The emergence of the ability to track a character's mental perspective in narrative

In comprehending stories, adults create mental models from which they follow the actions of the characters from the characters' different mental vantage points. Using a novel methodology, this study is the first to examine when children attain the narrative ability to track the mental perspective of characters. That is, when do children follow the actions of a story to different locations that a character is thinking about? The results of Study 1 demonstrate that this ability is nascent in 3-year-olds but adult-like by age 5. Study 2 demonstrates that 3-year-olds' difficulty is the result of the mention of the character's mental state per se rather than task complexity. Together, these studies shed new light on the development of narrative cognition in humans.     

Executive control within strategic deception: a window on early cognitive development?

Recently it has been claimed that the difficulty young children have with tests of strategic deception may be due to limitations in executive control rather than lack of insight into mental concepts. In the studies reported here we asked how reducing the executive demands of one measure of strategic deception, the windows task (J. Russell, N. Mauthner, S. Sharpe, & T. Tidswell, 1991), would affect performance. Study 1 demonstrated that both providing an artificial response medium and having children play in partnership enabled 3-year-olds to adopt a successful strategy. Study 2 examined whether social or executive factors accounted for the good performance of children when they played in partnership. Study 3 ruled out the possibility that the effectiveness of the artificial media was a result of reducing social intimidation-the manipulations were effective even in the presence the opponent. These results argue for executive factors playing a substantial role in the development of strategic deception.     

Young children's awareness of socially mediated rejection of food: Why is food dropped at the table “dirty”?

We sometimes drop food at mealtimes. Once dropped, the food becomes dirty or inedible not only in a physical but also in a social sense. Even without physical contact with contaminants, we may not eat fallen food in some social contexts, e.g., a high-quality restaurant. Such thinking is referred here as “socially mediated rejection.” In Study 1, Japanese children were observed during mealtimes at home and at school. Even 2-year-olds reacted to fallen food differently between at school and home. In Study 2, 4- and 6-year-olds and adults were presented several stories in an experiment, and were asked to predict the story character's bodily and emotional reactions to eating fallen food. Preschoolers noticed that physically contaminated food would cause bodily harm more than socially rejected food.     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

Emergence of representational activity during the early drawing stage: process analysis

This study analyzed the process underlying the emergence of representational drawing. Eighty-seven children aged 1–3 years were asked to color or draw either a simple picture (P) or a contour for an object (DC) in a shared task. After that, they were asked to draw their mother on a blank sheet of paper in a no drawn contour task (NC). Whereas 1½- and 2-year-olds were more successful in the P task than in the DC task, the 2½- and 3-year-olds were successful in both. The 2-year-olds were better in the DC than the NC task. The results show that 1½- and 2-year-olds can extract the component parts of a drawing even though they cannot produce them and children over 2½ years old can organize these components into a drawing by themselves. These findings indicate that representational drawing is based on the extraction of the component parts and the acquisition of the drawing ability to combine the parts into a drawing and that the beginnings of representational drawing are found in 1½- and 2-year-old children.     

Executive and theory-of-mind contributions to event-based prospective memory in children: exploring the self-projection hypothesis

In two studies, 4- to 6-year-olds were asked to name pictures of animals for the benefit of a watching hand puppet (the ongoing task) but to refrain from naming and to remove from view any pictures of dogs (the prospective memory [PM] task). Children also completed assessments of verbal ability, cognitive inhibition, working memory, and false-belief understanding (both studies), empathy (Study 1 only), and performance on false-sign tests that matched the false-belief tests in narrative content and structure (Study 2 only). Both studies found that inhibition and false-belief performance made unique contributions to the variance in PM, although in Study 1 the influence of inhibition was evident only when children needed to withhold naming. Study 2 further demonstrated that false-belief performance was the only reliable predictor of whether children remembered to return to the researcher an object that had been loaned to them prior to the picture-naming game. Both experiments uncovered moderate relations between PM and chronological age, but such relations were rarely significant after taking account of cognitive ability. We consider the implications of the findings for (a) current views regarding frontal/executive contributions to PM development and (b) the suggestion that the same brain network underlies various forms of mental self-projection, including envisioning the future and understanding the minds of other people.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children's explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N=24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant "explanation advantage" for children's reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

