness.     

Attitudes in social context: A social identity perspective

Research on attitudes and attitude phenomena occupies a central place in social psychology, but tends to focus mainly on cognitive, intra-individual, and interpersonal dimensions. The normative, group membership, and identity dimensions of attitudes tend to attract less attention. This article approaches attitudes from the perspective of research on group processes, intergroup relations, and social identity, and conceptualises attitudes and attitude phenomena in terms of their group normative properties and dynamics. Our perspective is explicitly framed and focused by contemporary social identity theory—a theory that has a great deal to contribute to attitude research, but often does not talk directly about attitudes. We discuss attitudinal influence and change, how people perceive normative attitudes, and how attitudes relate to action.     

Aggression, psychopathy and free will from a cognitive neuroscience perspective

This article considers the notion of free will in the context of aggression and psychopathy research. The philosophical literature is very briefly considered to determine under what assumptions free will can be considered to exist. However, as the issue of free will is very difficult to address directly, the prime focus of this article is on issues raised in the philosophical debate, that may be empirically tractable and that are relevant to the understanding of psychopathy. Specifically, the following issues are considered: (1) The distinction between automatic and controlled processing; (2) Impairment related to automatic processing in individuals with psychopathy; and (3) Impairment related to controlled behavior in individuals with psychopathy. It is concluded that, while there is not a direct mapping of the automatic versus controlled processing dichotomy on to the reactive versus instrumental aggression dichotomy, some overlap can be considered. As such, it is possible to consider that certain episodes of reactive aggression might be considered to occur in the absence of free will. However, instrumental aggression, at least from a compatibilist perspective, must involve free will.     

Effects of alcohol on person perception: a social cognitive neuroscience approach

The acute effects of alcohol on cognitive processing of expectancy violations were investigated using event-related brain potentials and a cued recall task to index attentional and working memory processes associated with inconsistency resolution. As predicted, expectancy-violating behaviors elicited larger late positive potentials (LPP) and were recalled better than expectancy-consistent behaviors. These effects were moderated by alcohol and the valence of initial expectancies. For placebo group participants, positive targets performing negative behaviors elicited the largest LPP responses and were recalled best. For those in the alcohol groups, negative targets behaving positively elicited the largest LPP and recall responses. These findings suggest that alcohol does not globally impair working memory processes in person perception but instead changes the nature of valenced information processing. Findings are discussed in the context of alcohol's effects on working memory processes, reward sensitivity, and the prefrontal cortical structures thought to mediate them.     

A social neuroscience perspective on adolescent risk-taking

This article proposes a framework for theory and research on risk-taking that is informed by developmental neuroscience. Two fundamental questions motivate this review. First, why does risk-taking increase between childhood and adolescence? Second, why does risk-taking decline between adolescence and adulthood? Risk-taking increases between childhood and adolescence as a result of changes around the time of puberty in the brain’s socio-emotional system leading to increased reward-seeking, especially in the presence of peers, fueled mainly by a dramatic remodeling of the brain’s dopaminergic system. Risk-taking declines between adolescence and adulthood because of changes in the brain’s cognitive control system—changes which improve individuals’ capacity for self-regulation. These changes occur across adolescence and young adulthood and are seen in structural and functional changes within the prefrontal cortex and its connections to other brain regions. The differing timetables of these changes make mid-adolescence a time of heightened vulnerability to risky and reckless behavior.     

价值观的稳定性与可变性：基于认知神经科学的视角

价值观的稳定性和可变性一直是该领域争论的焦点所在。近些年来, 研究者开始从认知神经科学的角度来探讨导致价值观稳定性差异的机制问题。已有的神经反应证据表明, 当某种价值观是基于道义主义的绝对规则来进行认知建构的, 或与自我概念在表征上存在一致性时, 其更倾向于保持稳定的状态; 若非如此, 便可能会在外界影响(如他人劝说)下发生重要程度上的改变。未来需要进一步丰富和完善认识价值观稳定性与可变性关系的认知神经加工模型, 并探索价值观长效改变背后的认知神经机制, 以促进理论研究在价值观教育中的实践和应用。     

社会阶层的心理学研究：社会认知视角

社会阶层是心理学研究的一个新的前沿领域,是指由于经济、政治等多种原因而形成的,在社会层次结构中处于不同地位的群体,这些群体之间存在着客观的社会资源（收入、教育和职业）的差异,以及感知到由此造成的社会地位的差异。基于社会认知视角的社会阶层理论认为,处于同一阶层中的个体,由于共享的经历,形成了相对稳定的认知倾向,低阶层者是情境主义的,高阶层是唯我主义的。大量的实证研究进一步证实,环境所导致的认知倾向差异,使得高低阶层这在感知自我、他人和社会的方式存在显著的不同。而阶层的流动性对个体心理与行为的影响以及本土化的社会阶层心理学研究是需要未来深入探索的研究方向。     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