The development of afterlife beliefs in religiously and secularly schooled children

Children aged from 4;10 to 12;9 attending either a Catholic school or a public, secular school in an eastern Spanish city observed a puppet show in which a mouse was eaten by an alligator. Children were then asked questions about the dead mouse's biological and psychological functioning. The pattern of results generally replicated that obtained earlier in an American sample, with older children being more apt to state that functions cease after death than younger children (11- to 12-year-olds > 8- to 9-year-olds > 5- to 6-year-olds), and all children being more likely to attribute epistemic, desire, and emotion states to the dead mouse than biological, psychobiological, and perceptual states. Although children attending Catholic school were generally more likely to state that functions continue after death than children attending secular school, the pattern of change with regard to question type did not differ between the Catholic and secular groups. The results were interpreted as reflecting the combined roles of religious instruction/exposure and universal ontogeny of cognitive abilities on the development of children's afterlife beliefs.     

Children's use of mental state information in selecting persuasive arguments

Whether and when children use information about others' mental states to invent or select persuasive strategies were examined. In Study 1, preschoolers, 3rd-graders, and 6th-graders (ns = 11, 12, and 16, respectively; 17 girls) were told about story characters' persuading parents to buy pets or toys. Children were either given or not given information about story parents' beliefs and asked to invent or select appropriate arguments. Older children, but not preschoolers, used belief information to select arguments. Results were replicated in Study 2 (16 kindergartners, 16 3rd-graders; 19 girls). In Study 3, kindergartners and 1st-graders (N = 16; 6 girls) reasoned well on false-belief tasks but not on persuasion tasks, suggesting that failure to consider mental states in persuasion was not due to lack of a belief concept. Findings suggest that mental state understanding may continue to develop after the preschool years; methodological qualifications are also considered.     

Factors affecting children's graphic symbol use in the third year: Language,similarity, and iconicity

The question addressed in this study is whether the claim that children understand the symbolic status of pictures by the middle of their third year is an overestimate of their ability. Specifically, we asked whether children use language if possible to facilitate their performance in graphic symbolic tasks. Language (availability of verbal labels) was manipulated along with iconicity (degree of resemblance between symbol and referent) and perceptual similarity (between choice items) in a series of four experiments. Children 2.5 and 3 years old were presented with a graphic symbol for 4 s and immediately asked to choose the object depicted (referent) from two choice objects. In Study 1, degree of iconicity between picture and referent was varied and both choice objects had the same verbal label. The 2.5-year-olds failed to use any pictures or replicas as symbols. The 3-year-olds performed well with all types of symbols and better with highly iconic symbols. In Study 2, verbal label availability was manipulated by presenting choice objects having the same or different labels and by varying familiarity of labels. The 2.5-year-olds performed at chance when verbal labels were unavailable but above chance when they were available. The 3-year-olds were above chance in all conditions but performed less well when verbal labels were unavailable. Study 3 confirmed that young children use language to mediate picture symbol use. When 2.5-year-olds were provided with subordinate verbal labels in the matching task, subsequent performance was good even when choice objects had the same basic level verbal label. In Study 4, verbal label availability was contrasted with perceptual similarity between choice objects. When verbal labels could be used and choice objects were dissimilar, performance was best, and when verbal labels could not be used and choice objects were similar, it was worst. The results suggest that children's developing understanding of the symbolic function of pictures is tenuous in the third year, and is supported by their use of verbal labels.     