知识经验与顿悟：来自认知神经科学的证据

知识经验对于顿悟问题解决是一把双刃剑,强势知识会阻碍顿悟问题解决,弱势知识才是顿悟问题解决的关键。强势知识引导的组块效应、约束效应和固着效应等心理定势现象,“帮助”问题解决者以惯用方案来理解、思考和解决问题。之所以会这样,可能是因为大脑内存在一套具有优先级差的层级加工系统,赋予惯用方案的优先级最高。不过,惯用方案不仅不能够解决顿悟问题,而且还会通过注意竞争和注意失灵方式来阻碍新异方案的探索和执行,所以,问题解决者往往都会进入思维僵局。僵局的打破和顿悟的实现,需要抑制住强势知识及其相关的惯用方案、激活弱势知识和新异方案,这违反了大脑的认知加工惯性,是很难以自发发生的。但是,可以通过激活扩散来增强弱势知识的激活水平,或者是拓宽注意范围、提高注意灵活性来增加弱势知识激活的可能性,从而促进顿悟问题解决。     

近红外光学成像在社会认知神经科学中的应用

社会认知神经科学是运用认知神经科学的研究手段,探讨社会科学问题与理论的多学科交叉领域。近来,功能性近红外光学成像技术(functional near-infrared spectroscopy,fNIRS)凭借生态效度高、成像安全、对头动耐受性高、成本低等优势,成为了该领域新兴的热点技术。无论是在婴儿发育和社会经济决策的单脑研究中,还是在人际互动的多脑研究中,它都有广泛应用。未来近红外光学成像的应用可以向多脑神经反馈、脑机接口技术、设备无线化和多模态成像做进一步探索。     

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective

A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.     

Developmental cognitive neuroscience: progress and potential

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is an evolving field that investigates the relations between neural and cognitive development. Lying at the intersection of diverse disciplines, work in this area promises to shed light on classic developmental questions, mechanisms subserving developmental change, diagnosis and treatment of developmental disorders, and cognitive and neuroscientific topics traditionally considered outside the domain of development. Fundamental questions include: What are the interrelations between developmental changes in the brain (e.g. in connectivity, chemistry, morphology) and developmental changes in children's behavior and cognitive abilities (e.g. representational complexity, ability to sustain selective attention, speed of processing)? Why, and how, is learning enhanced during certain periods in development? How is our knowledge organized, and how does this change with development? We discuss preliminary investigations of such questions and directions for future work.     

Understanding vulnerability for depression from a cognitive neuroscience perspective: A reappraisal of attentional factors and a new conceptual framework

We propose a framework to understand increases in vulnerability for depression after recurrent episodes that links attention processes and schema activation to negative mood states, by integrating cognitive and neurobiological findings. Depression is characterized by a mood-congruent attentional bias at later stages of information processing. The basic idea of our framework is that decreased activity in prefrontal areas, mediated by the serotonin metabolism which the HPA axis controls, is associated with an impaired attenuation of subcortical regions, resulting in prolonged activation of the amygdala in response to stressors in the environment. Reduced prefrontal control in interaction with depressogenic schemas leads to impaired ability to exert attentional inhibitory control over negative elaborative processes such as rumination, leading in turn to sustained negative affect. These elaborative processes are triggered by the activation of negative schemas after confrontation with stressors. In our framework, attentional impairments are postulated as a crucial process in explaining the increasing vulnerability after depressive episodes, linking cognitive and biological vulnerability factors. We review the empirical data on the biological factors associated with the attentional impairments and detail how they are associated with rumination and mood regulation. The aim of our framework is to stimulate translational research.     

On the relation between theory of mind and executive functioning: A developmental cognitive neuroscience perspective

Theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) show marked interrelatedness across childhood, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in understanding the nature of this association. The present review addresses this issue from a cognitive neuroscience perspective by exploring three hypotheses regarding their functional overlap: (1) ToM relies on EF (EF→ToM); (2) EF relies on ToM (ToM→EF); and (3) ToM and EF are mutually related, owing to shared neural structures or networks (ToM?EF). Drawing on evidence from normative brain development, neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative diseases, patient lesion studies, and brain-imaging studies, we suggest that only a strict version of the ToM?EF proposal of complete neural overlap can be confidently ruled out on the basis of existing evidence. The balance of evidence suggests that separable neurobiological mechanisms likely underlie ToM and EF, with shared mechanisms for domain-general processing that support both abilities. We highlight how future studies may empirically substantiate the nature of the ToM–EF relationship using various biobehavioral approaches.