Development of mental rotation in 3- to 5-year-old children

We assessed 3- to 5-year-olds’ mental rotation abilities using a new puzzle paradigm. It allows for assessment of mental rotation abilities in children younger than 5 years, using a task comparable to ones used with older children and adults. Children saw pairs of asymmetrical ghost figures, either as three-dimensional cut-outs or two-dimensional paper versions, in seven orientations. One of the ghosts fit into a hole if rotated right-side up – the other ghost was its mirror image and would not fit. Children were asked to turn the ghosts in their heads and choose the one that would fit into the hole. The number of children who chose the correct ghost above chance in the three-dimensional version of the task increased dramatically from 10% of 3-year-olds to 95% of 5-year-olds; average accuracy also increased significantly, from 54% to 83%. The two-dimensional paper version yielded similar results. These results indicate considerable development in mental rotation between 3 and 5 years.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children’s explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N = 24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant “explanation advantage” for children’s reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Source monitoring reduces the suggestibility of preschool children

The relation between source monitoring and suggestibility was examined among preschool children. Thirty-two 3- to 5-year-olds were simultaneously presented with a brief story in two different modalities, as a silent video vignette and a spoken narrative. Each modality presented unique information about the story, but the information in the two versions was mutually compatible. The children were then asked a series of questions, including questions about the source (modality) of story details, and leading questions about story details (to assess suggestibility). Performance on the source-monitoring questions was highly correlated with the ability to resist suggestion. In addition, children who were asked source-monitoring questions prior to leading questioning were less susceptible to suggestion than were those who were asked the leading questions first. This study provides evidence that source monitoring can play a causal role in reducing the suggestibility of preschool children.     

Children's understandings of the attributes of life

Previous investigations of children's understandings of the life concept have focused on their classifications of the life status of familiar objects. In this study, we attempted to examine more directly the processes by which children infer life status by examining their reasoning about unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things to establish which attributes they associated most closely with life. Children age 7 and younger most often named attributes true only of animals but not of plants; older children more often named attributes true of both animals and plants. However, movement was the single attribute cited most frequently by children of all ages tested. In Experiment 2, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were presented information about attributes of imaginary objects on a distant planet and were asked to infer if those objects were alive. Again, young children relied relatively heavily on qualities true only of animals but not of plants, whereas older children relied more on attributes true of both plants and animals. Also as before, movement was viewed as indicative of life at all ages tested. In Experiment 3, we examined the hypothesis that children discriminate among different types of motion and that the types of motion they associate with life are in fact typical of living things. Children ranging from age 5 through 11 were found to discriminate among different types of motion and to infer that objects were alive only when they showed the types of motion typical of living beings. The results of Experiment 3 allowed interpretation of seemingly conflicting results that have arisen in previous studies, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study.     

Neuroscience and Brain Death Controversies: The Elephant in the Room

The conception and the determination of brain death continue to raise scientific, legal, philosophical, and religious controversies. While both the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1981 and the President’s Council on Bioethics in 2008 committed to a biological definition of death as the basis for the whole-brain death criteria, contemporary neuroscientific findings augment the concerns about the validity of this biological definition. Neuroscientific evidentiary findings, however, have not yet permeated discussions about brain death. These findings have critical relevance (scientifically, medically, legally, morally, and religiously) because they indicate that some core assumptions about brain death are demonstrably incorrect, while others lack sufficient evidential support. If behavioral unresponsiveness does not equate to unconsciousness, then the philosophical underpinning of the definition based on loss of capacity for consciousness as well as the criteria, and tests in brain death determination are incongruent with empirical evidence. Thus, the primary claim that brain death equates to biological death has then been de facto falsified. This conclusion has profound philosophical, religious, and legal implications that should compel respective authorities to (1) reassess the philosophical rationale for the definition of death, (2) initiate a critical reappraisal of the presumed alignment of brain death with the theological definition of death in Abrahamic faith traditions, and (3) enact new legislation ratifying religious exemption to death determination by neurologic criteria.     

Deception by young children following noncompliance

A paradigm devised by M. Lewis, C. Stanger, and M. W. Sullivan (1989) was adapted to study deception and false-belief understanding. In Study 1, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to touch a toy in the experimenter's absence. Just over half of the children touched the toy, and of those children, the majority denied having done so. Of control children who were given permission to touch the toy, all touched it and admitted having done so. In Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to look in a box to identify its contents. Almost all children looked, most denied having looked, and a minority consistently feigned ignorance of the contents. False-belief understanding was linked to denial of looking but not to feigning ignorance. Of control children who were given permission to look, all acknowledged looking, and they almost always revealed their knowledge of the contents. The studies confirm that preschoolers deceive in the context of a minor misdemeanor but are less effective at feigning ignorance.     

Facing the Beyond: Experiences,Metaphors, and Spiritualities of the Afterlife

Unlike religious versions of the afterlife which promulgate notions of heaven and hell, spiritualities of the afterlife promote the idea of self-transformation in post-physical conditions. These spiritualities are more concerned with the meaning of self-authentication beyond death than with the moral conception of a salvationary future. In this respect, the extraordinary experiences claimed by proponents of the near-death and dream-travel phenomenon provide a class of data that support the redefinition of the self in its quest to confront death as a means to reach a ‘higher self’.     

School Aged Children’s Experiences 7 and 13 Months Following a Sibling’s Death

This study described 6-year to 12-year-old children’s responses 7 and 13 months after siblings’ NICU/PICU/ED death. Using semi-structured interviews, at 7 months, children were asked about events around their sibling’s death. At both 7 and 13 months, children were asked about their thoughts and feelings about the deceased, concerns or fears, and life changes since the death. Thirty one children (58% female), recruited from four South Florida hospitals and Florida obituaries, participated. Children’s mean age was 8.4 years; 64.5% were Black, 22.5% Hispanic, 13% White. Interviews were analyzed using conventional content analysis. Resulting themes: circumstances of the death, burial events, thinking about and talking to the deceased sibling, fears, and life changes. Most children knew their sibling’s cause of death, attended funeral/memorials, thought about and talked to their deceased sibling, reported changes in family and themselves over the 13 months. Fears (something happening to themselves, parents, other siblings—death, cancer, being snatched away) decreased from 7 to 13 months especially in 7-year to 9-year-olds. Seven-year to 9-year-olds reported the greatest change in themselves from 7 to 13 months. More Black children and girls thought about the deceased and reported more changes in themselves over the 13 months. School aged children thought about and talked with their deceased sibling, reported changes in themselves and their family and their fears decreased over the first 13 months after their sibling’s death     

Children's understanding of the Ulysses conflict

Two studies explored children's understanding of how the presence of conflicting mental states in a single mind can lead people to act so as to subvert their own desires. Study 1 analyzed explanations by children (4--7 years) and adults of behaviors arising from this sort of 'Ulysses conflict' and compared them with their understanding of conflicting desires in different minds, as well as with changes of mind within an individual across time. The data revealed that only the adults were able to adequately explain the Ulysses conflict. Study 2 asked children (4--7 years) and adults to choose among three explicitly presented competing explanations for self-subverting behaviors. The results suggest that an understanding of the influence of conflicting mental states on behaviors does not occur until at least 7 years of age.     

“They Danced Around in My Head and I Learned Them”: Children's Developing Conceptions of Learning

Two studies examined how 3–6-year-olds understand the process of learning. In study 1 examined how children spontaneously talk about learning via a CHILDES language analysis. Talk about the learning process increased between the ages of 3–5. Talk specifically about learning in terms of desire decreased during this period. This suggests the possibility that desire is important to children's initial understanding of learning, and children develop an understanding that various mental states including desire, attention, and intention, play a role in the learning process. In Study 2, we presented 4- and 6-year-olds with a set of stories designed to test their understanding of the role of these mental states. In both their judgments about whether someone learns and their justifications of their responses, younger children relied more on the character's desires whereas older children were more likely to integrate desire, attention, and intention together. These data suggest that children's understanding of the process of learning is developing during the early elementary school years.